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I. In twentieth century Protestant theology there has been a loss of ontological
distinction between the Church and the world. By this is meant a distinction in
being, in essence. That this is so is demonstrated by an analysis of four major
theologians.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, holding that reality is restructured in Christ, the
Incarnate One, raised the question about his concrete place in the world. By
following out the implications of his Lutheran incarnationalism, he in the end
answered that the whole world is the place of restructured reality. The result
is a dissolution of the sacred-profane distinction. God has fully entered the
reality of this world, and this world fully participates in the reality of God.
Paul Tillich sought to protect the radical otherness of God. By defining God as
'being-itself,' however, he ironically was left with a thorough-going immanentalism.
His ontology swept away the distinctions between God and humanity, faith and dis¬
belief, the Church and the world. Wolfhart Pannenberg's concern is for wholeness.
In Christ, we learn that God is the power of the future. This means that the
future is both the beginning and the end: all things flow out of the future, and
toward it, in an unbroken circle of historical events. Thus, Pannenberg has little
room for sin and its consequent brokenness. Jtfrgen Moltmann extrapolates know¬
ledge of the eschaton from the 'inner tendency' of the Christ event. The Cross
teaches that God has taken all death into his being, and the resurrection reveals
that God lives for all and will grant universal life. He contends for the
eschatological determination of essence, and thus, since all reality will auto¬
matically share a common future, we are left with the implication that all present
reality has the same being.
II. Therefore, with Bonhoeffer and Tillich the problem to be encountered is that
of immanentalism, and with Pannenberg and Moltmann, universalism.
The idea of the Holy offers a way to understand the proper relation between
God and the world in sin, and therefore also the relation between the Church and
the world. The holiness of God refers to his absolute distinction from all else.
Yet, inasmuch as the content of his being is revealed in Jesus Christ, his otherness
is revealed as precisely the overcoming of the distance between himself and sinful
humanity. His holiness is the uniqueness of his love in Jesus Christ. Therefore,
God radically transcends the world through the grace of his love for the world.
The Church is holy because God is holy. Constituted in Christ, it has its
being through the free act of holiness. Since it has this in grace, it confesses
the fact of sin, and will not count on an automatic, universal salvation, nor will
it look to an abstractly idealized future, but only to Christ, trusting the freedom
of his grace. And the Church is holy as God is holy. Participating in the being
of Christ, it is holy in that it is ontologically distinct from the world in its love
and self-giving for the world.
Karl Berth's theology provides a model which adequately accounts for the notion
of holiness. Structured around the fact of God's revelation in Christ, it is
trinitarian throughout: God the Father speaks his Word in Christ the Son, and
through the Holy Spirit empowers subjective human response. The Church for Barth is
set apart from the world as the community of those who hear and gratefully respond
to the reconciliation of God in Christ.
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Introduction
According to John's Gospel, the evening before Jesus'
death was an intimate time of communion for Jesus and his little
band of followers. Just prior to Judas' betrayal, the arrest,
and all the horror of the crucifixion that followed, Jesus
interceded with the Father on behalf of his disciples. This high-
priestly prayer is made poignant by its place in the calm before
the storm in which all heaven and hell breaks loose in the final,
eternal conflict between the love of God and the forces of evil.
In a dramatic silence, pregnant with the soul deafening sounds
of the march of history nearing its climax, Jesus opened the
chambers of his heart and invited his friends into his secret
closet of prayer. What was his concern in that high and holy
hour? His thought was for his disciples and their relationship
with the world:
I do not pray that thou shouldst take
them out of the world, but that thou
shouldst keep them from the evil one.
They are not of the world. Sanctify
them in the truth; thy word is truth.
As thou didst send me into the world,
so I have sent them into the world. 1
Jesus' prayer was not that his disciples would be taken out
of the world, for he had sent them into the world. His prayer
was that they would be preserved from the evil one, because they
are not of the world. The disciples' situation: in the world,
1 John 17:15-18. All biblical references quoted in this
thesis will be from the Revised Standard Version
unless otherwise noted.
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but not of the world; plunged into a river of human events in
which they must forever swim against the current; commissioned
as Christ's ambassadors in a foreign land.
From that time on, the followers of Christ have been faced
with the constantly contemporary problem of how best to under¬
stand, and live according to, their proper relationship with the
world. If at times the Church has perhaps been too isolated
from the world, voices have been raised calling the Church back
into the world; and if the Church has at other times been allied
too closely with the world, others have sounded forth the
summons for the Church to return to its true distinctiveness.
This thesis is concerned with this Church-world relationship;
specifically, . with the nature of the distinction between them.
In Part I, I will argue that there has been, in twentieth
century Protestant theology, a loss of ontological distinction
between the Church and the world, and in Part II, I will suggest
a re-examination of the biblical concept of holiness - God's and
the Church's - and contend, on the basis of it, that the tendency
to dissolve the ontological differences between the Church and
the world is unacceptable.
What does the phrase 'ontological distinction' denote?
By this I mean a distinction in being, in fundamental essence.
My concern is not with the more obvious differences: that the
Church gathers to worship, is nourished by the Word and Sacraments,
lives charitably in the world, is true enough and certainly
important, but not the central issue for this thesis. Nor does
my interest lie in the uniqueness of the inner subjectivity of
the Church, whether from the viewpoint of the experiences of
individual members or its collective self-consciousness. This
study, rather, intends to point to an objective difference in
essence between the Church and the world.
My argument is two-pronged. First, I will contend that
modern Protestant theology has tended to minimize an important
distinction in being between the People of God and those who are
not the People of God. To demonstrate this, I will call upon
the theologies of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Paul Tillich, Wolfhart
Pannenberg, and Jurgen Moltmann. I am only secondarily concerned
about what these theologians have written directly about the
Church; of far greater importance are their theological form¬
ulations as a whole. While these have not necessarily aimed
to minimize the ontological distinction between the Church' and
the world, such has been, in my judgment, their indirect consequence.
Therefore, I will attempt to outline with broad strokes the basic
structure of each of these theologies, and as the shapes and contours
emerge, show the implications of each for the Church-world
relationship.
Secondly, by underscoring the biblical notion of holiness,
I will seek to demonstrate how problematical this tendency is in
«
recent theology. It is my conviction that the Church is objectively
rooted, through faith, in a Being distinct from the world; that is,
it is grounded in the God of holiness. In fellowship with him,
iv
through Jesus Christ and in the power of his Spirit, the Church
itself is made holy, objectively distinct from the world. My
2
theological ally at this point will be Karl Barth.
The aim of the second part of this thesis is not to provide
solutions for all the theological problems raised in the first
part; space alone renders this an impossibility. And neither
is it my desire to set up Barth as the final authority on all
the theological questions of this century. Rather, I hope to
show, at very least, that the tendency to minimize the ontological
distinction between the Church and the world is problematical,
and also to offer - if only in a basic and brief way - an
approach to the Church-world relationship which sacrifices neither
the Church's distinction from the world, nor its relevance in
the world. Karl Barth is called upon as a friendly witness
whose ideas support my position because of the unavoidable
fact of his powerful presence in this century's debates, and
because it would be foolhardy to neglect such help when it is
available.
2 It is perhaps worth noting that in the original outline
of this thesis I had intended to criticize Barth along
with the others in Part I, basing my position on the
rather standard arguments that he is an a-historical
universalist. However, after months of being submerged
in Barth's works, I came to the conclusion that I was
wrong, as also were his critics. I discovered that
while Barth may not be free from all criticism (what
theologiam is?), he is nevertheless innocent of the
charges I was making against him. Thus he became an
ally rather than a foe.
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In any theological journey, many interesting problems
emerge that seem to plead for further elucidation. The little
back alleys may easily be ignored, but only with difficulty can
one get across the broad thoroughfares that intersect one's way -
the important theological questions that emerge and threaten
to halt all progress until they are answered. Given the
necessary breadth of this study, we will be particularly vulnerable
to this problem. But as I have tried to write with a destination
in mind, so the reader would be well advised to keep constantly
before him (or her) the central questions: Has modern theology
lost the ontological distinction between the Church and the
world? If so, is this acceptable in light of the biblical notion
of holiness? If our journey will not be straight, but often
wind tortuously through the nuances and implications of very
complex theological systems, I am convinced that we shall never¬
theless eventually reach the destination where these questions,
are answered.
A final word about the raison d"£tre of this study. The
driving motivation behind this thesis is not to point out proudly
how superior the Church is when compared with the world; it is not
my concern to hoist the Church up to a new level of irrelevant
arrogance. The motivation derives from a missionary concern:
How is the Church to understand itself in relation to the world?
This is a question with enormous implications for the praxis of
faith. If there is really no essential difference between the
Church and the world, then that will bear significantly on the
vi
Church's manner of life and work. If, on the other hand,
there is a difference, then that, too, will entail certain practical
consequences.
What is most obviously at issue in this matter is the
Church's task of evangelism. If there is no ultimate distinction
between the Church and the world, then will not the Lord's
admonition to 'make disciples of all nations' lose its imperative -
perhaps even fade out of the collective consciousness of the
Church as a piece of time-bound rhetoric lacking final necessity?
If in the end the being of those who confess faith in Jesus Christ
is identical with the being of those who do not, can the summons
to personal metanoia and commitment honestly retain any sort of
urgency, let alone the driving motivation that through the
centuries has thrust out into the world witnesses who not only
proclaimed a cross, but bore a cross of untold sufferings and
deprivations? If there is no real difference between the Church
and the world, then perhaps the Church may seek to love and affirm,
the world, but will there be any reason for it to call men and
women to become, through faith in Christ, a part of the People
of God?
It is beyond the scope of this study to deal directly with
these practical ramifications. This is a study in systematic
theology, limited by time, space, and academic considerations.
The a priori assumption, however, is that it is a question of
fundamental - even crucial - importance for the daily on-going
"1
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life of the Church. The terminus a quo of this thesis is the
question, Does it really make any essential difference whether
one is a part of Christ's Church? The terminus ad quem is the
answer, Yes! In between, the intellectual labour of supporting
this answer by demonstrating that, contrary to much contemporary
theology, there is an ontological distinction between the
Church and the world.
 
CHAPTER I
THE LOSS OF DISTINCTION FROM BELOW:
INCARNATION AND REALITY IN THE
THEOLOGY OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER
At that moment they caught sight of some thirty
or forty windmills, which stand on that plain,
and as soon as Don Quixote saw them he said
to his squire: 'Fortune is guiding our affairs better
than we could have wished. Look over there,
friend Sancho Panza, where more than thirty
monstrous giants appear. I intend to do battle
with them and take all their lives. With their
spoils we will begin to get rich, for this is a
fair war, and it is a great service to God to 'wipe
such a wicked brood from the face of the earth.'
'What giants?' asked Sancho Panza.
'Those you see over there,' replied his master,
'with their long arms. Some giants have them six
miles long.'
'Take care, your worship,' said Sancho;
'those things over there are not giants but
windmills, and what seems to be their arms are
their sails, which are whirled round in the
wind and make the millstone turn.' 1
It may seem odd to begin a chapter on Dietrich Bonhoeffer with
a quote from THE ADVENTURES OF DON QUIXOTE. What does a seventeenth
century madman have to do with a twentieth century theologian? How
is 'The Knight of The Sad Countenance,' girded with rusty armour
astride his gaunt steed, battling giants of his imagination, related
to the young man whose life and death has so deeply influenced modern
theology? The answer is that Bonhoeffer laboured through his varied
ministries to distinguish between windmills and giants, and to forge
new weapons for his age to replace the rusty swords of earlier
1 Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, THE ADVENTURES OF DON QUIXOTE,




battles. In a word, Bonhoeffer sought to comprehend reality.
The life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer is as fascinating as a dramatic
novel. Consider: a brilliant young student of theology, reared in
an upper-middle class German home with all the cultural advantages of
the bourgeois, establishes a solid academic reputation, pastors for a
time in Barcelona and London, travels widely on behalf of the ecumenical
movement, studies and lectures in the United States, directs an under¬
ground seminary, struggles to maintain the integrity of his Church torn
asunder by the compromising temptations of National Socialism, joins
in active resistance against Hitler, and finally is hanged as a
3
conspirator in the last days of the War. It is no wonder Kenneth
Hamilton wrote: 'It is the life as much as the thought of Dietrich
Bonhoeffer that has caught the imagination of men of our age and made
2 'Here is the immortal figure of Don Quixote, the knight of
the doleful countenance, who takes a miserable hack for a
charger and who rides into endless battles for the love of
a lady who does not exist. That is how it looks when an
old world ventures to take up arms against a new one and
when a world of the past hazards an attack against the
superior forces of the commonplace and mean ....
Our business now is to replace our rusty swords with
sharp ones.' Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ETHICS, ed. Eberhard
Bethge, trans. Neville Horton Smith (London: SCM Press Ltd.,
1955), pp.49-50.
3 The most comprehensive biography of Bonhoeffer is
Eberhard Bethge, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER - THEOLOGIAN,
CHRISTIAN, CONTEMPORARY, ed. Edwin Robertson, trans.
Eric Mosbacher et. al. (London: Collins, 1970).
All students of Bonhoeffer are indebted to his close
friend's painstakingly thorough work. For a more
popular approach, see Mary Bosanquet, BONHOEFFER -
TRUE PATRIOT (Oxford: H. R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd., 1968).
At least one fictionalized account inspired by his
life has been published: Donald Goddard, THE LAST DAYS
OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER (New York: Harper & Row, 1976).
3
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him so central a figure in the contemporary theological scene.'
Nevertheless, as interesting as his tragically short life may
be in itself, it is his theological thought that is his great legacy to
5
us. When Bonhoeffer was hanged to death at the age of thirty-nine,
early in the morning on 9th April 1945, in the concentration camp at
0
Flossenburg, his ideas were affirmed by the final witness - martyrdom.
This, of course, does not guarantee the validity of his theology, but
it does indicate a life of rare integrity and consistency. What might
have remained abstract in his convictions was given faithful, concrete
expression in costly action, even to the end. This becomes for us a
compelling invitation to listen carefully and critically to his theology
And what we have discovered is
a theologian whose thought is as christocentric
as that of Karl Barth, who raised the question
of the communication of the gospel as sharply
as Rudolf Bultmann, who was led to take the
problems of our pragmatic, problem-solving,
technological world as seriously as Reinhold Niebuhr,
but who, more than any of these men, thought from the
perspective of the concrete church. 7
4 Kenneth Hamilton, LIFE IN ONE'S STRIDE - A SHORT STUDY IN
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans,
1968), p.9.
5 'Younger European and American Christian thinkers often seem
to be divided into two camps: those who acknowledge their
debt to Bonhoeffer and those who are indebted but who
obscure the traces of their source..' Martin E. Marty,
'Introduction: Problems and Possibilities in Bonhoeffer's
Thought,' in THE PLACE OF BONHOEFFER - PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES
IN HIS THOUGHT, ed. Martin E. Marty (London: SCM Press Ltd.,
1962) , p.10.
6 Bethge, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, p.830.
7 John D. Godsey, THE THEOLOGY OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1960), p.17.
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But the valuable ore of his witness to the gospel has not been
mined from his writings without difficulty. The last twenty years
Q
have witnessed many interpreters wrestling with the difficulties of
understanding a thinker who wrote in a variety of ways, frequently
amidst turbulent events. His works range from THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS,
his scholarly doctoral dissertation written at the age of twenty-one,
to his LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON, which contain fragmentary
ideas of a probing, visionary, non-systematic nature. Unfortunately,
the greater share of the literature on Bonhoeffer
tugs on these fragments sticking up out of the
rubble of his thought hoping to unearth a whole
body, or at least an arm or leg to graft on to
their own dismembered theology. Their attempts
have not been all that encouraging. 9
The two theologians generally credited with the present interest
10
in Bonhoeffer, John A. T. Robinson and Paul van Buren, are guilty of
8 For survey of the trends in Bonhoeffer studies, see
Eberhard Bethge, BONHOEFFER - EXILE AND MARTYR, ed.
John W. De Gruchy (London: Collins, 1975), pp. 23-25',
and Andre Dumas, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER - THEOLOGIAN OF
REALITY, trans. Robert McAfee Brown (London: SCM Press
Ltd., 1971), pp.236-80.
9 Ray S. Anderson, HISTORICAL TRANSCENDENCE AND THE REALITY OF GOD
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1975), p.73.
10 'In 1963 two books appeared which have radically transformed
the whole theological scene. I refer of course to the
Bishop of Woolwich's HONEST TO GOD and to Paul van Buren's
THE SECULAR MEANING OF THE GOSPEL. Each of these works
appealed to Bonhoeffer and in so doing put him on the map,
at least, in the (English-speaking) world of theology and
church - and indeed beyond' (Reginald Fuller in 'Introduction'
to Jurgen Moltmann and Jtirgen Weissbaeh, TWO STUDIES IN THE
THEOLOGY OF BONHOEFFER, trans. Reginald H. & Use Fuller
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p.12). See also
Bethge, BONHOEFFER - EXILE AND MARTYR, p.24, and Kenneth
Hamilton, REVOLT AGAINST HEAVEN - AN ENQUIRY INTO ANTI-
SUPERNATURALISM (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1965),
p.169.
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just such a selective approach"'* that has presented a distorted
picture of his views and sadly made him often guilty through
association with the radical 'death of God' theologies of the 'sixties.
Phrases such as 'world come of age' and 'religionless Christianity'
are certainly vulnerable to careless misuse by those eager to put an
end to traditional theism, but any writer - and especially Bonhoeffer -
must be judged according to the whole of his work and with due
regard to his historical milieu. Thankfully, more complete analyses
have emerged that reveal both the continuities and variations in his
thought. On the one hand, there are those who have emphasized the
-1 p
changing pattern of his theology,J~~ and on the other, those who stress
13
its continuity. As an example of the former, Moltmann speaks about
11 Robinson, at least, acknowledges this fact. 'I have made
no attempt to give a balanced picture of Bonhoeffer's
theology as a whole . . . .' John A. T. Robinson, HONEST
TO GOD (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963), p.36.
12 Bethge, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER; Godsey, THE THEOLOGY OF DIETRICH
BONHOEFFER; Moltmann and Weissbach, TWO STUDIES IN THE
THEOLOGY OF BONHOEFFER; Hanfried Muller, VON PER KIRCHE ZUR
WELT. EIN BETRAG ZU PER BEZIEHUNG PES WORTES GOTTES AUF DIE
SOCIETAS IN DIETRICH BONHOEFFERS THEOLOGISCHER ENTWICKLUNG,
1961, as cited in Dumas, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, pp.248-54.
John A. Phillips, THE FORM OF CHRIST IN THE WORLD - A STUDY
OF BONHOEFFER'S CHRISTOLOGY (London: Collins, 1967);
Hans Schmidt, 'The Cross of Reality? Some Questions Concerning
the Interpretation of Bonhoeffer' in WORLD COME OF AGE -
A SYNPOSIUM ON DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, ed. Ronald Gregor Smith
(London: Collins, 1967), pp.215-55.
13 Anderson, HISTORICAL TRANSCENDENCE AND THE REALITY OF GOD,
pp.72-100; Dumas DIETRICH BONHOEFFER; Hamilton, LIFE IN ONE'S
STRIDE; William Kuhns, IN PURSUIT OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER
(London: Burns & Oates, 1967); Heinrich Ott, REALITY AND
FAITH - THE THEOLOGICAL LEGACY OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, trans.
Alex. A. Morrison (London: Lutterworth Press, 1971);
James W. Woelfel, BONHOEFFER'S THEOLOGY - CLASSICAL AND
REVOLUTIONARY (Nashville & New York: Abingdon Press, 1970).
6
a 'far reaching shift in Bonhoeffer's thinking,'- whereas Ott has
15
discovered an 'astonishing unity.' It is true that those who
discern a change also recognize certain unifying aspects and vice
versa, but the fact remains that Bonhoeffer's many interpreters are
arrayed on different sides of this fence. Why is this the case?
The answer, in my judgment, is that there is both a significant
core of unified, continuous thought in Bonhoeffer's theology, and
an undeniable change. Just as a caterpillar is metamorphosed into a
butterfly yet maintains the same life, so the inner life of Bonhoeffer's
thought remained unchanged, but as he reasoned in ever broader categories
about its implications, aspects of it evolved into patterns that in
the end were barely recognizable from those at the beginning. Full
attention must be given to both the continuity and discontinuity of
his theology if we are to use wisely the theological riches inherited
I
from the life, death, and thinking of this contemporary martyr.
My argument, in brief, is that (A) the inner cohesion in
Bonhoeffer's theology was his incarnational christology which under¬
stood Jesus Christ as the centre of restructured reality; (B) the
place where reality is restructured in Christ shifted in his thinking
from the Church to the world, partly because of external circumstances
and partly because he followed out the inner logic of his Lutheran theology
of incarnation; and (C) the result was a consequent loss of ontological
distinction between the Church and the world, and an inadvertent de-
historicizing of the gospel.
14 Moltmann & Weissbach, TWO STUDIES IN THE THEOLOGY OF
BONHOEFFER, pp.55-56.
15 Ott, REALITY AND FAITH, p.205.
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A. The Centre of Reality
'The one word which best sums up Bonhoeffer's entire theological
development is christology. It is the golden thread which ties
16
together his works from first to last.' Like Barth, Bonhoeffer was
rigorously christocentric, seeking to understand God and the world
from the revelation of God himself in his Word, Jesus Christ.
For this reason, a good place to begin with Bonhoeffer is his lectures
17
given during the summer semester, 1933, at the University of Berlin.
Though the original manuscript has not survived, 'a large number of
13
students' notes make possible a reasonably adequate reconstruction.'
Eberhard Bethge reckons this course of lectures was
the high point of Bonhoeffer's academic career.
This he felt to be the hardest task he had
yet undertaken; not because interruptions
became more frequent, but because he was faced
with the task of bringing together, preserving and
testing out all he had previously thought, said
and attempted. 19
And if it was a summation of what went before, it was also an
20
establishment of the base from which he would work in the future.
16 Woelfel, BONHOEFFER'S THEOLOGY, p.134. So also Phillips,
THE FORM OF CHRIST IN THE WORLD, p.27: 'Bonhoeffer's
emphasis on Christology, particularly on a Christology
which exhibited certain definite and constant tendencies,
is a basic clue to his thinking.'
17 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, CHRISTOLOGY, trans.
Edwin Robertson (London: Collins, 1978).




The American title, CHRIST THE CENTER, is very appropriate, for it
not only sums up the theme of these lectures, but it could be said
that since it is here Bonhoeffer deals directly with christology,
the work itself forms a kind of centre in his corpus.
21
Christology for Bonhoeffer is the science par excellence.
Since what is under investigation, however, is not an idea but a
person, the usual scientific question 'How?' is ruled out. The only
legitimate question is the personalistic 'Who?1 This 'is the question
of the dethroned and distraught reason, but it is also the question of
22
faith: "Who are you? Are you God himself?"' This means
the christological question can only be posed
scientifically in the setting of the Church.
It can only be put 'where the basic presupposition,
that Christ claims to be the Logos of God, is
accepted: there where men ask about God because
they know who he is . . . . Here a man can
seek what has already been found. 23
Christology, then, is fundamentally an ontological question. 'Its
24
aim is to work out the ontological structure of the "Who?". Two
questions are excluded from the outset: the question whether or not
one may ask 'Who?1, because the human logos cannot exalt itself
above the Logos of God and because the testimony of Jesus is
21 Bonhoeffer, CHRISTOLOGY, p.28.
22 Ibid., p.30.
23 Ibid., p.32. '. . . even before Barth did so, Bonhoeffer
studied theology only within, and on the basis of the
Church.' Bethge, BONHOEFFER - EXILE AND MARTYR, p.63.
24 Ibid., p.33.
9
self-authenticating; and the question 'How?' for the same reason,
i.e., the human logos cannot stake out an independent position by
25
which to judge the revelation of God. Siding with Luther,
Bonhoeffer rejects attempts to begin with the work of Christ as a
means to understanding his person. His work is ambiguously open
26
to various interpretations. Thus, the person of Christ is the
central concern. 'The subject of christology is the personal
27
structure of being of the complete historical Jesus Christ.'
The word 'structure' should be carefully noted. It seems an
alien word to the realm of theology - a stowaway from the foreign
land of engineering or architecture, transported by a flight of
theological fancy. But its very uniqueness in describing the person
of Christ underscores its importance. In a sense, Bonhoeffer was
anticipating his own call for a 'non-religious interpretation' of
the gospel. He was restating the biblical witness in a fresh way,
28
and it played a central role in his theology. What does-he mean
when he speaks of 'the personal structure of being' of Jesus Christ?
25 Ibid. , p.32.
26 Ibid., pp.37-38.
27 Ibid., p.39.
28 'The two key-words in Bonhoeffer's thought, what might
be called his formal principle and his substantive
principle, are structuring (Gestaltung) and deputyship
(Stellvertretung).' Dumas, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, p.31.
10
'Structure' normally conveys an external meaning. When we
speak of a building's structure, for example, we refer to a framework
of a specific form. The edifice exists for a purpose, and its shape
may be related to its end, but the 'structure' refers to its empirical
shape quite apart from its particular use. A square brick building
may be a home, school, shop, or garage - and the structure itself
remains unchanged.
In Bonhoeffer's use of the word, however, it designates both
empirical form and purpose. When he speaks of the structure of
Jesus Christ he is referring to his external shape in the world and
the inner meaning of his being. What is the structure of Christ?
The structure of his person must be outlined
more and unfolded as the pro me structure
(that is, the structure I can relate to) of
the God-Man, Jesus Christ. Christ is Christ,
not just for himself, but in relation to me.
His being Christ: is his being for me, pro me.
This being pro me is not to be understood as
an effect emanating from him, nor as an
accident; but it is to be understood as the
essence, the being of the person himself.
The core of the person himself is the pro me. 29
30
The pro me structure unified the being and act of Christ, and it
means three things for the new humanity. 1. Jesus is the first fruits,
'the first-born of many brethren who follow him.' 2. He stands in the
place of the new humanity before God, as representative. 'He is the
Church. He not only acts for it, he is it, when he goes to the cross,
carries the sins and dies. Therefore, in him, mankind is crucified,
29 Bonhoeffer, CHRISTOLOGY, p.47.
30 Ibid.
11
dead and judged.' 3. Because the new humanity is in him, God is
31
gracious to it. The structure of Jesus Christ, i.e., the inner
meaning of his personal being, means that he is pro me, my redeemer.
But the Christ who is pro me is the Incarnate, Crucified, and
Risen One. Because he is the Logos who became man, assuming the
likeness of sinful flesh, he cannot be thought of in a spiritualized,
docetic way. As the Incarnate One who bound together the reality
of God and the reality of humanity, his structure must have an
external, empirical form. The question about the place of Christ is
32
thus legitimate. 'Where?' is contained within the question 'Who?'
33
This spatial vocabulary is important. As the Incarnate One, God
has made a space for himself, concretely, in the world. 'Jesus
Christ is the one who structures the world by representing its true
reality before God until the end' 'S and, like any structure, it is
inconceivable that it could have anything but a concrete, empirical
place in the world.
31 Ibid., p.48.
32 Ibid., p.59.
33 'By adopting a forthrightly spatial vocabulary, drawn
from both sociology and logic, Bonhoeffer is trying
to overcome this suspicion that the revelation of
God in Jesus Christ might be only tangentially
related to the ongoingness of the world, without
being understood for what it truly is, the central




Before considering Bonhoeffer's answer to the question 'Where?',
we should pause to clarify the use of a word that has cropped up
several times already in this chapter: reality. Though Bonhoeffer
does not use the word directly in these early lectures, it is one
that takes a very important place in his later writings, and because
what he meant by it was already implicit in the earliest stages of
his thought, we would do well to speak of it at this point. Many
interpreters of Bonhoeffer have identified reality as a fundamental
35
motif of his theology. Ott writes:
The fundamental tendency of Bonhoeffer's thought
from the earliest days .... to the latest,
as can easily be shown from the ETHICS and from
LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON, is precisely
that he wrestles with reality and seeks to match
the articulation of his thought to its divine -
human concreteness. 36
35 Anderson, HISTORICAL TRANSCENDENCE AND THE REALITY OF GOD,
p.74 ('Stated in the broadest possible terms, Bonhoeffer's
problem was that of uniting the reality of God with the
reality of the world'); Dumas, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER,p.36
('Bonhoeffer's theology is a theology of reality');
Gerhard Ebeling, WORD AND FAITH, trans. James W. Leitch
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963), p.284 ('The concept of
reality runs through the whole of Bonhoeffer's work . . .');
Moltmanr. & Weissbach, TWO STUDIES IN THE THEOLOGY OF
BONHOEFFER, pp.60-61 ('The difficult problems of act and being
which had engaged Bonhoeffer in his earlier writings are
dropped. In their place we now have the exciting new concept
of "reality" as the focal point'); Ott, REALITY AND FAITH,
p.316 ('. . . his problem in all parts of his thought is
reality. This was the subject both of his life, and of
his theology'); Schmidt, 'The Cross of Reality?', p.216
('Bonhoeffer was unable to solve the problem of the
relationships between the reality of the world and the
reality of God which tormented him').
36 Ott, REALITY AND FAITH, p.198. This large study is, as the
title indicates, aimed at underscoring the importance of this
concept for Bonhoeffer. Unfortunately, it suffers from an
a-historical approach that ignores the formative events
surrounding his life.
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Because God and humanity are concretely united in Christ, we may no
longer think in a dualistic manner. Jesus Christ is the revelation
of the one reality of God and world. More about that later, but
at this point observe: his concern for reality is a consequence
of the incarnation.
It is because he took so seriously the incarnation
of the Son of God in the space and time of this
world that he insisted 'that there is no real
possibility of being a Christian outside the reality
of this world and that there is no worldly exist¬
ence outside the reality of Jesus Christ.' There
is no place therefore to which the Christian can
withdraw from the world; rather he must learn to
live out the reality of Christ within it, for it
is in that world that He the Son of God made our
reality His own, and made His reality ours. 37
In Christ, then, windmills are not giants, the real is not lost to
imagination, but becomes concrete. The incarnation is the method¬
ological starting point. God and humankind are united in the
concrete reality of Jesus Christ; from this perspective alone can
33
we understand God and his creation.
37 Thomas F. Torrance, GOD AND RATIONALITY (London: Oxford
University Press, 1971), p.78.
38 For an interesting Roman Catholic appraisal of Bonhoeffer's
incarnational approach, see William Kuhns, IN PURSUIT OF
DIETRICH BONHOEFPER. 'Bonhoeffer's radical understanding
of the Incarnation may be the key to his thought and to
the development taken in his thought. It is, I am con¬
vinced, the secret of his availability to Catholics, and
the most promising avenue for pursuing his relevance for
Catholic theology. Catholics are more sensitive to the
Incarnation as a fundamental mystery than are Protestants,
if by the simple fact that they must live with some in—
titutional consequences of the Incarnation in a way that
Protestants do not' (p.262).
Now again we raise the question 'Where?' Where does the
structural reality of Jesus Christ take shape? Where does one empirically
find its form? If it is the reality of the Incarnate One, it must have
a distinct place in this world. Bonhoeffer's answer to this question
varied, depending on when he responded to it. This is the changing
aspect of his theology that has so divided his interpreters. Here we
come to the heart of the problem. In pursuing an incarnational
christology, Bonhoeffer was consistent throughout his life, but when
he sought to identify the place of the reality of Jesus Christ, his
thought shifted. Early in his career he identified it as the Church;
39
at the end, the world. Just as a peoble thrown into a pond sends
out wider and wider concentric circles, so Bonhoeffer's christology
had an expanding horizon. The centre always remained Jesus Christ,
but the place of his structured reality began in the Church and
gradually widened to encompass the world.
39 While I am much indebted to John Phillips' excellent study,
THE FORM OF CHRIST IN THE WORLD, for highlighting aspects
of the changing pattern of Bonhoeffer's thought, and
especially for showing its relationship to the tumultuous
historical circumstances of his day, it should be clear I
cannot accept his so-called 'two Christologies' (p.75).
Bonhoeffer, it seems to me, has one christology with an
ever-widening horizon of application.
B. The Place of Reality 15
The dissertation he wrote for his doctoral degree from the
University of Berlin, The Communion of Saints, would be noteworthy
in itself, but that Bonhoeffer wrote it at the age of twenty—one years
makes it a remarkable piece of work. Barth praised it (though
unfortunately too late for Bonhoeffer to have appreciated it) in the
CHURCH DOGMATICS by confessing his own misgivings whether he could
40
reach the high level it attains. What Bonhoeffer sought to accomplish
in this very academic book was - in his own words - 'to understand the
structure, from the standpoint of social philosophy and sociology, of
the reality of the church of Christ which is given in the revelation
41
of Christ.' Bonhoeffer's attempt, in other words, was to understand
the social structure of the Church in a way that made full use of
social philosophy and sociology to help elucidate dogmatic ecclesiology.
Given his incarnational premises, the use of empirical methods of
investigation was fully legitimate, since the Church as the place of
the Incarnate One was for him no docetic idea but concrete in space and
time. He recognized that the Church is more than a human fellowship,
and thus social science alone could not reveal its total essence;
nevertheless, the nature of God's reality in Christ has social dimensions.
Although the unique structure of the Church can be known only on the
42
basis of revelation, what is given to us is an empirically
discernable sociality.
40 Barth, CHURCH DOGMATICS, ed. T. F. Torrance & G. W. Bromiley, trans.
G. W. Bromiley, et. al. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936-69), IV/2,
p.641 (hereafter cited as CD).
41 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS - A DOGMATIC INQUIRY
INTO THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE CHURCH,trans. and ed. Ronald Gregor
Smith (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).
42 Ibid., p.89.
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For Bonhoeffer, the person presupposes relationships.
Man is not conceived by God, the all-embracing Person
as an abstract, individual being, but as in natural
communication with other men, and in his relation
with them not satisfying just one side of his other¬
wise closed spiritual existence, but rather discovering
in this relation his reality, that is, his life as an I.
God created man and woman, each dependent on the other.
God does not desire a history of individual men, but
the history of the community of men. Nor does he
desire a community which absorbs the individual into
itself, but a community of men. In his sight the
community and the individual are present at the same
moment, and the rest in one another. 43
Created as persons, men and women were placed in an original fellowship
with God and others, but the consequence of the Fall is broken fellowship,
ruptured relationship. Thus, the true reality of God is re-created
in Jesus Christ through the restructured fellowship effected by his
44
Spirit. 'The thread between God and man which the first Adam
45
severed is joined anew by God, by his revealing his love in Christ. '
46
Thus, 'the church is God's new purpose for men.' In Jesus Christ
43 Bonhoeffer, THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS, p.52. See also p.201.
Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, CREATION AND FALL, trans. John C.
Fletcher (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1959), pp.61-62, where
Bonhoeffer understands the community of man and woman as
the original form of the Church. Cf. also Dietrich Bonhoeffer
NO RUSTY SWORDS - LETTERS, LECTURES AND NOTES, 1928-1936, ed.
Edwin H. Robertson, trans. John Bowden, Eberhard Bethge (London:
Collins, 1965), p.34. In a letter to Rossler from Barcelona
dated 7th August 1928, Bonhoeffer writes: 'Men are not the
same even at the deepest level, but they are individuals,
totally different and only united by the Word in the church.'
44 Ibid., p.89. 112.
45 Ibid. , p.106.
46 Ibid., p.103.
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persons are set in- reality, i.e., they are united once again in
relationship with God and each other, thereby attaining their true
47 48
state as persons. All of this is quite empirically observable,
because God's reality is as concrete as the Incarnate Christ himself.
Now if the reality of Jesus Christ is set forth in the
communion of relationships established in him, then it follows that
the Church is the place of Christ in the world. Or, better put,
where he is, the Church is.
If we look at the church not in terms of how it
is built up, but as a unified reality, then the
image of the body of Christ must dominate. What
does this really mean? .... If we take the
thought of the body seriously, then it means
that this 'image' identifies Christ with the
church, as Paul himself clearly does (I Cor.12.12
6.5); for where my body is, there too am I. 49
Bonhoeffer interprets Paul as teaching, 'Christ himself is the
50
church.' Though the Church as we know it is beset by imperfections,
has a relativity of forms, and is unpretentious in appearance, never¬
theless, 'the empirical church is the Body of Christ, the presence of
51
Christ on earth . . .} The Incarnate One has fully entered history,
47 'The Church is the concrete place where human existence receives
its form and structure in Christ, where the everyday world
discovers its true reality .... This is why to be a
Christian is to become true man once more.' Dumas,
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, pp.33-34.
48 Bonhoeffer, THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS, pp.114-38. 'The Word is
active in three different ways; the Holy Spirit, that is,
acts in a three-fold way upon his church, analagous to the
three basic sociological relationships which we found were
in force in the church established in Christ: as a multiplicity
of spirits, as community of spirit and as spiritual unity.
These three forms are thus analogous also to the basic sociological






so that now 'the church is his presence in history .... For the
52
church is Christ existing as the church.' Five years later
Bonhoeffer expressed the same idea when he identified the Church as
'the presence of God in the world. Really in the world, really the
53
presence of God.' Therefore, since God is present to us only in
Christ, 'the church is the presence of Christ on earth, the church
54
is Christus praesens.' The logical conclusion: extra ecclesiam
55
nulla salus. 'Communion with God exists through Christ, but
Christ is present only in his church, hence there is communion with
56
God only in the church.' Bonhoeffer can without hesitation refer
to the empirical Church as 'the organized "institution" of salvation
The Church, then, is our Mother, for through her we have life, and
our response to her can only be gratitude.^ Gratefully we gather
59
around the Word entrusted to her in preaching and the sacraments,
and by these concrete functions the Spirit unites us in community.
Where is the place of Jesus Christ? It is clear that' when
Bonhoeffer wrote THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS, he identified it as the
Church. 'Overflowing from the heart of God, the church is reality
52 Ibid., p.146. See also p.135.
53 Bonhoeffer, NO RUSTY SWORDS, p.150.
54 Ibid., p.157.







as restructured in Jesus Christ.' The Church is the world as God
meant it to be, the space where it is structured according to its
61
centre. 'The church is the ongoing outworking of the incarnation.'
His view remained unchanged by the time he wrote ACT AND BEING.
This habilitation thesis, submitted to the Berlin faculty in 1930,
sets out to unite 'hostile brothers, whether they be called transcend-
entalists and ontologists, or theologians of action and theologians
62
of being, or Barthians and Lutherans' by applying his understanding
of 'Christ existing as community' to the problems of philosophy.
This is how Bonhoeffer described the question at issue: 'The
problem is one of forming genuine theological concepts and choosing
whether one is to use ontological categories in explaining them or
63
those of transcendental philosophy.' The latter stress act, the
former being, and the whole of theology depends on which of these
. . 64
it: emphasizes.
Ray Anderson has provided a very succinct summary of what
Bonhoeffer was doing in this book:
While he now leaves behind his concern with the
sociological categories which comprise the reality
of the Church as an empirical community, he continues
his theme of the Church as.the community of revelation
which mediates between the sheer contingency of a theology
of act and the static and objectifying of a theology of
being. The philosophical foils for his argument were
the transcendentalism of Kant and the ontology of
Heidegger, but in a positive sense, he is seeking
60 Dumas, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, p.91.
61 Ibid., p.82.
62 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ACT AND BEING, trans. Bernard Noble
(London: Collins, 1962), p.12.
63 Ibid., p.14.
64 Bethge, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, p.96.
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to unite the concept of revelation which he found
in Karl Barth with the reality of man in community,
thus giving continuity and concreteness to revelation
without making it an entity which man possesses by
his ideas or his institutions. Revelation _is the
community established by the Word and Spirit of
God - Christ existing as the Church. 65
Transcendentalism, as Bonhoeffer understands it, derives from
the Kantian differentiation between a thing-in-itself and the
apperception of it. Reason is accordingly delimited, and
understanding is severely restricted. Existence is understood as
being in reference to knowledge; hence, as act.
To understand existence is, for Kant, to know
oneself in being as 'having reference,' to feel
the radical challenge which knowledge throws down
to the knowing self, to be unable to rest in oneself
without surrendering oneself, to be purely and
simply the act. 66
But transcendentalism has at its heart an inner contradiction,
because it is reason itself that has understood and defined its
limitations. 'Reason has become the critic of reason' and thus
reinstates itself to its original rights. The result, therefore,
is that man understands himself 'not from the transcendental but
07
from himself.' Entangled in himself, man has 'no possibility of
asserting the being of God outside the I, since there is only the
08
reason alone with itself.'
If Kant dethroned any meaningful ontology, it was Hegel who
69
restored it. The task of a true ontology is to demonstrate the
65 Anderson, HISTORICAL TRANSCENDENCE AND THE REALITY OF GOD, p.75.





primacy of being over consciousness, to say that there is real being
70
outside limits of reason. Drawing on Heidegger, Bonhoeffer explains
the ontoiogical position as recognizing that 'all thought is but an
71
ontoiogical characteristic of Dasein.' It does not produce itself.
It just is. The difficulty with this, however, is that in considering
being the a priori of thought in such a way that thought itself is
suspended in being, being itself somehow comes into the power of the
thinking I 7^
The result is that both positions are unacceptable because both
evolve into an I-enclosed universe. Hence neither can help in under¬
standing the concept of revelation. Consequently
in both cases the I understands itself from within
a closed system. Per se, a philosophy cannot spare
room for revelation; let it then recognize revelation
and confess itself Christian philosophy, knowing that
the place it wished to usurp is_ already occupied by
another - Christ. 73
li
Human existence, then, must be understood in reference to revelation.
Revelation is both transcendent and ontoiogical. It is contingent -
absolutely free in relation to reason, an occurrence which is an
75








revelation; however, God is not free of but for humanity. The Word
of God's freedom is Christ. Therefore, revelation must also be under
stood in ontological categoi-ies. Revelation exists, is present,
accessible in being.
The revelation of God is his Word, Jesus Christ, and since
77
Christ is the Church, the Church is the unity of act and being.
'The Christian communion is God's final revelation: God as "Christ
70
existing as community."' God's free revelation, his act, is the
being of the community of persons constituted and embraced in Christ.
ACT AND BEING is clearly one with THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS in irs
understanding of the Church as the concrete place of Christ in the
world. At this stage in Bonhoeffer's thought there is a clear,
ontological distinction between the Church and the world.
John Phillips sets forth what he judges to be the weakness in
this phase of his thought:
The dangers of his position are reasonably clear:
His view of revelation as the church leaves open
the question of the relationship of Christ and
the church to the world outside of the church. 80
The consequence, he avers, is that Bonhoeffer began to think in
broader christological terms. History intervened, however, and with
the Confessing Church struggle his christo-ecclesiology became even




79 Ibid., pp.123, 148.
80 Phillips, THE FORM OF CHRIST IN THE WORLD, p.69.
Cf. Anderson, HISTORICAL TRANSCENDENCE AND THE REALITY OF GOD,
p.82, and Schmidt, 'The Cross of Reality,' pp.228-29.
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Phillips cites CHRISTOLOGY, placing great emphasis on these 1933
lectures: 'The former theme, "Christ existing as the church,"
the "community of revelation," was made subservient to a concept of
31
Christ as the "transcendent person."' The emphasis now is on the
person of Christ in relation to the individual believer.
It is true that Bonhoeffer answered the question 'Where?' in
these lectures by identifying the place of Christ in personalistic
terms. 'Where is he? He stands pro me, in my place, at the centre
82
of my existence and at its boundary between the old I and the new I.
The spatial location of Christ at the centre is very important and
consistently plays a role in Bonhoeffer's thought. In CREATION AND
FALL, he comments on the fact that the tree of life was in the
middle of the garden: 'This means that God, who gives life, is in
the middle .... Adam's life comes from the middle which is not
83
Adam himself but God,' With the Fall, however, the middle-place
has been violated by selfish seizure. 'Now man stands in the middle,
now he is without limit .... now he lives out of his own resources
84
and no longer from the middle.' Adam's situation is desperate for he
85
is imprisoned within himself. Salvation demands a new spatial
restructuring of human life. The reality of God must once more become
81 Ibid., p.70.
82 Bonhoeffer, CHRISTOLOGY, p.60.




the centre, and that is just what happens in Christ. He is
the centre - of my existence and the world.
Is this, then, a different emphasis as Phillips contends?
Listen to what Bonhoeffer says about Christ in relation to the person:
'Christ can never be thought of as being for himself, but only in
relation to me. That in turn means that Christ can only be thought of
/ 87
existentially, or to put ih another way, in the Church.' In other
words, one knows Christ only in faith, and to have faith means that
one is already in Christ, that is, in his Body the Church. Thus
Bonhoeffer does not consider it in the least bit contradictory to say
Christ is at the centre of my personal being, and yet to continue to
affirm that Christ is present in and as the Church. Bonhoeffer's
incarnational stress should not be forgotten here. To speak of
Christ simply as the centre of my personal existence may lead to a
docetism in which the presence of Christ is understood spiritually,
but not concretely in the reality of this world. His presence does,
however, assume a particular form. 'Between his ascension and his
88
coming again the Church is his form and indeed his only form.'
His form as Church is. concretely, his presence as Word (the incarnational
incognito and humiliation of the God-Man continues to be worked out in
hidden form, in the stumbling block of the offensiveness of preaching),
86 It is interesting to note that this theme recurs again at the
end of his life. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM
PRISON, ed. Eberhard Bethge, trans. Reginald Fuller, et. al.
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1971) (hereafter cited as LPP), p.282:
'■ I should like to speak of God not on the boundaries but at
the centre . '
87 Bonhoeffer, CHRISTOLOGY, p.47.
88 Ibid., p.58.
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sacrament, and the gathered community. Therefore, if Christ is
present in the Church, it is the centre of history.
As is evident from his earliest writings, Bonhoeffer's constant
concern was to understand the concreteness of the gospel. At every
juncture he sought to grasp the implications of the incarnation.
The Church, for him, was the concrete form of the reality of God
restructured in Jesus Christ. And perhaps it was this striving for
concreteness that led Bonhoeffer, in the early 1930's, into an
90
intense interest in the commandment of God. This is reflected in
various lectures and papers written at the time, and especially in
his recurring reflection on the Sermon on the Mount. The latter
finally found full expression in THE COST OF DISCIPLESHIP, perhaps
Bonhoeffer's most well-known work. Written in 1935 while he was the
director of the Preachers' Seminary of the Confessing Church at
Finkenwalde, it aims to understand the life of faith in terms of
concrete discipleship.
At the outset, Bonhoeffer distinguishes between cheap and costly
grace. Though the former seems to be the common standard of the day,
it is a perversion of the great Reformation rediscovery of justification
91
by faith. It is grace as doctrine, a principle, a system - lifeless.
Having lost its tension with the world, 'the Christian life comes to
mean nothing more than living in the world and as the world, in being
89 Ibid., pp.45, 48.
90 Bonhoeffer, NO RUSTY SWORDS, pp.153-69, 284-87.
91 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, THE COST OF DISCIPLESHIP, trans.
R. H. Fuller & Irmgard Booth (London: SCM Press Ltd.,
1959), p.35.
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no different from the world, in fact, in being prohibited from being
92
different from the world for the sake of grace.' Its concern is
the justification of sin, but not the sinner.
Costly grace, however, is not sold on the market like cheapjack
wares. It is costly because it is a summons to follow, and it is
93
grace because it is an invitation to follow Jesus Christ. The call
■to discipleship is an invitation to an exclusive attachment to his
person. The key point is this: 'Only he who believes is obedient,
94
and only he who is obedient believes.'
If the first half of the proposition stands alone,
the believer is exposed to the dangers of cheap
grace, which is another word for damnation. If
the second half stands alone, the believer is
exposed to the danger of salvation through works,
which is also another word for damnation. 95
The call of Christ is a command to deny oneself, which means to look
solely at Christ, to be aware only of him and no more of self. It is
96
a death. 'When Christ calls a man, he bids him come and die.'
Through his exposition of the Sermon on the Mount and the corpus
Paulinum which follows, Bonhoeffer makes very clear that disciple-
97
ship involves a separation from the world. It is the 'hall-mark
of Christianity.' Discipleship is a step away from the world in
92 Ibid., p.42.
93 Ibid., p.37.
94 Ibid. , p.54.
95 Ibid., p.58.
96 Ibid., p.79.
97 Ibid., pp.98, 106, 139, 199-275.
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answer to Christ's call. But how do we hear his summons today? Well,
we must listen in the place where he is found, 'that is, in the Church
through the ministry of the Word and Sacrament. The preaching of the
Church and the administration of the sacraments is the place where
98
Jesus Christ is present.' Jesus calls us to obedience through his
personal presence on earth, the Church, and our response (signified
in baptism) betokens a breach with the world. True, the Christian
remains in the world, possessing a secular calling, but he is there
only to engage in frontal assault on it, to show himself a stranger
and sojourner in this world. 'The antithesis between the world and
the Church must be borne out in the world. That was the purpose of
,99
the incarnation. The language Bonhoeffer uses here is uncompromising.
The Christian is 'torn from the clutches of the world,'he lives on
101 102
the other side of 'the great gulf,'"1" ~ and is 'waging war.'
Bonhoeffer describes the sealing of the Spirit pictorially:
The community of the saints is barred off from the ,
world by an unbreakable seal, awaiting its ultimate
deliverance. Like a sealed train travelling through
foreign territory, the Church goes on its way through
the world. Its journey is like that of an ark,
which was 'pitched within and without with pitch'







103 Ibid. , p.251.
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The Church must be thus separated from the world, for it is God's habit¬
ation on earth, the place from which judgment and reconciliation go
104
forth, the place of Jesus Christ. As a consequence of the incarnation,
105
this place must have space in the world. Though the world will seek
to crowd it out, it must stand firm in all its spatial concreteness.
This theme has a recurrent echo in Bonhoeffer's ecumenical and
ecclesiastical work of that period. In 1936 he wrote two essays that
once again underscored the concreteness and distinctiveness of the
106
Church. In 'The Visible Church In The New Testament' he laid aside
any ecclesiological docetism of a Church which claims no place, and the
secular, materialistic approach which is often associated with a
magical attitude to the sacraments (Barth gives rise to the first
107
danger, as he sees it, and Dibelius the second). The Pentecost
story of Acts 2 indicates the founding of the Church was a visible
event. The Spirit made a place for himself in the world with visible
103
signs. The activity of the Spirit is creative, and his, coming is
the new creation. No new religion has been founded by his presence;
109
'a part of the world has been made anew.' This second creation
110
is the reality of God.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid., p.240.
106 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, THE WAY TO FREEDOM - LETTERS, LECTURES
AND NOTES 1935-1939, ed. Edwin H. Robertson, trans.






In the same year, Bonhoeffer wrote a very controversial essay
111
on 'The Question of the Boundaries of the Church and Church Union.'
It is, he said, a question that does not arise from within the Church.
The Reformation set us free from the theoretical speculation about the
saved and the lost. Instead is heard only the joyful cry, 'Here is
112
the Gospel! Here is the church! Come here!' The problem arises,
though, from outside. Some refuse the invitation, and then the
question of boundaries arises. Baptism as a guide in this matter is
113
too full of difficulties, so we are led to the Confessions. They
are crucial because they are the Church's 'decision about its
boundaries made on the basis of theology ... a decision ... to
114
join battle at a specific place.'
For the Confessing Church struggle, the Synods of Barmen and
Dahlem (1934) are definitive in the question of boundaries. There
the Church took a stand. Barmen declared the teaching of the
German Christians false, and such teaching has no place in the Church.
Dahlem declared that the National Church had separated itself from the
115
Christian Church. What does this historical fact mean?
Extra ecclesiam nulla salus. The question of
church membership is the question of salvation.
The boundaries of the church are the boundaries
of salvation. Whoever knowingly cuts himself
off from the Confessing Church in Germany cuts








As might be expected, this bold deduction caused a furor of
protest, and its author was accused of everything from 'enthusiasm' to
'Romanism.' Bonhoeffer was shocked at this sharp response - and no
wonder. It was for him a matter of simple logic, as it had always
been. He was affirming nothing new. Salvation is in Christ; to be
in Christ is to be in the Church; and if Barmen and Dahlem had
declared the Confessing Church the true Church of Germany, then what
else could be concluded? It was not a matter of speculation about
who was saved and lost (this is where Rome had perhaps failed), but
simply an offer of grace, a matter of faith.117
It must be said again and again that for the church
to deny its boundaries is no work of mercy. The
true church comes up against boundaries. In
recognizing them it does the work of love towards
men by honouring the church. 118
Before advancing to the next phase of Bonhoeffer's thought, it
should be pointed out that for all his vigorously strong accents on
the distinctiveness of the Church as the concrete place of,Jesus Christ
in the world, Bonhoeffer was no romantic out of touch with the actual
shortcomings of the Church in his day. Hans Schmidt has suggested
that his shift in emphasis away from the Church to the world (which we
will consider shortly) was due to the conflict between his maximum
praise for the visible Church and his minimum of concrete, practical
119
experience with it. The implication is that everyday encounter with
117 Ibid., p.94.
118 Ibid., p.95.
119 Schmidt, 'The Cross of Reality?', p.229.
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the Church tended to undermine his high theological view of it. It
is probable that when the Confessing Church flagged in zeal and made
certain compromises accommodating itself to the harsh difficulties of
a war-torn country, Bonhoeffer felt deep disappointment, but that that
in itself shook his theology loose from an ecclesiology to a christology
of wider dimensions is not likely. All along Bonhoeffer was wary of
any idealization of the empirical Church. It was, for him, the concrete
reality of God, but it was God's reality, his creation. As early as
THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS he warned that the 'confusion of community
romanticism with the communion of saints is extremely dangerous. The
communion of saints must always be recognized as something established
120
by God . . .' And after his unusual experiences with the House of
Brethren community at Finkenwalde, which was closed down in 1937 by
the Gestapo, Bonhoeffer recorded, in a general format, what had been
done there in LIFE TOGETHER, the most widely read of his books during
121
his lifetime. In it he presses home the fact that divine community
is not a human ideal, but a reality created by God, and thus every wish
dream projected on to the Christian community is a hindrance to
genuine fellowship. Instead, thankfulness for what God has given
must be the tenor of life together.
If we do not give thanks daily for the Christian
fellowship in which we have been placed, even
where there is no great experience, no discoverable
riches, but much weakness, small faith and
difficulty; if on the contrary, we only keep
complaining to God that everything is so paltry
and petty, so far from what we expected, then
we hinder God from letting our fellowship grow
120 Bonhoeffer, THE COMMUNITY OF SAINTS, p.196.
121 Bethge, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, p.387.
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according to the measure and riches which are
there for us all in Jesus Christ. 122
Though it is not likely that disillusionment with day-to-day
Church involvement caused him to look elsewhere for the manifestation
of God's reality, it is certain, in my judgment, that his thought was
to take a significant turn. Though some have glossed over the change
123
in his thinking, Moltmann has grasped something important when he
describes a 'far-reaching shift' that took place between.THE COST OF
DISCIPLESHIP and his wartime writings (ETHICS and LETTERS AND PAPERS
, 124
FROM PRISON). And Hanfried Muller, though overstating his case,
has discerned a movement FROM THE CHURCH TO THE WORLD, as the title
125
of his book suggests. As Bonhoeffer continued to strive to
comprehend the reality of God restructured in Christ, there was a
broadening of his vision. His horizon expanded, so that what was an
early preoccupation with the Church and its distinctiveness, gave
way to a new concern for the world as a whole. In the first stage
of his thought, the emphasis was on a movement from the world to
the Church. Now he is concerned with precisely the opposite
120
movement. This change was accompanied, and no doubt influenced,
by his decision to become involved, in underground activity.
122 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, LIFE TOGETHER, trans. John W. Doberstein
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 19b4), p.17.
123 As e.g. Dumas, DIETRICH BONHQEFFER, pp.91ff.
124 Moltmann & Weissbach, TWO STUDIES IN THE THEOLOGY
OF BONHOEFFER, pp.55-56.
125 Muller, VON PER KIRCHE ZUR WELT.. For a more condensed presentation
of his view, see his 'The Problem of the Reception and Interpretati
of Dietrich Bonhoeffer' in WORLD COME OF AGE, ed. R. G. Smith,
pp.182-214.
126 Godsey, THE THEOLOGY OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, p.269.
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At the beginning of 1939 Bonhoeffer the theologian
and Christian was entering fully into his con¬
temporary world, his place and his time. That
means into a world which his bourgeois class had
helped to bring about, rather than prevent. He
accepted the weight of that collective responsibility,
and began to identify himself with those who were
prepared to answer for guilt and try tentatively
to shape something new for the future, instead of
merely resting on ideological grounds, as had
hitherto been usual on the ecclesiastical plane.
So in 1939 the theologian and Christian became
a contemporary. 127
It was not that Bonhoeffer was blind to the world before.
The world is present at the beginning of his thought, just as the
Church is at the end. As early as 1928, Bonhoeffer confessed in a
letter from Barcelona:
One thing strikes me again and again: here one
meets people as they are, away from the masquerade
of the 'Christian world,' people with passions,
criminal types, little people with little ambitions,
little desires and little sins, all in all people
who feel homeless in both senses of the word, who
loosen up if one talks to them in a friendly way,
real people; I can only say that I have gained
the impression that it is just these people who
are much more under grace than under wrath, and
that it is the Christian world which is more under
wrath than grace. 128
Here one senses a conception in Bonhoeffer's mind that will one day
give birth to ideas, such as the non-religious interpretation of the
gospel, that emerge in the LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON. Also,
some of his major ethical themes are nascent in his lectures to his
congregation in Spain on the priority of grace in Christian ethics
127 Bethge, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, p.581. See also Godsey,
THE THEOLOGY OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, pp.263-64.
128 Bonhoeffer, NO RUSTY SWORDS, p.34.
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and the consequent freedom before God one has in.the concrete moment
129 . '
of decision. He even anticipates theworld.li.ness of the Christian
in words that are remarkably similar to those written sixteen years
later:
A glimpse of eternity is revealed only through
the depths of our earth, only through the storms of
human conscience .... The man who would leave
the earth, who would depart from the present dis¬
tress, loses the power which still holds him to
the eternal, mysterious forces. The earth remains
our mother, just as God remains our Father, and
our mother will only lay in the Father's arms
him who remains true to her. That is the Christian's
song of the earth and her distress. 130
These words are surprising, coming as they do at a time when the
young theologian was so carefully arguing that the Church is our
mother. They do indicate, therefore, that we cannot speak of an
13 1
about-face in the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. There is an
evolutionary change of emphasis.
It has already been indicated that various circumstances in
Bonhoeffer's life, such as his decision to join the resistance, may
have contributed to the broadening of his christological vision. It
is my conviction, however, that there was a more fundamental reason,
namely, his incarnational christology - the inner logic of which
naturally pushed his thought outward as he considered its implications
in ever-broader categories of thought.
129 Ibid., pp.35-44.
130 Ibid. , p.43.
131 For further evidence, see CREATION AND FALL, pp.35-36, 38,
44, 67. Here Bonhoeffer affirms our bond to the earth
and our being-there-for-others - themes which later emerge
in the prison letters.
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The doctrinal soil out of which this christology blossomed was
Lutheranism and its insistence on the finitum capax infiniti, the
finite can encompass the infinite. Against the Reformed view,
finitum incapax infiniti, Bonhoeffer joined ranks with Luther in
132
vigorous protest all his life. Whereas Reformed theologians
held that the glory of the sovereign God is always transcendent
over creaturely reality, and hence never fully contained within it,
Luther affirmed the capacity of the finite for the infinite,
according to his understanding of the incarnation, where, he believed,
the human nature of Jesus did contain the infinite. As Bethge under¬
stands it, this was a concern for Bonhoeffer in ACT AND BEING where
he argues with Barth, warning him of the dangers
of his transcendental philosophy and trying to
make him more 'Lutheran.' He wanted to persuade
him of his own belief in the finitum capax infiniti,
that in spite of everything God was accessible. 133
This was a constant point at issue for Bonhoeffer throughout his
theological development, and, as James Woelfel has suggested,
134
could well be his theological motto. It reflects his life-long
concern for concreteness. If one truly encounters reality in the
God-Man, Jesus Christ, then God himself must be fully in that reality
and not hidden behind it, discoverable only through a process of
abstraction. The only majestic, sovereign, free God we know is the
132 Bethge, 'Bonhoeffer's Life And Theology,' WORLD COME OF AGE,
ed. Ronald Gregor Smith, pp.36-37.
133 Bethge, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, p.97.
134 Woelfel, BONHOEFFER'S THEOLOGY, p.141. See also Marty,
'Introduction: Problems and Possibilities in Bonhoeffer's
Thought,' THE PLACE OF BONHOEFFER, ed. Martin Marty, p.21,
and Phillips, THE FORM OF CHRIST IN THE WORLD, pp.170-72.
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one revealed in Jesus Christ. He is not free of humanity; he is
13
free for humanity. He is 'haveable,' 'graspable,' in Jesus Christ.
The Incarnate One is the concrete glory of God.
T. F. Torrance has shown that the traditional Lutheran under¬
standing is based on a receptacle notion of space and time - a view
not held by Patristic theology and one made obsolete by modern
1.36
theories of relativity." The finitum capax infiniti had the effect
of consolidating the receptacle view in the epistemological structure
137
of Lutheran thought. The finite was understood as a type of
container which, in Christ, held the infinite. But when they focused
attention upon the nature of the creaturely receptacle
the receptacle had to be enlarged in order to
make it receive the divine nature within its
dimensions, and so it was held that the Son
of God communicated to the humanity of Christ
an infinite capacity enabling it to be filled
with the divine fullness. 138
Hence the Lutheran development of the communicatio idiomatum,
139
the communication of attributes.
Reformed theologians have accepted this doctrine to the extent
that it affirms that idiomata of either nature belong to the whole
135 Ibid., p.142.
136 Thomas F. Torrance, SPACE, TIME AND INCARNATION (London:
Oxford University Press, 1969), p.30.
137 Ibid., p.35.
138 Ibid., .p.140.
139 For a brief summary of the Lutheran understanding of
communicatio idiomatum, see J. A. Dorner, HISTORY OF
PROTESTANT THEOLOGY, vol.11, trans. George Robson &
Sophia Taylor (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1871), p.148.
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person of Christ (genus naturarum), and that acts of his one person
are at the same time acts of the two natures cooperating in the work
of redemption (genus apotelesmaticum). But Luther went a significant
step farther, declaring a transference of the idiomata of the one
nature to the other (genus majestaticum). This genus did not accept
any diminution of the divine nature in the hypostatic union, though
it did understand the human nature as participating in the divine
140
attributes. Karl Barth, describing this development, writes:
This impartation consists in the fact that in
the hypostatic union which it encloses, there
is such.an appropriation, illumination and
penetration, not of the divine nature by the
human but of the human nature by the divine,
that all the attributes of the divine nature
of Jesus Christ may be ascribed also to His
human nature. This does not, of course,
involve a destruction or alternation of the
human nature, but it means that this nature
experiences the additional development
(beyond its humanity) of acquiring and having
as such all the marks of divinity, of
participating directly in the majesty of God,
of enjoying in its creatureliness every
perfection of the uncreated essence of God. 141
Luther saw in the communicatio idiomatum a justification of his
142
literal understanding of hoc est corpus meum, with the final
140 See Article VIII, 'The Formula of Concord,' THE BOOK OF
CONCORD - THE CONFESSIONS OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH,
ed. and trans. Theodore G. Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1959), pp.486-92. For a modern Lutheran theology that
rejects this doctrine, see Helmut Thielicke, THE EVANGELICAL
FAITH - VOLUME TWO: THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AND OF CHRIST,
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1977), p.326: 'In letting
his original concern of faith lead him so far into speculation,
Luther takes a fateful course.'
141 Barth, CD, IV - 2. p.77.
142 Torrance, SPACE, TIME AND INCARNATION, p.32.
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deduction of the ubiquity of the body (or human nature) of Christ which
plays a significant role in the Lutheran doctrine of the real presence,
but in using it he advanced into an unfortunate realm of speculative
144
abstraction that has some dangerous consequences. After raising
the traditional Reformed objection ('does this not compromise both the
145
true deity and the true humanity of Jesus Christ?'), Barth asks:
But how are we to guard against a deduction which is
very near the surface, which once it is seen is extremely
tempting, and once accepted very easy to draw, but which
can compromise at a single stroke nothing less than the
whole of Christology? For after all, is not the humanity
of Jesus Christ, by definition, that of all men? And
even if it is said only of Him, does not this mean that
the essence of all men, human essence as such, is capable
of divinisation. If it can be said in relation to Him,
why not to all men? 146
A door is thus left open by this 'heaven-storming doctrine of the
humanity of the Mediator' which leads directly to the modern
147
transition from theology to anthropology.
In his christology lectures, Bonhoeffer declared that 'the
genus majestaticum is the heart of Lutheran christology,' 'though
he does not made his own position entirely clear. He recognizes
the risks in this doctrine and expresses discomfort at the whole
143 Thielicke, THE EVANGELICAL FAITH - VOLUMg TWO, p.326.
144 '. . . the fatal doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum,
by means of which the statement of faith concerning the
unity of the divine with the human was transformed into
a metaphysical theory.' Emil Brunner, THE MEDIATOR -
A STUDY OF THE CENTRAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH,
trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957), p.342.
145 Barth, CD, IV-2, p.79.
146 Ibid., p.81. See also Torrance, SPACE, TIME AND INCARNATION, p.41.
147 Ibid., p.83.
39
Reformed-Lutheran debate. If in the end he seems only mildly to
149
affirm it, perhaps it is because he recognizes its dangerous
proximity to the inadmissible question 'How?'
Apparently he managed to set aside his hesitation, however,
for in a Christmas letter sent to former students and friends in
1939, he commends the doctrine of the genus majestaticum - 'the
contribution of the Lutheran Church, added to the ancient Church's
150
Christology.1 Citing the 'Formula of Concord' and Luther, he
admits the incomprehensibility of the idea that human nature, which
is our nature should share the properties of divinity, but is
certain that 'this is scriptural doctrine, and it expresses the
1 5i
deepest and ultimate union of God with man . . . '
If we have seemed to spend a disproportionate amount of space
on this traditional Retormed-Lutheran debate (especially when
Bonhoeffer so seldom mentions it directly!), it is because it is an
important key that unlocks the door leading to a fuller understanding
of the evolution in Bonhoeffer's thought. Recall what has been
presented as central in his theology: Jesus Christ, the Incarnate
One, is the concrete revelation of God himself; in him, reality -
God's and humanity's - is structured; reality is the restored communion
148 Bonhoeffer, CHRISTOLOGY, p.91.
149 Ibid., p.93.
150 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, TRUE PATRIOTISM - LETTERS, LECTURES
AND NOTES 1939-45, ed. Edwin H. Robertson, trans.




one experiences with God and his fellow human beings, and since this
is accomplished in Christ, and to be in Christ is to be his Body,
the place of the concrete structuring of reality is the Church.
The Church has been distinct from the world in Bonhoeffer's
thought up to this point, just as Christ himself, as the revelation
of God to man, stands over against the world. But now questions
emerge: Can one in fact meet Christ, God's reality, outside the
152
Church? What is the relationship between the world and reality?
Are there not responsible human relationships outside the bounds
of the visible Church? What can one make of the fact that the
Confessing Church seemed to retreat into a self-protective posture,
while men and women of the world boldly took responsibility for the
guilt and demands of the evil hour, often sacrificing fortune, honour,
and even life? And - most important - what does the incarnation
of God in Christ mean for the reality of the sinful world? Was it
not borne in his flesh and reconciled at the cross? Has only a
portion of humanity entered the reality of God? Or has the
incarnation abolished all distinctions, revealing in the God-Man
one reality?
Bonhoeffer's insistence on the finitum capax infiniti and its
doctrinal corollary, the genus majestaticum, now begins to bear
fruit. If the finite human nature i_s capable of encompassing the
infinite, and if God's reality has been communicated to the human
152 Cf. Anderson, HISTORICAL TRANSCENDENCE AND THE REALITY
OF GOD, p.85, and Phillips, THE FORM OF CHRIST IN
THE WORLD, pp.69-70.
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nature in the one person Jesus Christ, and if he, in assuming our
nature, became our representative before God, then is not human
nature as such capable of God's reality? Does not the incarnation, as
Bonhoeffer understood it, lead one inexorably to the conclusion that
in some way all humanity has been ontologically restructured and
set into the one reality of God?
It is not surprising, therefore, to find a broadened horizon
of incarnational reality in Bonhoeffer's ETHICS. If Bonhoeffer was
concerned with the exclusiveness of Christ's lordship in THE COST
OF DISCIPLESHIP, the wide range of his lordship is the new emphasis
153
of ETHICS. Theologically, Bonhoeffer now took his stand on the
incarnation, with all its implications for the world.
Bonhoeffer is really convinced that the
incarnation has restored the whole of reality
under one Head and that in Christ faith has
a vision of the whole creation as it existed
before God in the beginning and as it will be
at the end.
All dualistic systems in terms of 'realms'
and 'spheres' inevitably flounder upon this
christological vision of the reconciliation of
God and the world. 154
His concern is to show how God and the reality of this world are
155
united in Jesus Christ. No longer is the empirical Church pre¬
supposed as the reality of revelation; rather, he speaks in ETHICS
of the wider range of God's revelation in Christ as it is manifest
153 Bethge, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER,p■622.
154 Moltmann & Weissbach, TWO STUDIES IN THE THEOLOGY
OF BONHOEFFER, p.61.
155 Dumas, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, p.139.
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among the creation. 'He seeks to view every sphere of life as part
157
of the world reconciled in Christ with God.'
Bonhoeffer considered ETHICS his most important work.
Unfortunately, the course of events disallowed its completion, and we
are left with the essays and fragments of several different attempts
he made to understand the nature of the Christian life in this world.
Eberhard Bethge has provided invaluable service in gathering these
together (as is also the case in his compilation of the LETTERS AND
PAPERS FROM PRISON), and if we are disappointed in not having a final,
consistent manuscript from Bonhoeffer's hand, we are also grateful
for the portions we do have as they point us in the direction his
thought was moving.
The reader who goes to ETHICS hoping to find a helpful guide in
the distinction between good and evil will be surprisingly turned
away at the outset - or at least turned in another direction. Yes,
ethical reflection strives to attain the knowledge of good'and evil.
Christian ethics, however, has as its first task the invalidation of
158
this knowledge. At his origin the human creature knows only one thing:
God. In that singular knowledge he is a unity. But in grasping at the
knowledge of good and evil his life is broken into disunity, for he
becomes a god against God and a person in conflict himself, constantly
summoning himself from the evil to the good through the voice of his
156 Schmidt, 'The Cross of Reality?', p.230. So also Phillips,
THE FORM OF CHRIST IN THE WORLD, p.139: In ETHICS
'Bonhoeffer's Christology is liberated from his ecclesiology.'
157 Moltmann & Weissbach, TWO STUDIES IN THE THEOLOGY
OF BONHOEFFER, p.56.
158 Bonhoeffer, ETHICS, p.3.
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conscience. Shame is the consequence, and the covering sought by men
159
and women is but the attempt to overcome their fundamental disunion.
The ethical person, the one for whom the knowledge of good and evil has
come to be of supreme importance, is fully revealed in the New Testament
2.00
Pharisee. He is the man of disunion. In contrast to him stands
Jesus. He will not be drawn into his conflicts and countless
decisions. He knows only one thing: the will of God. He thus lives
freely and simply.
For the Christian, then, it is not a matter of rational
wrangling and reflection over good and evil. In Christ we are set
free for a life of singular unity, freedom and simplicity. We look
only to Jesus Christ and the will of God revealed in him. The
consequence is that 'the more exclusively we acknowledge and confess
Christ as our Lord, the more fully the wide range of His dominion will
16 2
be disclosed to us.' The present day has witnessed a breakdown of
traditional ethical systems, and what is needed is not another system;
rather, we must look to Christ alone in simplicity, and 'whoever sees
Jesus Christ does indeed see God and the world in one. He can hence-
163




162 Ibid., p.41. Moltmann calls this 'the key to the unity of
Bonhoeffer's thought which underlines the various themes
in his writings.'. . Moitmann & Weissbach, TWO STUDIES
IN THE THEOLOGY OF BONHOEFFER, p.56.
163 Ibid., p.51.
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Looking to Christ in faith does not mean looking away from the world.
Quite the contrary. In Christ we see the real world, and are set free
to be real men and women. The reason for this is found solely in
164
the incarnation of God.
165
In ETHICS we feel a tension. Clearly perceptible are the
recurring notes of themes sounded in THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS, ACT AND
BEING, and others of his writings. Yet there are, as it were, the
first tentative phrases of a new melody in a different key - an over¬
ture promising more to come. Outward circumstances and the development
of his incarnational theology modulated his thought into a new leitmotif,
and this transition is fully recognizable in ETHICS. In the first part,
Bonhoeffer identifies 'real man' as the man conformed to the Incarnate
1- 66
One, but the distinctions this involves finally seem to give way to
the overpowering thought that the Incarnate One has already conformed
himself to real man. Following out the logic of the former idea,
Bonhoeffer still has a place for an ontologically distinct Church.
'The Church, then, bears the form which is in truth the proper form of
all humanity .... What takes place in her takes place as an example
1 67
and substitute for all men.' Therefore, the Church can be viewed
as a section of humanity in which the form of Christ has concretely
163
taken shape in this world. Yet, if this is still the old melody, the
cantus firmus, we begin to hear a counter-point, a contrasting descant.
164 Ibid., pp.55-56.
165 So also Phillips, THE FORM OF CHRIST IN THE WORLD, pp.74-75.




In the fourth chapter, 'The Last Things And The Things Before
169
The Last,' Bonhoeffer explains that though God's gracious mercy
is his final word, which includes a final judgment on all things
penultimate, a certain amount of room is nevertheless left open for
'the things before the last.' 'The Christian life means neither a
170
destruction nor a sanctioning of the penultimate.' All things
must finally be judged from the end, but precisely in the light of
God's grace, the penultimate is upheld and given a concrete place,
for creaturehood itself is a pre-condition for justification by faith
171
and must, for the sake of the ultimate, be preserved. In a similar
manner, Bonhoeffer makes a place for the concept of the natural -
a term generally discredited in Protestant ethics. 'The natural
is that which, after the Fall, is directed towards the coming of
Christ. The unnatural is that which, after the Fall, closes its
172
doors against the coming of Christ.' The natural will therefore
endure by its inherent strength, for life and the reality of God
.,173
are on its side.
Thus the outlines of a new vision of reality are beginning to
distinguish themselves in Bonhoeffer's thought. It is the view of









By the fifth chapter, 'Christ, Reality and Good,' Bonhoeffer
finally breaks into the new tune.
In Christ we are offered the possibility of partaking
in the reality of God and in the reality of the world,
but not in the one without the other. The reality of
God discloses itself only by setting me entirely in
the reality of the world, and when I encounter the
reality of the world it is already sustained, accepted
and reconciled in the reality of God. This is the
meaning of the revelation of God in the man
Jesus Christ. 175
What this means, therefore, is that I cannot experience the reality of
God without also experiencing the reality of the world, and I cannot
experience the reality of the world without also experiencing the
176
reality of God. The presupposition that reality is divided into
two spheres - holy and profane, sacred and secular - must emphatically
be rejected. There is only one sphere of reality: Jesus Christ.
In him we share at once in the reality of God and the reality of the
177
world. The incarnation means that just
as in Christ the reality of God entered into the
reality of the world, so, too, is that which is
Christian to be found only in that which is of
the world, the 'supernatural' only in the natural,
the holy only in the profane, and the revelation
only in the rational. 178
When Bonhoeffer proceeds to raise the question whether or not







we see clearly to what extent his thought has changed. In THE COST
<
OF DISCIPLESHIP, as was shown above, he affirms the need for space
on earth for the Body of Christ as a consequence of the incarnation,
179
and warns the Church that the world will seek to crowd it out.
Actually, Bonhoeffer's own incarnational christology crowded it out,
for in ETHICS he denies a space to the Church because the Church exists
to bear witness to what is true for the whole world: 'It is the place
where testimony is given to the foundation of all reality in Jesus
180
Christ.1 Whether the world recognizes it or not, it is entirely
the world of Christ. There is no part that belongs more to Christ
than another, and 'no part of the world, be it never so forlorn and
never so godless, which is not accepted by God and reconciled with
181
God in Jesus Christ.' If the Church is divided from the world,
it is solely because she affirms in faith the reality which is the
]_Q2
reality of the whole world. " The ontological distinction between
Church and world that marked Bonhoeffer's earlier writings is now
exchanged for a cognitive distinction in the one ontological reality
of God.
All of this is not to say, however, that the Church has no
function in the world. It clearly has an important duty to fulfil
as it bears witness in its proclamation and sacraments to the reality
of God in Jesus Christ, but since the whole world is relative to
Christ it must take its place along with other institutions which
179 Bonhoeffer, THE COST OF DISCIPLESHIP, pp.223, 240.




express the concrete will of God and provide spheres in which
day-to-day obedience is realized.
The
relativeness of the world to Christ assumes
concrete form in certain mandates of God in
the world. The Scriptures name four such
mandates: labour, marriage, government and the
Church. We speak of divine mandates rather
than of divine orders because the word mandates
refers more clearly to a divinely imposed task
rather than to a determination of being. 183
The mandates are earthly agents, conferred with divine authority,
184
through which God's commandment comes to us. Because one lives
by this commandment alone, there is freedom of movement and action,
185
release from the uncertainties present in the fear of decision-making.
The corresponding concept to freedom is responsibility - each pre¬
supposing the other. The structure of the responsible life is life
bound to other persons and to God, and this bond sets one in genuine
freedom. The obligation to the other assumes the form of deputyship,
after the manner of Jesus who lived as deputy for us. He was the
responsible person. Deputyship, therefore, consists in the complete
186
surrender of oneself to the other.
Not only is the responsible life marked by deputyship; it takes
action in accordance with reality. If Jesus Christ is the reality of God,
183 Ibid., p.179. Later Bonhoeffer changes 'labour' to 'culture.'
See pp,252ff. Moltmann refers to the mandates as 'spheres
for the practice of obedience.' Moltmann & Weissbach,
TWO STUDIES IN THE THEOLOGY OF BONHOEFFER, p.75.




action in accordance with Christ is action corresponding to earthly-
reality. It allows the world to be the world, setting it free for a
genuine worldliness, for in Jesus Christ the world is loved, condemned
187
and reconciled by God. Because of this relationship to Christ, the
world remains the world. The responsible person does not overstep it
and try to make it the kingdom of God, nor can he piously be indolent
in righteous self-concern. The responsible life recognizes the world
as its concrete place of action, with all due recognition for realistic
138
limitations and opportunities.
Whereas Bonhoeffer's earlier thought led him to identify the
Church as the place of christo-structured reality, an unmistakable
evolution has transpired. The Incarnate One, as deputy for all creation,
has received in his humanity the full reality of God (communicatio
idiomatum). The door is barred to dualism and any form of particularism,
and 'thus we recognize that Christ is thought of as the foundation of
189
all reality and the One immanent in it all.' Perhaps one way to
accentuate the change is to put it this way: Bonhoefier first stressed
the fact that one encounters reality in Jesus Christ; now he seems
to say, one encounters Jesus Christ in reality. 'All real and essential
experience becomes in this way the experience of Jesus Christ as the
187 Ibid., pp.199-200.
188 Ibid., pp.202-4.
189 Ott, REALITY AND FAITH, p.179.
190 Ibid., p.191.
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It is from this perspective that we must-seek to understand his final
191
thoughts as preserved for us in LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON.
Sadly, Bonhoeffer was not permitted to develop a thorough,
systematic approach to the ideas that sprang out of the latter stages
of his work on ETHICS. We are left instead with probing questions,
a few suggestive notions that beg for elucidation, and whetted
appetites that serve to heighten the outrage felt at the tragedy of
his premature death. Careful exegesis, with one eye fixed on the
text, and the other on what has preceded it, is necessary if we are
to understand these fragments. Simply to repeat the contents of the
letters in a chronological order will not further our understanding
of Bonhoeffer. In order to enter into responsible dialogue with him,
we must try to grasp the structure and movement of his thought. This
will require some systematization, but hopefully only that which
arises naturally from the text itself.
Fully in step with the theological cadence he set for-himself,
Bonhoeffer took a close look at reality from behind the bars of a
Gestapo prison. Since Jesus Christ has united the reality of God with
the reality of the world so that all real experience becomes an experience
191 At the outset of any discussion of these disparate writings,
the fragmentary nature of what we are dealing with should
be recognized. Modern theology has perhaps unfairly put
much emphasis on these brief ideas flashed forth from
smuggled-out prison letters. Had their author lived to
set out carefully his thoughts in a balanced way, they might
have taken a very different form. Any statement about
Bonhoeffer's theology of his last days is therefore
qualified at the outset. We may speak of what he seemed
to be saying, and, noting the movement of his thought from
earlier works, indicate the direction it was apparently
heading, but the situation behooves respectful caution.
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of Christ, his vision naturally turned outward for a look at worldly
tackled the problem in two different methodological ways: first,
he examined the world empirically, and then he considered it
theologically. Both approaches found their ultimate convergence in
Jesus Christ, the one reality of God and humanity. What, then, was
his discovery about reality considered (1) empirically, and (2)
theologically? And (3) what did all this mean for the Church?
193
(1) In a letter to Eberhard Bethge dated April 30, 1944,
Bonhoeffer wrote: 'What is bothering me incessantly is the question
what Christianity really is, or indeed who Christ really is, for us
194
today.' The emphasis in this sentence falls on the word 'today,'
for it appeared to Bonhoeffer that he was living in a uniquely dif¬
ferent time. The world had changed. People were no longer moved by
theological and pious words. The day of inwardness and conscience was
195
passed - 'and that means the time of religion in general.' The
questions relentlessly push his mind forward: How can Christ be Lord
of the religionless? Are there religionless Christians? What does
this change mean for the Church (community, sermon, liturgy) and an
individual life? How can we speak about God in accordance with this
new state of reality? What about prayer and worship in a religionless
192 Bonhoeffer was greatly interested.in the Old Testament at
this time, for he found there a certain concrete, earthly
reality. See Bonhoeffer, LPP, pp.156, 168-69, 336-37.
193 Ibid., pp.278-82. Bethge considers this letter evidence of a
'decisive new start.' See DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, p.763.
194 Bonhoeffer, LPP, p.279.
reality.
192






situation? Does not the Pauline rejection of circumcision as
a condition for justification by faith mean also that there is freedom
197
from religion?
What did Bonhoeffer mean by 'religion.' and what are we to make
of his analysis that today is a religionless age? Gerhard Ebeling
198
believes Bonhoeffer was concerned to free the Gospel from law,
and in a similar vein, T. F. Torrance sees here a radical affirmation
of 'justification by grace alone over against man's own religious
199
self-justification and self-security.' The difficulty with these
views, however, is their failure to account for the historical move-
200
ment Bonhoeffer discerned. His first concern is not a theological
restatement of reformation theology. He is describing an empirically
observable change of affairs. Religion is marked by metaphysics and
individual inwardness. 'Neither of these is relevant to the biblical
201
message or to the man of today.'
196 Ibid., pp.279-81.
197 Ibid., p.281.
198 Ebeling, WORD AND FAITH, p.142.
199 Torrance, GOD AND RATIONALITY, p.75. So also Hamilton,
LIFE IN ONE'S STRIDE, p.58; and REVOLT AGAINST HEAVEN,
pp.179-80. Cf. Woelfel, BONHOEFFER'S THEOLOGY, p.293,
where Torrance is accused of a 'conservative domestication
of Bonhoeffer.'
200 'An understanding and acceptance of the movement of history
is behind the demand for religionless Christianity.'
Phillips, THE FORM OF CHRIST IN THE WORLD, p.152.
201 Bonhoeffer, LLP, pp.285-86. One cannot help wondering,
at this point, whether his analysis is factually correct.
How are we to understand the present fascination with
Transcendental Meditation, the occult, U.F.O's, life-after-
death research, astrology, etc.? Have things changed that
much in the last forty years?
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A characteristic that tends to add confusion to our efforts to
sort out the strands of Bonhoeffer's thought is his parallel concern
about the nature of the Church's proclamation. As he is discovering
an empirically demonstrable change in the present state of affairs
(a religionless time), he is asking how one speaks clearly about the
202
gospel in such a situation (non-religious interpretation). As
he sees it, Barth was the first to have begun the criticism of religion,
but he failed to carry it through, substituting a 'positivist doctrine
203
of revelation which says in effect, "Like it or lump it." ' In other
words, though Barth saw the theological dangers of religion, he failed
to reinterpret the gospel's content in a way consistent with the
present religionless situation. Also, for the same reason, he is inter¬
ested in Bultmann's attempt at de-mythologizing, but finally must
reject his approach as just another effort of liberal reductionism
which fails to deal justly with the real content of the biblical
204
message. Bonhoeffer is thus easily vulnerable to misinterpretation,
for when Barth speaks of religion he does have in view humanity's attempt
at self-justification, and by association with him Bonhoeffer is under¬
stood as meaning the same thing. But his concern is very different.
He observes a religionless age (something Barth would not have accepted),
and asks how the gospel is to be appropriately proclaimed in this
setting. Though Barth and Bultmann might have been of help, given
their theological rejection of religion, they failed to translate
202 Ibid., pp.280-81.
203 Ibid., pp.280, 286, 328. Cf. Regin Prenter, 'Bonhoeffer and
Earth's Positivism of Revelation,' WORLD COME OF AGE,
ed. Ronald Gregor Smith, pp.93-130.
204 Bonhoeffer, LPP, pp.285, 328-29.
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theology into a non-religious language which would have been in
accordance with the present religionlessness.
By studying the reality of this world, what did Bonhoeffer
205 ,
discover? He saw a world that had 'come of age' rhrough an
historical movement toward autonomy. Though not wanting to get into a
debate about the exact date, he writes:
The movement that began about the thirteenth
century. . . towards the autonomy of man (in which
I should include the discovery of the laws by which
the world lives and deals with itself in science,
social and political matters, art, ethics, and
religion) has in our time reached an undoubted completion.
Man has learnt to deal with himseif in all questions
of importance without recourse to the 'working
hypothesis' called 'God' .... As in the scientific
field, so in human affairs generally, 'God' is being
pushed more and more out of life, losing more and
more ground. 206
The world has become self-confident. Certainly there have been
failures (like the present war), but these do not cause the world
207
to question its course.
At this point Bonhoeffer is reporting more than editorializing.
Impartially considered, the reality of the world has become religionless.
Unfortunately, it is also a fact that Christianity has not always
acted in accordance with reality. Clinging to metaphysical dualism,
religious people are constantly on the retreat, able to speak about
God only when knowledge or human resources have come to an end.
God is for them the deus ex machina who provides the apparent solution
208








on the boundaries of life, rather than at the centre, and as our
understanding increases, God will be pushed more and more out of
210
the picture - a stop-gap for the incompleteness of our knowledge,
In fact, this has happened, and Christian apologetics has had to
struggle to reserve a space for God by attacking the adulthood of the
world. As its special tools it has used existential philosophy and
psychotherapy to work out some ingenious methods to make persons in
the world come of age realize they really need God - even though they
211
may not know it. This assault on the world's new maturity,
however, is pointless, ignoble, and unchristian.
Pointless, because it seems like an attempt to put
a grown-up man back into adolescence, i.e. to make
him dependent on things on which he is, in fact,
no longer dependent, and thrusting him into problems
that are, in fact, no longer problems to him. Ignoble
because it amounts to an attempt to exploit man's
weakness for purposes that are alien to him and to which
he has not freely consented. Unchristian because it
confuses Christ with one particular stage in man's
religiousness, i.e. with human law. 212
So we should frankly face the facts about the reality of the world,
213
and 'recognize that the world, and people, have come of age . . . .'
209 Ibid., cf. Bonhoeffer, CHRIST0L0GY, p.60, and CREATION AND FALL, pp.49-50.
210 Bonhoeffer, LPP, pp.311-12.
211 Ibid., p.341.
212 Ibid., p.327.
213 Ibid., p.346. Cf. Hamilton, LIFE IN ONE'S STRIDE, p.60:
'Perhaps the major ambiguity present in Bonhoeffer's last phase
of thought lies in his apparent implicit acceptance of a progressive
view of history (a view he explicitly rejects) through his use
of the term "man come of age."' Indeed, it is this that has
caused Bonhoeffer's interpreters such difficulty, but the
ambiguity rests, in my judgment in the failure to distinguish
between the two approaches, empirical and theological, that
Bonhoeffer finds converging in Jesus Christ.
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(2) Because the Incarnate One has bound into a single unity
the reality of God and the reality of the world, Bonhoeffer is free to
examine the worldly realm, from the mundane to the momentous, and if
he discovers certain facts, such as its religionlessness, then these
must have a parallel theological explanation; there are not two spheres,
one holy and one profane, but a single arena of reality encompassing
both God and humanity. This means that if his empirico-historical
assessment of the world's movement towards autonomy locates its rise in
the thirteenth century, 'his understanding of faith enables him, and
21
compels him, to place this movement in the very heart of Christianity.'
Advancing to the theological perspective, Bonhoeffer writes:
So our coming of age leads us to a true recognition
of our situation before God. God would have us know
that we must live as men who manage our lives with¬
out him. The God who is with us is the God who
forsakes us (Mark 15.34). The God who lets us live
in the world without the working hypothesis of God
is the God before whom we stand continually. Before
God and with God we live without God. God lets him¬
self be pushed out of the world on to the cross.
He is weak and powerless in the world, and that is
precisely the way, the only way, in which he is
with us and helps us. Matt. 8.17 makes it quite
clear that Christ helps us, not by virtue of his
omnipotence, but by virtue of his weakness and
suffering. 215
214 Ronald Gregor Smith, SECULAR CHRISTIANITY (London:
Collins, 1966), p.180. Thus I think Kenneth Hamilton
is far from correct when he writes: 'It is quite
mistaken to imagine that he regarded "secularization"
as having decidedly Christian roots.'. . . LIFE IN
ONE'S STRIDE, p.57.
215 Bonhoeffer, LPP, p.360.
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This is a critical passage - clearly the fulfilment of what has
preceded it and the clue to what follows. The world's coming of age
has a theological basis, for it is grounded in the reality of God.
What is the inner meaning of the world's experience? It is the
experience of Christ on the cross. From the premise that God's
reality and the world's reality are united in the Incarnate One,
and by comparing this premise with the actual contemporary state of
the world, Bonhoeffer makes some important deductions: the reality
of God granted us is Christ crucified; the reality of our present
age is the experience of spodforsakenness, i.e., Christ crucified.
'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' is the cry of reality -
both God's and the world's. The God before whom we live is at once the
forsaking God and the forsaken God, and the world in which we live
is both abandoned by God and the reality of God in his abandonment.
The world come of age is the experience of the cross of Jesus Christ.
Its autonomy and loss of God result from the actual godforsakenness
of Christ; yet because Christ is the Son of God, it is also the
experience of God himself in weakness and suffering.
Bonhoeffer looked at man in his day and saw in
the spirit humanity going forward to 'a completely
religionless time.' And there came upon him, as
it were, with elemental power the final meaning
of what was happening, that it was the Passion
of Christ himself which was taking place in our
time! God permits himself anew to be nailed to
the Cross for the salvation of man; he chooses
helplessness for our sakes. The Crucified makes
himself present anew as the Crucified for our
sakes. This thought took a strong hold upon
Bonhoeffer. 216
216 Ott, REALITY AND FAITH, p.111. See also p.373.
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Here is the final flowering of an incarnational christology
rooted in the finitum capax infiniti and communicatio idiomatum.
Humanity can encompass the reality of God, according to Bonhoeffer,
and the attributes of God himself can be communicated to human nature.
In Jesus Christ the Incarnate One, God and the world were united into
a single reality. This does not mean they are identical, but it does
mean that when one experiences the reality of this world, one enters
into the experience of God himself. In our time, the attribute
communicated to human nature is not the omnipotence and power of God,
but his weakness and suffering. This is the reality we undergo as
we participate in the event of Calvary; it is ours in Jesus Christ.
(3) Throughout his life Bonhoeffer summoned the Church to enter
reality, to dismount from its miserable hack, throw down its rusty
sword, and give up fighting windmills as if they were giants. And
this was his call to the end. Having identified reality as the
cross of Christ, he issued again the plea:
Man is summoned to share in God's sufferings at
the hands of a godless world. He must therefore
really live in the godless world, without attempting
to gloss over its ungodliness in some religious way
or another. He must live a 'secular' life, and
thereby share in God's sufferings ....
It is not the religious act that makes a Christian,
but participation in the sufferings of God in the
secular life. That is metanoia: not in the first
place thinking about one's own needs, problems,
sins, and fears, but allowing oneself to be caught
up into the way of Jesus Christ, into the messianic
event, thus fulfilling Isa. 53. 217
Pig
The Christian is profoundly this-worlaly;~ that is to say, one who
217 Bonhoeffer, LPP, pp.361-62.
218 Ibid., p.369.
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enters the reality of Jesus Christ, the reality of the godforsaken
world. In Christ, he participates in both the silent suffering of
God and the self-giving sacrifice of the Son. This is, it seems to
me, the way we can achieve at least a partial understanding of
219
Bonhoeffer's notion of the 'secret discipline..1
His view of the Church has undergone quite a transformation
along the way of his theological pilgrimage. Whereas he first
understood it as the place of reality, now it has become for him
an incognito presence in the one reality of God and world - a
discipline of silence that will in some way protect the mysteries
220
of the faith. Bonhoeffer is frank that he is not exactly sure
what the Church will be like in the new world situation, but is
certain it will need to hold its tongue until a new, perhaps non-
221
religious, language emerges." In the meantime, the Christian
222
life will be marked by 'prayer and righteous action.'
219 Ibid., pp.281, 286, 300.
220 Ibid., p.286.
221 Ibid., p.300. Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
I LOVED THIS PEOPLE, trans. Keith R. Crim (Richmond:
John Knox Press, 1965), pp.49-50, where, in a fragment
from a play written in prison, Bonhoeffer wrote:
'I tell you to guard from misuse the great words which
have been given to man. They do not belong in the
mouth of the masses and in the headlines of the news¬
papers, but in the hearts of the few who will guard
and protect them with their lives.'
222 Bonhoeffer, LPP, p.300.
60
„Bethge stated it well when he commented:
It is a disturbing thing for the Church that at
the end of his theological activity Bonhoeffer
gives us no completed ecclesiology that we can
get hold of, but leaves this, of all things,
entirely open. 223
Clearly, Bonhoeffer was pointing the way to something new -
something that would need much careful thought. We are left with
a feeling of incompleteness and are not quite sure what to do with
the Church after Bonhoeffer has argued so forcefully for the one
reality of God that admits no barriers or distinctions between
separate spheres. We can place the 'secret discipline' within the
general structure of his thought, however, and by that perhaps
provide some illumination.
Consider, first, the silence. If Christians enter the reality
of God and experience the contemporary suffering of Christ on the
cross, then that means they will participate in the rejection God
endures by allowing himself to be pushed out of the world and ignored.
224
'Christians stand by God in his hour of grieving.' They will enter
into the suffering silence of the one who was oppressed and afflicted
yet opened not his mouth (Is. 53.7). Given the non-religious change
in affairs, the Church is not really sure yet how to express the
mysteries of the faith, anyway. So from the fact of its participation
223 Bethge, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, p.790. Of. Ronald Gregor Smith,
THE NEW MAN - CHRISTIANITY AND MAN'S COMING OF AGE (London:
SCM Press Ltd., 1956), p.104. Here Smith vastly over¬
values the 'secret discipline' when he writes: 'This
is the heart of his thought.'
224 Bonhoeffer, LPP, p.349.
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in the reality of the suffering God, and from the standpoint of its
uncertainties about proclamation, the silence of the Church itself
becomes a witness.
As to righteous action, that too is the result of participating
in the reality of God. It is 'allowing oneself to be caught up into
225
the way of Jesus Christ.' At the cross, God revealed himself in
Christ to be a God of love who sacrifices himself for others. In
Christ, where his reality is made concrete for us, his transcendence
is his 'being there for others.' In notes outlining a proposed book,
Bonhoeffer wrote:
Who is God? Not in the first place an abstract
belief in God, in his omnipotence etc. That is
not!a genuine experience of God but: a partial
extension of the world. Encounter with Jesus
Christ. The experience that a transformation of
all human life is given in the fact that 'Jesus
is there only for others.' His 'being there for
others'is the experience of transcendence. It
is only this 'being there for others,' maintained
till death, that is the ground of his omnipotence,
omniscience, and omnipresence. Faith is participation
in this being of Jesus (incarnation, cross and resur¬
rection). Our relation to God is not a 'religious'
relationship to the highest, most powerful, and
best Being imaginable - that is not authentic
transcendence - but our relation to God is a new
life in 'existence for others ,' through participation
in the being of Jesus. 226
The Christian is the one who has faith in Jesus, which is to say,
the one who has entered God's reality in him. The current historical




godforsakenness of modern secularity (with all the suffering and
silence this will entail for the Church), and the second is the this-
worldly transcendence of God in Christ as the man for others. The
cross reveals God's surrender to the needs of others, a sacrifice
encompassing transcendence. Hence, to enter into Christ, to participate
in his being, is to share in the authentic transcendence of 'being
227
there for others.' 'The church is the church only when it exists
2?Q
for others.' ~ Its self-giving should be concrete, as concrete as
Christ himself. Therefore, as a start, the Church should 'give
229
away all its property to those in need,' The identity of the Church
of religionless Christianity is this: 'being herself in not wanting
anything for herself. 1 ^
Into one sphere of reality, Jesus has united, by his incarnation,
God and human life. The reality of this world is the reality of God.
If this world is apparently godless, then it is because God has granted
to us this experience of his reality - the experience of the cross.
227 'Encounter with the "being of Jesus for others" is the
experience of transcendence - this worldly transcendence.
There can be no doubt that Bonhoeffer finally has
committed himself wholeheartedly to the kind of Lutheran
development Barth deplored, with all its risks. The
finite world is_ capable of the infinite.:, this world
bears the other world, and it does so in Christ's absolute
givenness "for others."' Phillips, THE FORM OF CHRIST
IN THE WORLD, p.197. ~
228 Bonhoeffer, LPP, p.382.
229 Ibid.
230 Bethge, BONHOEFFER - EXILE AND MARTYR, p.153.
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Thus faith leads us into the reality of God's suffering in the
world. We share in his godforsakenness through our secularity
and the silent discipline we maintain about the mysteries of
faith. Faith also leads us to participate in the reality of the
cross through being-for-others, for at the cross the transcendence
of God was revealed concretely in Jesus, the man for others.
Participation in his being is righteous action - sacrifice for
others.
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C. The Triumph of Reality
By tracing the route of Bonhoeffer's short but significant
theological pilgrimage, we have seen a theology evolve through
different stages, yet remain christocentric throughout. With
unwavering consistency Bonhoefferendeavoured to grasp the meaning
of God's revelation in Jesus Christ. In the Incarnate, Crucified,
and Resurrected One, he saw a God who has restructured reality,
uniting himself to, and transforming, the reality of the world.
Through Christ, God entered our world of space and time, and thus
his is not simply a spiritual presence, but fully concrete and
visible. Where is the place of Jesus Christ in this world?
Bonhoeffer, at the beginning of his career, pointed to the Church;
at the end, to the world. What was it about his theology that
led to this change? The answer is found, not in a basic christoiogical
change, but in the progressive working-out of a christology grounded
firmly in a distinctively Lutheran incarnationalism.
At the outset of his theological labours, Bonhoeffer
identified the Church as the place of Jesus Christ on earth. It
was, he thought, the sphere of restructured reality. The Confessing
Church struggle provided an arena in which his theology found clear
expression and, at the same time, met its limitations. Throughout
this period he emphasized the ontological distinctiveness of the
Church. Because it is the fellowship of God's people called out of
darkness into light, it is not afraid to face boldly the question
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of boundaries. It has a space in this world, and when its
proclamation is met with resistance, it joins battle in confessional
witness, thereby marking its boundaries as an act of love for the
world. But a question emerged: Can. one encounter Christ outside
the bounds of the Church? In his activity.in the resistance
movement, Bonhoeffer encountered men and women of the world who
fully accepted the reality of the tragic days in which they lived,
and, with sacrifice, accepted responsibility for it - a fact
which must have added urgency to this question.
The answer came from the centre of his theology itself. The
boundaries were pushed back, like rippling waves moving forth in
wider circles from a splash in the middle of a pond. The centre
remained Jesus Christ, but as Bonhoeffer logically followed the
impulse of his understanding of the incarnation, the sphere of God's
231
restructured reality moved from the Church to the world.
Working with the corollary premises, finitum capax irrfiniti and
the genus majestaticum, Bonhoeffer finally rejected all dualism. In
Jesus Christ the finite received the infinite: the reality of God
231 Cf. Anderson, HISTORICAL TRANSCENDENCE AND THE REALITY
OF GOD, pp.77-98, and Hamilton, LIFE IN ONE'S STRIDE,
p.59, for explanations about the change in Bonhoeffer
which identify it as his new concern for the Church's
relationship to the world, after having established its
identity in the world. This mission emphasis does not
account for the loss of boundaries between the Church
and world, and the theological affirmation of the
historical movement toward secularism as the contemporary
experience of God's reality.
66
was communicated to the reality of this world, the two becoming a
single unity, and in that one reality, God and the world are ontologically
united in such a way that divine transcendence is this-worldly, and
worldliness itself an experience of the reality of God.
In the unfolding of this incarnational approach what happened
to Bonhoeffer's conception of the Church? How are we to understand
the change from an early emphasis on its uniqueness, its separation
from the world as the place of Jesus Christ, to his final thoughts
about a somewhat enigmatic 'secret discipline' in the one reality
of God? Andre Dumas asks:
Did Bonhoeffer give up an attempt to interpret
Christ and the church in concrete terms, and
was he convinced that only an 'anonymous
Christianity' (immersed in the secularity of
the world and living a sort of double life
between existence for others in a godless world
and the ' secret discipline' before God and with
God) could now correspond to the form that the
presence of Christ in reality ought to take?
Did he feel that the concretizing of the church
was a hindrance to the human freedom of Christ,
understood as this-worldly transcendence? 232
Though acknowledging that these questions must be left open, since
only Bonhoeffer himself could offer an explanation as to where his
thought was leading, Dumas believes it would be very surprising if
233
this interpretation corresponded to his ongoing task. He argues
that 'from a supposed evolution in Bonhoeffer's thought one might








However, this could not be the case, in his judgment, for Bonhoeffer
would then have suffered defeat in his battle for God in the midst
of reality, since it would entail a final diminution of God's
reality - 'a new dualism between the visibility of the world and
235
the invisibility of faith.'
Perhaps, though, Dumas has missed the point. Has not Bonhoeffer
so identified God with the reality of the world that any diminution
of God's reality, through an invisible faith or any other means, is
rendered logically impossible? If the incarnational triumph of the
one reality has so completely annihilated its opposing dualism, then
the result is that however invisible faith - or even the Church -
may be, God's reality will always be as visible and concrete as
the world in which we live.
This is not to say that one can see in the prison letters a
final destruction of all distinction between Church and world.
There remains the arcane discipline, and 'this means he had no
intention of simply including the religionless world within the
236
Church or making the Church and the world the same thing.'
Nevertheless, it must also be said that this concept seems to be
held in tension with the general thrust of this theology - a pause,
as it were, before following his theological journey to the end.
Admitting that for Bonhoeffer there remained a place (though not
clearly defined) for the Church in the world, may we not legitimately
ask, however, whether the movement of his thought was such that it
235 Ibid.
236 Bethge, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, p.785. See also Bethge,
BONHOEFFER - EXILE AND MARTYR, pp.150-51, and
Godsey, THE THEOLOGY OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, p.271.
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inevitably demands a releasing of even this minimal view of the
Church's distinctiveness as a piece of baggage no longer useful in
the world's pilgrimage to a fully christocentric secularity?
Has not Bonhoeffer's ontological uniting of the reality of God and
the reality of the world pulled the foundation stones out from
under any wall marking off the Church as fundamentally different
from the world?
Though Dumas, it seems to me, has not sufficiently grasped
the full ecclesiological implications in Bonhoeffer's incarnationalism,
he has pin-pointed the central difficulty, i.e., his Lutheran emphasis
'in which the incarnation is in danger of ceasing to be the word of
revelation _to reality and of being transformed into the ongoing
237
structure of reality.' In this ontological realism, Christ
ceased to be the revelatory Word of God and becomes, as it were,
a polyphonic presence in the midst of the world around us, 'as
though the incarnation has transformed Christ into the Dionysius
238
of the earth.' Those who would defend Bonhoeffer to the end
must finally answer this objection. It is significant that Bonhoeffer
views the 'secret discipline' as a silent affair. Though he was
concerned at one point with the problems of speech in a non-religious
age, at the end he left no real place for proclamation in the Church's
life; prayer and righteous action - yes, but not preaching. The
Word which encounters us, at times over against our will, calling
237 Dumas, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, p.235.
238 Ibid., p. 273.;
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us to turn from the poverty of our proud autonomy, becomes a
devalued commodity in a theological market-place which has as its
monetary standard an incarnationalism which grants worth to the
world's independence, discovering in it the riches of a mature
freedom before God. When the vertical dimension of transcendence
is swallowed up in an horizontal this-worldliness, objective
encounter is ruled out infavourof participation. For Bonhoeffer,
one participates experientially in the ontological reality of God —
a reality which is one with the reality of the world. Thus,
for example, the experience of this world's secular autonomy is
actually participation in God's experience of the cross. The
crucifixion of Christ ceases to be a Word of judgment and recon¬
ciliation addressed to the world; instead, it becomes a kind of
239
principle that explains the experience of modern life.
This leads to a second observation: not only has Bonhoeffer's
incarnationalism led to an abandonment of any ontological dis¬
tinction between Church and world, it has finally resulted in an
a-historical theology. This is particularly ironic, given Bonhoeffer's
urgent desire to grasp fully the historical and empirical reality
239 'The Crucified makes himself present anew as the
Crucified for our sakes. This thought took a
strong hold upon Bonhoeffer. He sought to make
it a kind of "principle"; perhaps this had to
be "the starting point for secular interpretation."'
Ott, REALITY AND FAITH, p.111.
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of the world. In spite of all his concern for the concrete
reality of the world, his theologia crucis appears, at the end,
to be based more on a principle than an event in space and time in
241
which God acted extra nos on our behalf, once and for all.
Given the fact that God and the world became a unity in his
incarnationalism, Bonhoeffer was, in effect, compelled to find a
theological rationale for the present secularity of the world.
The cross provided the interpretative principle, and accordingly,
the contemporary experience of godlessness was seen by him to be
nothing less than participation in the godforsakenness of the cross
that is, the experience of his reality God grants to us in our
time is the Passion of Christ. But notice: in taking this step,
240 Though I take a somewhat different approach, I am
partially indebted to Hans Schmidt's article,
'The Cross of Reality?', WORLD COME OF AGE, ed.
Ronald Gregor Smith, pp.215-55. He points out
3onhoeffer's return to the non-redemptive-
historical Yahwehism of Israelite Wisdom
literature. Cf. also Bonhoeffer, CREATION AND
FALL, p.68, where Bonhoeffer describes the
serpent's 'Did God say?' as a thoroughly religious
question in which evil was making claim to be the
power behind the Word of God. 'On the basis of an
idea, a principle, some previously gained knowledge
about God, man is now to judge God's concrete Word.'
241 Cf. the language of The Letter to the Hebrews:
'. . .he entered once for all in the Holy Place. . .'
(9;12) 'But as it is, he has appeared once for all
at the end of the age to put away sin by the sacrifice
of himself. And just as it is appointed for men to die
once, and after that comes judgment, so Christ, having
been offered once to bear the sins of many. . .'(9:26-27)
'. . .We have been sanctified through the offering
of the body of Jesus Christ once for all.' (10:10)
'. . .Christ had offered for all time a single
sacrifice. . .'(10:12) 'For by a single offering he has
perfected for all time those who are sanctified.' (10:14)
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Bonhoeffer has pulled the rug out from under a concrete, historical,
substitutionary atonement. Whereas the New Testament speaks of
Christ's death in the aorist past tense, Bonhoeffer translates it
into the present. Whereas the apostolic witness points to one who
stood in our place, thus securing our redemption, Bonhoeffer has
us undergoing ourselves the ultimate curse of sin: abandonment by
God. We must therefore ask whether Bonhoeffer's theology finally
leads to an undermining of the sola gratia. If the world itself
experiences Christ's godforsakenness, then is it not, in a sense,
its own saviour? Bonhoeffer himself would never have gone this far,
but that is inconsequential to the question whether his final theological
position does not actually lead in that direction. That Bonhoeffer
stopped short of this final step is a confirmation of his loyalty
to Scripture and basic Reformation theology, but it is not necessarily
a witness to his theological consistency. If divine reality and
human reality have become so ontologically united that humanity is
presently enduring the wrath of God against sin, then is not humanity
242
at least a co-labourer in its own salvation?
There remains this final animadversion: it appears that for all
243
his efforts to place God at the centre, Bonhoeffer is finally
242 Certainly there is a sense in which the New Testament calls
us to participate in Christ's sufferings (as e.g., Paul
in Phil. 3:10), but it is clearly referring to a present
identification with an historically accomplished event.
By faith, Christ's once-for-all death has become my
death, and in him I endure the cross, but only in him.
Because he is my representative, I die the death I
deserve. Bonhoeffer seems to have lost the critical
element of substitution, in so far as Christ's Passion
is understood as an interpretation principle for the
world's present experience.
243 See Bonhoeffer, CREATION AND FALL, pp.73, 85, 93;
CHRISTOLOGY, p.60; and LPP, p.282.
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guilty of locating him at the limits of human experience. 'The God
who is with us,' he wrote, 'is the God who forsakes us ... . God
244
lets himself be pushed out of the world on to the cross.' The
present godlessness of the world is but an experience of the fact
that God has allowed himself to be 'pushed out of the world.' God,
therefore, is no longer at the centre, but marginal - the One who
is limited by his weakness and suffering at the hands of this world.
The 'Cross of Reality' led to a misunderstanding
of the cross of Jesus Christ. Because for
Bonhoeffer this world appeared to be left to its
own resources precisely through the word of God,
God could no longer be thought of by him as the
one who does his work in and with the world,
but only as its last limit. 245
By pursuing his incarnational presuppositions to the end,
namely, the finitum capax infiniti and genus maiestaticum of his
Lutheran tradition, Bonhoeffer married together the realities of
God and the world in such a way that the union gave birth to a
theology which came very close in the end to having a world without
the Church, and even finally, without God.
244 Bonhoeffer, LPP, p.360.
245 Schmidt, 'The Cross of Reality?', p.253.
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CHAPTER II
THE LOSS OF DISTINCTION FROM ABOVE:
TRANSCENDENCE AND BEING IN THE
THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH
I want to tell you now about the insects to whom
God gave 'sensual lust' .... I am that insect,
brother, and it is said of me specially. All we
Karamazovs are such insects, and, angel as you are,
that insect lives in you, too, and will stir up a
tempest in your blood. Tempests, because sensual
lust is a tempest - worse than a tempest! Beauty
is a terrible and awful thing! It is terrible because
it has not been fathomed, for God sets us nothing but
riddles. Here the boundaries meet and all contra¬
dictions exist side by side. I am not a cultivated
man, brother, but I've thought a lot about this.
It's terrible what mysteries there are! 246
Torn by the tempestuous yet mysterious beauty of his
sensuality, Dostoevsky's Dmitri Karamazov saw his life as the
place where 'boundaries meet and all contradictions exist side by
side.' Similarly, when Paul Tillich was asked to give an account.
of the development of his ideas, he wrote: 'I thought that the
concept of the boundary might be the fitting symbol for the whole
247
of my personal and intellectual development.' This self-analysis
serves as a fitting introduction to the thought of one of the most
influential theologians of this century - provided we keep in mind
the fact that boundaries not only designate divisions, but more
importantly (for Tillich's thought at least), mark the places where
246 Fyodor Dostoevsky, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV, trans.
Constance Garnett (London: William Heinemann, 1912), p.106.
247 Paul Tillich, ON THE BOUNDARY - AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
(London: Collins, 1967), p.13.
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different realms adjoin. His mind seemed to be situated on the
borderlands linking nineteenth century idealism with twentieth century
existentialism, philosophy with theology, and morality, culture,
and politics with religion. Beyond his varied intellectual interests,
moreover, Tillich himself was a boundary, uniting, as it were,
the brothers Karamazov in his own life: he singularly combined
the intellectual rigour of an Ivan, the passionate eros of a Dmitri,
and the spiritual mysticism of an Alyosha.
Like Bonhoeffer, Paul Tillich was personally touched by some of
the human suffering which followed in the wake of the Nazi Party's
crushing drive for totalitarian power. Fortunately, Tillich did
not lose his life, but he was among the first professors dismissed
248
from university positions when Hitler came to power in 1933.
249
His book THE SOCIALIST DECISION was an unequivocal rejection of
Nazi ideology, but, as it turned out, was published too late to
have any noticeable influence on current affairs. "//hen Hitler
248 In addition to ON THE BOUNDARY, Tillich wrote two other
autobiographical sketches: see 'Author's Introduction' in
Paul Tillich, THE PROTESTANT ERA, trans. James Luther Adams
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp.IX-XXIX;
and Paul Tillich, 'Autobiographical Reflections,' ln~.THE THEOLOGY
OF PAUL TILLICH, ed. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall
(New York: Macmillan, 1952), pp.3-21. The most comprehensive
biographical study of Tillich is Wilhelm and Marion Pauck,
PAUL TILLICH - HIS LIFE AND THOUGHT (London: Collins, 1977).
Equally interesting, though understandably less objective,
is Hannah Tillich, FROM TIME TO TIME (London: George Allen
and Unwin Ltd., 1974).
249 Paul Tillich, THE SOCIALIST DECISION, trans. Franklin Sherman
(New York: Harper & Row, 1977).
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came to dictatorial power it was promptly banned and the publishers
250
forbidden to circulate it/ Among other things, the book placed
him high on the new regime's list of enemies and inevitably led
to his academic dismissal. Germany's loss, however, was America's
gain, as Tillich accepted a post with combined teaching responsibilities
at Union Theological Seminary and Columbia University. The United
States became 'home' for the Tillichs, and thus arose the anomaly
of a major German theologian whose chief works had to be translated
from English into German.
To explain Tillich's theological method, we would do well to
return to the notion of the boundary, and add yet one more geographical
image: the mountain. If we can imagine standing on a boundary,
and, at the same time, on the summit of the highest mountain, we have
a good picture of Tillich's approach to theology. From the heights,
he has a panoramic view of reality: on the one side, he looks down
into the depths of human existence, and on the other, he surveys the
truths of eternity. 'Theology,' he writes, 'moves back and forth
between two poles, the eternal truth of its foundation and the
251
temporal situation in which the eternal truth must be received.'
Theology must therefore own up to its apologetic task; it must be
'answering theology.' 'It answers the questions implied in the
250 Pauck, PAUL TILLICH - HIS LIFE AND THOUGHT, p.128.
251 Paul Tillich, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY - Vol.1
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), p.3.
(hereafter cited as ST I).
76
"situation" in the power of the eternal message and with the means
252
provided by the situation whose questions it answers.' Thus the
theologian must constantly balance between two poles, or - in
our imagery - must look out from the mountain into two different
realms. It was a great mistake of kerygmatic theology, Tillich
believes, to fix its gaze solely upon revelation, without correlating
it with 'a courageous participation in the "situation," that is,
in all the various cultural forms which express modern man's
253
interpretation of his existence.' Tillich sets out to redress the
imbalance, explaining his approach in this way:
. . . . it is necessary to seek a theological method
in which message and situation are related in such a
way that neither of them is obliterated .... The
following system is an attempt to use the 'method
of correlation' as a way of uniting message and
situation. It tries to correlate the questions implied
in the situation with the answers implied in the message.
It does not derive the answers from the questions as a
self-defying apologetic theology does. Nor does it
elaborate answers without relating them to the
questions as a self-defying kerygmatic theology does-
It correlates questions and answers, situations and
message, human experience and divine manifestation. 254
So this is the method: Tillich intends to look at one moment
into the 'situation' of contemporary human existence, and the next
into the adjoining province of the eternal message. And this is the





elevation to see clearly into both-the dominion of humanity and
the dominion of God.
But what shall guide him in the use of his method? Tillich
lists two formal criteria: first, 'the object of theology is
255
what concerns us ultimately~ and second, 'our ultimate concern
256
is that which determines our being or not being.' With a vast
panorama of God and humanity spread before him, and thus also
infinite possibilities for contemplation, the theologian's vision
is specifically directed to look beyond preliminary concerns and
focus solely on those things which are of 'ultimate concern.'
And a concern is 'ultimate' if it has to do with that which has
the power of threatening or saving our being.
255 Ibid., p.12.
256 Ibid., p.14.
A. A Panoramic View
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Tillich's entire theological system is structured according
to the 'method of correlation': the question - answer dialectic
is its formal organizing principle. Thus his theology is organized
into five major questions correlated with five major answers: the
question of reason, and the answer of revelation; the question of
being, and the answer of God; the question of existence, and the answer
of Christ; the question of life, and the answer of the Spirit; the
257
question of history, and the answer of the kingdom of God. The
boundary situation in which he has placed himself has provided an
excellent vantage-point from which to examine human existence. From
this view, five central questions emerge. For the answers, he turns
and looks - where? He has already laid down the general guidelines
the theologian must be governed by 'ultimate concern.' But now the
inevitable question of authority is raised. Granted that ultimate
answers are what the theologian seeks, how is he to know which
answers are authoritative?
In identifying the sources from which the answers emerge for
systematic correlation with the 'situation,' Tillich lists several.
The Bible, of course, is an important source, even 'the basic' because
'it is the original document about the events on which the Christian
258
church is founded.' However, it is not the only source, as
257 These pairs of questions and answers form the five parts of
Tillich's SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. Parts I and II comprise ST I.
Part III is SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY - Vol.11 (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1957) (hereafter cited as ST II), and Parts IV
and V of the system make up SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY - Vol.Ill
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963) (hereafter
cited as ST? III). This chapter will focus principally upon
Tillich's SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. Finished at the end of his career,
it forms the final and most comprehensive presentation of his
thought.
258 Tillich, ST I, p.35.
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'neo-orthodox biblicism' asserts. 'The biblical message cannot be
understood and could not have been received had there been no
259
preparation for it in human religion and culture.' And furthermore,
the biblical message presupposes a receiving Church. Therefore,
the history of the Church and dogma, and even the history of religion
260
and culture, are important sources for systematic theology. Thus,
261
the survey of the sources shows 'their almost unlimited richness.'
Certainly there are 'degrees of importance' in these sources, the
most important bearing a more direct relationship to the 'central
event on which the Christian faith is based, the appearance of the
262
New Being in Jesus as the Christ,' but the multiplicity of sources
263
indicates the intellectual openness required of the theologian.
The various sources are gathered up by the theologian and mediated
through his experience. Experience itself is not a source, but is
264
the necessary medium through which the sources speak to us.
Though experience receives and does not produce, it does have the
power to transform what is given to it. Thus Tillich is anxious to





263 This openness readily reveals itself in Tillich's system and is
shown by his amazing breadth of interests. He is as quick to
call up a quotation from Greek philosophy or mythology as from
Scripture; depth psychology is as easily drawn upon as dogma;
the history of culture as readily analyzed as the history of
the Church.
264 Tillich, ST I, p.40.
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experience so that theology becomes mere repetition instead of
transformation, and the excessive influence of experience by which
265
a new production results instead of a transformation.
Now if the theologian has before him a rich variety of
sources, all of which will be mediated through his experience,
this question arises : What will be the norm to which the sources
and experience must be subjected? According to Tillich, there is
no one, universally valid norm for systematic theology. 'The norm
grows; it is not produced intentionally; its appearance is not
the work of theological reflection but of the Spiritual life of
P00
the church, for the church is the "home" of systematic theology.'-
What does Tillich mean by 'the Spiritual life of the church?'
It appears that he means that the norm evolves out of the Church's
encounter with its contemporary culture. He writes:
It is not an exaggeration to say that today man
experiences his present situation in terms of
disruption, conflict, self-destruction, meaninglessness,
and despair in all realms of life. This experience is
expressed in the arts and in literature, conceptualized
in existential philosophy, actualized in political
cleavages of all kinds, and analyzed in the psychology
of the unconscious .... The question arising out of
this experience is not, as in the Reformation, the
question of a merciful God.and the forgiveness of sins;
nor is it, as in the early Greek church, the question
of finitude, of death and error; nor is it the
question of personal religious life or the Christianization
of culture and society. It is the question of a reality
in which the self-estrangement of our existence is over¬
come, a reality of reconciliation and reunion, of
creativity, meaning and hope. We shall call such a





So the present apologetic situation necessarily calls for the
/
answer 'New Being.1 This is the morm, says Tillich, to which the
sources and experience are to be subject. The circular nature of
Tillich's argument is glaringly evident: the multiplicity of
sources are mediated through experience; this calls for a norm
for both the sources and experience; the norm is the New Being;
the reason we know this is the norm is our experience. The
contemporary situation reveals to us the norm, by which we judge
the sources, which will give the answers to the question of the
P0Q
contemporary situation!~ Tillich, of course, would not want to
admit that the answers are derived from the questions. 'These
answers are contained in the revelatory events on which Christianity
is based and are taken by systematic theology from the sources,
269
through the medium, under the norm.' Nevertheless, inasmuch as
Tillich already has shown how the norm grows out of the same soil
as the questions, it is.difficult to see how he can be so certain
about which sources supply the proper answers. By starting with a
multiplicity of sources, none of which are authoritative in themselves,
Tillich is forced to locate the norm in human experience - the
263 It is no wonder that Karl Barth asked: 'Is man with his
philosophical questions, for Tillich, not more than simply
the beginning point of the development of this whole method
of correlation? Is he not, in that he himself knows which
questions to ask, anticipating their correctness, and there¬
fore already in possession of the answers and their consequences?'
Karl Barth, 'An Introductory Report By Karl Barth' in
THE SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH - A REVIEW AND
ANALYSIS, by Alexander J. McKelway (Richmond: John Knox
Press, 1964), p.13.
269 Tillich, ST I, p.64.
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situation which gives rise to the questions in the first place.
His distinction between the content and form of the answer (the
former derived from revelation and the latter from experience) is
not at all convincing. It is difficult to understand how he can
say that 'there is a mutual dependence between question and
270
answer, when clearly the question governs the answer: it
controls not only the way in which the answer is stated (form),
but also the content, inasmuch as it sits in judgment over the
answers, determining which one is authoritative.
Tillich quite consistently follows through with this accent
on experience as he unfolds his doctrine of revelation. The question,
to which revelation is the answer, arises from the nature of
human reason. Reason is torn apart by conflicts which ask for an
271
answer. 'Reason does not resist revelation. It asks for revelation,
072
for revelation means the reintegration of reason. Revelation does
not destroy reason; rather, it transcends the limits of rpason
(including the basic condition of finite reason: the subject-object
structure). It is , therefore, 'ecstatic reason.' Tillich says simply:
273
'there is no revelation without ecstacy.' Revelation is received
through ecstatic experience. This ecstasy does not just happen, as in
a vacuum; it is mediated in different ways. 'There is no reality,
thing, or event which cannot becom.e a bearer of the mystery of being
270 Ibid.
271 Tillich details the precise nature of the conflict as 'autonomy
against heteronorny, ' 'relativism against absolutism,' and




and enter into a revelatory correlation.1 Thus Tillich lists
nature, history, groups, individuals, and the word as all potential
275
media of revelation. Nothing can be excluded, because nothing
is included on the basis of special qualities. 'No person and no
276
thing is worthy in itself to represent our ultimate concern.'
Again the question of a criterion raises itself. Which -
and whose - ecstatic experience is normative? Christianity claims
that the revelation in Jesus as the Christ is final. 'Final'
does not mean last, according to Tillich, but genuine. 'It means
the decisive, fulfilling, unsurpassable revelation, that which is
277
the criterion of all others.' But what makes this particular
revelation final? Tillich's answer:
a revelation is final if it has the power of negating
itself without losing itself. This paradox is based
on the, fact that every revelation is conditioned by
the medium in and through which it appears. The
question of the final revelation is the question of a
medium of revelation which overcomes its own finite
conditions by sacrificing them, and itself with them-
He who is the bearer of the final revelation must sur¬
render his finitude - not only his life but also his
finite power and knowledge and perfection. In doing
so, he affirms that he is the bearer of final revelation
(the 'Son of God' in classical terms). He becomes
completely transparent to the mystery he reveals ....
In the picture of Jesus as the Christ we have the picture
of a man who possesses these qualities, a man who, there¬







Apparently for Tillich, then, revelation is not revelation in
the finite, but to the extent that it overcomes the finite. Whereas
279
John's Gospel speaks about the Word who became flesh, Tillich
seems to be saying that the flesh must sacrifice itself to the Word.
This has enormous significance for the development of his christology,
as we shall see, but at this point we must emphasize that Tillich
assumes that the ultimate cannot be expressed in the finite. On the
contrary, it is revealed most fully where the finite is overcome.
The question to Tillich then is: How does he know this?
On what basis has he asserted that the bearer of final revelation
'must' surrender his own finitude? Certainly he cannot appeal to
Scripture at this juncture, for by his own formulation, Scripture
is only one source among others; so also Church history and the
history of dogma. His analysis of the contemporary situation has
led him to affirm that the norm for these sources is the New Being,
but clearly this idea in itself has not provided him with ,this
fundamental insight about 'final revelation.' So the question keeps
returning: How does he know? How is it that he is in such a position
to be able to pronounce upon what revelation 'must' be like?
Perched on a high pinnacle, Tillich is somehow in possession of
a vast panorama overlooking not only human reality, but divine.
He has risen to such heights that he can see the proper relationship
between human existence and divine revelation; indeed, as he
279 John 1:14.
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correlates these two realms he is able to announce even the proper
nature of revelation. However, if we ask what it is he stands
upon which provides such a vast authoritative view, we see that
the ground beneath his feet is only as substantial as his own
intellect. That is to say, he is in fact standing on nothing out¬
side of himself, but has perched himself on a rationalistic mountain
of his own creation. With great speculative power,' Tillich has
created a synthesis of universal proportions. He numbers among
the great system builders 'for whom all things must be made to
serve their intellectual construction and for whom even what is
2qo
negative lives only from the positive which it denies*' Thus
Kenneth Hamilton argues that 'Tillich's system still stands firmly
281
in the Hegelian succession.'
Tillich would contend, against this charge, that he has taken
into account the existentialist reaction against Hegel. Has he not,
after all, systematically probed the human situation? Theology,
he told us, is about 'what concerns us ultimately.' This, he believes,
points to the existential character of religious experience. Calling
upon Kierkegaard, he declares that religion 'is a matter of infinite
232
passion and interest.' He criticizes the hybris ('self-elevation
toward the realm of the divine') by which Hegel placed himself on
280 Zahrnt, THE QUESTION OF GOD, p.302.
281 Kenneth Hamilton, THE SYSTEM AND THE GOSPEL - A CRITIQUE
OF PAUL TILLICH (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963), p.46.
282 Tillich, ST I, p.12.
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the throne of providence and contended that idealism in general
failed to see 'the gap between the unconditioned and the conditioned
28^
which no ontological or ethical self-elevation can bridge. This
gap, according to Tillich, can only be transcended 'in the power of the
285
transcendent, i.e., in faith.'
Has Tillich, then, sufficiently separated himself from the
'Hegelian succession' in which Hamilton has placed him? It is
true that, in the fabric of his system, he devotes much attention
to human existence, drawing especially on the existential analyses
of the human condition produced in this century (e.g., Heidegger),
but this is true only of the content of his system; methodologically,
it is a different matter. What Tillich does, in fact, is take up
the terminology of existentialism and incorporate it into his
system of universal truth. Tillich is often described as a Christian
existentialist, but such a label can hardly be justified. For he
has never held that existentialism is sufficient in itself fo provide
a comprehensive view of life. 'On the contrary, he has consistently
maintained that existentialist elements must be brought into relation
with their opposite (essentialist elements) within a rounded
- 283 Paul Tillich, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT FROM ITS
JUDAIC AND HELLENISTIC ORIGINS TO EXISTENTIALISM,
ed. Carl E. Braaten (New York; Simon and Schuster,
1967), p.414.
284 Tillich, THE PROTESTANT ERA, p.68.
285 Ibid.
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philosophy.' Since this is accomplished in the power of his own
thought, the system epistemologically evolves out of an idealistic
approach. Indeed, so he admits: 'I am epistemologically an idealist,
if idealism means the assertion of the identity of thought and
287
being as the principle of truth.'
If we raise again the question of authority, we can now more
fully understand his refusal to grant a normative power to any of the
multiple sources available to theology, for in the end, Tillich
himself is the authority. If he speaks about the New Being as
the theological norm for today, he knows this because of his
comprehensive analysis of the human situation, and if he believes
the Christ to be the New Being demanded by our times, the 'final
revelation,' it is because he has systematically worked out before-
286 Hamilton, THE SYSTEM AND THE GOSPEL, p.38. See also
Adrian Thatcher, THE ONTOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH,
(London: Oxford University Press, 1978), p.24.
287 Tillich, ON THE BOUNDARY, p.82. While Hamilton sees Tillich
in the 'Hegelian succession,' David Hopper more specifically
identifies Tillich's relationship with idealism by
attempting to show his dependence on Schelling.
According to Hopper, Tillich's basic ontological
frame of reference is found.in his 1912 dissertation
for the degree Licentiate of Theology, MYSTICISM AND
GUILT-CONSCIOUSNESS IN SCHELLING'S PHILOSOPHICAL
DEVELOPMENTS. (David Hopper, TILLICH: A THEOLOGICAL
PORTRAIT (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott,
1968), p.107.) Tillich seemed to confirm this, at least
in part, when he wrote: 'With respect to my ontological
thought generally, I want to state that it is much less
influenced by existentialism than by Aristotle and
Schelling' (a reply quoted in Gustave Weigel, 'The
Theological Significance of Paul Tillich' in
PAUL TILLICH IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT, ed. Thomas A. O'Meara
and Celestin D. Weisser (London: Darton, Longman and
Todd Ltd., 1965), p.23).
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hand what revelation 'must' be like. To the question of authority
he has answered in effect, 'My idea of theology
shall interpret the Christian faith. And the
authority by which it will act shall be the appeal
of the idea itself, backed by the coherence of my
system which will show the implications of the
idea and how it can be used to give an intelligible
picture of human life and the universe within
which life is lived.' 288
And it is this system which, by a strange irony, asserts
that for revelation to be final the finite 'must' be sacrificed to
the infinite. Tillich has formulated this principle not on the
authority of revelation itself, but by means of a finite projection
of thought which enables him rationally to grasp the nature of
the finite. Thus there emerges a serious flaw in Tillich's whole
theological system: his theological method contradicts his
theological content. His system is constructed out of the very
materials it later declares unusable. By means of finite reason,
he has developed a theology which asserts that the finite 'must'
be sacrificed to the infinite. Though he has set 'methodological
rationality' as one of the fundamental requirements of systematic
288 Hamilton, THE SYSTEM AND THE.GOSPEL, p.25.
Thus the principle argument of Hamilton's book
is that the system itself (Tillich's 'idea')
exerts totalitarian influence over its
interpretation of the Gospel. Though
Hamilton often gives way to harsh polemic,
his argument is, it seems to me, well
founded.
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theology, he has himself apparently violated this principle.
If Tillich has announced from the empyrean heights the
ecstatic character of revelation, and further has described
revelation as 'final' if it completely sacrifices the finite to
the infinite, there is a reason for this that emerges from within
the content of his theology. For the view from the mountain which
occupies his attention is what one might call a 'supra-trans¬
cendental God.' In order to demonstrate this, we must proceed
to an analysis of what is central for Tillich's theology : his
ontology.
The basic question which concerns theology is the question
of God, and for Tillich, 'God is the answer to the question implied
290
in being.' Thus the question of being is no mere ancillary
problem for theology to deal with. It is the raison d"etre for
the question about God.
291
'The ontological question is: what is being?' This question,
the question of being-itself, 'arises in something like a "metaphysical
292
shock" - the shock of possible non-being.' Faced with the fact
that he Fs rather than is not, a person asks what the is of his life





means, he asks about the nature of being. Because theology must
be apologetic, i.e., answering theology, this question, the most
. i
fundamental to human existence, will provide the form in which the
answer is cast. If 'God is the answer to the question implied in
being,' as Tillich asserts, then it is obvious that the way in
which being is analyzed is not a minor matter for Tillich's theology.
It is determinative for all that follows.
Tillich identifies 'the basic ontological structure' as that
which is the implicit condition for the ontological question; that
is, since a question presupposes an asking subject and an object
about which a question is asked, the subject-object structure of
being is presupposed. This in turn 'presupposes the self-world
294
structure as the basic articulation of being.'
At a second level of analysis, this basic structure can be
broken down into three polarities, the first of each corresponding
to the self-relatedness of being, and the second to the 'world'
295
part of the structure of being. These polarities are:
296 297
individualization and participation, dynamics and form, and
293 The question may be asked, Given his concern for
ontology, how does Tillich view the relationship
between theology and philosophy? Tillich's answer:
'Philosophy and theology ask the question of being.
But they ask it from different perspectives.
Philosophy deals with the structure of being itself;
theology deals with the meaning of being for us'
(ST I, p.22).
294 Ibid., p.164.




freedom and destiny. A thorough consideration of these 'ontological
elements' is beyond the scope of this chapter, but what is important
to note is that Tillich believes these polarities form the structure
of being. Being comprises both individual cent-redness (individual¬
ization) and relatedness to the world (participation); both the
potentiality and power of being (dynamics), and the structure for
creative vitality (form); and both personal independence (freedom)
299
and the situation in which the individual finds himself (destiny).
But being in itself does not give rise to the question about
God. What causes this is the possibility of nonbeing, the
'metaphysical shock.' Therefore, humanity is faced with the problem
of f initude. 'Being, limited by nonbeing is finitude.'
Because human beings have the power of self-transcendence, they
302
become aware of their finitude, and are thus thrust into anxiety.
The question of God thus becomes inevitable.
298 Ibid., pp.182ff.
299 In addition to the 'ontological elements,' Tillich
introduces a further 'level' of being, the
categories: 'Categories are the forms in which
the mind grasps and shapes reality' (p.192).
The four categories are time, space, causality,
and substance. The spatial limitations of this
chapter disallow any discussion of these, but
they do reveal the breadth of Tillich's ontology,





The question of God must be asked because the
threat of nonbeing, which man experiences as
anxiety, drives him to the question of being
conquering nonbeing and of courage conquering
anxiety. 303
The answer to this question arising out of the anxiety of
human finitude is God. God is not a being; 'the being of God is
being-itself.'^ If God were a being he would be subject to the
structure of being and the categories of finitude. But God can¬
not be subject to anything, for he radically transcends everything.
He is holy. His holiness 'makes it impossible to draw him into
the context of the ego-world and the subject-object correlation.
He himself is the ground and meaning of this correlation, not an
305
element within it.' Thus Tillich defines God as 'the ground
306
of being' - perhaps the most well-known phrase in his theology.
God is not subject to the structure of being; the structure is
307
grounded in him. He is_ the structure of being.
Tillich, therefore, vigorously champions the transcendence
of God. In fact, it could be argued that he is a supra-transcendentalist,





307 Ibid. David Hopper argues that in this Tillich has been
influenced by Schelling: 'God, Schelling finally asserted,
is all-embracing reality; God himself is the final
synthesis .... God transcends the cleavage of subject
and object.' Hopper, TILLICH: A THEOLOGICAL PORTRAIT,
pp. 119-20. " " ""
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God of traditional theology. He is no theist in the ordinary sense
of the word, for he rejects the idea of an 'existent,1 personal God.
To affirm this about God, according to Tillich, would mean that God
is necessarily a being alongside of other beings, and therefore
subject to the ontological structure and its elements. But God is
308
transcendent. He is thus being-itself, the ground of all being.
So Tillich introduces the phrase 'the God above God' as a way of
309
transcending theism. The 'God above God' is the power of being
which infinitely transcends every being and the totality of beings.
Does this mean then that God is non-personal? Hot exactly.
Tillich recognizes that 'according to every word of the Bible,
310
God reveals himself as personal.' But God cannot be personal in
the way 'personal' is normally understood. For if he was, he
would be found within the whole of reality, and then 'the whole of
311
reality' would be the transcendent concept. Nevertheless, God is
not less than personal. 'Being includes personal being; it does
not deny it. The ground of being is the ground of personal being,
312
not its negation.' God includes the personal, but also transcends
it. This means, therefore, that 'our encounter with the God who is a
person includes the encounter with the God who is the ground of
313
everything personal and as such not a person.
308 Paul Tillich, THE COURAGE TO BE (London: Collins, 1952;
reprinted, Fount Paperbacks, 1977) pp.178-79.
309 Ibid.
310 Paul Tillich, BIBLICAL RELIGION AND THE SEARCH FOR ULTIMATE





This emphasis on divine transcendence is what led Zahrnt
to write: 'One might say that Tillich's whole theology is
concentrated upon the first and second commandments. It contends
•314
for the deity of God against the misuse of his name. To
protect the holy from profanation, Tillich wages an iconoclastic
battle against all cognitive idols which limit the transcendent
otherness of God in any way.
To this end, Tillich introduces, as an important part of his
system, the use of symbols as a way of 'protecting the mystery of
God and preserving it from becoming something finite, directly
315
present, and within the world.' There is only one nonsymbolic
statement, according to Tillich: the statement that God is being-
itself. After this has been said, 'nothing else can be said about
316
God as God which is not symbolic.' A symbol is not merely a
sign, the latter bearing no necessary relation to that to which it
points, but 'participates in the reality of that for which it
317
stands.' Because 'everything participates in being-itself, '
31
finite reality can provide a symbolic basis for assertions about God.
314 Zahrnt, THE QUESTION OF GOD, p.301.
315 Ibid., p.318.
316 Tillich, ST I, p.239.
317 Ibid.
318 Ibid., p.240. Tillich thus affirms the analogia entis, but
denies it is the property of a questionable natural theology
which seeks to move from the finite to the infinite. It does,
however, give us 'our only justification of speaking at all
about God. It is based on the fact that God must be under¬
stood as being itself ' (ibid.).
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Nevertheless, though there is an identity, the symbol is not the
thing itself. The concept of symbol protects the radical trans¬
cendence of God; it preserves the absolute break between the
infinite and the finite.
As George McLean stated it, 'whatever might be said about his
projection of the divine beyond subject and object, it has provided
319
a defence of God's transcendence.' The question we must ask of
Tillich's theology, however, is whether Tillich has in fact
systematically described the transcendence of the God who has
revealed himself (including his holy otherness) in Jesus Christ and
the kerygma which witnesses to him. Does it not appear as if
Tillich, by relying so thoroughly on the power of his own reason,
has really arrived at an abstract transcendence to which he has
given the name 'God'? The irony, of course, is that Tillich is
able to describe the transcendence of God only by a massive act of
intellectual self-transcendence. Epistemologically, Tillich has
had to place himself in the absurd position of being a bit higher
than the absolutely highest, in order to see it all so clearly.
The result is an abstraction that, for all its lofty recognition
319 George F. McLean, 'Paul Tillich's Existential Philosophy
of Protestantism,' in PAUL TILLICH IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT,
ed. Thomas A. O'Meara and Celestin D. Weisser (London:
Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd., 1965), p.70. Tillich's
emphasis on transcendence has been noted by other inter¬
preters as well. See Anderson, HISTORICAL TRANSCENDENCE
AND THE REALITY OF GOD, p. 29; Nels F. Feme, 'Tillich's
View of the Church,' in THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH,
ed. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Brettal (New York:
Macmillan, 1952), p.251; and Thatcher, THE ONTOLOGY
OF PAUL TILLICH, pp.86-88.
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of divine holiness, profanes the deity of God by subjecting it to
its own 'transcendentalism.' More will be written about this later
in the thesis; now we must see what difficulty this abstract
transcendentalism leads to.
As Tillich's transcendentalism unfolds, a curious fact
emerges: it results in a-thorough-going immanentalism! By pushing
God into the heights he has firmly set him in the depths. When God
is conceived of as being itself, the reverse notion is not slow
in suggesting itself. Is not all being God? Or - more moderately
stated - does not all being somehow participate in the being of God?
By a way of a radical transcendence, Tillich was led to this radical
immanence. The result of the former can be atheism; the result of
the latter, pantheism. 'Not surprisingly, Tillich has been accused
320
of both.' Strictly speaking, however, Tillich is neither an
atheist nor a pantheist. He does not deny the reality of God, only
the God of theism who is a being alongside of others. And he does
not make a strict one-to-one correlation between the universe
and God, but since his theology identifies God as the ground of all
being, 'it must be classified as a monistic system standing in very
321
close relation to pantheism.' This transcendentalism of an immanental
character is revealed clearly in this passage of Tillich's:
320 Thatcher, THE ONTOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH, p.88.
321 Hamilton, THE SYSTEM AND THE GOSPEL, p.85.
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Being-itself infinitely transcends every finite
being. There is no proportion or gradation
between the finite and the infinite. There is
an absolute break, an infinite 'jump.' On the
other hand, everything finite participates in
being-itself and in its mystery. Otherwise it
would not have the power of being. 322
Tillich's 'on the other hand' points to the second major
contradiction in his theology - this time in the context itself:
Tillich seeks to conjoin, in one ontology, both a radical trans¬
cendence and a radical immanence. Adrian Thatcher has stated
the problem well:
How can the finite be essentially included within
being-itself, how can being-itself posit its opposite
non-tneing within itself in a dialectical process,
if being-itself is at the same time ineffable and
beyond characterization? How can that which is utterly
beyond any life-process also be the supporting ground
and moving power of them all? Two different concepts
of God and of being seem to be required if both-
God's transcendence and immanence are to be forced
so far apart in some contexts and held so close
together in others. 323
Tillich, of course, did not intend to create 'two different
concepts of God'; nevertheless, the contradiction created by his
abstract transcendentalism seems to require it. In reducing the
definition of God to 'being-itself,' which was an attempt to keep
God unlimited, Tillich walked into the house of immanentalism
322 Tillich, ST I, p.277.
323 Thatcher, THE ONTOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH, pp.86-87.
Cf. Hamilton, THE SYSTEM AND THE GOSPEL, pp.89ff.
Hamilton believes that Tillich 'separates the divine and
the human at one level of being, but that level is no
more than a preliminary one' (p.91). Tillich's real
intent, he contends, is to develop a monistic immanentalism.
Hamilton's theory, however, grants a consistency to Tillich's
thought that ignores the very real contradiction created
by an abstract transcendentalism described in an
immanentalistic way.
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through the back door, so to speak. Ironically, we are back to
where Bonhoeffer left us, only this time not via an incarnationalism,
but by way of a transcendentalism uneasy with the notion of
324
incarnation.
Now if God is being-itself, the ground of all being, one
would reasonably expect all being to participate in the perfections
of God. The human experience, of course, provides overwhelming
evidence to the contrary. Our existential experience is one of
suffering and shame. How can our being be God's being? To refer
again to the Karamazov brothers, is not life as we experience it,
more often represented by the passionate, broken life of Dmitri
than by the mystical purity of Alyosha?
In Tillich's system this fact is dealt with through the
distinction made between essence and existence. For Tillich,
the traditional doctrine of 'the fall' is best understood as the
325
transition from essence to existence. Because the divine life
is creative, constantly 'actualizing itself in inexhaustible
abundance,' the doctrine of creation is not simply the story of
an event which took place 'once upon a time.' 'It is the basic
326
description of the relation between God and the world.' All
being is grounded in God who has created, _is creating, and will
327
creatively fulfil his telos. As God grants being to the creature,
324 Tillich, ST II, pp.94-95, 148-49.
325 Ibid., p.31.
326 Tillich, ST I, p.252.
327 Ibid., p.253.
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he also grants freedom and destiny (one of the 'ontological elements'),
and it is this creaturely, finite freedom which makes inevitable the
transition from essence to existence. To actualize its freedom, the
creature must step out on its own, but that means to step away from
the ground of its being. The creature thus is caught between the
anxiety of losing itself by not actualizing its potentialities, and
the anxiety of losing itself if it does and is separated from being-
3 28
itself. The creature decides for the latter; its 'finite freedom
329
works within the framework of universal destiny' and the transition
from essence to existence becomes fact. Tillich writes:
Man has left the ground in order to 'stand upon'
himself, to actualize what he essentially is, in
order to be finite freedom. This is the point at
which the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of
the fall join .... Fully developed creatureliness
is fallen creatureliness. The creature has actualized
its freedom in so far as it is outside the creative
ground of the divine life .... To be outside the
divine life means to stand in actualized freedom,
in an existence which is no longer united with
essence. Seen from one side, this is the end of
creation. Seen from the other side, it is the
beginning of the fall. 330
For Tillich, then, the creation equals the fall. Humanity is
granted being from the ground of being; a constituent element of being
is freedom; as it actualizes what it is_, it 'falls' from essence to
331
existence. The result is 'the state of estrangement.'
328 Tillich, ST II, p.36.
329 Ibid., p.32.
330 Tillich, ST I, p.255.
331 Tillich, ST II, p.44.
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'Man as he exists is not what he essentially is and ought to be.
332
He is estranged from his true being.1 The marks of estrangement
are unbelief (turning away from God toward self), hybris (seeking
to elevate self) into the sphere of the divine), and concupiscence
333
(drawing all reality into self). Tillich prefers the word
'estrangement' to describe the predicament of human existence,
but nevertheless wants to retain the word 'sin' in theological
vocabulary because it expresses the personal character of estrange¬
ment. The actualizing of finite freedom i's a personal act, arising
from the freedom of the creature. Freedom, though, always stands
in polar relationship to destiny; thus the free act of actualizing
freedom is carried out in relationship to the universal state of
humankind, i.e., estrangement. This is the meaning behind the
334
phrase 'original sin.' 'In every free act the destiny of estrange¬
ment is involved and, vice versa, .... the destiny of estrangement
is actualized by all free acts.'^^
Tillich recognizes that his doctrine of creation and the fall
330





336 Ibid., p.43. Tillich is responding here to an early
criticism of his theology made by Reinhold Niebuhr.
Niebuhr raised the question whether Tillich ontologizes
away the reality of the fall and sin. See Reinhold Niebuhr,
'Biblical Thought And Ontological Speculation in Tillich's
Theology' in THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH, ed. Charles W.
Kegley & Robert W. Bretall (New York: Macmillan, 1952),
pp.216-27.
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does not really try to get himself out of this difficulty. He
argues, in effect, that there is no other alternative because
337
'actualized creation and estranged existence are identical.'
If one denies the literalist interpretation of the Genesis story,
which Tillich certainly does, then one must also necessarily deny
a historical stage of created goodness. Theologians must there¬
fore accept the consequences: creation and the fall are one.
To be an actualized creature means necessarily to be in the state
of estrangement.
Thus Tillich places his picture of human existence in the
setting of a sharp dualism between the divine, which is the state
of essential wholeness in perfection, and the human, the state
of actualized existence, which is neither whole not perfect -
338
in fact, evil. To support this view, Tillich appeals to Plato,
and maintains that 'on this point, the Platonic and the Christian
339
evaluations of existence coincide.' For Tillich, 'human existenc
can only be understood if Plato was right and terrestrial life is
to be imagined as a shadow of the really real and the truly divine .'
337 Tillich, ST II, p.44.
338 Tillich uses the term 'evil' to describe the consequences
of the state of sin and estrangement. See ST II, pp.59-78.
339 Ibid., p.23.
340 Hamilton, THE SYSTEM AND THE GOSPEL, p.79. This is
another reason why Tillich does not like to speak
about the existence of God. 'God does not exist.
He is being-itself beyond essence and existence.
Therefore to argue that God exists is to deny him'
(ST I, p.205).
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But can the Tillichian view be supported by Scripture as well
as by Plato? Is it really true that one must accept the coincidence
of creation and the fall as a necessary consequence of rejecting
the literalist interpretation of the Genesis story? Tillich
overlooks the possibility that the literal reading of the account
in Genesis may be rejected while the central intent of the story
is affirmed. That is, one does not necessarily have to accept a
historical stage of innocence in order to affirm the difference
between the act of creation and the act of sin. What the story
witnesses to is the essential goodness of creation itself, as a
gift from God, and the absurd disobedience of the creature by
which he turns his back on the Creator. Tillich's view completely
excludes any idea of disobedience - an aspect of sin prominent not
simply in the third chapter of Genesis but throughout the entire
Bible. Sin, for Tillich, is the necessary consequence of being
a creature; the absurd mystery of human disobedience is rationalized
away by means of a Platonic ontology. As Tillich would have it,
the sinful act is accepting the gift of creation; to take what God
freely gives is at the same time the act of turning away from God.
This makes finite freedom completely ambiguous in Tillich's system.
'From one point of view it is man's end, the telos of creation, but
341
from the other point of view this is man's shame.' Tillich leaves
341 J. Heywood Thomas, PAUL TILLICH - AN APPRAISAL
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963), p.132.
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no place for an actualized freedom for God; the free act, by
definition, is the sinful act. That this differs from the
Genesis story is not the critical point. What is at issue is a
whole stream of biblical tradition which views sin as an absurd
act of wilful disobedience and not as an automatic fact of
creation. For Tillich, the prophetic and apostolic threats of
condemnation and judgment, and the urgent call for repentance and
return, can only be nonsense.342
By defining the transcendence of God in a way that leads
inevitably to its opposite, Tillich has wedded together in one
ontology a radical transcendentalism and a radical immanentalism.
The result is a further contradiction: Tillich asserts that humanity
is both separated from God and not separated from God. The first
is consistent with his transcendentalism; the second with his
immanentalism; but each is inconsistent with the other. Humanity,
*
Tillich tells us, is 'estranged' from God through the actualizing
of its finite freedom. With Platonic dualism as his intellectual
ally, Tillich describes this as 'the transition from essence to
existence.' The result is estrangement, sin, evil. God, however,
342 George Tavard correctly points out that Tillich is wrong
to constrict his account of the fall to the Genesis story
of Adam and Eve, since the Christian view is founded more
on The Epistle To The Romans (especially 5:18). 'By over¬
looking the Pauline doctrine, Tillich can treat the entire
doctrine of the Fall as mythical. This helps him to
ontologize original sin. It has been done at the cost
of a clearly scriptural teaching, and by rejecting a whole
stream of tradition. . .' (George H. Tavard, PAUL TILLICH
AND THE CHRISTIAN MESSAGE (London: Burns and Oates, 1962),
p. 42).
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infinitely transcends this. His being is perfect wholeness.
Thus humanity is separated in some way from the ground of being.
Nevertheless, humanity cannot really be separated, for it still
possesses being, albeit in estranged existence. To say that a
person is_ means that he participates in being-itself, and being-
itself is God. Tillich himself seems to recognize the difficulty
when he writes that
man discovers himself when he discovers God;
he discovers something that is identical with
himself although it transcends him infinitely,
something from which he is estranged, but from
which he never has been and never can be separated. 343
How, we must ask, can one discover God as both 'identical with
himself' and that which 'transcends him infinitely.' Simply to
affirm both of these in an authoritative way does not resolve the
difficulty; it merely underscores the presence of a problem that
runs throughout Tillich's system.
This dilemma constitutes an intractable problem for
the ontology because the system seems to require botfh
(a) that God cannot participate in estrangement
because estrangement is by definition separation
from God, and (b) that God must participate in
estrangement since even what is estranged has being,
and God is the ground of all being, whether it is
343 Paul Tillich, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE,
ed. Robert C. Kimbal (London:
Oxford University Press, 1959), p.10.
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reconciled to him or not. And both answers are
present side by side in the ontology. 344
Unfortunately, this contradiction never finds resolution
in Tillich's theology. On the contrary, it creates a basic
ambiguity throughout.
344 Thatcher, THE ONTOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH, p.137.
See also Alistair Macleod, PAUL TILLICH -
AN ESSAY ON THE ROLE OF ONTOLOGY IN HIS PHILOSOPHICAL
THEOLOGY (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1973).
.This highly critical work argues that there is 'an
incoherence at the very heart of Tillich's philosophical
thought' because he fails 'to distinguish several quite
different concepts of ontology' (p.18).
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B. The Manifestation Of What Is
To show how christology fits into Tillich's system of theology,
we should begin by describing in more detail the nature of estranged
existence.
'Man's estrangement from his essential being is the universal
345
character of existence.' This estrangement results in the
>
disruption of being, the disruption of life, and the disruption
of history.
The structure of being, with the basic distinction between
self and world, and its 'ontological polarities,' is not fundamentally
altered in the condition of existence, but the estrangement of
existence manifests itself as the relation of the poles is disrupted.
The first mark of evil is self-loss, the loss of one's determining
centre through disruptive drives which cannot be brought into unity.
As the drives move against each other, the person is split, and
346
with the loss of self, one also loses his world. 'The inter¬
dependence of self-loss and world-loss in the state of estrangement
is manifest in the interdependent loss of the polar elements of
347
being.' In the moment of separation from essence, freedom
348
becomes arbitrariness and destiny.mechanical necessity;





dynamics are distorted into a formless urge for self-transcendence
349 '
and form becomes eternal law ; and individualization becomes
II
loneliness and participation descends to submergence in the
350
collective. These conflicts have many consequences, the two out¬
standing examples being suffering marked by meaninglessness and
351
loneliness. Finally, over all is cast the ominous shadow of
death, for 'estranged from the ultimate power of being, man is
352
determined by his finitude.'
With the disruption of the ontological polarities comes the
disruption of life. The ontological polarities form the structure
of being; God is being-itself. Another word Tillich uses to
describe the unity of the ontological elements is 'spirit';
God _is spirit. Now 'spirit' is the telos of life. 'Actualized as
353
life, being-itself is fulfilled as spirit.' Thus Tillich sets
out an equation like this: God = being = spirit = life. Corresponding
to the three ontological polarities, life is characterized by Tillich
as having three functions: 1. self-integration (relating to the
354
individualization - participation polarity), 2. self-creation
355
(relating to the dynamics - form polarity), and 3. self-
356





353 Tillich, ST I, p.249.




The first function describes the centredness of life; the
second describes growth as an aspect of life; the third describes
the sublimity of life as spirit. Additionally, these three
functions are named by Tillich morality, culture, and religion.
It is not necessary for us to explain at length Tillich's
detailed analyses of these functions of the spirit. What is
important to note is that Tillich is describing being, in this
part of his system, from the functional viewpoint. As being is
actualized in life, it is marked by the acts of morality, culture,
and religion. And further, inasmuch as actualized life is
experienced only in estrangement, these functions are always
ambiguous in nature.
When considered from the standpoint of the historical
dimension, the three functions of life reveal additional aspects
of their ambiguity. Historical self-integration is marked by
357
the problems of empire and centralization. Historical -self-
creativity shows itself in the tension between revolution and
358
reaction. Historical self-transcendence raises the question
359
of utopia, its possibility and failures. At no point is there
a clear 'yes' to be spoken, nor an unambiguous 'no.' Everything
is ambiguous, for life is being-in-existence. Since existence is
the state of being estranged from essence, life is estrangement.
It is always experienced in brokenness and conflict. Thus arises





If this is the question arising from the human predicament,
what is the answer offered by 'apologetic theology'? The answer,
Tillich tells us, is the 'New Being.'
The term 'New Being,' as used here, points directly
to the cleavage between essential and existential
being - and is the restorative principle of the
whole of this theological system. The New Being
is new in so far as it is the undistorted manifest¬
ation of essential being within and under the conditions
of existence. It is new in contrast to the merely
potential character of essential being: and it is
new over against the estranged character of
existential being. It is actual, conquering the
estrangement of actual existence. 360
The Christian assertion is that in Jesus of Nazareth the New Being
has appeared. This is a paradoxical statement - paradoxical
because essential being has manifest itself under the conditions
361
of existence. 'In one personal life essential Manhood has
appeared under the conditions of existence without being conquered
362
by them.' Christ, therefore, is the mediator in that he shows
us what humanity essentially is; and because essential humanity is
harmoniously united with the ground of being, essential humanity, by
363
its very nature, represents God. 'The paradoxical character of
his being consists in the fact that although he has only finite
freedom under the conditions of time and space, he is not estranged
from the ground of his being.






The biblical portrait of Jesus of Nazareth is remarkable in
its honest stress on his finitude: Jesus confronts real temptation,
experiences anxiety, lacks a definite place, knows insecurity, want,
loneliness, and is subject 'to uncertainty in judgment, risks of
365
error, the limits of power, and the vicissitudes of life.' Thus
we have the picture of one who experiences all the consequences of
existential estrangement, but in whom estrangement is conquered
and a permanent unity with God is maintained. 'Into this unity he
accepts the negativities of existence without removing them.
This is done by transcending them in the power of the unity. This
is the New Being as it appears in the biblical picture of Jesus
.. _. . , ,366
as the Chrisc.1
In order to gain a clear outline of Tillich's christology,
we would do well to raise two questions: I. How does Tillich
relate the divine and human presence in the person of Jesus? and
2. What is the resulting conception of salvation?
It has already been shown that for Tillich revelation is 'final'
when the finite is fully sacrificed to the infinite. (Presumably,
this assumption is a direct consequence of his transcendentalism.)
Jesus shows himself to be the ultimate criterion of revelation
because he has fully sacrificed the medium of revelation to the
revelation itself; that is, 'Jesus of Nazareth is sacrificed to
3g7
Jesus as the Christ.' The implication for us is that 'we are
365 Ibid., p.131.
366 Ibid., p.135.
367 Tillich, ST I, p.135.
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liberated from the authority of everything finite in him.'
369
'It is the end of Jesusology.'
This christological approach finds its parallel in Tillich's
description of the New Being as the one who, under the conditions
of existence (Jesus of Nazareth) reveals the essence of God-Manhood
(the Christ). Jesus of Nazareth is significant because in him
the New Being is manifest. In himself, the person of Jesus is not
important; yet he commands faith's attention because the Christ
is revealed through him. The symbol of the cross points to the
fact that Jesus of Nazareth subjected himself fully to the conditions
of existence. That he did this without estrangement from the ground
of being is the significance of the symbol of the resurrection;
3
through him the cleavage between essence and existence was overcome.
He thus reveals the New Being.
368 Ibid., p.134.
369 Ibid., p.136.
370 Tillich, ST II, pp.152-53. Though Tillich dismisses the
psychological explanation of the resurrection (ibid., p.156),
his own view comes suspiciously close to this. He writes:
'A real experience made it possible for the disciples to
apply the known symbol of resurrection to Jesus, thus
acknowledging him definitely as the Christ' (ibid., p. 154).
Apparently, Tillich believes that by saying the disciples
had 'a real experience' he has separated himself from the
psychological theory of resurrection. Yet for him, the
resurrection 'symbol' still arises from within the disciples
themselves. Further, Tillich's a-historical approach to
the resurrection is revealed when he states: 'It is the
certainty of one's own victory over the death of existential
estrangement which creates the certainty of the Resurrection
of the Christ as event and symbol; but it is not historical
conviction or the acceptance of biblical authority which
creates this certainty (ibid., p.155).
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How then does this description of Jesus as the Christ fare
when set alongside the traditional christological norms of the
371
Church?
Tillich believes that though the councils of Nicea and Chalcedon
were forced to use 'very inadequate conceptual tools,1 they were
nevertheless important events for the Church because through them,
'both the Christ-character and the Jesus-character of the event of
372
Jesus as the Christ were preserved.' Does this mean that Tillich
affirms the traditional doctrine of the unio hypostatica of the
human and divine natures in Christ? Not really. Because God, by
Tillich's definition, is beyond essence and existence, the term
'divine nature' cannot be applied to Christ in any meaningful way,
'for the Christ (who is Jesus of Nazareth) is not beyond essence
373
and existence.' On the other hand, the term 'human nature' is
371 Thatcher has catalogued the criticisms against Tillich's
christology: 'Some critics believe him to be orthodox
in Christology, others that he is Nestorian, Sabellian
and Monarchianistic, Adoptionistic, Docetic, Dionysian,
and GnosticJ' He concludes from this, probably with
justification, that the variety of judgments against
him is more significant than any one in particular,
because it demonstrates the-difficulty of judging a
largely ontological vocabulary according to traditional
theological norms (Thatcher, THE ONTOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH,
pp.147-48).
372 Tillich, ST II, p.145.
373 Ibid., p.148. Similarly, Tillich rejects as 'nonsensical'
the statement 'God has become man,' since the word 'God'
points to ultimate reality. 'The only thing God cannot
do is to cease to be God. But that is just what the
assertion "God has become man" means' (ibid., p.94).
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ambiguous, and therefore it too should be rejected. Furthermore,
historical criticism has demonstrated the impossibility of finding
374
the empirical truth about Jesus of Nazareth, and thus all
statements about his human nature are untrustworthy. Tillich,
therefore, ends up in a very strange position.
The divinity of Christ has been rejected for fear
of a Christological metamorphosis. And the
humanity of Christ has been declared unknowable.
Thus both the Christ-character and the Jesus-
character of Jesus the Christ have been lost.
Where the Council of Chalcedon, spearheading the
Church, follows a ridge between the chasms, the
Christology of Paul Tillich falls into both
chasms one after the other. 375
Though it is tempting to linger over the implications of
this theology for the doctrine of the person of Jesus Christ,
we must press on to raise the question concerning the work of
Jesus Christ: What are the soteriological implications of Tillich's
christology?
Jesus as the Christ reveals the New Being because in him one
life has been lived under the conditions of existence without being
conquered by them. As he subjected himself to the conditions of
existence (estrangement) he maintained the essential unity between
God and humanity. He thus overcame 'in principle' the cleavage between
essence and existence. Zahrnt explains the overcoming in this way:
374 Ibid., pp.lOlff.
375 Tavard, PAUL TILLICH AND THE CHRISTIAN MESSAGE, p.132.
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a process of healing has begun which is taking
effect as a redeeming power in all existence.
The disastrous rift which runs through being
and separates one life from another, one man
from another, has been healed, and unity restored.
And it is this old being healed which is the
New Being. 376
For us, then, this means that to experience the New Being in
Jesus the Christ means that we experience the power in him which
377
has conquered existential estrangement, Faith is based on the
378
experience of being grasped by this power. This means that
Jesus the Christ 'is the keystone in the arch of spiritual
379
manifestations in history. He is not an isolated event.1
What makes him unique is that his spirit was 'possessed' by the
380
divine Spirit in a complete way. This makes him the 'qualitative
center in a process' which precedes him and extends beyond him,
for the divine spirit which made Jesus into the Christ is creatively
381
present in the whole of history.
However, we must ask about the nature of the healing present
in the power of the New Being. Is existence really healed? Or is it,
rather, destroyed? Alan Lewis has pointed out that
376 Zahrnt, THE QUESTION OF GOD, p.325.
377 Tillich, ST II, p. 125,
378 Ibid., p.155.




Tillich moves, without always signaling the
momentousness of the transition, from the Christ
who is not conquered by existence, to the Christ
who actually conquers existence. It'is one thing
to accept the hostile world; it is another for
him to elevate the finite out of and beyond the
hostile world. 382
This assessment correctly points to the fact that, for Tillich,
salvation is not salvation in existence, but salvation from existence.
The New Being is manifest in Jesus Christ, Tillich tells us,
because Jesus was sacrificed to the Christ, the finite to the
infinite. Essence is revealed as existence negates itself. As
38
Thatcher puts it, 'the divinity causes him to destroy his humanity.'
This is perhaps the logical consequence of a Platonic dualism which
separates essence and existence, especially as existence is
identified as necessarily evil, but does this not run counter to
384
a whole stream of tradition, beginning in the Gospels and
385
extending up to the present day, which views the soteriological
work of Christ as grounded in an incarnation by which the divine
enters fully into human existence, not to destroy it, but to redeem
it from the brokenness of sin? It was inevitable that Tillich would
want to deny this sort of incarnationalism, for he has equated
382 Alan E. Lewis, 'The Experience of Grace - The Problem of
Sanctification in Contemporary Systematic Theology' (Th.D.
dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1977), p.231.
See also Thatcher, THE ONTOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH, p.150,
where the same idea is stated in even stronger terms:
'The appearance of the essential Jesus then . . . ,
does not "save" existence; it crushes it.'
383 Ibid.
384 See, for example, John 1:14: 'And the Word became flesh
and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth.'
385 See Chapter I of this thesis.
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creation itself with the evil of estrangement. Salvation can only-
mean salvation from human existence when one begins with this
assumption.
Yet, as was indicated earlier in this chapter, while Tillich
develops a transcendentalism that is very dependent upon Platonic
dualism as its conceptual ally, he defines the transcendence of God
in a way that leads inevitably to an immanental monism. This
inner conflict runs throughout his thought, as is clearly seen
in his christology. For if his description of Jesus the Christ
seems formed by the radical distinction between essence and
existence (following his transcendentalism), his analysis of the
salvation that follows Christ's work is more congenial to his
immanentalism. The New Being brings salvation, i.e., healing.
He conquers the evil of estrangement and overcomes the ambiguities
of life and history. However, since we can never really be
separated from the ground of our being, Christ's work is more
a manifestation of what really is, rather than the creation of
anything new.
Tillich does describe healing as the 'uniting of that which
is estranged .... overcoming the split between God and man, man
386
and his world, man and himself.' The threefold character of this
387
salvation is described as participation in the New Being (regeneration),




acceptance of the New Being (justification), and transformation
389
by the New Being (sanctification). 'Regeneration is the state
of having been drawn into the new reality manifest in Jesus as the
390
Christ,' the state of being grasped by the divine presence.
Faith results, not as a human 'work,' but as a consequence of the
391
Spirit's action in a person's life. Such a one is thus justified
by God. Justification 'is the eternal act of God by which he accepts
392
as not estranged those who are indeed estranged from him by guilt.'
393
God accepts us, and we, for our part, 'must accept acceptance.'
Regeneration and justification are two sides of the one divine act
by which God causes the reunion of what is estranged. Sanctification
is the process initiated by the event of reunion. It 'is the
process by which the New Being transforms personality and community,
394
inside and outside the church.'
388 Ibid., pp.177-79.
389 Ibid., pp.179-80.
390 Ibid. , p.177.
391 Ibid., p.178.
392 Ibid.
393 Ibid., p.179. For a vivid description of grace as
acceptance, see Tillich's sermon 'You Are Accepted'
in Paul Tillich, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1949), pp.161-62.
394 Tillich, ST II, p.180.
This same event of salvation is described in a slightly-
different way by Tillich as he views it from the perspective of the
ambiguities of life and history. Here he refers to the power of
the New Being as the 'Spiritual Presence.' 'When it grasps man,
395
it creates unambiguous life.' The ambiguities of morality,
culture, and religion are transcended in the power of the Spiritual
396
Presence. This 'Presence' is mediated to persons through the 'Word
397
and sacraments' defined by traditional theology, but is not
narrowly restricted to these media, for 'no part of encountered
reality is excluded beforehand from the possibility that it might
become sacramental material.'
From the viewpoint of history, the symbols of salvation are
'the Kingdom of God' and 'Eternal Life.' The kingdom of God points
to the power of the New Being in overcoming the ambiguities of
399
historical existence, and Eternal Life symbolizes the telos
of history.What is the inner aim of history? It is 'life in God.'
The word 'in' summarizes the rhythm of Tillich's whole ontological
395 Tillich, ST III, p.112.
396 Tillich explains the effect of the Spiritual Presence on
the ambiguities of religion (ibid., pp.162-245), the
ambiguities of culture (pp.245-65), the ambiguities of
morality (pp.266-75), and the ambiguities of life in
general (pp.275-82).
397 Ibid., p.120.




approach: it points to the presence of all being in the divine
ground of being; first, as potential essence in the mind of God,
second, as ontological dependence even in the state of estrangement,
and finally, as the 'in' of ultimate fulfilment in which is
accomplished the 'essentialization' of all creatures.
One could refer to this rhythm as the way from
essence through existential estrangement to
essentialization. It is the way from the merely
potential through actual separation and reunion
to fulfilment beyond the separation of
potentiality and actuality. 401
This brings us back to Tillich's fundamental problem.
For Tillich, persons are always 'in' God, even in the state of
estrangement. He must affirm this ontological dependence because
humanity i_s. This means it has being, and God is being-itself.
For all that Tillich tries to make estrangement a matter of ambiguity
and brokenness, can it ever really be much more than a temporary
imbalance in the structure of being? The structure could not be
destroyed or fundamentally altered, even in the transition from
essence to existence, for then persons would have slipped into nonbeing.
That a person _is means, by Tillich's definition, that he is organically
connected with being-itself. The presence of the New Being under
the conditions of estrangement is not really the appearance of
anything new. As essence enters existence in Jesus the Christ,
it can only reveal what is, the true, essential nature of things
which firmly supports all that has being, regardless of the
temporary difficulties of estrangement.
401 Ibid., p.421.
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When the truth of Christianity is thought to
'imply' the New Being, then the truth has ceased
to lie with a message about the Incarnate Son of
God and has been transferred to a message about,
the real structure of the Universe. Salvation
becomes the breaking through into time and space
of the power of the essential unity conquering
existential estrangement; or, to put the same
thing less technically, the power of the New
Being within man is eternally witnessing to
the wholeness of being that lies behind
appearances .... 402
The manifestation of what is, is not without effect, of
course. As already shown, the power of the New Being - the
Spiritual Presence - grasps us in an ecstatic event: 'We are
grasped, in the experience of faith, by the unapproachable holy
which is the ground of our being and breaks into our existence
403
and which judges us and heals us.' This ecstatic grasping is
the movement which from one point of view is called 'faith';
from another 'love.' Faith 'is the state of being grasped by the
transcendent unity of unambiguous life - it embodies love as the
404
state of being taken into that transcendent unity.' However,
since the 'transcendent' is defined by Tillich in an immanentalistic
way, we would expect the faith and love created by the power of the
New Being to be already present as' ontological realities. Indeed,
our expectations are not disappointed.
402 Hamilton, THE SYSTEM AND THE GOSPEL, p.150.
403 Tillich, THE PROTESTANT ERA, p.78.
404 Tillich, ST III, p.129.
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Tillich also describes faith as 'the state of being ultimately
405
concerned-' This ultimate concern may express itself in many
forms, but since everybody is ultimately concerned about something,
Tillich affirms that 'every individual is the bearer of a special
experience and content of faith.Thus, for example, even
doubt is really faith, for doubt, after all, is concern for truth,
and ultimate concern is faith. The importance this has for Tillich
is clear when he testifies of his discovery of this: 'so the
paradox got hold of me that he who seriously denies God, affirms him.
407
Without it I could not have remained a theologian.' Thus,
for Tillich, 'faith is an essential possibility of man, and there¬
fore its existence is necessary and universal
So thoroughly has Tillich ontologized faith that one wonders
what is unique about the Christian faith. Apparently, it is that
some are distinguished from others, not because they respond to
God's Word in faith, but because they have an ecstatic experience
in which they realize what is common to all, namely, that humanity
is essentially united with the ground of all being in spite of its
estrangement.
405 Paul Tillich, THE DYNAMICS OF FAITH, (London:
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957), p.l.
406 Ibid., p.55.
407 Tillich, THE PROTESTANT ERA, pp.XIV-XV.
408 Tillich, THE DYNAMICS OF FAITH, p.126. Cf. David Hopper,
TILLICH: A THEOLOGICAL PORTRAIT, pp.184-85. Hopper
criticizes Tillich for theoretically denying to
persons the possibility of choice: 'In the end
the question comes down to this: does the New
Testament principally and not secondarily,
articulate a choice in a way of life?' (p.185).
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And what of 'love'? This, too, is ontologized like faith.
'Love is an ontological concept .... God is love. And, since
409
God is being-itself, one must say that being-itself is love.'
Therefore, there is no such thing as 'being' without love; to
say that a man or woman i_s, means necessarily that that person loves.
'Being is not actual without the love that drives everything that
410
is toward everything else that is.'
Again, we must wonder what distinguishes Christian love from
the love which undergirds all reality. Presumably, it is with love
as with faith: the real difference is in the degree of cognitive
awareness provided by the ecstatic experience of being grasped by
the power of the New Being. Clearly, though, in the case of both
faith and love, the 'grasping' adds nothing essentially (ontologically)
new to one's being for being itself, by definition, is impossible
without faith and love.
So now we raise again the question of what salvation ('healing')
really is in the Tillichian system. With a separation that is not
really a separation, an estrangement that is not ultimately estranging,
does not Tillich end up with a Saviour who really does not save, and
a Christian life which is essentially no different from any other life?
409 Tillich, ST I, p. 279.
410 Paul Tillich, LOVE, POWER, AND JUSTICE - ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSES
AND ETHICAL APPLICATIONS (London: Oxford University Press,
1954), p.25. Hamilton argues that Tillich's stress on love
as the drive toward unity makes eros his controlling concept
in such a way that there is no room left in his system for




We have witnessed an inner contradiction which runs through
the heart of Tillich's theology. He seeks to hold together in one
ontology a radical transcendentalism and a radical immanentalism.
This leads, in the first instance, to the dualism between essence
and existence, which could only result in a conception of salvation
as salvation from human existence. His immanentalism, on the other
hand, cuts against this with the fact that persons, as beings,
can never really be separated from the ground of being - the final
soteriological implication of which is that nothing essentially
happens in Christ other than the manifestation of what is. What
finally is the outcome of this tension in his theology? Do the
two radically different approaches equally balance each other so
that we are left to bounce back and forth between them with no
clear resolution? I think not.
The scale tilts, as it were, toward his ontological monism
in the end. This is the inevitable consequence of beginning with
an abstract transcendentalism. By seeking to maintain thoroughly
the transcendent otherness of God, Tillich defined God in such a
way that in the end the distinction between God and humanity was
swept away. Because his radical transcendentalism is defined by means
of a radical immanentalism, the latter finally must be the dominant
theme. In one telling sentence, Tillich sums up the triumph of
ontological monism: 'Unity embraces itself and separation, just
411
as being comprises itself and non-being.' In other words,
411 Tillich, LOVE, POWER AND JUSTICE, p.25.
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while separation and non-being - estrangement and finitude -
may be penultimate realities, they are not ultimate: the unity
of being finally embraces everything, even its opposite. All
reality is gathered up into the all-powerful homogeneity of being-
itself.
The boundary between the reality of God and the
reality of the world threatens to become confused.
God seems to become so worldly, and the world so
divine, that both begin to lose their outline,
God his deity and the world its worldliness. 412
To raise finally the question whether Tillich's theology
destroys any ontological distinction between the Church and the
world is almost superfluous. A theology which comes very near
to doing away with the distinction between God and humanity by means
of an embracing ontological monism is certainly not going ro make an
ontological distinction between the Church and the world. For if
the Church is, then it has being, and like all being it is grounded
in being-itself. To posit any sort of essential distinction
between the Church and the world would be tantamount, for Tillich's
theology, to affirming a split within being-itself - a clearly
intolerable option, for God is indivisible, the unity of all things.
Tillich prefers the term 'Spiritual Community' to Church.
Churches are torn apart by all the ambiguities of life, especially
the ambiguities of religion. 'The Spiritual Community does not
exist as an entity beside the churches, but it is their Spiritual
412 Zahrnt, THE QUESTION OF GOD, p.335.
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essence, effective in them through its power, its structure, and
413
its fight against their ambiguities.' Another way of putting it
is that the Spiritual Community is 'the inner telos of the churches
and that as such it is the source of everything which makes them
414
churches.'
The churches, as institutions of religion, have three important
groups of functions: the functions of constitution, related to
their foundation in the Spiritual Community; the functions of
expansion, related to the universal claim of the Spiritual Community;
and the functions of construction, related to the actualizing of the
415
Spiritual potentialities of the churches. These functions all
participate in the ambiguities of life, but in the power of the
Spirital Presence the ambiguities are overcome. As the community
of the New Being, the Spiritual Community participates in the trans¬
cendent unity of unambiguous Divine Life. It is, therefore, holy -
416
a holiness which manifests itself in faith and love.
Momentarily, this may indicate to us a certain distinction
between the Church and the world - until we remember that all being
participates in Divine Life (indeed, is 'grounded' in it), and that
all being possesses faith and love. If there is any distinction
whatever in Tillich's theology, it can only be the relatively minor
413 Tillich, ST III, p.163.
414 Ibid., p.165.
415 Ibid., p.182. For a detailed description of these
'functions,' see pp.182-216.
416 Ibid., pp. 155-56; 173-77.
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difference, at the penultimate level, between those who are ecstatically
made cognitively aware of what is true for all and those who are
still blinded by the ambiguities of estrangement. However, there
can be no ultimate distinction in essence, for all being is one:
it is as indivisible as God himself.
If the Spiritual Community is not identical with the Church,
how does Tillich understand its relationship with other communities,
as for example, other religious groups? In answer to this question,
Tillich distinguishes between the latent and manifest Spiritual
Community, and this is how he explains the difference:
Latency is the state of being partly actual,
partly potential; one cannot attribute latency
to that which is merely potential, for example,
the reception of Jesus as the Christ by those
who have not yet encountered him. In the state
of latency, there must be actualized elements
and elements not actualized. And this is just
what characterizes the latent Spiritual Community.
There is the Spiritual Presence's impact in faith
and love; but the ultimate criterion of both
faith and love, the transcendent union of un¬
ambiguous life as it is manifest in the faith
and the love of the Christ is lacking. Therefore
the Spiritual Community in its latency is open to
profanization and demonization without an adequate
principle of resistance, whereas the Spiritual
Community organized as a church has the principle
of resistance in itself and is able to apply it
self-critically, as in the movements of prophetism
and Reformation. 417
What is the difference? Simply this: in the latent Church
the 'criterion' is lacking; that is to say, the knowledge of the
manifestation of unambiguous faith and love in Jesus the Christ
417 Ibid., pp.153-54.
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is absent. Nevertheless, faith and love are present in the latent
Church, though sometimes open to distortion through ignorance.
As examples of the latent Church, Tillich lists the people of
Israel, Islamic communities, the communities worshipping 'the
great mythological gods,' Greek philosophical schools, and
418
classical mysticism in Asia and Europe. In all these communities,
Tillich tells us, 'there are elements of faith in the sense of
being grasped by an ultimate concern, and there are elements of
419
love in the sense of a transcendent reunion of the separated.'
We should ask, however, why any group should be excluded from
Tillich's list, for has he not already made faith and love
constituent elements of being? Does this not mean, therefore,
that if any group is, it is a Spiritual Community in its latent
form? George Tavard sums up this problem in Tillich's system
well when he writes:
Instead of erecting the holy community out of
the world it sees the whole world as already
being the holy community. Nobody escapes it.
All, even unawares, belong to it. Is this
still the Christian faith? 420
Thus we have shown that Tillich, too, has obliterated any
ontological distinction between the Church and the world by means
of an immanentalism which threatens even the distinction between
God and man. 'Whereas Bonhoeffer lost this distinction 'from below,'
418 Ibid., p.154.
419 Ibid.
420 Tavard, PAUL TILLICH AND THE CHRISTIAN MESSAGE,
pp.38-39.
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through an incarnationalism, Tillich lost it 'from above,'
through a radical transcendentalism. The effects are the same;
the starting-points vastly different.
The great irony which cuts through Tillich's system is that
he endeavoured with all his considerable powers of reason to
define God in a manner that truly protected his holy otherness.
He championed with great rigour the transcendence of God. And,
it should be added to his credit, he sought to understand what
this means for all reality - not simply theology, but also
philosophy, history, culture, politics, psychology (to name a few
of his concerns). Yet, because he relied so thoroughly on the
power of human reason to take up and evaluate the different
sources of truth, he effectively imprisoned God with an abstract
transcendentalism. For all his carefully reasoned effort to
push God beyond the heavens into the depths of being, in order
to maintain the infinite distinction between God and humanity, he
ended with an almost complete loss of that distinction and a
God firmly bound by Tillich's conception of holiness.
Surely the first aspect of transcendence that must be
recognized by theology is freedom. If God is absolutely trans¬
cendent, is he net absolutely free - free even from human definitions
of 'transcendence'? New if we grant this, then we must affirm his
freedom to create beings alongside his being, and his freedom to
reveal himself in any way he chooses - perhaps even by manifesting
his greatness through the power of self-emptying humility, by
421
becoming 'small' for us.
421 See Chapters V and VI.
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The corollary to this is that for our part we can only
receive what he gives us to know about himself. If the God
whom we would know is transcendent, then we must hear the Word
he speaks concerning himself, or we have nothing but a 'God'
delimited by our notions of transcendence. All the more is this
the case if we accept (as we should) Tillich's often brilliant
description of the estranging effects of sin. What is surprising
is that Tillich could argue with such persuasiveness for the
brokenness of human existence, and yet, in the existence of his
own person, rise to such an unambiguous panoramic view of the
unity of all reality! As Karl Barth reminded Tillich, 'our
standpoint is neither the time of creation nor that of redemption,
and therefore it is not that of a far side of being. It is the
422
present between the times, the time of the regnum gratiae,'
Perhaps when we stand on the other side of eternity, we shall
be given the divine perspective and see the now hidden unity of
all being. But until then 'we see through a glass darkly.'
The brokenness of our present existence includes the distorted
myopia of reason's eyes. This is not to say that we can know
nothing of ultimate reality; it is only to confess that what we
may know is only that which is given to us. We are dependent on
revelation. By starting with an abstract idea of transcendence,
422 Karl Barth, CD 1/1, p.48.
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Tillich has by-passed the starting-point of Christian theology,
namely, an authoritative kerygma, and for that reason has cut
himself loose from the specific ground out of which all Christian
423
thinking grows.
As Hannah Tillich described her husband's last days in the
hospital, she wrote:
I had not brought anything to the hospital
since he had been ill, except his Bibles - a small
Greek New Testament, a German Bible, which had
been his from his first year of life, and an
English version. I had hoped to read from the
Bible to him when he became restless, if he
wished me to, but he had only touched the Greek
version with his frail hand. He did not wish to
see the other Bibles or have the Bible read to
him. I was glad. He belonged to the world,
to the cosmos, not to one book. 424
What a person wishes to have read to him on his deathbed is no
doubt irrelevant to the truth or falsehood of his theology. But
Hannah Tillich's-joy that he belonged 'to the cosmos, not to one
book' can only be balanced by Christian theology's sorrow that
he was not more dependent on that 'one book,' for therein is the
only way to know the God of the cosmos.
423 Hamilton, THE SYSTEM AND THE GOSPEL, p.29.
424 Hannah Tillich, FROM TIME TO TIME, p.224.
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CHAPTER III
THE LOSS OF DISTINCTION FROM THE BEGINNING:
FUTURE AND WHOLENESS IN THE
THEOLOGY OF WOLFHART PANNENBERG
Madnessi that reason lodged in human heads
Should hope to traverse backward and unweave
The infinite path Three-personed Substance treads.
Content you with the quia, sons of Eve:
For had you power to see the whole truth plain
No need had been for Mary to conceive . . . 425
A. History As A Whole
Precisely because of the quia, the effects of God's activity
in human history, Wolfhart Pannenberg believes the sons of Eve have
the power to see the whole truth plain. It is not madness, according
to him, but in accordance with the reasonable nature of human existence
that human beings should not only hope, but actually be able, to traverse
backward and unweave the infinite path Three-personed Substance treads.
And it is the whole truth that concerns Pannenberg most. Though
not incorrectly considered an eschatological theologian, a passion for
the future does not seem to be his starting-point. Rather', his
426
thinking begins with the question of the truth of the whole. Isolated
425 Dante Alighieri, THE DIVINE COMEDY - PURGATORY, trans.
Dorothy L. Sayers (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1955), p.89.
426 Robert W. Jenson, GOD AFTER GOD - THE GOD OF THE PAST AND THE
GOD OF THE FUTURE, SEEN IN THE WORK OF KARL BARTH (Indianapolis
and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969), p.175. Pannenberg
confirmed this interpretation of his thought: 'Robert Jenson . . .
rightly says that my thought does not start with the future
as do other approaches of eschatological theology ....
But I start with a concern for wholeness of meaning ....
Everything I say about the end and eschatology is an extra¬
polation from this. I agree with this kind of analysis.'
Wolfhart Pannenberg, 'A Theological Conversation With
Wolfhart Pannenberg,' DIALOG 11 (1972): 287.
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facts, existing as disparate phenomena, are unable to lead one
to understand the meaning of existence, for
the question of meaning gives rise to the concern for
context. Each of us experiences life in bits and
pieces - as fragments in a nexus of fragments. The
meaning of each fragment cannot be grasped as a thing
in itself, but only in its wider contexts .... 427
Ultimate meaning, therefore, can be known only in the context of the
428
whole, and since 'history is reality in its totality,' truth becomes
visible only in the light of universal history. 'The wholeness of
429
reality which Pannenberg seeks is the wholeness of history.'
History as a unity is a necessary presupposition before am- of its
430
particular events make sense. However, contingency and individuality
are also fundamental characteristics of the historical. The unity
of history must therefore be conceived in such a way that the radical
contingency of individual historical events is maintained. Thus
Pannenberg rejects any interpretation of history which tends to
suppress openness to a contingent future. Though the principle of
analogy is indispensable for the historian, an exclusive dependence
427 Carl Braaten, 'Theology and Our Common World,' WORLDVIEW,
September 1972, p.23.
428 Wolfhart Pannenberg, BASIC QUESTIONS IN THEOLOGY, 3 vols.,
trans. George H. Kehm and R. A. Wilson (London: SCM Press
Ltd., 1970-1973), 1:21 (hereafter cited as Pannenberg, BQT).
429 Jenson, GOD AFTER GOD, p.175.
430 Pannenberg, BQT, 1:68.
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upon it to fix the limits of historical knowledge must be ruled out,
for it presupposes the similarity of all events instead of their
uniqueness. Also, teleological approaches are unacceptable because
a future which evolves out of the past denies history the necessary
openness to the radically new future. Likewise, all morphological
conceptions of historical unity (e.g. ,Spengler, Toynbee) are inadequate
because 'the genuinely historical is always to be sought in precisely
431
the variations and modifications of the typical.' And though
432
Hegel's system should be regarded as 'the most significant attempt'
at a solution to the problem of historical unity, it finally must
also be rejected. While Pannenberg is deeply appreciative of Hegel's
quest for a universal history, and his belief that truth is not
timelessly unchangeable but a process which will finally be revealed
only at the end, he objects
that the horizon of the future is lost in Hegel's
thought. He had to understand his own position as
the end of history in order to be able to think of
the unity of history. The unity of history - and
thus of truth - comes into view only from the end.
Theologically, this means that Hegel no longer had
an open future, an eschatology before him ....
future truth is necessarily excluded from his system. 433
The only adequate conception of the unity of history will be
one which protects the contingency of events. Pannenberg is led,
therefore, to posit a common root: 'The God who by the transcendence





the ground of the unity which comprises the contingencies as history.'
i
The concept of God is not simply a matter for tfieology, but is
435
'indispensable for the historian.'
And if God is indispensable for the historian, history is
indispensable for the theologian. The first reason is that 'the
word "God" is used meaningfully only if one means by it the power
436
that determines everything that exists.' The task of theology
thus goes beyond its special theme, the revelation of God in
Jesus Christ as attested in the Scriptures, and includes 'all truth
437
whatever'; that is to say, universal history. The second reason
follows from the specific character of Scripture itself. Pannenberg
maintains that the
universal-historical thinking has its origin in the
biblical idea of God. It was the biblical God who
first gave rise to an understanding of the totality
of reality as a history of ever new, once-occurring
events directed toward a final goal, in contrast to
the Greek understanding of the world as a constantly
uniform order of events. 438










Pannenberg is anxious to defend his views on two fronts:
on the one side, against the existential theology of Bultmann and
Gogarten which dissolves history into the historicity of existence;
on the other side, against the thesis that the real content of
faith is suprahistorical - a view developed by Martin Kahler in
the tradition of Heilsgeschichte and one which lives on in Barth's
interpretation of the incarnation as Urgeschichte.
Both theological positions, that of pure historicity
and that of the suprahistorical ground of faith,
have a common extra-theological motive. Their
common starting point is to be seen in the fact
that critical-historical investigation as the
scientific verification of events did not seem to
leave any more room for redemptive events. There¬
fore the theology of redemptive history fled into
the harbor of a suprahistory - or with Barth, of
pre-history. 440
Pannenberg seeks to make space for Christian theology in the
post-Enlightenment world, not by retreating into the supposed
safety of an authoritarian 'Word of God' revealed in a suprahistorical
manner, but by advancing on to the intellectual ground of our age
and demonstrating that the concept of God, and especially the
Christian conception of'God, is unavoidable. If modern historical
criticism has successfully routed theology and caused it to beat
a hasty retreat, leaving even reason behind in its flight toward
the impenetrable fortress of pure subjectivity, Pannenberg reverses
the attack and seeks to show both history and theology that God is
necessary for an adequate interpretation of history, and history
is fundamental for a theology of God.
440 Ibid., 1:16. The justification of Pannenberg's criticism on this
matter is questionable. Cf. Barth, CD IV/3, pp.179-80; and
Chapter VI of this thesis.
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History is a requisite for theology because revelation is a
441
historical event. Revelation is the self-disclosure of God
manifested indirectly through his actions in human history. The
events of history have within themselves an inherent meaning openly
visible to the eyes of impartial investigation. It is not for the
theologian to interpret the meaning of otherwise opaque events on
the basis of a s.uprahistorical revelation of hidden meaning. The
meaning inheres in the events in such a way that ordinary scientific
history is able to grasp the revelation of God in his indirect self-
disclosure. There will, of course, be differences of opinion about
the meaning of events, but critical-historical study is the means
of resolving such differences. 'The history which purports to be
revelatory must be studied in its continuity with the rest of history.
Precisely the same methods of investigation and criteria of verification
442
are applicable.' The investigation of God occurs in ordinary history,
and it must be approached in the same spirit of rationality as we
approach any other phenomena within the continuity of historical hap¬
penings. God has revealed his deity, not in a higher glossolalia known
443
only to the faithful, but in the ordinary language of historical facts.
441 For a concise summary of Pannenberg's view of revelation
as history, see 'Dogmatic Theses on The Doctrine of
Revelation' in REVELATION AS HISTORY, ed. Wolfhart
Pannenberg and trans. David Granskou (London: Collier-
Macmillan Ltd., 1968), pp.123-55. Though this doctrine
is not peculiar to Pannenberg, 'he has upheld it with a
thorough-going emphasis peculiarly his own. It is the
key concept of his theology.' Allan D. Galloway,
WOLFHART PANNENBERG (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1973), p.35.
442 Ibid. , p.40.
443 Pannenberg, REVELATION AS HISTORY, p.137.
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Since every historical event has an inherent revelatory meaning,
we might be led to assume there are numerous 'revelations.' That,
however, would negate the definition of revelation as the self-
disclosure of the one God. Therefore, 'revelation must be understood
444
as comprehending the entirety of God's activity.' Thus it was that
the Israelite conception of revelation held that it is
only when the revealing events are completed that they
can produce knowledge of the deity of Yahweh as, so to
speak, their last act .... The power to manifest
Yahweh's deity is, in fact, not attributed only to this
or that individual event, but is increasingly ascribed
to the whole pattern of events. 445
As the prophets of the exile reflected on Israel's loss of the land,
they could no longer accept that individual events of their history
were the ultimate self-revelation and self-vindication of Yahweh.
The decisive revelation of Yahweh was pushed more and more into the
future. Apocalypticism 'for the first time regarded all that
happens as a single history, at the end of which the glory of
446
Yahweh will be made manifest.'
444 E. Frank Tupper, THE THEOLOGY OF WOLFHART PANNENBERG, (Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1973), p.86. See also Pannenberg,
REVELATION AS HISTORY, p. 131: 'Revelation is not comprehended
completely in the beginning, but at the end of revelatory history.'
445 Wolfhart Pannenberg, FAITH AND REALITY, trans. John Maxwell
(London: Search Press, 1977), p.56.
446 Ibid., p.57. Pannenberg's understanding of the development and
meaning of apocalyptic, though central to his theology as a
whole, has by no means met with general approval. Hans Dieter
Betz ('The Concept of Apocalyptic in the Theology of the
Pannenberg Group' in JOURNAL FOR THEOLOGY AND THE CHURCH, ed.
Robert W. Funk (New York: Herder & Herder, 1969), pp.192-207)
argues that it is completely uncertain that apocalypticism
developed out of Old Testament prophecy (p.200), and that
'universal history is not the central theme of apocalyptic
thought' (p.202). Also, William R. Murdock ('History and
Revelation In Jewish Apocalypticism,' INTERPRETATION 21 (1967):
167-87) contends that apocalyptic thought saw the eschaton,
not as glorious fulfilment of history, but as the final
divine assertion of sovereignty against a history dominated
by a demonic will.
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As would be expected, it is no insignificant matter for
Pannenberg that modern biblical studies have revealed the importance of
apocalyptic thought in understanding the development of the New
Testament writings. Understanding the life and fate of Jesus Christ
against this background, Pannenberg believes that in him the end of
history has been anticipated in such a way that we can understand
history as a unity without minimizing its provisionality and
contingency. The end toward which apocalypticism looked - the
unity of history and therefore the full revelation of God -
has entered the present in an anticipatory way through Jesus of
Nazareth. This is the key which unlocks the post-Hegelian problem
we are faced with as we seek to understand the meaning of universal
history from its end without compromising the actual relativity of
all thought and the openness necessary for those who know themselves
447
not yet at the goal. 'An understanding of history as a whole is
made possible for the first time because the end of history is
already present.'
Before examining Pannenberg's christology in more detail,
we should pause to consider a question he raises: Can the apocalyptic
449
conceptual world still be meaningful for us? Pannenberg presents
447 Pannenberg, BQT, 1:181.
448 Ibid., 1:36.
449 Wolfhart Pannenberg, JESUS - GOD AND MAN, trans.
Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane Priebe (London: SCM Press Ltd.,
1968), p.82 (hereafter cited as Pannenberg, JGM).
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a clear answer; but first we may well inquire why he feels constrained
to ask it. After all, is he not concerned to free theology from the
450
subjectivism he perceives in the theology of both Barth and Bultmann?
Pannenberg explicitly rejects the use of contemporary experience as
the point of departure for theology (which he believes originates with
Schleiermacher and the Erlangen Lutheran school of the nineteenth
century). Because personal experience is too untrustworthy, faith
must be grounded outside of itself in the events of history, he contends.
Then what difference does it make whether or not we find
apocalyptic thought meaningful? It matters to Pannenberg, as I under¬
stand it, because he is so largely motivated Dy an apologetic concern.
He very much wants to get theology out of the ghetto of the faithful
and into the marketplace of the world's ideas. At its basis, his
theology affirms a universal history of God's revelation that is
openly accessible to any with eyes to see it. From this conviction
of its inherent rationality he takes the argument into another realm
to demonstrate further its reasonable nature; i.e., he argues from
an anthropological level. In so doing, however, the enemy sneaks in
450 See Richard John Neuhaus, 'Wolfhart Pannenberg: Profile of a
Theologian' in Pannenberg's THEOLOGY AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969), pp.15-16
(hereafter cited as Pannenberg, TKG).
451 Pannenberg, JGM, pp.25-27. 'Only on the basis of what happened
in the past, not because of present experiences, do we know
that Jesus lives as the exalted Lord .... No one now has
an experience of him as risen and exalted, at least not an
experience that could be distinguished with certainty from
illusion' (ibid., p.28).
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the back door, and he appears himself to be very anthropocentrici
Referring to Jesus, Pannenberg writes: . . . 'if at that time the
revelation of God took place for all men and times, it will also
452
stand the test of men1s experience of reality today■'
According to Pannenberg, the revelation of God does indeed
stand the test of human experience today. If Barth considered
religion the negative consequence of humanity's sinful will to self-
justification, and Bonhoeffer discovered a religionless age,
Pannenberg takes the natural religiousness of humanity as a pre-
453
supposition, and argues from this for the reasonableness of the
concept of God. Human beings are distinguished from the rest of nature
in that they have an openness to the world. Animals have an environment,
but humans transcend their environment, they have a world.
Since the individual man relates himself to the
still outstanding wholeness of his own existence,
he relates himself to the whole of the world and
its history. In this way he also relates him¬
self to God as the mysterious power that con¬
stitutes this - absent - wholeness. 454
452 Pannenberg, FAITH AND REALITY, p.53 / italics mine_/. See
also THE APOSTLES' CREED IN THE LIGHT OF TODAY'S QUESTIONS,
trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1972), p.104
(hereafter cited as Pannenberg, AC); BQT, 1:10; 2:25-26,
237; 3:88-89, 104-5, 107; THEOLOGY AND THE PHILOSOPHY
OF SCIENCE, trans. Francis McDonagh (London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 1976), p.310.
453 William Hamilton,'The Character of Pannenberg's Theology,'
in THEOLOGY AS HISTORY, ed. James M. Robinson and
John B. Cobb, Jr. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p.178.
Hamilton finds this notion hard to take: 'It is rather
hard to understand, or take seriously, a theology that can
by a definition dispose of the secularism which has been
an important segment of Western history for the past four
hundred years' (p.180).
454 Pannenberg, BQT, 1:171. See also AC, pp.23-24.
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The question of God, therefore, is not a special concern for the
'religious.' 'It arises out of the very structure of human existence
and is thus the most fundamental and universal concern of all mankind^'
Because humanity relates itself naturally to a still outstanding
456
wholeness, hope belongs to the essence of conscious human existence.
'Thus, because of the structure of human existence, it is necessary
for man in one way or another to conceive of the fulfilment of his
457
destiny and indeed of the totality of his existence beyond death.'
Can the apocalyptic conceptual world still be meaningful for us?
Yes! answers Pannenberg, for just as post-exilic Israel longed for
the final manifestation of God's glory, which would bring with it
the resurrection from the dead and the consummation of God's
revelation in history, so we also hope for a final fulfilment that
will gather up the fragments of our existence into a meaningful whole.
455 Galloway , WOLFHART PANNENBERG, p.16.
456 Pannenberg, JGM, p.85.
457 Ibid., p.86. See also WHAT IS MAN?, trans.
Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1970), p.43.
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B. The Beginning at the End.
The mission and fate of Jesus Christ are understandable only
458
when viewed in the context of apocalyptic hope - both Israel's
and ours. The critical affirmation about Jesus Christ is this:
in him the end of history is present in proleptic form. We can
make this statement, not as a blind 'leap of faith,' but as the
outcome of a rational investigation of the historical event of
Christ's resurrection. We, too,
must still understand the resurrection of Jesus
as a historical event which happened at a specific
time: as a reality, and not a mere hallucination,
even though we can designate it only by means of
images. The resurrection of Jesus is to be viewed
as a historical event in this sense, namely, that
the disciples of Jesus were overwhelmed by a reality
which confronted them, and for which not only they,
but we, too, have no other explanation and there¬
fore no other designation than the symbolic talk
about the 'resurrection from the dead.' 459
The event of Christ's resurrection means at least three things,
according to Pannenberg:
(1) Since apocalyptic hope looked forward to the resurrection
of the dead as an end-time occurrence, the end has taken place in
Jesus' resurrection. (Modern men and women readily identify with the
fact of Jesus' bodily resurrection, because now we find unacceptable
any dualism between mind and body - such as is found in the Greek
4-GO
notion of the immortality of the soul. ) The wholeness for which
458 Pannenberg, REVELATION AS HISTORY, p.145. See also John Cobb, Jr.,
'Wolfhart Pannenberg's "Jesus: God and Man,"' THE JOURNAL FOR
RELIGION 49 (1969): 195; and Galloway, WOLFHART PANNENBERG, p.65.
459 Pannenberg, BQT, 2:26. For a concise summary of his apologetic
defense of the historical resurrection, see 'Did Jesus Really
Rise From The Dead?', DIALOG 4 (1965): 128-35. For a fuller
account, see JGM, pp.88-106.
460 Pannenberg, WHAT IS MAN?, pp.45-51.
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Israel hoped and for which we, too, hope - the wholeness that is
possible only at the end of universal history - has proleptically
appeared in the event of Christ's resurrection.
(2) Through the resurrection it is confirmed (retroactively)
461
that Jesus is, and always has been, one with God. Revelation,
we have heard Pannenberg argue, must be the self-manifestation of
God which can be accomplished fully only at the end of universal
history, in the totality of all historical events. But since the
end has appeared in Jesus' resurrection, he must be God himself
present in his revelation.462
The assertion of Jesus' pre-existence as Son of God
is therefore nothing more than a conclusion drawn
from Jesus' unity with God himself in his revelation.
It includes Jesus' oneness of nature with God. For
otherwise God would not be revealed as himself in
his revelation of Jesus. 463
However, Jesus understood himself as a Son, distinct from God
his Father. 'If Jesus' history and his person now belong to the
essence, to the divinity of God, then the distinction that 'Jesus
maintained between himself and the Father also belongs to the
464
divinity of God.' In this way Pannenberg comes to the trinity
465
'from below,' rejecting the speculative 'Logos christology'
461 Pannenberg, JGM, p.136.
462 Ibid., p.141.
463 Pannenberg, AC, p.68.
464 Pannenberg, JGM, p.159.
465 Similarly, the Spirit is fully present in the revelation event
of the resurrection as the origin of all life (AC, p.133),
and is therefore one with God in his revelational unity.
Yet the Spirit is an independent person over against the
Son and Father 'because he leads us to glorify the Son and
Father and thereby demonstrates himself to be distinct
from both' (JGM, p.179).
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that begins 'from above.'
(3) The pre-Easter activity of Jesus was authenticated by God
through the resurrection. This is significant for (a) his death, and
(b) his teaching.
a. The death of Jesus is universally efficacious for human
destiny because in the light of the resurrection of Jesus we see that
those involved have switched places: now those who crucified Jesus
as a blasphemer are shown to be the real blasphemers themselves, since
Jesus has now been owned by God. In the strict sense, then, Jesus
died in their stead - for their crime of blasphemy. And because those
who condemned Jesus acted as the official office-bearers of the people,
the vicarious power of Jesus' death extends to all Israel, and indeed,
to everyone, since the Jewish nation was elected by God to represent
the whole of humanity. These facts provide the essential basis for
467
the Christian assertion of the vicarious nature of Christ's death.
Therefore, the godforsakenness of death is overcome for all
humanity. No longer must anyone die alone and hopeless, for our
community with Jesus extends through death into the future participation
40Q
in the new life that has already appeared in him.
466 Ibid., pp.l60ff. Tupper has concisely summarized Pannenberg's
reasons for rejecting an incarnational christology 'from
above.' Such a method (1) arbitrarily presupposes the divinity
of Jesus (the most important christological task is to present
the reasons for such a confession), (2) devalues the constitutive
significance of the historical Jesus of Nazareth, and (3) forces
the believer to try to stand in an impossible position - the
position of God. WOLFHART PANNENBERG, pp.131-32.
467 Pannenberg, AC, pp.84-85.
468 Pannenberg, JGM, p.269.
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b. Rejecting attempts to make Jesus' claim to authority the
basis of christology, as though the only crucial matter was a person's
'decision' for or against him, Pannenberg contends that only the
resurrection confirms his pre-Easter works, and grants authority
469
to his claim. 'Jesus' works are legitimated materially through
470
what has become revealed in Jesus himself through his fate.'
The resurrection gave authentication to Jesus' central message:
471
the imminence of God's kingdom. ~ If God has raised Jesus from the
dead, then that means his proclamation about God and his rule
are true.
'//hat, specifically, did Jesus teach? The starting point for
his message was the Jewish apocalyptic hope for the future kingdom
of God. He modified it, however, by stressing that it does not lie
in the distant future but is imminent. Thus, the present is not
independent from it; rather, since the future is so close it makes
'an imperative claim upon the present, alerting all men to-the urgency
47?
and exclusiveness of seeking first the Kingdom of God.'
469 Ibid., p.66.
470 Ibid., p.210. Notice the distinction Pannenberg makes
between the activity and fate of Jesus. This is central
to his thought. Jesus actively proclaimed the imminence
of the kingdom in word and deed, but he passively received
the fate of death and resurrection.
471 Pannenberg, TKG, p.53. In JGM Pannenberg discusses the
traditional doctrine of the three offices of Christ,
and concludes that while the titles 'prophet,' 'priest,' and
'king' are not without meaning, they nevertheless are not
accurate in the strictest sense. Therefore, we are on
more secure ground simply to understand Jesus' office as
the one sent to call men to the kingdom of God (see pp.
212-35).
472 Pannenberg, TKG, p.54.
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Even though the future rule of God is not distant but near,
and therefore impinges upon the present, it is nonetheless future.
473
We must give 'priority to the future' as we seek to understand
what Jesus taught about God's kingdom. For 'what Jesus did was
simply to face men with the personal decision for or against the
474
future of God.' The traditional Jewish expectation of the coming
reign of God on earth became for Jesus the decisive and all-encompassing
475
content of a person's relation to God. Obedience to God means
turning toward his future (and therefore to God himself). Jesus'
message of the kingdom 'called men out of the securities of their
everyday way of life and thereby unmasked the provisional character
476
of all inner-worldly forms and fulfillments of life' as it pointed
to the ultimacy of the approaching future of God.
It is clear that Jesus thought the kingdom was so imminent it
would appear in his own generation. There is no doubt, therefore,
that he erred in this matter. However - and this is decisive! -
his imminent expectation did not remain unfulfilled. 'It was
fulfilled by himself, insofar as the eschatological reality of the
477
resurrection of the dead appeared in Jesus himself.' His resurrection
473 Ibid.
474 Pannenberg, AC, p.51.
475 Pannenberg, TKG, p.133.
476 Pannenberg, JGM, p.226.
477 Ibid.
147
was, in fact, the appearance of God's future, though not in its
478
final fulfilment but only in proleptic form.
Frank Tupper has suggested that 'perhaps the truly novel,
47
radical dimension of Pannenberg's theology is his doctrine of God.'
Pannenberg defines God as 'the power of the future.He comes to
this definition, first by way of his belief that the unity of all
things can be known only at the end of universal history, which means
God (the unity of all things) is to be fully known only as a future
reality. Secondly, his biblical-historical study has convinced him
that in Jesus the end has appeared as a present reality through the
resurrection, which, in turn, shows that God has confirmed the
teaching of Jesus. Reduced to a syllogism, what Pannenberg is saying
473 From the foregoing, it should be obvious that, for Pannenberg,
Jesus proclaimed a kingdom that is totally future. Inasmuch
as the future is considered imminent, it influences the
present in a decisive way, but that does not minimize the
kingdom's futurity. As will be seen below, this is a
critical assumption upon which Pannenberg builds much of
his theology. It is, however, a very vulnerable position.
Modern biblical theology has swung from the view that Jesus
proclaimed a kindgom that is wholly future (Weiss-Schweitzer),
through believing that it is totally present in his life
(C. H. Dodd), to the presently held consensus that it is
both present in Jesus Christ and future in its final fulfilment
For a thorough presentation of the options, see Norman Perrin,
THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN THE TEACHING OF JESUS (London: SCM Press
Ltd., 1963). Perrin concludes: '. . .it can be shown there
are aspects of the teaching of Jesus in which the Kingdom is
present, and further aspects in which it is future. . .'
(p.185) It is not surprising, therefore, that Perrin, in
reviewing JGM, wrote: 'This use of selected results of
historical scholarship in support of a theological position
is the most striking feature of the book . . .' (Norman
Perrin, 'Putting the Clock Back,' THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 85
(December 11, 1968): 1575-76.
479 Tupper, WOLFHART PANNENBERG, p.285.
480 Pannenberg, BQT, 3:210.
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is this: omnipotence is constitutive for the being of God; Jesus
proclaimed the future reign of God, and the truth of this claim was
confirmed by God himself through the Easter event; therefore, God
himself is future. 'Thus it is necessary to say that, in a restricted
but important sense, God does not yet exist. Since his rule and his
being are inseparable, God's being is still in the process of coming
482
to be.' This in no way minimizes the eternity of God, because God
has always been the future of even the most distant past. 'He existed
k
as the future that has been powerful in every present. Thus, the
483
futurity of God implies his eternity.' Only when the kingdom comes
will the statement 'God exists' prove to be definitely true because
it is this future which has always been powerfully simultaneous with
484
every time.
By thus emphasizing the 'ontological primacy of the future of
485
the kingdom over all present realities,' Pannenberg believes he
has made possible an understanding of freedom that is not inconsistent
with God's omnipotence. If God is the power of the future, then that
makes freedom genuinely possible for both God and humanity. Since God
'is the ultimate future,' he should be conceived as pure freedom,
481 Pannenberg, TKG, p.56.
482 Ibid.
483 Pannenberg, BQT, 2:224.
484 Pannenberg, TKG, p.62.
485 Pannenberg, BQT, 2:240.
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'for what is freedom, but to have future in oneself and out of oneself?'
And humans also discover a new freedom when they no longer think of
God as an existent being. The atheists have helped theology face the
fact that God's omnipotence logically conflicts with the freedom of
humanity - if God 'exists' in a static sort of way. Human freedom con-
487
sists of possibilities not yet realized, of possessing a future.
As the power of the future, God therefore guarantees human freedom.
This reflection upon the power of the future over the present
leads Pannenberg to a new idea of creation, oriented not toward a
past primeval reality but toward the future eschaton.
The statement that all things and all beings are
created through Jesus Christ means that the
eschaton that has appeared beforehand in Jesus
represents the time and point from which the
creation took place. According to the Biblical
understanding, the essence of things will be
decided only in the future. What they are is
decided by what they will become. Thus, the
creation happens from the end, from the ultimate
future. 488
The end is the beginning. Creation is not to be understood' as an
act that happened one time in past history; rather, it takes place
constantly out of the future. 'The future lets go of itself to
bring into being our present.
486 Pannenberg, TKG, p.63.
487 Pannenberg, BQT, 3:111.
488 Pannenberg, JGM, p.169.
489 Pannenberg, TKG, p.59.
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Pannenberg1s concern for wholeness has thus led him full-circle:
individual events, he asserts, are meaningful only within their
contexts; each context requires a greater context, so that the final
meaning will be revealed only at the end of universal history; God,
by definition the power determining everything that exists, is himself
the all-encompassing unity that will be revealed at the end;
proleptically, he has revealed himself (as the end) in Jesus Christ;
Jesus taught that the reign - and therefore the being - of God is
future, and had this message confirmed by God; as future, therefore,
God is the creator of individual events of history. When we speak of
the future, then, it is not really as the end so much as the begin¬
ning and final integrator of every present. The future - God - is
the unifying, creative power that makes possible the wholeness
Pannenberg seeks.
But now we must ask about the freedom of God and humanity
that Pannenberg has been so eager to demonstrate by his emphasis on
the future. Has he not substituted a totalitarianism of the future
that is every bit as deterministic as the traditional theology of an
'existent,' omnipotent God? Pannenberg makes much out of the fact
that a property of history must be contingency, an openness to new
possibilities in the future. This, he thinks, makes possible
genuine human and divine freedom. At this point, however, an
ambiguity in his thought surfaces. Does he really guarantee an
ontological openness? It is doubtful that he does, for it appears
thac things are so ordered from the eschaton, in his theology,
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that future events are 'contingent' only in the sense that they
are hidden from view in the present. But is our ignorance about
God's future the same as a genuine contingency? How does the
determination of all events from the future grant us a real freedom
that is not simply an illusion of ignorance? Does not this
totalitarianism of the future finally minimize humanity's role as
co-labourer with God in the making of history? Though he rejects
theologies that start 'from above,' he has, in fact, ended with a
theology that seeks to interpret history and all reality from the
standpoint of God, and the interpretation that follows depreciates
the human role as an active participant in the outworking of a
future that is genuinely open.
Hiroshi Obayashi has written of 'an eschatological conformism'
in Pannenberg's theology that undermines the human responsibility of
decision and commitment:
Responsibility consists not only in an epistemological
openness, but also in an ontological openness.
History is not destined to a totalitarian and
conformist perfection of the eschaton. That is what
makes man and God responsible. 490
Is it not the case, however, that Pannenberg must deny a genuine
'ontological openness' to the future? For the eschaton is the power
of creation itself, he tells us, creating all things in conformity wi
490 Hiroshi Obayashi, 'Future and Responsibility: A Critique
of Pannenberg's Eschatology,' STUDIES IN RELIGION/SCIENCES
RELIGIEUSES 1 (1971): 201. See also Tupper, WOLFHART
PANNENBERG, p.301.
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itself, determining every present and past. Openness for Pannenberg
can therefore only be epistemological; that is, an 'openness'
which is related only to man's knowledge or ignorance of the future.
Obayashi has raised a significant problem that Pannenberg's theology
seems powerless to solve.
The inevitable loss of human responsibility in Pannenberg1s
thought has also been seen by Daniel Day Williams. He writes:
As to the Scripture, the New Testament gives us at
least two eschatological pictures of the end and
not one. In one there is universal salvation.
All things are made new. God's life embraces the
whole, all is redeemed. In the other, God divides
the good from the evil in judgment. Some are lost.
We should not be diverted by pathological conceptions
of hell with God willing the eternal torment of his
creature. The question is whether there is a real
risk of lostness in being ....
His j_ Pannenberg' s_/ final event seems to require
the first option, an absolutely universal consum¬
mation which is the essence of every event, no matter
what relation to good and evil it may sustain.
But I must ask, how can life be serious if in a
final event it will all be one absolute good, no
matter what has happened? 491
Not only does Pannenberg undercut the biblical tension between
salvation and lostness in the eschaton, as Williams correctly notes,
but he has difficulty explaining the fact of evil in the present -
if indeed all things flow out of a future of absolute good.
Pannenberg's passion for wholeness fails to account for the broken-
ness of sin. According to the joint testimony of Scripture and
491 Daniel Day Williams, 'Response To Wolfhart Pannenberg,' in
HOPE AND THE FUTURE OF MAN, ed. Ewert H. Cousins (London:
The Garnstone Press Ltd., 1973), p.87.
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human experience, there is, at least in the present, a very real
dualism between good and evil, holiness and sin. Theology has
traditionally understood God's activity with humanity in a sequential
way: creation, fall, brokenness, reconciliation, restoration, whole¬
ness. But Pannenberg, by beginning with the end, by taking the
wholeness of salvation as his starting-point, left himself no room
for human rebellion and its consequent 'sickness unto death.' In
an ironical way Pannenberg has actually become a-historical(!) in
that it appears that nothing really transpires between God and humanity
in the events of space and time but all history becomes a theophany
of God's eternal glory, flowing from the victorious end and deter-
492
ministically guaranteed from the beginning.
We are therefore not surprised to find that Pannenberg's
theology finds little place within itself for the cross. The
necessitas of the cross is inexplicable apart from the reality of
sin. One cannot escape the impression that, for Pannenberg', broken¬
ness is only apparent (given our present finitude), since all things
will finally be shown to have always been united in the wholeness of
God. Apart from a very real brokenness, the cross can only be a
492 Tupper criticizes Pannenberg for tending to minimize
'the radicality of the destruction and brokenness within
history as the expressions of the sinfulness of man'
(p.301). Significantly, Pannenberg admits this in a
postscript to Tupper's book. 'It is correct to say
that the role played by sin, evil, suffering, destruction
and brokenness in human history has not received very
extensive treatment in my writings.' WOLFHART PANNENBERG,
p. 303.
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marginal point - almost a curious oddity - in the proclamation of
the Church. But of course this was not the case with the apostolic
witness. 'I decided to know nothing among you,' wrote Paul to the
493
Corinthians, 'except Jesus Christ and him crucified.' Certainly
it was the resurrection which made the early Church see the true
significance of the cross and filled them with a confident boldness
that came from being in fellowship with the Resurrected One in their
midst, but they proclaimed that this one God raised was him who had
died for the sake of the world. The victory of the resurrection
pointed them not simply to the coming eschaton (though indeed they
understood it as the 'first fruits'), but also to the scandal of an
incredible past: the Resurrected One was none other than Jesus of
Nazareth who had been nailed to the cross for humanity's reconciliation
with God. Walter Kreck, referring to Pannenberg's 'resurrection
theology,' summed up the problem:
'. . . the groundwork is laid for a Christology in
which the cross as saving event seems to play no
decisive role. The emphasis lies, rather, on the
fact that he is the first fruits of those who are
to rise from the dead.' 494
To be sure, Pannenberg does seek to explain the significance
of the cross, as was shown above; but simply to affirm that Jesus
innocently experienced death for the crime of blasphemy, only to
have the tables turned when God raised him, while perhaps helpful in
itself, does not fully explain the reason for the cross. It bears
493 I Corinthians 2:2 [_ italics mine_/
494 Walter Kreck, 'The Word of the Cross,' INTERPRETATION 2^
(1970): 227.
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no material relationship to the rest of Pannenberg's theology.
Why did God allow Jesus to endure the
Godforsakenness of the cross prior to the
eschatological fulfillment of Jesus'
expectation of God's coming Kingdom?
Was the cross a prerequisite to the
eschatological appearance of God's
Kingdom? Pannenberg fails to answer
these crucial questions 495
495 Tupper, WOLFHART PANNENBERG, p.300.
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C. A Provisional Witness
What place, then, does the Church have in this theology
of wholeness? How does Pannenberg view the relationship between the
Church and the world?
In his work on the Apostles' Creed, Pannenberg attempts to
understand the meaning of the adjective 'holy' as it is applied to the
catholic Church. In one hand Pannenberg wants to hold the biblical
meaning of 'holy,' but with the other he grasps firmly his theology of
wholeness. His attempt to fuse the two into a systematic synthesis
is not very successful. The ambiguity is clear in this passage:
. . . the church's holiness describes its
separation from the profane world and the
fact that it belongs to God and to his activity
in the world. According to biblical tradition,
everything is holy which belongs to the divine
sphere and which is allied to it because it has
been chosen by God. It is in accordance with
the Christian belief in the incarnation, more¬
over, that holiness does not mean separation
from the world but that the church should be
sanctified in the midst of the world for God
and his coming. 496
It is unfortunate that Pannenberg was not more precise in his
choice of words. He would have us believe that the Church is
separate from the world and that the Church is not sepatate from the
world. How something can be both 'A' and 'non-A' is difficult to
496 Pannenberg, AC, p.146. Note also p.156 for an
almost identical repetition of this idea:
'The holy . . . means "set aside" ....
The church is holy because it is separated
from the existing world .... On the
other hand, . . . the holiness of the church
cannot mean separation from the world' . . .
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understand. What is not hard to see, however, is why he was led to
affirm this break with elementary logic. Forced by the creed to
define the nature of the Church's holiness, Pannenberg faithfully
adopted the biblical meaning inherent in the concept. However, at
basis this contradicts his theology of wholeness. The idea of a
Church truly separate from the profane world would seem to admit
the inadmissible: a dualism in conflict with wholeness. Therefore,
Pannenberg must quickly qualify his use of the word 'separate' to
show that he really means 'non-separate.' When Pannenberg writes
about the Church in contexts of his own choosing (not burdened by
the difficulties of explaining a traditional label like 'holy')
his theology of the Church's relationship to the world emerges
with greater clarity.
Informing his ecclesiology is an implicit, often explicit,
universalism. Admittedly, Pannenberg does not directly and un¬
equivocally espouse a doctrine of universal salvation for all creation.
He seems reticent, for some reason, to take this step, even though
the structure of his theology would appear to welcome it. He does
often seem to endorse it indirectly, however, and I think it is
because of his conception of a unifying future that embraces all
reality. The future of all creatures is a universal one because
497 Notice his ambivalence: 'Salvation is only guaranteed
to the man who has definite communion with Jesus -
and who has through this communion the hope of over¬
coming death with Jesus. But all other men . . .
can achieve the salvation which appeared in him -




'each instance of reality has the same future.' Exegetically,
Pannenberg finds at least a hint of universal salvation in the
symbolic language of Christ's descent into hell. He believes 'it
asserts that men outside the visible church are not automatically
499
excluded from salvation.' Therefore, he can write, in various
contexts:
. . . whether they know it and want it or not,
all things and all men are subject to the lord¬
ship of Christ. . . 500
. . . Jesus' resurrection allowed the destiny
of all men to a life of nearness to God, as
Jesus had proclaimed it, to appear in him. 501
. . . the future salvation of the whole of
mankind has already appeared in the history of
Jesus and especially in his resurrection from
the dead. 502
. . . the Kingdom of God will comprise all
mankind. 503
This universalistic emphasis is crucial for an understanding
of how Pannenberg sees the Church in the world. Since all humanity
has a common future (the universal destiny which has appeared in
Jesus), the Church is unique only to the extent that it bears testimony
504
to the destination of all humankind in the kingdom of God.
498 Pannenberg, TKG, p.61.
499 Pannenberg, JGM, p.272.
500 Pannenberg, AC, p.126.
501 Pannenberg, JGM, p.196.
502 Pannenberg, AC, p.158.
503 Wolfhart Pannenberg, et
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1970), p.114.
(hereafter cited as Pannenberg, SFC).
504 Wolfhart Pannenberg, HUMAN NATURE, ELECTION AND HISTORY
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1977), p.99.
(hereafter cited as Pannenberg, HNEH).
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That is to say, for Pannenberg the Church is distinct from the world
in a functional but not an ontological way. Ontologically, Church and
world are in no way separate, for they come from and move toward
the same future. As the unifying power of wholeness, the future
knits together into one being all humanity. The Church, however, has
an important role to play functionally. It is 'an eschatological
community pioneering the future of all mankind.By faith ^ it lives
toward the coming kingdom of God, demonstrating in its life and witness
the provisionality of the time in which we live. As the People of God,
Christians are elected to serve the purpose of God: 'they are chosen
to exemplify the gracious intentions of God's love for all human
507
beings.' The Church is true to this vocation 'only as it anticipates
508
and represents the destiny of all mankind, the goal of history.'
505 Pannenberg, TKG, p.75.
506 Much of the present dialogue with Pannenberg concerns his
understanding of faith. It is beyond the scope of 'this
chapter to enter fully into the debate, except to point
out that for him faith is an orientation of trust toward
the future. Pannenberg believes that faith must be
grounded upon certain historical events that are open to
rational investigation. However, that does not mean
he has totally compressed faith into reason. He
distinguishes between knowledge and trust, faith needing
both. On the basis of knowledge, a person must entrust
himself fully to the object of his knowledge, and in
Christian faith, that means the God of the future.
See AC, pp.3-12; BQT, 1:65; 2:28-43; FAITH AND REALITY,
pp.66-67; THEOLOGY AS HISTORY, pp.221- 76; and cf.
Martin J. Buss, 'The Meaning of History,' in THEOLOGY AS
HISTORY, pp.135-54 (esp. 154); Daniel P. Fuller, 'A New
German Theological Movement,' SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY 19
(1966): pp.170-71; Galloway, WOLFHART PANNENBERG, pp.52-53,
Helmut G. Harder & W. Taylor Stevenson, 'The Continuity of
History and Faith in the Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg:
Toward an Erotics of History,' THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION 51
(1971): 24-56 (esp. 51-52).
507 Pannenberg, HNEH, p.108.
508 Pannenberg, TKG, p.75.
160
_ Though the Church is a 'precursory form' of the kingdom, it is
! 509
not the whole of the kingdom. Thus Pannenberg is very careful
to distinguish between the two:
The kingdom of God is not the church; it is the
future of the church, as it is the future of all
mankind. But the church is the community of those
who already wait for the kingdom of God for Jesus'
sake and live for this expectation. 510
The Church's waiting and living in expectation fulfils two
important functions: it forces the political institutions realistically
to admit their preliminary character as it demythologizes the
political myths of a given time and, to use Pannenberg's image,
511
sobers up those who have become drunk with power ; and it grants
'individuals access to the wholeness of life in the presence of the
51 2
eternal' by confronting persons with the ultimate mystery of life,
513
with the God of the future and his purposes in history.
Since Pannenberg consistently views the Church from the perspective
of its functional purposes, he refuses to ascribe eternity to it, seeing
514
it rather as a temporary necessity. Given the provisional nature
of the present world, a separate religious institution is needed because
the destiny of humanity is not yet realized in the general life of
society. 'The function of the Church, put quite simply, is a
515
preliminary function.'
509 Pannenberg, JGM, p.373.
510 Pannenberg, AC, p.155.






The existence of the Church is justified only because
the present political forms of society do not yet
provide the ultimate human satisfaction for
individual or corporate life. If the present
social structures were adequate, there would be
no need for the Church. For then the Kingdom
would be present in its completeness. 516
517
Thus the Church cannot be understood as an end in itself.
Its existence is justified only by the service it renders as a
518
concrete symbol which makes possible life in the secular world,
for without the Church, secular institutions would seek to
sacralize and absolutize themselves to positions of tyranny over
519
humankind. The Church exists as a reminder of the provisionality
of all things before the end; but when the end comes, the Church
will lose its raison d'etre and therefore cease to exist.
That is why, according to Pannenberg, the new Jerusalem will
have 'no further need of any special religious institutions or
temple (Rev. 21:22). Then all life will be carried on in the
520
direct presence of God.' But is this not a very weak biblical
justification for the notion of the transitory nature of the Church?
True enough, there will be no need for the temple (a localized place
of worship), but what is the new Jerusalem itself? Who are its
inhabitants? In context, is it not clear that the citizens of this
city are together the Bride who has made herself ready for the marriage
516 Ibid.
517 Pannenberg, SFC, p.119.
518 Pannenberg, HNEH, pp.32-33.
519 Pannenberg, TKG, pp.92-93.
520 Pannenberg, AC, p.157.
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of the Lamb, having been clothed in the fine linen of the righteous
deeds of the saints and the robes made white in the blood of the
521
Lamb (Rev. 19:7-8; 7:14)? And does not the great multitude pour
forth its Hallelujahs like the sound of mighty thunderpeals because
this Bride is corporately those who have endured the great tribulation
and have come out of the Babylon 'thrown down with violence' so that
she is 'found no more' (Rev. 18:4, 21)? Clearly Babylon and the
Bride do not have the same future as it is envisioned by John of the
Apocalypse; yet is not that precisely what Pannenberg envisions -
a common future from which both somehow emerge and to which they
return? How different the imagery of Scripture! Here the wholeness
comes only after a great disruption which is itself part of the end;
the joyous music of marriage only after the mournful lament of
522
3abylon.
By presupposing a wholeness created by an all-encompassing
future, Pannenberg has offered us a not unattractive vision of
reality that has a symmetrical neatness to it; however, one is left
with the .feeling that he has overstepped the bounds of knowledge
witnessed "to by Scripture, and in so doing has failed adequately to
account for the disunity that is not only our present experience of
521 Cf. Ephesians 5:32.
522 For a more complete analysis of the biblical material
regarding universalism, judgment, and the Church,
see Chapter VI of this thesis.
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broken sinfulness, but is, in a way beyond our comprehension, an
instrument of healing in the eschaton itself, where somehow unity
includes division, wholeness brokenness, and salvation judgment.
Perhaps Dante was correct after all:
Madness! that reason lodged in human heads
Should hope to traverse backward and unweave




THE LOSS OF DISTINCTION FROM THE END:
PROMISE AND FULFILMENT IN THE
THEOLOGY OF JURGEN MOLTMANN
. I don't know what will happen to me now.
We've got some difficult days ahead. But it
really doesn't matter to me now. Because I've
been to the mountaintop. I won't mind.
Like anybody else, I would like to live
a long life. Longevity has its place. But
I'm not concerned about that now. I just want
to do God's will. And he's allowed me to go
up to the mountain. And I've looked over, and
I've seen the Promised Land.
I may not get there with you, but I
want you to know that we as a people will get
to the Promised Land.
So I'm happy tonight. I'm not worried
about anything. I'm not fearing any man. Mine
eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the
Lord. . .' 523
So spoke Martin Luther King, Jr. to a crowd of two thousand
gathered at the Clayborn Temple in Memphis, Tennessee. The next
afternoon he was shot dead. An assassin's bullet lethally ripped
into the body of this modern Moses who had sought to lead his people
to the 'Promised Land.' Though with his people oppressed by injustice,
his commitment to God's will found expression through resistance to
the status quo - a venture set free by a vision of the faint light
already breaking on the horizon of a new day.
Jurgen Moltmann, in a vastly different setting and using language
far removed from the lilting cadences of southern Black preaching,
has expressed in a systematic way the theology inherent in King's
523 Martin Luther King, Jr.j as quoted by Coretta Scott King,
MY LIFE WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (London: Hodder &
Stoughton Ltd., 1969), p.328.
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moving testimony on the eve of his death. He has written a theology
which aims to have its eyes fully open to 'the glory of the coming
of the Lord.1 There is only one real problem in Christian theology,
524
according to Moltmann: 'the problem of the future.' This is
so because
Christianity is eschatology .... The
eschatological is not one element of
Christianity, but it is the medium of
Christian faith as such, the key in which
everything is set, the glow that suffuses
everything here in the dawn of an expected
new day. 525
Thus Moltmann, like Pannenberg, is an 'eschatological theologian' -
but with significant differences. In the last chapter, we saw that
while Pannenberg speaks much about the future, he does so by way of
re-defining it as the beginning. With a concern for wholeness as his
starting-point, he views the future as the creative power of all
reality, and reality, in turn, is moving towards its source. Pannenberg's
theological construct, therefore, has an all-encompassing wholeness
to it, like a closed circle: the end is really the beginning of all
things which are moving towards the end which is really the beginning . . .
In sharp contrast to this closed circle, Moltmann's theology
looks linearly toward an open-ended future. The Easter appearances of
the Crucified Christ, Moltmann tells us, have opened the eschatological
horizon and set history moving toward the future of the coming Lord.
524 Jilrgen Moltmann, THEOLOGY OF HOPE - ON THE GROUND AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF A CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY, trans. James W. Leitch
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1967), p.16 (hereafter cited as TH).
525 Ibid., p.16.
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Thus, if in the Middle Ages Anselm of Canterbury set down the basic
theological principle, fides quaerens intellectum - credo, ut intelligam,
today it is of decisive importance for Christian theology to follow
5
this basic principle: spes quaerens intellectum - spero, ut intelligairi.
What is necessary, then, is a 'theology of hope.'
Faith binds man to Christ. Hope sets this
faith open to the comprehensive future of
Christ. Hope is therefore the 'inseparable
companion' of faith .... Without faith's
knowledge of Christ, hope becomes a utopia
and remains hanging in the air. But without
hope, faith falls to pieces, becomes a faint¬
hearted and ultimately dead faith. 527
Biblical hope is not an escapist diversion from the pains of
the present. Because of the Christ event, it stands on the mountaintop,
as it were, and looks over into a Promised Land that contradicts
present reality. Those conscripted into the army of hope suffer under
present reality as if in an alien land. 'Peace with God means conflict
with the world, for the goad of the promised future stabs inexorably
5-28
into the flesh of every unfulfilled present.'
But then, does hope rob humanity of the happiness of the present?
Quite the contrary, Moltmann answers, for hope 'is itself the happiness
529
of the present.' Hope unleashes the power of expectation which





enables a person to accept the whole of life - joy and sorrow -
because 'in the promises of God he can see a future also for the
530
transient, the dying and the dead.' Without hope there is no
real life. 'Hell is hopelessness, and it is not for nothing that at
the entrance to Dante's hell there stand the words: "Abandon hope,
531
all ye who enter here."'
The theology of hope gladly announces that the gates of this
hell have been thoroughly ravaged by the promises of God - especially
the promise of God, Jesus Christ. Moltmann thus outlines a theology
of promise, for it is promise that vitalizes hope. Each of his three
major books analyzes one aspect of promise: THEOLOGY OF HOPE inquires
532
into the logic of promise as a revelatory event; THE CRUCIFIED GOD"-
looks to the cross of the risen Christ as the key to the content of
533
promise; THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT seeks an under¬
standing of the people of promise. The remainder of this chapter




532 Jiirgen Moltmann, THE CRUCIFIED GOD - THE CROSS OF CHRIST AS THE
FOUNDATION AND CRITICISM OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY, trans.
R. A. Wilson & John Bowden (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1974)
(hereafter cited as CG).
533 Jiirgen Moltmann, THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT -
A CONTRIBUTION TO MESSIANIC ECCLESIOLOGY, trans.
Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1977)
(hereafter cited as CPS).
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A. The Logic Of Promise
The discovery, at the end of the nineteenth century, of the
eschatological background and content of Jesus' life and ministry,
which owes its beginning to Albert Schweitzer and Johannes Weiss, is
appreciated today as one of the most important exegetical advance¬
ments in modern Protestant theology. However, Moltmann maintains
that Schweitzer and Weiss unfortunately retreated back into traditional
liberalism. Because the end did not come as Jesus expected, the
534
eschatological element was depreciated.
After World War I, the founders of 'dialectical theology,'
led by Karl Barth, once again took up the eschatological, dusted off
the condemnations heaped on it for its ineffectiveness, and put it at
the centre of not only exegetical but also dogmatic study. Nevertheless,
it was not really set free to transform theology, according to Moltmann.
Though Barth announced that Christianity must be 'unreservedly
eschatological,' he imprisoned it in the shackles of transcendentalism.
'It was precisely the transcendentalist view of eschatology that
53
prevented the break-through of eschatological dimensions in dogmatics.'
Moltmann's THEOLOGY OF HOPE is essentially a determined effort to set
the prisoner free, to deliver eschatology from the bondage of contra¬
dictory presuppositions. Once liberated, the eschatological becomes
not just one part of theological study, usually trailing in the wake of
other doctrinal formulations, but the determining conceptual frame¬
work for all theological study. If the eschatological is truly central
534 Moltmann, TH, pp.37-38.
535 Ibid., p.40.
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to the message and mission of Jesus, as Moltmann believes it is,
then eschatology is not simply one subject for study among others,
but the entire process of theological study itself must submit to
the unique nature of this subject.
Moltmann sets out to accomplish what Barth
intended but for various reasons was unable
to accomplish, namely, the goal of drawing
all Christian theology out of its own
peculiar subject matter and thus making it
eschatological and therefore dialectical. 536
What does Moltmann mean by 'transcendental eschatology1?
By this term he means those theologies which answer the question of
the future and goal of revelation by means of a reflection!: 'the
wherefore and the whence are the same, the goal of revelation is
537
identical with its source.' Barth is guilty of this because for
him God reveals only himself, and thus 'the goal and the future of
538
revelation lies in himself.' Similarly, Bultmann is guilty of a
transcendentalism of the human self so that the goal of revelation '
that man should attain to his authenticity and primordiality, that i
539
to himself.' The result of either approach to revelation is that
revelation and the eschaton coincide - in the former instance, in
God, and in the latter, in the human self.
Revelation does not then open up a future in terms
of promise, nor does it have any future that would
be greater than itself, but revelation of God is
then the coming of the eternal to man or the
coming of man to himself. It is precisely this
reflection on the transcendent 'self' that makes
eschatology a transcendental eschatology. 'Revelation'
536 M. Douglas Meeks, ORIGINS OF THE THEOLOGY OF HOPE
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), p.19. See also pp.59-61




becomes the apocalypse of the transcendent
subjectivity of God or of man. 540
In either case, reality is de-historicized and humanity is robbed of
a genuine future. With Barth, it is almost impossible to speak of
an outstanding future of Christ, but only of a noetic unveiling of
what has already been accomplished and revealed in him. Over against
this, Moltmann contends that eschatology is not simply a summing up
or a disclosure of an accomplished fact, but it speaks of a reality
that is not yet, a hope for something yet to be reconciled, a waiting
for a genuinely 'new thing.' And on the other hand, because 'Bultmann
and his school had baptized eschatology in the waters of existentialism,
history was swallowed up in the personal decision of faith. For if a
person comes 'to himself,' attains final authenticity in faith, then
faith itself is the practical end of history, since through it the
believer attains his perfected selfhood. Hence 'there would be nothing
more that still awaits him, and nothing more towards which he is on his
542
way in the world in the body and in history. . .' Thus, eschatology
for both Barth and Bultmann is turned into the 'epiphany of the eternal
, ,543present.'
540 Ibid.
541 Gabriel Fackre, THE RAINBOW SIGN - CHRISTIAN FUTURITY,
New Reformation Series (London: Epworrh Press, 1969), p.4.
542 Moltmann, TH, p.68.
543 Ibid. It is questionable, in my judgment, whether Moltmann
has really come to terms with the full scope of Barth's
eschatology, especially its later development in CD IV/3.
Cf. Chapter VI of this thesis.
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Though Moltmann is critical of the de-historicizing of the
eschatological in dialectical theology, he is equally unwilling to
accept the complete historicizing of revelation that one finds in
Pannenberg. To hold a view of 'revelation as history' fails to
comprehend adequately the present significance of the cross, he
contends. If we look to the future of the crucified Lord, then
'theology must accept the "cross of the present" (Hegel), its
544
godlessness and godforsakenness.' The eschaton is not simply a
clearer interpretation of present reality; rather, it stands over
against history as we know it. The future opened up through Christ's
resurrection is not just an apocalyptic unveiling of universal
545
history, but breaks the bounds of Jewish apocalypticism. The
resurrection is not merely the first instance of a universal end,
but turns the eyes of faith to the new future of the Lord himself
546
who is coming, and therefore is given a world-transforming outlook.
Over against these exclusive definitions of revelation as Word
(Barth and Bultmann) or as history (Pannenberg), 'Moltmann developed
a concept of revelation as Word-history .... This third, reconciling
547
view was "promissory history."' The Word of God is history-making
because it is given in the form of promise - a Word which opens up
544 Ibid., p.84.
545 Ibid., pp.192-93.
546 Ibid., pp.82-83. Cf. also Moltmann's rejection of 'salvation
history' in which 'revelation became a predicate of history,
and "history" was turned deistically into a substitute
for God' (TH, p.71).
547 Meeks, ORIGINS OF THE THEOLOGY OF HOPE, p.65.
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the future and sets its hearer on the way. Not in the logos of the
epiphany of the eternal present, but in the hope-giving word of
promise did Israel find God's truth. 'Christian eschatology in the
language of promise will then be an essential key to the unlocking
548
of Christian truth.'
For Moltmann, the essential thing to be understood about
'promise' is that it
announces the coming of a not yet existing
reality from the future of the truth ....
It does not illuminate a future which is always
somehow already inherent in reality. Rather,
'future' is that reality which fulfils and
satisfies the promise because it completely
corresponds to it. 549
We should note three important implications of this definition:
550
first, promise contradicts existing reality - a fact that has
great importance for Moltmann as his theology develops; second,
if revelation is promise, then it must be understood as open-ended,
551
pointing and leading forward beyond itself; " third, promise refers to
something new, a creative act that will accomplish something that is
552
not yet. Thus, promise establishes an 'interval of tension' between
548 Moltmann, TH, p.41. For a concise summary of what Moltmann




551 Ibid., p.88. Thus Moltmann speaks about 'the questionableness
of human existence and the questionableness of reality as a
whole' (TH, p.94).
552 Ibid., p.88, 92. 227. 'What, then, does the future of
Christ bring? Not a mere repetition of his history
/ contra Pannenberg_/, and not only an unveiling of it
[_ centra Barth_/, but something which has so far not
yet happened through Christ' (TH, 228-29).
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present and promised reality. This has a historicizing effect as
553
humanity is set on its way toward a goal and given the opportunity
554
in the interval to obey or disobey. The question as to how one
should live in the in-between time now becomes urgent. The answer
is given in the form of commandment. 'Promise and command, the
pointing of the goal and the pointing of the way, therefore,
555
belong immediately together.'
The word of promise, according to Moltmann, is the golden thread
linking together the various narratives of the biblical witness.
It was promise that set Abraham on his way to a new land. It was
promise that kept Israel moving through the wilderness. It was
promise, contradicting present reality, open-ended and anticipating
the new, that caused Israel constantly to look beyond into a coming
future. It was promise that marked off Israelite worship from that
of its neighbours as it maintained a cultic practice informed by the
life of sojourning - even when it had settled in the land. Whereas
the religions around them hallowed places, times, and persons,
because of their association with the divine 'appearing,1 and so
found order in their lives through contact with the eternal cosmos,
Israel, in striking contrast, understood the 'appearing' of God in
terms of the uttering of the word of promise. The reason for the
553 Ibid., pp.100, 103.
554 Ibid., p.104.
555 Ibid., p.120. Thus commandments are 'as little rigid
norms as the promises,' but are the 'ethical side of
the promise' (TH, p.122).
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appearances, then, was to point beyond themselves into an as yet
556
unrealized future. Even on Israel's political deathbed, instead of
weakening in power, the promise is universalized and intensified
557
as all the nations are brought into the hands of God and his future.
The moving horizon of the assurances for the
future given by the God of promise, once it
is extended to embrace 'all peoples,' then
reaches the utmost bounds of human reality
as such, and becomes universal and so also
eschatological. 558
Once the promise becomes eschatological, it is quite likely, Moltmann
thinks, that apocalyptic cosmology became eschatologized, so that
apocalyptic literature represents not a cosmological interpretation
of eschatological history, but the reverse, 'an eschatological and
559
historic interpretation of the cosmos.' The promise, as it were,
breaks the bounds of the cosmos and takes the cosmos itself up into
its history.
The vision of hope one finds in late Jewish apocalyptic con¬
cerning the resurrection of the dead has to do with the question of
theodicy: 'When will God's righteousness triumph over this world of






560 Ju'rgen Moltmann, RELIGION, REVOLUTION, AND THE FUTURE,
trans. M. Douglas Meeks (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1969), p.45.
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It is in this context - the word of promise and its consequent
history - that the gospel must be understood. Jesus' Father was
Yahweh, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God who promised.
As a Jew, Jesus stands in the community and history of promise;
therefore only against this background can his life and ministry
be properly known. 'The gospel is promise and as promise it is an
561
earnest of the promised future.'
The event of the promissory gospel is the resurrection and
appearances of Jesus Christ. 'If it is this Old Testament God of
promise who acts and reveals himself in the event of the resurrection,
then this revelatory event must also be understood in terms of
50P
promise and fulfilment.' Neither historicism, which approaches
the resurrection as if it simply took place in history and somehow
corresponds analogously to other events which provide the key to its
563
interpretation, nor existentialism, which never gets beyond the
564
question how the Church preached to the question why it spoke,
is adequate for understanding the full significance of the raising
of Christ from the dead.
Beyond both historicism and existentialism stands
the attempt to find the ground of historic phenomena
neither in a positivistic system of laws nor in the
historic character of human existence, but to see
them in their significance for the future. 565
561 Moltmann, TH, p.148.
562 Meeks, ORIGINS OF THE THEOLOGY OF HOPE, p.73.




This means that 'the event of the raising of Christ from the dead is
566
an event which is understood only in the modus of promise.' The
resurrection is 'historic' because it is history-making, i.e., in
a promissory way it points the way to future events, 'it discloses
an eschatological future.' ^
What constitutes the horizon of history and what is to be
expected of this history set in motion by the eschatological promise
of the raising of the one who was crucified, is outlined by the inner
tendency and the intention of God revealed in this event. What
Christian eschatology discerns by this is nothing less than Christ's
future lordship over all creation and over every enemy, including
568
death. To be sure, the future is only delineated in a provisional
way. The resurrection is not fulfilment, but promise; hence, it
provides a fragmentary knowledge, straining beyond itself to an open
569
future and a new creative act. Nevertheless, Moltmann believes that
the tendency of things latent in the resurrection of Jesus and the
intended goal toward which they point are recognizable to a degree.
What is seen in the event is the future lordship of Christ, the
kingdom of God.
If the apocalyptic hope for the resurrection of the dead raised
the question of theodicy, the eschatological event of Christ's resur¬
rection gave the answer. God's righteousness, by which all things will
566 Ibid.
567 Ibid., p.180-81.
568 Ibid., pp.194, 226-27.
569 Ibid., p.203.
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be reconciled (persons will be set right with themselves, with their
fellows and the whole creation), will triumph in the future of Jesus
(
Christ. Therefore, with the resurrection we have to do with a universal,
all-inclusive eschatological event that promises all reality a future
570
new being. The inner necessity of the Christ event is 'to bring
out in all things the eternal life latent in him and the justice of
571
God latent in him.' Thus, the promise of the coming reign of God
in Christ is universal - all things will attain 'to right, to life,
572
to peace, to freedom, and to truth.'
If the kingdom of God begins as it were with
a new act of creation, then the Reconciler is
ultimately the Creator, and thus the eschatological
prospect of reconciliation must mean the recon¬
ciliation of the whole creation, and must
develop an eschatology of all things. 573
From the foregoing it may seem that Moltmann is guilty of the
accusation he makes against Pannenberg: a one-sided emphasis on
the resurrection. Such is not the case. He recognizes that 'the
divine righteousness has its ground both in the event of the cross
and in that of the resurrection, that is, both in his death and in
574
his life.' It is the crucified one who was raised from the dead.
That means for Moltmann that God's revelation in Christ is constituted
in the form of a dialectic - an open dialectic - which will only
575






575 Meeks, ORIGINS OF THE THEOLOGY OF HOPE, p.79.
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means that because Jesus has been raised from the dead the kingdom
of God can be nothing less than a new creation; and since the
risen Lord is the crucified Christ, the coming
lordship of God takes shape here in the
suffering of the Christians, who because
of their hope cannot be conformed to the
world, but are drawn by the mission and
love of Christ into discipleship and
conformity to his sufferings. 576
This theme has been more fully amplified by Moltmann as his theology
has developed, as will be evident in our discussion of THE CRUCIFIED
GOD and THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT. Yet, even in THEOLOGY
OF HOPE, which puts the emphasis on the resurrection, there is a
recognition of the cross and its necessary relationship to the raising
of Christ.
The question, however, is whether Moltmann's 'dialectic' of
cross and resurrection is really a dialectic or merely a contradiction;
that is to say, does Moltmann, in THEOLOGY OF HOPE, adequately account
for the dialectic of cross and resurrection, or does he, using those
labels, really set up a contradiction between this age and the age to
come? It appears that Moltmann at this stage in his thought, has not
really come to terms with the presence of the risen Lord in the cross
and the future of the crucified Lord in the eschaton - the present and
future dialectic between cross and resurrection in which each mutually
577
interprets and is informed by the other. Rather, Moltmann temporalizes,
576 Moltmann, TH, p.222.
577 Later, in THE CRUCIFIED GOD and THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE
SPIRIT, Moltmann does deal with this dialectic. The present
criticism applies only to the earlier stage of his thought
reflected in THEOLOGY OF HOPE.
179
so to speak, the cross and resurrection, so that they stand for two
completely contradictory periods. In a way similar to Hegel's
'speculative Good Friday' and Bonhoeffer's 'world come of age,'
Moltmann uses the cross as an interpretative principle of present
experience.
In the cross we recognise the god-forsakenness
of all things, and with the cross we can
recognize the real absence of the kingdom
of God in which all things attain to righteous¬
ness and peace. 578
The resurrection, on the other hand, is not the in-breaking of the
eschaton but a promise directed toward it. The resurrection points
beyond itself, becoming the symbol of the coming kingdom that stands
in contradiction to the present godlessness of this age. The kingdom
of God is here present only as promise and hope, and therefore
if it is present as promise and hope, then this
its presence is determined by the contradiction
in which the future, the possible and the promised
stands to a corrupted reality. 579
And since all reality stands under the sign of the cross, the sign
of the resurrection promises the future restoration of all things
through new creation, 'and hope in the kingdom can be satisfied with
no less than this.'^^
It is difficult to understand how, in Moltmann's thought, the
future will bring to reconciliation the dialectic between the cross
and resurrection; rather, it seems that the future itself is the
other side of the great contradiction between ages. Instead of achieving




a reconciliation between two presently dialectical elements, Moltmann
is really looking for a complete transition from the age of the
cross to the age of the resurrection; that is, transformation not
reconciliation.
By beginning with the premise that revelation is promise, and
that means an open-ended, fragmentary, present-reality-contradicting
event that points beyond itself to something completely new, Moltmann
finds himself in a situation in which the revelatory event of the
gospel must be devalued as an event in itself and seen as a pointer
to the coming future. The resurrection for Moltmann is promise,
but according to his definition of promise that means it must contra¬
dict present reality; thus his sharp disjunction between the cross and
the resurrection, the present and the future, the godforsakenness of
the present and the universal salvation of the future.
But is the kingdom of God, in fact, wholly outstanding? This is
the critical question that must be raised against Moltmann'-s THEOLOGY
OF HOPE. Is there not a sense in which the kingdom is present, not
in fulfilment of course, but concretely present nonetheless? Christ's
resurrection may indeed be promise, but what gives it its eschatological
581 In a private conversation with me, Moltmann agreed with my
criticism of his complete disjunction between this age
and the eschaton in THEOLOGY OF HOPE. The eschaton is
concretely present, he now believes, in the crucified
Christ and the gifts of the Spirit. This change in
his thinking is evident in his later works . When I
asked him if he believed he had changed his position,
he replied, 'Of course, I'm no stone! ' With that
admirable affirmation of flexibility in the pursuit
of theological truth, the conversation ended.
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scope if not the fact that the new creation has indeed broken in
upon this present age? According to the synoptics, Jesus proclaimed
582
a kingdom that was both future and present. He taught his disciples
to pray 'thy kingdom come' (Matt. 6:10), yet he also announced that
'the kingdom of God is in the midst of you' (Lk. 17:21). And is not
the Spirit the present 'seal' andiguarantee' of our inheritance
(I Cor. 1:22; 5:5; Eph. 1:13-14)'- the Spirit who concretely manifests
the Lord's presence in the experience of the Church through the
charismata (I Cor. 12:4-11)? In Moltmann's theology
the Kingdom appears as an arc that reaches from
the resurrection of Christ over history and
cosmos to its touchdown point at the resur¬
rection of the dead. A world so bereft of the
'thermal current' of eschatological grace at
work in the present is difficult to square with
the Christian drama. It is not only the promise
of Christ that breaks in proleptically but his
real presence and power; not just the 'whiff'
of what id to come but an authentic foretaste .. 583
Moltmann's complete dependence on the logic of promise has
ill-served him at this stage in his thought. Apart from the biblical
difficulties his theology is faced with, it has, in effect, knocked
out all foundations from under itself. For if the kingdom is wholly
outstanding and all present reality is godforsaken, then presumably
Moltmann's theology itself (indeed, all theology) is godforsaken and
bereft of the revealing light of the new day dawning in Christ. The
only logical response to that situation would be to shut the books,
582 Cf. footnote 53 in Chapter III.
583 Fackre, THE RAINBOW SIGN, p.75.
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set down the pen, and keep an honest silence that suffers under
the contradiction of the present.
One final aspect of THEOLOGY OF HOPE should be mentioned before
we proceed to Moltmann's later works, for it is an idea he consistently
maintains throughout his theological development. It is this: 'the
584
Easter appearances of Christ are manifestly phenomena of vocation.1
Because the resurrection is a promise pointing to the coming future
of Jesus Christ, a horizon has been opened to his followers and they
are set on their way toward his future lordship. That means the
resurrection creates mission. In fact, Moltmann takes that a step
further, saying, in effect, mission creates the Church. The existence
of the Church 1 is completely bound to the fulfilling of its service.
For this reason it is nothing in itself, but all that it is, it is
535
in existing for others.' Like Pannenberg, Moltmann adopts a
completely functional concept of the Church. We shall examine this
later, but notice: this idea, which he consistently follows, is a
consequence of his logic of promise as developed in THEOLOGY OF HOPE.
For if there is no present, concrete manifestation of the future in
this present age, then it is impossible to understand the Church in
any way other than only functionally different from the rest of the
world. It has its 'existence' in the act of mission, to be sure, but
'if we would fathom its essence, then we must enquire into the future,
584 Moltmann, TH, p.196.
585 Ibid., p.327.
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on which it sets its hopes and expectations.' What this means is
that there is no essential difference between the Church and the
world for Moltmann, for he clearly believes in a future universal
restoration, as was shown above. Since the future of all things is
the same (the future of Jesus Christ), and since 'essence' is
defined by the future, then presumably the essence of all reality
is identical. That leaves his theology with a Church whose unique¬
ness is defined wholly in terms of its functional activity, its
mission. Though Moltmann later modifies his disjunction between the
cross and resurrection, this age and the eschaton, he does not alter




B. The Content of Promise
From the resurrection of the crucified Christ, Moltmann turns
his theological attention to the cross of the risen Christ in
THE CRUCIFIED GOD. This is the appropriate sequence for considering
the Christ event, according to Moltmann, because ''for Paul the
"word of the cross" is based in the event of the resurrection of
587
the crucified Christ.'
It is important for the history of the primitive
Christian tradition to realize that after the
theology of the resurrection and the enthusiasm
of the Spirit, faith once again returned and
reached back to the earthly and crucified Jesus
of Nazareth. Students of Paul have emphasized
this astonishing fact and its significance.
It was this which gave rise to the new literary
category of a gospel, in the synoptic sense. 588
Thus, following Paul and the experience of the early Church,
Moltmann enquires into the significance of the crucifixion of the
one risen and confessed as Lord. ^
587 Moltmann, CG, p.73.
588 Ibid., p.74.
589 Moltmann wants to stay clear of both a Jesuology which is
concerned solely with the earthly, historical Jesus, and
a Christology concerned only about the Christ whom faith
and the Church proclaim. Therefore, Moltmann considers -
the crucifixion from the perspectives of 'The Historical
Trial of Jesus' (pp.112-53) and 'The Eschatological Trial
of Jesus' (pp.160-196): 'We shall attempt to achieve an
understanding of the crucified Christ, first of all in the
light of his life and ministry, which led to his crucifixion,
and then in the light of eschatological faith which proclaims
his resurrection from the dead, and in so doing proclaims him
as the Christ (CG, p.112). Unfortunately, we must dispense
with a thorough analysis of his first goal, given the
limitations of this chapter. If the bulk of the. following
discussion emphasizes the eschatological implications of
the cross, it is because of its more direct relevance to
the argument here presented, and, in my judgment, more of
a piece with the fabric of his theology as a whole.
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Now this order of approach - moving from the resurrection to the
cross - is by no means arbitrary or simply reflective of historical
experience. It is absolutely necessary, for the resurrection is the
only door through which one gains access to the theological meaning
of the cross. 'Christian faith essentially reads the history of Jesus
590
back to front.' The crucified Christ was understood in the light
of the resurrection, and his resurrection was understood in the light
of the eschaton. That means, therefore, his historical crucifixion
was an eschatological event. 'The resurrection "does not evacute
the cross" (I Cor. 1:17), but fills it with eschatology and saving
591
significance.'
However, once one comes to the eschatological cross via the
resurrection, one is immediately turned around and sent back to the
resurrection and the coming glory; that is to say, 'his death on the
592
cross expresses the significance of his resurrection for us' and
593
'in the crucified Christ we view the future of God.' Clearly, then,
Moltmann has become more fully dialectical in THE CRUCIFIED GOD as
he seeks to understand the inner relationship between the cross and
the resurrection. Only through the resurrection can one understand





593 Jiirgen Moltmann, THE EXPERIMENT HOPE, ed. and trans.
M. Douglas Meeks (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1975), p.57.
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In what way does the cross illuminate for us the meaning of
the resurrection?
By understanding Christ's death as having taken
place 'for many,' one can understand his resur¬
rection from the dead as having taken place in
favour of those who are still dead. If that is
the case, then his death on the cross 'for us'
can be understood as a proof of his resurrection.
To understand the representative significance of
his death is to understand the resurrection. In
His dying for us the risen Christ looks on us
and draws us into his life. 594
In other words, the 'for us' nature of God's self-giving in Christ's
death reveals the 'for us' nature of the resurrection. Whereas late
Jewish apocalypticism expected a resurrection from the dead in order
for God's righteousness to triumph in a final judgment, and hence
was constantly threatened by the ambivalency of an uncertain verdict,
Christian faith is set free from doubt about the future. It knows
only an unequivocally joyful hope. 'It shows the cross of Christ as
the unique and once-for-all anticipation of the great world judgment
595
in favour of those who otherwise could not survive it.' Through
the cross, therefore, the future is opened to all - not just the
righteous, but even the unrighteous. Since the cross shows that God
takes the side of the unrighteous-, the future of this God (promised
in the resurrection) must be understood completely in terms of the
grace this revealed. 'The coming glory of God is mirrored in the face
596
of the crucified one.' Thus, if the resurrection is an event of
594 Moltmann, CG, p.186.
595 Ibid., p.176.
596 Moltmann, RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE, p.53.
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promise, the cross outlines more specifically the content of this
promise. If the resurrection is the event of promise that sets us
off on a journey through the wilderness of this life, the cross is
Mt. Nebo, elevating us high enough to look beyond the Jordan into the
land flowing with the milk and honey of God's grace.
How is it the cross reveals the grace of God? What is there
in the scandalous fact that the risen Christ is the same as the
condemned, forsaken, executed Jesus of Nazareth that discloses the
'for us' of the gospel? This question cannot be answered, according
to Moltmann, by referring to the concept of 'expiation.' This is
because
the early Jewish-Christian idea of the dying Christ as
an expiatory offering for our sins, which has constantly
been repeated throughout the traditions in varied forms,
cannot display any intrinsic theological connection
with the kerygma of the resurrection. 597
Moltmann is not unaware of the biblical traditions that support the
notion of expiation (e.g., the sacrificial cult of the Jerusalem
temple, the concept of the special expiatory power of the 'blood of.
598
Jesus' that one finds in Romans 3:25 and I Corinthians 10:16, etc.),
but he feels constrained to reject them because 'it is very difficult
to harmonize the resurrection of Jesus with these interpretations of
599
death.' We should clarify this: it is very difficult to harmonize
597 Moltmann, CG, p.183.
598 Ibid.
599 Ibid. One may well ask whether it is legitimate for Moltmann
to dispense with a view so broadly supported in Scripture
because it does not 'harmonize' with his theology of the
resurrection. Is it possible that his understanding of
the resurrection needs to be modified to give a more full
accounting of the biblical witness?
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Moltmann's view of the resurrection of Jesus with these interpretations
of his death. As was shown above, he sees the raising of Christ as
an event of promise pointing forward to the future. True, it casts
a light on the cross, but that light is immediately reflected back
upon the resurrection - indeed beyond, to the eschaton - revealing
more clearly the nature of the promise. The cross, then, is as forward-
looking as the resurrection: it brings into sharper focus the future
promised by the event of the resurrection. Now the problem Moltmann
has with the idea of expiation is that it exists within the framework
of the law. Through sin a person falls short of the righteousness of
the law and comes under its condemnation; 'by expiation he is restored
to the righteousness of the law. Expiation for sins has a retrospective
character. Its concern is the restitutio in integrum, not the begin¬
ning of a new life. 'Consequently, Moltmann rules out expiatory
notions - not on exegetical grounds, but because they are not: prospective
in character, i.e., they do not seem to conform to the forward-looking,
promissory structure of God's ways with humanity.
In what way, then, do we understand the cross as an event of God's
gracious salvation? For Moltmann, the cross reveals the panentheistic
nature of reality. To explain this, we must first emphasize Moltmann's
concern to penetrate the trinitarian implications of the cross. The title
of his book indicates this: THE CRUCIFIED GOD. In the suffering of
Jesus God himself suffered and died for us; we properly speak of the
600 Ibid.
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crucifixion of God. However, this fact must be kept in its trinitarian
context. 'Jesus' death cannot be understood "as the death of God,"
602
but only as death in God.' The Son of God died in abandonment and
godforsakenness - he enters into the godlessness of sin for our sake.
And in that act, the Father suffers too, for he, according to Paul,
'delivered up' his Son, handed him over to abandonment for the sake of
603
humanity. 'In the cross, Father and Son are most deeply separated
in forsakenness, and at the same time are most inwardly one in their
surrender.'In the Father's delivering up of his Son, and in the
Son's abandonment by the Father, God suffered by identifying himself
fully with the brokenness of sin. Thus Moltmann can say:
God overcomes himself, God passes judgment on
himself, God takes the judgment on the sin of
man upon himself. He assigns to himself the
fate that we should by rights endure. 605
Moltmann does not mean by this to stress a judicial, penal atonement
in the sense that God's injured holiness found satisfaction through
the death of Christ. Rather, he seems to be articulating a theology
of salvation by identification and absorption. In Christ, God





605 Ibid. , p.193.
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he entered completely into the godlessness and suffering of sin.
1
In so doing, he took it upon himself - as if to say, he absorbed all
sin and its awful consequences into his being. This means that now
God and suffering are no longer contradictions, but 'God's being is
in suffering and all the suffering is in God's being itself.
The content of the doctrine of the Trinity is the
real cross of Christ himself. The form of the
Crucified Christ is the Trinity. In that case,
what is salvation? Only if all disaster, forsaken¬
ness by God, absolute death, the infinite curse of
damnation and sinking into nothingness is in God
himself, is community with this God eternal salvation,
infinite joy, indestructable election and divine
life. The 'bifurcation' in God must contain the
whole uproar of history within itself ....
If one describes the life of God within the
Trinity as the 'history of God' (Hegel), this
history of God contains within itself the whole
abyss of godforsakenness, absolute death and the
non-God .... All human history, however much
it may be determined by guilt and death, is taken
up into this 'history of God,' i.e., into the
Trinity, and integrated into the future of the
'history of God.' 607
By virtue of the death of Christ, all reality is taken up into God
and made a participant in the eschatological life of God.^^
Panentheism thus leads to universalism:
. . . the theology of the cross is the true Christian
universalism. There is no distinction here, and there
cannot be any more distinctions. All are sinners with¬
out distinction, and all will be made righteous without
any merit on their part by his grace which has come to
pass on Christ Jesus (Rom. 3:24). 609
606 Ibid., p.227.
607 Ibid., p.246.
608 Ibid., p.255. Thus Moltmann asserts that 'even Auschwitz
is in God himself (CG, p. 278).
609 Ibid., p.195.
Because the cross shows us that all things have been taken up into
God - even sin and death - it reveals the universal scope of the
promise given in the resurrection. Though our knowledge of the
eschaton is only anticipatory, this much is certain for Moltmann:
It will bring universal participation in the life of God.
It should be obvious that Moltmann, in THE CRUCIFIED GOD, does
seek to be more fully dialectical in his understanding of the cross
and resurrection. The cross is visible only in the light of the
resurrection, he tells us, and conversely, the meaning of the resur¬
rection is revealed through the event of the cross. However, it is
still questionable whether Moltmann's theology really hopes for a
reconciliation of this dialectic in the eschaton. If he seems to
have a contradiction between ages in THEOLOGY OF HOPE, with a trans¬
formation from one age to the next, but no real reconciliation, then
it appears that in THE CRUCIFIED GOD he locates the reconciliation in
God himself, not in thefucure eschaton. At the cross, Moltmann
asserts, God has taken all evil into himself, and therefore grants
all reality a share in his eschatological life.
In THEOLOGY OF HOPE, Moltmann is constrained by his a priori
definition of 'promise' (that which contradicts present reality) to
adopt a contradictory structure of reality with this age ana the age
to come as polar opposites. Since this age stands under the godless-
ness of the cross, the promise of the resurrection points toward the
restoration of all things in a new creation. In THE CRUCIFIED GOD,
as Moltmann sought to penetrate more deeply the trinitarian implications
of the cross, he maintained, to a certain extent, the category of promise
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as the mode of revelation, as is seen in his rejection of the idea of
expiation because of its supposed backward reference to the law and
its restoration. Since the cross is understood in light of a promissory
event, and because it in turn outlines more clearly the character of
the promise, it must itself be an event of promise - or at least
forward-looking, and not retrospective. Wherein is its salvation for
humanity? In the fact that it is an event that takes place within the
trinitarian history of God, by which God takes all reality in its
broken sinfulness up into himself in order to grant to all reality an
inheritance in his eternal life. Moltmann's original structure of promise
and fulfilment, with this age and the age to come standing in strict
contradiction, has been considerably altered. Now he sees 'inherent in
610
the Christ event a real incarnation of God's future.' The cross is
611
the 'historical mediation of God's future ': the salvation of the
future is concretely present in the crucifixion of Jesus. This position
more adequately accounts for the Scriptural witness to the present
reality of the kingdom (later, in THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT,
Moltmann continues to explore the kingdom's presence in the manifestations
of the Holy Spirit), but in moving away from the ruling category of
promise, Moltmann seems to proceed toward a position in which God's
being itself is understood as the event of reconciliation, and toward
610 Moltmann, RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE, p.213.
611 Meeks, ORIGINS OF THE THEOLOGY OF HOPE, p.124.
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the corollary idea of the panentheism of all reality. This appears
to be a surprising concession to a more static, objective, ontologism
that runs counter to his whole programatic structure of promise and
fulfilment. It is hard to see how history can still be filled with
the dynamic of a movement initiated by promise, and straining in hope
toward a future fulfilment, when all things have been taken up and
reconciled within God. We might ask Moltmann: What has yet to be
accomplished in the future? One wonders if he hasn't come surprisingly
close to the position with which he finds fault with Barth, i.e.,
viewing the eschaton as only a noetic unveiling of an already
accomplished reconciliation.
Be that as it may, one thing is certain: the practical effect
is the same. Even with his dialectical modifications, which more
fully account for the present reality of the kingdom in the cross and
resurrection, Moltmann still maintains a thoroughgoing universalism
that leaves the present reality of the Church only a functional position
within this world. In THEOLOGY OF HOPE, all present reality is under
the cross, but promised life by the event of the resurrection; in
THE CRUCIFIED GOD, all present reality is taken up into God himself and
thus granted a share in his future. In both cases, and eschatological
universalism is maintained, and the ecclesiological result is a
functional concept of the Church.
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C. The People of Promise
In his third major theological work, THE CHURCH IN THE POWER
OF THE SPIRIT, Moltmann turns his attention to the people of promise,
the Church. The first and most basic affirmation that must be made
concerning ecclesiology, he believes, is that 'the lordship of Christ
612
is the church's sole, and hence all-embracing, determining factor.'
The task of Christian theology is constantly to remind the Church
of this fact. To affirm that the lordship of Christ is the Church's
'determining factor' means that the Church is set within the history
of God's promise in Jesus Christ, and lives on the way toward its
fulfilment. There is a 'teleological principle,' Moltmann tells us,
that has penetrated to the very heart of the Christian message. The
'theological final clauses' of Paul reveal this most clearly: the
meaning of the justification of sinners is the liberating lordship of
Christ over the dead and the living; the meaning of the lordship of
Christ 'is the complete rule of God in which God himself is "everything
to every one.'"^"^ The Church is the community which lives according
to this teleological dynamism. It is the fellowship of justified sinners,
who live under the lordship of Christ, and who have their eyes fixed on
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the final triumph of God's lordship. This community of Christ comes
6"1 5
about through the presence and power of the Holy Spirit. It is the
Holy Spirit who works in the people and events of history in order
to realize concretely in the present the future glory of God.





Consequently the whole eschatology of the
history of Christ which is expounded in the
theological final clauses can also be described
as the history of the Spirit, a result of the
workings and indwelling of the Spirit through
which the future that is hoped for enters into
history. 615
So in his theology of Pentecost, Moltmann manages to hold on
to the eschatological structure of reality for which he argued so
forcefully in his theology of Easter, and yet continues to advance
along the lines of his theology of Good Friday by maintaining a
present reality of the coming kingdom. The result is- a pneumatological
eschatology that, in my judgment, maintains the strengths of both
earlier formulations, yet avoids some of their weaknesses. Contrary
to THEOLOGY OF HOPE, Moltmann is able to keep in hand both a vigorous
eschatological theology, yet not do violence to the fact of the kingdom's
concrete historical presence. And contrary to THE CRUCIFIED GOD,
while making a theological space for the kingdom's present manifestation,
he does not risk undermining the interrelation of promise and fulfilment
that he believes is basic to Christian faith and its theological
formulations.
Throughout THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT, Moltmann keeps
two facts about the Church in tension: (1) the Church, as the work of
the Holy Spirit is 'itself the beginning and earnest of the future of
6 j_ 7"
the new creation,' x yet, (2) 'in the longer-range history of the Spirit
618





lives in anticipation. It is 'hope lived in fellowship.'
'The church in the power of the Spirit is not yet the kingdom
« 620
of God, but it is its anticipation in history - a concrete
anticipation in which 'the coming glory already becomes efficacious
621
in the present life.' As the people of the kingdom, the Church
lives in joyous liberation of the divine lordship. It incarnates
622
the future joy of the eschatological glory of God.
In the remembered and hoped for liberty of Christ
the church serves the liberation of men by demonstrating
human freedom in its own life and by manifesting its
rejoicing in that freedom. 623
Its joy is not an escapist flight from the difficulties of worldly
existence. On the contrary, because believers live in the freedom of
the eschaton that contradicts present reality, they engage in the
politics of the cross. For 'believers the divine glory is revealed on
the face of the crucified Jesus; it no longer belongs to the crowns
624
of kings or the fame of nations or any earthly authorities.' As
this 'iconoclasm of the cross' manifests itself in the Christian
fellowship, the future takes shape in the present, bringing its liberation





623 Jilrgen Moltmann, THEOLOGY AND JOY, trans. Reinhard Ulrich
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1973), p.87.
624 Moltmann, CPS, p.92.
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This joyous, messianic fellowship is enabled to become com¬
prehensible to itself as the Holy Spirit grants it certain 'processes
625
and experiences.' What does Moltmann mean by 'processes and
experiences' of the Spirit? These are
on the one hand the 'means of salvation' -
proclamation, the Lord's Supper, worship,
prayer, acts of blessing and the way in
which individual and fellowship live.
On the other hand, they are the 'charismata,'
the ministries, gifts and tasks (or offices,
as they are called) in this fellowship for
society. 626
The details of Moltmann's theology of the sacraments and ministries
of the Church cannot be fully presented here, but this much should
be noted: through proclamation and the sacraments of baptism and the
Lord's Supper the kingdom is mediated to the world, and in the power
627
of the Spirit's 'charismata' it is concretely manifested.
Given Moltmann's recognition of the present reality of the future,
which is brought about in the life and ministry of the Church through
the power of the Holy Spirit, we might be led to assume that he would
acknowledge an ontological distinction between the Church and the
world. If the Spirit's work gives rise to a community of the future,
who live in the present joy and power of the coming glory, and who
thus live in contradiction to the sinful brokenness of this world,
then it would appear that Moltmann's theology has moved from an
ecclesiological functionalism to a position congenial to the idea that





However, such is not the case. Moltmann is constantly influenced by
his eschatological universalism. Though the Spirit makes use of the
Church in the present, it is only as a way or transition to the final
all-inclusive reality, the kingdom of God. It is quite proper,
according to Moltmann, to speak of the Church as 'the people of the
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kingdom' - a people on the move toward God's future, an 'exodus
church.' But this movement in no way sets the Church off in distinction
from the rest of the world, for it finds itself in a universal move¬
ment and understands itself as only 'the beginning of the liberation
629
of the whole enslaved creation for its consummation in glory.'
Early in his thought, Moltmann laid down the principle of the
eschatological determination of essence - a dictum which has consistently
influenced his ecclesiology.
All being has its horizon of meaning, is ek-sistent,
points toward something, has a tendency and an inter¬
pretation in the direction which it ought to go. We
cannot talk about Christianity if we do not talk
about that towards which it is directed, if we have
nothing to say about that which constitutes the
eschatological content of its history. That is all
that is meant when the church is characterized as an
instrumental function of the apostolic process of
God's history. 630
Two things should be noted from this quote. First, Moltmann is
saying that the being of the Church is determined by its 'horizon of
meaning'; its essence is ordained by its future. We should recall,
at this point, that Moltmann's eschatology is hammered out on the anvil
of an all-embracing universalism. What that means, therefore, is that
628 Ibid., p.83.
629 Ibid.
630 Jlirgen Moltmann, HOPE AND PLANNING, trans. Margaret Clarkson
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1971), p.145. See also TH, p.325,
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the Church and the world both exist in the same 'horizon of meaning';
the 'being' of each, as it is defined by a common future, must be
identical. The second thing to notice in rhe above quote is the
consequent image he has of the Church: a functional instrument of
the apostolic process of God's history. 'Mission does not come
from the church; it is from mission and in light of mission that
the church has to be understood.' From the vantage point of
the eschaton, Moltmann tends 'to assimilate the total reality of the
032
church to the action of mission.' The Church is nothing in itself;
its complete existence is defined by its action on behalf of the
coming kingdom. All reality has the same future, and is thus
indistinguishable _in essence; the difference between the Church and
the world can therefore only be a relative difference. At the van¬
guard of the eschatological movement of all creation, the Church
serves the apostolic function of witness to the coming eschaton.
631 Moltmann, CPfe, p.10. Meeks, in ORIGINS OF THE
THEOLOGY OF HOPE, maintains that Moltmann came
into contact with, and was significantly
influenced by, the Dutch Apostolate theology,
especially J. C. Hoekendijk (see Meeks, ORIGINS
OF THE THEOLOGY OF HOPE, pp'. 24-30). Hoekendijk
summarizes his position this way: 'The nature
of the church can be sufficiently defined by its
function, i.e., its participation in Christ's
apostolic ministry' (J. C. Hoekendijk, THE CHURCH
INSIDE OUT, trans. Isaac C. Rottenberg, ed.
L. A. Hoedemaker & Pieter Tijmes (London: SCM
Press Ltd., 1966), p.40).
632 Meeks, ORIGINS OF THE THEOLOGY OF HOPE, p.160.
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Thus it appears that while Moltmann wants to base his ecclesiology
on christology, what has in fact been the determining factor is his
eschatology - specifically, his universalism which left him no other
alternative than to evacuate the distinction between the Church and the
world of any essential difference. What is left is simply the Church
in actu, wholly defined by its missionary task.
The question arises, however, whether Moltmann is not guilty of
an ecclesiological docetism. It appears he is, for taken to its
logical conclusion, Moltmann's theology leads to an discarnate mission.
Even if the missionary function of the Church is granted a central
place in our understanding of its existence, is it not necessary to
speak about the being of the Church as well as its act? Can mis¬
sionary action completely exhaust the meaning of a Church grounded
in the incarnate Christ? If the future concretely makes a place for
itself in the present through the work of the Holy Spirit, then is
there not an appropriate way to speak about the being of a Church that
is not merely a means to a future end, but is, at least partially,
an end in itself? For
a new generation of Christians who will again have to
struggle to find their identity as Christians in the
church and for a political theology that must relate
to the complexities of urban power systems, there
needs to be an ecclesiology which can focus on the
embodiment of the Christian mission. 633
The choice between an ontological or simply functional distinction
between the Church and the world has enormous practical ramifications,
as Moltmann's discussion of mission strategy reveals. In discussing the
633 Ibid., p.161.
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Church's relationship with other world religions, for example, Moltmann
shows clearly how a functional concept of the Church can lead to a
relativization of its significance in the world. What is Christianity's
missionary task in relation to other religions? Moltmann recognizes that
it is 'one goal of mission to awaken faith, to baptize, to found churches
and to form new life under the lordship of Christ,'*^4 but one cannot
help but feel he has given mere 'lip service' to this task. In five
short sentences he dispenses with this part of mission and spends the
next ten pages underscoring the need for a mission strategy that
635
aims toward 'the qualitative alteration of life's atmosphere,'
by which he means the 'aim to ''infect" people, whatever their religion,
036
with the spirit of hope, love and responsibility toward the world.'
This latter type of mission takes place in dialogue, he tells us, and
that means Christianity must shake off the vestiges of 'absolutism'
g37
and renounce 'its exclusive claim in relation to other religions.'
As a new model for the Church's role in the world, Moltmann suggests
638
'the formula of the critical catalyst.' 'A catalyst causes elements
639
to combine simply through its presence.' Thus, simply by their







presence, Christians will indirectly infect other religions 'with
Christian ideas, values and principles'0^ so that in the end 'a Buddhist,
Hindu, Moslem, animist, Confucian, Shintoist Christianity will come
641
into being.'
But is this the aim of Christian mission? Moltmann's concern
to 'infect' other religions 'with Christian ideas, values and principles'
sounds like an echo of the played-out theme of nineteenth century
liberalism - a discordant melody falling on ears tuned to the theological
leitmotifs of the twentieth century. If it is a goal of mission, as
Moltmann grants, to awaken faith and baptize, then is it not the
Church's aim to awaken faith in the lordship of Christ and to baptize
in the name of the triune God revealed in him? Moltmann is quite
eager to underscore the radical implications of the lordship of Christ
when it comes to the political realm of life, vigorously asserting the
'iconoclasm of the cross.' Well, does not this cross also throw down
the gods of religion? Are there not religious as well as prolitical
idols that are dethroned in the affirmation 'Jesus is Lord'? Moltmann
strangely retreats into a vague liberality with regard to religious
systems that confess other 'lords,' and in a way highly inconsistent
with his own concern to emphasize the lordship of Christ. In so doing,
he seems to have forgotten his own admonition to Pannenberg that
Christian faith awaits the future of Jesus Christ, not an abstract
eschaton. Now he appears to be speaking about an idealized future
defined by 'Christian ideas, values and principles' - whatever that means.




Jesus Christ, and to confess him as lord is to recognize and accept
the 'scandal of particularity.' 'And there is salvation in no one
else, for there is no other name under heaven given among men by
642
which we must be saved.' Of course, Moltmann recognizes the
salvific uniqueness of the name of Christ, but he extrapolates from
that name a future so universal and comprehensive in its embrace
that confession of the name becomes only relatively important.
'No' culture,' Moltmann writes, 'must be pushed out and no religion
643
extinguished.' There is no need to push these out, presumably,
because all things will share in the coming glory. They must,
644
however, be given a 'messianic direction towards the kingdom.'
But what can that mean, if not a re-directing of all peoples to the
Messiah, to the Lord himself? As Moltmann has taught us, it is his
future we look for, not a realm of idealized principles abstracted
from our present notions of universal peace and harmony.
In the end, Moltmann's eschatology overwhelms whatever ontological
distinction between the Church and the world we may have been able
to postulate from his doctrine of the Spirit's manifestation of the
642 Acts 4:12. Cf. John Baillie's response to the question,
Why only in one name? '. . . when we ask ourselves why
these things should be, we have to answer simply that we
do not know. But then why should we expect to know? We
have to take experience as we find it.' Nevertheless, a
little more can be said about it. 'For if it had been so
that each could find God in his own way, each would be
finding him without at the same time finding his brother . . . .
If the various tribes of mankind could find their ultimate
enlightenment and salvation in different names, the human
race would forever remain divided' (John Baillie, THE
SENSE OF THE PRESENCE OF GOD (London: Oxford University
Press , 1962), p.207-8).
643 Moltmann, CPS, p.103.
644 Ibid.
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kingdom in the present reality of the Church. Finally there can be
no essential difference for him, because all things have been granted
a space in the eschaton.
In THEOLOGY OF HOPE, the logic of promise led him to posit two
contradictory ages: one of universal godlessness (symbolized by the
cross), the other of universal salvation (symbolized by the resurrection).
In THE CRUCIFIED GOD, Moltmann set aside this strict contradiction and
began to deal more fully with the dialectical relationship between
Good Friday and Easter, but prematurely (it seems) reconciled it all
in God, so that all history - broken and sinful - is somehow 'taken
up' into God and thus guaranteed life in his future. Would it not
have accorded more adequately with the biblical witness to continue
the dialectic into the future of Christ himself? If we grant Moltmann
his contention that the cross explains the meaning of the resurrection,
and hence the coming kingdom, can we not then speak about both the
judgment and grace of God in the future of Jesus Christ? Certainly
Paul did not hesitate to do so. To the Thessalonians, who had certain
erroneous opinions about the parousia of the Lord, Paul wrote about
this event in a way which indicates that he envisioned a Day of both
judgment and grace,
when the Lord Jesus is revealed from heaven with his
mighty angels in flaming fire, inflicting vengeance upon
those who do not know God and upon those who do not obey
the gospel of our Lord Jesus. They shall suffer the
punishment of eternal destruction and exclusion from
the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his
might, when he comes on that day to be glorified in
his saints, and to be marveled at in all who have
believed. 645
645 II Thessalonians 1:7-10.
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This passage seems harshly contradictory to Paul's witness
that in Christ God will 'reconcile to himself all things, whether
640
on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of the cross.'
What then is our conclusion to be - the word
concerning judgment and separation, heaven and hell,
or the message of universal redemption? Both aspects
remain juxtaposed in their harsh incompatibility.
We cannot even assign them to their respective
witnesses. They stand in the same epistle, in
fact in the very same chapter. And the one, by its
very absoluteness, logically excludes the other.
Which of them is the ultimately valid point of view?
Our answer is: both voices are the Word of
God .... Only through this indissoluble duality
do we grasp the duality of God's being which is yet
one: His holiness and His love. All symmetrical,
logically satisfying knowledge of God is death
bringing. 647
Moltmann himself has pointed the way for us. He teaches us
to understand the resurrection and coming kingdom in reference to
the cross. If we see revealed in that event the dialectic between
God's grace and judgment, then should we not expect to see a fuller
revelation of that dialectic in the future, and expect its reconciliation
to take place only within the person and work of the coming Christ
himself? Our hope, therefore, must be even more radically open-
ended than Moltmann's theology will allow: we 'see through a glass
darkly' and can in no way fathom the how of his final reconciliation
in judgment and grace. This does not entail uncertainty about the
future outcome of life in Christ; in Christ we share in his assured
victory over sin and death. But it does mean that we listen carefully
646 Colossians 1:20.
647 Emil Brunner, ETERNAL HOPE, trans. Harold Knight
(London: Lutterworth Press, 1954), pp.183-84.
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to the warnings of Scripture about the fearful possibility of
unbelief, of being outside the realm of Christ's grace, personally
face to face with the holy judgment of God against sin.
In Christ, God has revealed not only his mercy, but also his
unrelenting condemnation against sin. Moltmann has only made brief
reference to the element of judgment in the event of the cross. This
is due, no doubt, to his desire to be rid of any ideas connected with
atonement vis-a-vis the law. Because of its supposed retrospective
character, expiation is ruled out. Rather, he sees salvation as a
panentheistic inclusion of all reality in the being of God: in
becoming one with us in the brokenness of sin's consequences, God
takes all - even godlessness and godforsakenness - up into himself,
and all things are therefore guaranteed life through participation in
his being. But has Moltmann done justice to the judgment of God
against humanity and its pride? When Moltmann deals with sin, it is
almost always in a passive sense, emphasizing its consequences: he
speaks of brokenness, pain, suffering. Is not this, however, to
neglect the essential element of sin, its active disobedience? If
all sin and godlessness have been taken up into God, then can we ever
speak about God's judgment over against human rebellion? It would
not seem so. Thus Moltmann quite consistently expects a universal
restoration when all things, having already been taken up into God,
will participate in the life of God's future.
It is astonishing, however, that Moltmann's theology, which
aims to be so thoroughly eschatological, almost completely ignores
the New Testament passages that speak directly about the coming
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eschaton. No doubt this is because they speak not only of the
consummation of grace but also of a coming; judgment - an embarrassing
problem for the eschatological triumphalism which is the undercurrent
of Moltmann's theology. So he is more content, apparently, to
extrapolate from his own understanding of the 'inner tendency' of the
Christ event; but it is regrettable that he does not at least
acknowledge the direct witness Scripture itself makes to the nature
of the coming future of Jesus Christ. Had he done so, his eschatology
would perhaps rest less assuredly on a universal restoration of
all creation, and its consequent levelling and relativizing of all
distinctions in present reality, and been more truly informed by






In the year of Grace, 1654,
On Monday, 23d of November, Feast of St. Clement,
Pope and Martyr, and of others in the Martyrology,
Vigil of Saint Chrysogonus, Martyr and others,
From about half past ten in the evening
until about half past twelve
- FIRE
God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of
the philosophers and scholars.
Certitude. Certitude. Feeling. Joy. Peace.
God of Jesus Christ. 648
A few days after Pascal's death in 1662, a servant noticed by
chance that in the lining of his master's coat there was something
thicker than the rest. Upon tearing it open, he discovered a
649
little piece of parchment paper covered with Pascal's own writing.
It was a testimonium to a life-changing encounter. For eight years
s y
Pascal kept close to himself a record of a two-hour meeting with -
FIRE. The Unexpected had invaded his soul: a God 'not of philosophers
and scholars,' well-defined and domesticated by neat and tidy systems
of thought, but the Incomprehensibly Greater One, the God of
Jesus Christ.
648 Blaise Pascal, as quoted by Emile Cailliet,
PASCAL - GENIUS IN THE LIGHT OF SCRIPTURE




After four chapters of theological analysis, Pascal's
experience raises for us some disturbing questions. In writing
about others' thoughts about God, has it been the Gud of Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob with whom we have had to do, or simply the God 'of
the philosophers and scholars'? By manipulating the tools of
logic, intellectual reflection, and dialectical argument, have we
constructed an image of 'God' limited by the dimensions of our
rational powers? Have we been trying to define the Indefinable,
understand the incomprehensible, circumscribe the infinite? Have
the intellectual wranglings of the last two hu:ndred pages brought
us any nearer to a genuine knowledge of the One who transcends
all human thought and speculation? As interesting as the thoughts
of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Paul Tillich, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and
Jurgen Moltmann have been, has this exercise in theological
criticism been carefully and coolly crafted far away from the
singeing heat of the Holy? Have we been burned - even warmed? -
by the FIRE that consumed Pascal on the night of November 23, 1654?
Is not this God always beyond our formulations? Does he not
constantly encompass us about as Night, as we walk by the light of
our reason? Or - better, perhaps - is he not always the blinding
Sun that darkens our minds' eyes and sends us reeling back from
arrogant attempts to gaze into the light of his truth? In the end,
are we perhaps left before the Abyss with only dumb silence and a
prayer for the illuminating FIRE?
Because of the nature of the object of its study, Christian
theology is constantly faced with these questions. In that it
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seeks to speak coherently about God, it will continue down the
road of rational analysis and systematic clarification; but,
inasmuch as it seeks to speak coherently about God, it inevitably
treads a perilous route between the Scylla of intellectual arrogance
and the Charybdis of a mute, faithless witness. The intention of
this chapter is to show that the Consuming Fire of the Holy i£
'Jt
knowable, not in spite of, but precisely because of, his otherness.
That which sets God 'above' is exactly that which sets him 'near.'
The incomprehensible is the given comprehensibility of God.
Divine separateness defeats separation. The distinction is the
overcoming of the distance. God is the alien, burning fire of




Throughout the first part of this study our thesis was that there
has been, in twentieth century Protestant theology, a notable loss
of ontological distinction between the Church and the world. To
demonstrate this, we have presented the thought of four theologians
and have tried to show that their different approaches have resulted
>
either in an immanentalism or a universalism - both of which effectively
obliterate any essential distinction between the Church of Jesus
Christ and its context, the world. We have been only secondarily
concerned about what these theologians have directly written about
the Church and its relationship to the world (which may or may not
have been consistent with the rest of their theological formulations);
rather, we have sought to show how, in the case of each, the structure
of his theology as a whole resulted in this loss of distinction.
(1) In Chapter I, we argued that Dietrich Bonhoeffer took the
incarnation as his starting-point for christology. Because Jesus
Christ is the Incarnate One, Bonhoeffer raised the question of the place
of Jesus Christ. A Christ without a place in the world would be a
docetic, unbiblical Christ. Where is the place of Jesus Christ,
according to Bonhoeffer? His answer to this question varied. First,
he identified the Church as the place of Jesus Christ, but as he
followed out the logic of the finitum capax infiniti and the genus
majestaticum of his Lutheran tradition, he finally affirmed the world
as the place of Jesus Christ. By this identification, he sought to
bring into a comprehensive whole the one reality of God. The incarnation
for Bonhoeffer meant the complete abolition of the distinction between
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the Holy and the profane. By means of an incarnationalism,
therefore, Bonhoeffer was led to an immanentalism which resulted
not only in the loss of ontological distinction between the Church
and the world, but very nearly even the loss of distinction between
God and the world. Thus Bonhoeffer lost the concept of an ontological
distinction between the Church and the world from below.
(2) Paul Tillich, likewise, created a theological system
which eventuated in a sweeping immanentalism, but unlike Bonhoeffer,
he did not take the incarnation as his starting-point. For Tillich,
rather, it was an abstract transcendentalism that led to this end.
In Chapter II we contended that Tillich, though employing contemporary
existentialist terminology, was really a loyal descendent of
nineteenth century idealism. By an intellectual ascent into the
heavens, he sought to bring together into one complete system the
reality of God and the reality of the world. In an attempt to
maintain the radical 'otherness' of God, Tillich defined God as
'being—itself,' or 'the ground of all being.' The consequence of
such an abstract attempt to preserve the transcendence of God was
the almost complete loss of distinction between God and humanity.
His ontology was sweeping, carrying in its wake the divine and the
human, grace and sin, faith and love. Thus Tillich lost the concept
of an ontological distinction between the Church and the world
from above.
(3) Like Tillich, Wolfhart Pannenberg seems also to be motivated
by a passion for wholeness. He,- too, in many ways, is a grateful
heir of the idealism of the last century, particularly the philosophy
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of Hegel. But he recognizes that Hegel's system of universal history
was defective inasmuch as Hegel had to see himself as being at the
end of history in order to comprehend the meaning of the whole.
This problem is overcome for Pannenberg by a proper understanding
of the resurrection of Jesus Christ. In this event, he maintains,
the end has broken into the midst of history in a proleptic way.
This means that history can be grasped in its universal significance,
and yet, since the full revelation of the end is still outstanding,
the openness (contingency) that is a requisite of history is still
preserved. The further implication of the resurrection is that God
has validated the pre-Easter activity (teaching and death) of Jesus
of Nazareth. Therefore, because Jesus taught that the kingdom of God
will come in the future, and because God's reign and his being are
to be conceived of as one, God is 'the power of the future' and,
in this way, is still in the process of coming to be. The future,
then, becomes the dominant category for Pannenberg. In fact, we
saw that it exerts an almost totalitarian influence over his theology.
Creation, for example, is not an event that happened in the past
(how could it be if God's power is future?), but is rather the way
of speaking about things as they flow out of the future■ The future,
for Pannenberg, is not so much the end as it is the beginning; all
things flow out of the future (God), and, at the same time, all
things flow toward the future. Thus Pannenberg's system merges
r-
together the Alpha and Omega as it envisions a cyclical movement of
reality, complete in its wholeness. The consequence is a theology
with little place for the brokenness of sin and the grace of its
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overcoming, and no place at all for an ontological distinction
between the Church and the world. The universal future is, for
Pannenberg, the creative power of a perfect cosmic whole. Thus
Pannenberg loses the concept of an ontological distinction between
the Church and the world from the beginning.
*
(4) Jurgen Moltmann shares a similar concern to understand
the eschatological implications of the Christ event. Unlike
Pannenberg, however, he wants to maintain a more open-ended future.
This is because of the promissory nature of revelation: it points
beyond itself to a new reality which stands in contradiction to the
present. Nevertheless, as Moltmann's thought develops, he seems to
be willing to say more and more about the nature of the eschaton.
On the basis of Jesus Christ (the promissory event), Moltmann
discerns an 'inner tendency' which reveals the 'intention of God.'
This is that all reality shall be granted a share in the eschatological
victory promised in the resurrection. Since in the Cross God
identified fully with all the brokenness of sin, and thereby
absorbed it all into himself, all reality will in turn share in the
triumph of the resurrection. (Conspicuously lacking in Moltmann's
theology of the Cross is the notion of judgment against sin; rather,
the central idea is God's complete identification with humanity in
its sin.) Furthermore, Moltmann holds that the essence of a thing
is determined by its future. Now this means, then, that since all
things will automatically share in the future he has perceived in the
'inner tendency' of the Christ-event, all things must share in the
same essence. Any difference, therefore, between the Church and the
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world dissolves before a triumphant universalism that imposes an
ontological conformity on all present reality. Thus Moltmann loses
the concept of an ontological distinction between the Church and the
world from the end.
The reconnaissance of Part I seems to indicate, therefore, two
>
major problems: an immanentalism, in the cases of Bonhoeffer and
Tillich; and an automatic universalism, in the cases of Pannenberg
and Moltmann. As far as the relationship between the Church and the
world is concerned, both lead to the same conclusion: there is no
essential difference, no distinction in being, between the Church
and the world.
At this point, we cannot evade an obvious question. If four
theologians of the calibre and influence of Bonhoeffer, Tillich,
Pannenberg and Moltmann have developed theologies which call for the
removal of the notion of an ontological distinction between the Church
and the world, then why persist in the criticism? With the cumulative
force of these theologies clearly flowing in one direction, why fight
the current in an attempt to swim upstream? Is it worth the effort?
Indeed, is it even necessary?
The rest of this chapter is an attempt to answer these questions.
It is my conviction that the ontological distinction between the
Church and the world is a truth that must be affirmed by theology,
resting as it does on solid biblical and theological ground. The case
for this has yet to be made, of course, but if I am correct in this
judgment, and right in my analysis of the four contemporary theologians
that have engaged our thinking so far, then it is clear that, whatever
216
we say finally about the relationship between the Church and the
- world, we must constantly keep before us the two main difficulties
that have emerged.
As to the problem of immanentalism (incarnational or trans¬
cendental), our first concern must be with a doctrine of God-in-
relationship-to-the-world, for the loss of distinction in the
Church-world relationship is but a reflection, in this case, of
the loss of distinction in the God-world relationship.
Ronald Gregor Smith put it this way:
To find a way of asserting simultaneously the
absolute difference of God from everything else,
and his relation to everything else, without
diminution of the difference, is without any
doubt the key problem for theological thought. 650
With the problem of universalism, our concern must be with a
doctrine of God-in—relationship—to-the-world-in-sin; that is to say,
with a soteriology, informed by the dialectic of grace and judgment,
which fails to take seriously neither God's opposition to the world¬
s-sin, nor his gracious favour to the world-in-sin. Neither his
distinction from the world nor his decision for the world must be
lost. And further, we must search for a way among the many possible
theological paths which keeps in view both the certainty of God's
salvation in Jesus Christ (without abstracting from it a 'law' of
650 Ronald Gregor Smith, THE DOCTRINE OF GOD, ed. K. Gregor Smith
and A. D. Galloway (London: Collins, 1970), p.89. The
remainder of this chapter will be devoted to this
concern, with special reference to Bonhoeffer and
Tillich.
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universalism, positing an 'automatic' end of history), and the
651
freedom of grace.
651 Chapter VI will propose a solution to this
problem and consider it with special
regard to Pannenberg and Moltmann.
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B. Reveille and Password
In I Peter we find an exhortation to the Church 'to be a
652 653
holy priesthood,' grounded in the fact that it is 'a holy nation.'
Accordingly, the Creed confesses 'one, holy, catholic, and apostolic
Church.' What is the nature of this holiness? Does it perhaps
provide a way into the question of the relationship between the
Church and the world that offers us a way out of the theological
cul-de-sac at which we have apparently arrived? Since we have seen
that the view one holds of the Church-world relationship is often
a consequence of one's view of the God-world relationship, we
will want to ask whether the concept of the Holy is perhaps a clue
with which to discover a fundamental framework for a theology of
God-in-relation-to-the-world. Indeed, such is the case, for 'of all
the qualities attributed to the divine nature there is one which,
in virtue both of the frequency and the emphasis with which it is
used, occupies a position of unique importance - namely, that of
654
holiness.' Add to this the fact that 'holiness,' by definition,
652 I Peter 2:5.
653 I Peter 2:9.
654 Walther Eichrodt, THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT - Vol.1,
translated by J. A. Baker (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1961),
p.270. So also J. Muilenburg, 'Holiness,' THE INTERPRETER'S
DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE - Vol.11, ed. George Arthur Buttrick
(New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1962), p.616:
'
. . . . "holiness" gives expression to the essential
nature of the "sacred." It is therefore to be under¬
stood, not as one attribute among other attributes,
but as the innermost reality to which all others are
related.'
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refers to that whichr is 'sacred' as opposed to that which is
'profane' (i.e., it ,is a word denoting a certain relationship between
the divine and the non-divine), and it becomes clear that in this
word we may possibly have a key with which to unlock a deeper
understanding of the relationship between God and the world, and
also, therefore, a more adequate grasp of the relationship between
the Church and the world. If once we get a hold of what the concept
of the Holy means in reference to God, we shall then be able to apply
that knowledge to the 'holy priesthood,' the Church of Jesus Christ.
To this end, let us consider (1) the biblical data, and (2) the
major theological formulations of the idea of the Holy.
(1) In so far as the meaning of 'Holy' can be determined
etymologically, the word originally had reference to 'that which is
655
marked off, separated, withdrawn from ordinary use.' (The root
656
V T p apparently developed from , 'to divide.') As von Rad
stated it,
the holy could much more aptly be designated the great
stranger in the human world, that is, a datum of experience
which can never really be co-ordinated into the world in
which man is at home, and over against which he initially
feels fear rather than trust - it is, in fact, the
'wholly other.' 657
655 Eichrodt, THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT - Vol.1, p.270.
656 0. Procksch, 'Clyio^ , THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT -
Vol.1, ed. Gerhard Kittel, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand
Rapids & London: William B. Eerdmans, 1964), p.89. My analysis
of the biblical meaning of 'holiness' is very much indebted to
this excellent linguistic and theological study. See pp.88-115.
657 Gerhard von Rad, OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY - Vol•I• trans.
D. M. G. Stalker (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and
Boyd, 1962), p.205.
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The Holy, then, is something utterly distinct, 'the great stranger
in the human world.'
In the life and faith of Israel, the term 'holiness' underwent
a significant development. Procksch has outlined two major streams
of tradition which, though often overlapping, are distinctly
discernable in the literature of the Old Testament: the cultic
J 4-v. v. 658and the prophetic.
a. 'From the very first 4/"Tp is very closely linked with the
cultic. Anything related to the cultus, whether God, man, things,
659
space or time, can be brought under the term k)7 p .' According
to Procksch, the substantive 'always denotes a state and not
060
an action.' The term is not found in Genesis where the cult plays
no significant role, but it does emerge in Exodus with the story of
Moses. Its static nature is shown in the fact that objects are
'holy,' e.g., the ground around the burning bush (Ex. 3:5), Gilgal
before Jericho (Jos. 5:15), Jerusalem (Is. 48:2; Neh. 11:1,18), the
site of the temple (Is. 11:9; 56:7), the temple itself (Is. 64:10),
the 'holiest of holies' (Ps. 28:2). And 'the more deeply we penetrate
into the priestly literature of the Pentateuch, the more common the
661
word becomes.' In Leviticus we read of holy offerings (2:3,10),





the unleavened bread and the holy place where it is to be eaten
(6:16-17), the 'most holy' guilt offering (7:1), holy linen (16:4),
holy garments (16:4), the holy place of atonement (16:16-17),
holy convocations (23:4), the holy tithe of the land (27:30), etc.
These are 'holy things' (22:2) of the Lord. As the static
conception of the Holy merges with the cultic, eventually 'the
cultus itself comes under the threat of the purely material
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conception.of holiness.' This materialization of the Holy had
become commonplace by the time of Jesus, as his rebuke of it
seems to indicate (Matt. 23:17-19).
The cultic was not, however, completely limited by a material¬
ized notion of 'holiness.' The adjective is more fluid
in its renderings, and with it an important development takes
place. This form of the word is used of persons. As a pre¬
dicate of God, it 'comes to have the meaning of divine, and thus
becomes an adjective for God (Is. 5:16; 6:3: Hos. 11:9).' ^
The personalization of the Holy finally comes into its own as the
substantive ( u)~T'P ) , which originally had a purely static
connotation, is applied to the name of God. In the priestly
literature, the phrase flli]> O<j/ is particularly common,
as it is in the Psalter.^ Through this process of personification,





finally Yahweh's holiness is contrasted with everything creaturely.
The name, Word and Spirit of God are all forms of
His revelation, but as they are set in
antithesis to everything Worldly or creaturely,
so that even the cultic is almost consumed by
the divine. God's holiness thus becomes an
expression for His perfection of being which
transcends everything creaturely. 665
To sum up the exegetical investigation to this point: in its
most primitive use, 'holiness' has to do with that which is
separate; first, as applied to the cult, the holy things of God
are perceived as set apart for his service; and second, as applied
to the name and person of God, God himself is understood as set apart.
Thus, the Holy is first a religious, and not an ethical, term.
It indicates that which is alien to ordinary human life: either
the personal being of God, or those things set apart by him.
Eventually, however, the ethical is brought into relationship
with the religious. Because God has not only set apart objects for
his use, but a people as well, the idea of the holy people,' whose
lives are marked by a specific conduct, emerges, as is seen in the
so-called Holiness Code of Leviticus (17:26). Everything here is
based on the basic statement in Leviticus 19:2: 'You shall be holy;
for I the Lord your God a.m holy. '
Yahweh's holiness demands the holiness of His people
as a condition of intercourse. If the cultic character
of holiness is prominent in this code, c.19 shows us
that cultic qualification is inconceivable without purity.




b. It is in prophetic theology that this ethicization of the
Holy reaches full bloom. The prophets blast with abhorrence
empty cultic ritualism and call the holy people of God to live justly
by correcting oppression, defending the fatherless, and pleading
for the widow (Is. 1:11—17). This emphasis on the conduct of the
holy people is perhaps due to a new appreciation of the moral
distinctives of their holy God. nit is Hosea, especially, who
recasts the idea of the Holy into a new form. Breaking completely
with the cultic element of Israel's faith, Hosea presents Yahweh
in moral antithesis to man^®^: 'I am God and not man, the Holy One
in your midst1 (11:9). Because his holiness opposes the uncleanness
of Israel (6:10; 9:4), it has a death-dealing aspect to it which
causes the final 'stumbling' of Israel (14:1); yet, there is also
a creative element to God's holiness which makes him a tree of life
(14:8). In a way that is incomprehensible for human understanding,
as well as astonishing in the context of Israel's religious traditions
Hosea links the notions of holiness and love (11:1-4). 'The
opposition of God's holiness to Israel thus works itself out in His
668
love.' The holiness of Yahweh, as the sum of his being, is
precisely the creative love which heals as it tears, and brings
life through its slaying (6:1).
667 Ibid.
668 Ibid. , p.93.
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There can be no playing down the annihilating power
of holiness, and the intensity of the threat of
judgment in Hosea can hardly be exaggerated.
Nevertheless, in the end it is the incomprehensible
creative power of love which marks out Yahweh as
the wholly 'other'; the one whose nature is in
complete contrast to that of the created cosmos. 669
Or, as Procksch summed up Hosea's view, 'the antithesis between God
670
and man consists in the very love which overcomes it.'
In the theology of Isaiah, the concept of holiness is central.
His God is 'the Holy One of Israel' (5:19,24; 10:20; 12:6; 17:7;
29:19,23; 30:11,12,15; 31:1). 'The Trisagion of his initial
671
vision (Is. 6:3) remained normative for his picture of God.'
In Isaiah's temple-experience, the tearfulness and awe before the
'wholly other' is surely present, but the contrast for Isaiah is
moral in character: 'Woe is me I For I am lost; for I am a man of
unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips . . .'
(6:5). Atonement is needed, and it comes to Isaiah from the Holy
God (6:7). In the presence of the Holy, Isaiah's state of moral
estrangement is revealed, and at the same time the reconciliation
is effected.
Deutero-Isaiah develops further Isaiah's image of the Holy One
of Israel, filling the phrase with a content not unlike Hosea's
theology of holiness. For Deutero-Isaiah the thought of redemption
is central. The Holy One of Israel is the Redeemer (41:14; 43:3,
14-15; 47:4; 48:17; 49:7; 59:5). 'A connection is here established
672
between salvation and holiness.' Yahweh reveals his holy 'otherness'
669 Eichrodt, OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY - Vol.1, p.281.
,CJ )
670 Procksch, dyio^ , p.93.
671 Ibid.
672 Ibid. , p.94.
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precisely in his power to save, to be the Holy one of Israel■
If in the context of the cult, the Holy is susceptible to
distortion through materialization, with the ethical the danger is
moralistic legalism. That this, too, was prevalent in Jesus'
time is seen from his rebuke of it (Mark 7:1-23).
c. Our survey of the Old Testament understanding of holiness
has revealed the presence of two important aspects of the Holy.
First, a religious use of the word 'holy,' quite independent from
moral connotations, was intertwined with the cultic life of Israel.
Here the word carried with it its most primitive etymological
meaning: it signified the 'wholly other,' the utterly separate.
It was as readily (perhaps more readily) applied to things as to
persons. It indicated the complete distinction between the
sacred and the profane.
But as the word 'holy' was associated with the God of Israel,
it underwent a personalization - the consequence of which was an
equation of holiness and divinity. As Israel's God, then, revealed
himself and his will more fully, the concept of holiness progressed
accordingly. As God acted on behalf of his people, showing himself
to be their Redeemer, a God of love, these attributes became, by
association, the characteristics of holiness. Thus an ethical
dimension was introduced to the idea of the Holy.
So the eventual Old Testament view of the Holy may be summarized
this way: the Holy is utterly distinct; the 'wholly other' is the
God of Israel; his set-apartness consists in the fact that he is a
Redeemer, the God of love. The holiness of God, therefore, refers
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to the fact that God is antithetical to humanity precisely in his
overcoming of the antithesis.- As holy, he is the consuming fire
„ . 673
of love.
For Pascal, the encounter with this FIRE meant a meeting with
not only the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, but also the 'God
of Jesus Christ.' Indeed, Christian faith confesses that in
674
Jesus Christ 'all the fulness of God was pleased to dwell.'
'In many and various ways God spoke of old to our fathers by the
prophets; but in these last days he has spoken to us by a Son ....
675
He reflects the glory of God.' If this is true, that is, if
the God of the prophets is truly revealed in Jesus Christ, then
we would expect this One to bear the image of the Holy.
c/
'The description of Jesus as Q y L 0^ is rare .... On the
other hand, it is ancient and full of content.'in Luke it is
_ -- </
grounded upon his miraculous birth, when the jfVC UJU.&. &y L O V
came upon Mary. Because of his supernatural origin, 'the child to be
born will be called holy, the Son of God' (1:35). 'As Ciy (.0 5 fOU QS&Uj
Jesus is 'the Firstborn and IHaugurator of the pneumatic age
673 In the Old Testament, holiness and fire are associated with
striking frequency. 'It is in fire that Yahweh manifests
himself most characteristically, especially in the great
theophanies from the time of Moses on (Exod. 3:2-3; 19:18;
24:17; Deut. 4:12.24; 5:22-27; 9:3; Ps. 18:8-14 = II Sam.
22:9—15; Ezek. 1:4-28; Hab. 3:3-4); these and many other




676 Procksch, fayLO^ , p. 101.
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which will destroy the kingdom of demons.' Thus the confession
of his holiness issues forth from the demons (Luke 4:34; Mark 1:24).
So, just as the Holy was first conceived of as the 'wholly other,'
in separateness, Jesus is pictured by the Synoptics as set-in-
opposition to the world of evil; and, even as the Holy took on an
ethical connotation in prophetic theology, so Jesus is opposed by
the 'unclean' demons.
In the Gospel of John the description of Jesus as 'the Holy
One of God' is recorded in a place of extraordinary importance:
in the confession of Peter (6:69). The disciple's recognition of Jesus
C & a
as O aytO$ T60 atOO is an act of faith, setting him beside
the God whom Jesus addressed as 'Holy Father' (17:11).
Luke also puts the confession of Jesus' holiness on the lips
of Peter, this time in his Pentecostal address: he rebukes his
listeners because they 'denied the Holy and Righteous One, and asked
67ofor a murderer' (Ac. 3:14). To recall von Rad' s definition
of the Holy, Jesus was 'the great stranger in the human world' ....
679
who could 'never really be co-ordinated into the world.'
Though the author of Hebrews does not specifically name
Jesus 'the Holy One,' he does use an imagery to explain the efficacy
of Christ's work that strongly points to his holiness. As the one
677 Ibid., p.102.
678 See also Acts 4:27,30.
679 von Rad, OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY - Vol.1, p.205.
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who brought to fulfilment the Jewish cult, Jesus is both priest
and victim. As the high-priest, he entered the 'holiest of holies'
(9:3) to made a perfect atonement for the people, offering his own
blood as a sacrifice for sins (9:25ff.). Thus Jesus himself is able
680
'to sanctify the people' (13:12), that is, to make them holy.
By his blood, consciences are purified from dead works to serve the
living God (9:14). Again, we see the uniting of a religious
(cultic) conception of holiness with the ethical (prophetic).
The 'wholly other' of the priestly cult has acted to fulfil the
681
prophetic exhortation to moral cleanliness.
680 For a fuller discussion of Christ's role as
sanctifier, see Chapter VI.
681 With the exception of an occasional reference, New Testament
biblical theology has scarcely noted the description of
Jesus as 'the Holy One,' let alone fully developed its
implications. Perhaps this is because its use as a
christological title is not as common as other primitive
Christian designations. See, for example, Rudolf Budtmann,
THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT - Vols.I-II, trans. Kendrick
Grobel (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1952-55); Hans Conzelmann,
AN OUTLINE OF THE THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, trans.
John Bowden (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1969), esp. pp.72ff.,
336ff; Oscar Cullmann, THE CHRIST0L0GY OF THE NEW
TESTAMENT, trans. Shirley C. Guthrie and Charles A. M. Hall
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1959), esp. p.285; Frederick C.
Grant, AN INTRODUCTION TO NEW TESTAMENT THOUGHT (New York
and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950); George
Eldon Ladd, A THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, (Guildford
and London: Lutterworth Press, 1975), esp. p.165; Alan
Richardson, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEOLOGY OF THE NEW
TESTAMENT (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1958), esp. pp.l46ff;
Ethelbert Stauffer., NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY, trans. John
Marsh (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1955), esp. pp.112-16.
229
(2) What, then, are the theological implications of this
summary of the biblical data? How has systematic theology accounted
for this material in its definitions of holiness0 Following the
different strands of biblical witness, the Holy has been defined
a. religiously, b. morally, and c. Christocentrically.
a. A theological discussion of the Holy can hardly avoid
Rudolf Otto's very influential book, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY. 'It is
probably the most widely read theological work in German of the
682
twentieth century.' The most significant thing about this book
is that it vigorously champions the religious aspect of the Holy, in
contradistinction from the ethical. Whereas the Holy had usually
been identified by theologians with absolute moral good, 'Otto
683
defined the holy as an independent category.' Not only did he
C
set it apart from the moral, he also separated it from the rational."
685
To describe the Holy in its ineffable character, Otto introduces
686
a term coined from the Latin numen, 'the numinous.' The numinous
is the object outside the perceiving mind, to which the mind turns
687
spontaneously when encountered. It causes the 'creature-feeling'
to arise within, 'the note of submergence into nothingness before an
682 Zahrnt, THE QUESTION OF GOD, p.48,
683 Ibid.
684 Rudolf Otto, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY - AN INQUIRY INTO THE NON-
RATIONAL FACTOR IN THE IDEA OF THE DIVINE AND ITS RELATION
TO THE RATIONAL, trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford





overpowering, absolute might of some kind.1 The numinous has
two sides, to it. On the one hand, it is the mysterium tremendum,
the element of daunting awefulness, majesty, that which evokes awe
689
and terror in a person - the 'wholly other.' On the other hand,
there is something attractive, fascinating, about the numinous;
it has a magnetic appeal. This characteristic he calls the fascinans.
'These two qualities, the daunting and the fascinating, now combine
in a strange harmony of contrasts,'together representing the
content of the Holy.
That a person can perceive the numinous is due to the fact that
the capacity for encountering the Holy is an inherent quality in
the human creature. Otto speaks of the 'predisposition,' the
691
'religious impulsion,' in humanity. With the foundation thus
688 Ibid., p.10. Otto prefers to speak of 'creature-consciousness'
rather than Schleiermacher's 'feeling of dependence,'
believing he thereby avoids Schleiermacher's subjectivism.
John Harvey points out, correctly I think, that Otto's
intention in THE IDEA OF THE HOLY was to emphasize the objective
reality of the Holy: '. . . . Otto's emphasis is always upon
the objective reference, and upon subjective feelings only as
the indispensable clue to this .... He was . . . really
opposing the subjectivist trend in religious thought' (John
W. Harvey, 'Translator's Preface,' THE IDEA OF THE HOLY by
Rudolf Otto, p.xvii). Nevertheless, it is doubtful that he
succeeded in his task, for the larger part of his work con¬
sists of a psychological description of the effects caused
by the holy object. Otto never really breaks out of the
subjectivist framework, for the Holy is always defined in
terms of the experience it generates in man's perceiving
consciousness. Cf. Friedrich Schleiermacher, THE CHRISTIAN
FAITH, ed. H. R. Mackintosh & J. S. Stewart, trans.
D. M. Baillie, et. al. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928), pp.341-
45, where the holiness of God is treated under the section
dealing with the consciousness of sin.
689 Otto, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY, pp.!2ff.
690 Ibid., p.31.
691 Ibid. , p.116.
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laid, Otto proceeds with an empirical study of the appearances
of the Holy in its earliest manifestations (magic, worship of the
692
dead, animism, loathing of the unclean, etc.), its development,
from the 'crude' stage to higher religions (as the numinous reveals
itself, thus supplying a rational element, yet without minimizing
693 694
the non-rational), and its fullest development in Christianity.
Why can he assert that Christianity is the most perfect revelation
of the Holy? It is by 'intuition' that we perceive the Holy in
Christ.
The Cross of Christ, that monogram of the
eternal mystery, is its completion . Here
the rational are enfolded with non-rational
elements, the revealed commingled with the un-
revealed, the most exalted love with the
most awe-inspiring 'wrath' of the numen,
and therefore, in applying to the Cross of
Christ the category of the 'holy,' Christian
religious feeling has given birth to a religious
intuition profounder and more vital than any to
be found in the whole history of religion. 695
Otto rediscovered the religious nature of the Holy, as*
distinct from the ethical meanings that had often been associated
with it. In doing so, he clearly underscored one strand of
biblical tradition concerning the Holy, namely, its character
as the 'wholly other.' However, inasmuch as his discussion






distanced himself from even this tradition, for in the priestly
conception of the Holy the word often conveyed an objective meaning,
as we have seen. The consequent sanctification of things, the
material holiness of the cult, is quite foreign to Otto's thought.
For this reason, von Rad concludes that the 'considerable body of
Old Testament evidence concerning holiness reveals the limitations
of the great work of Rudolf Otto, in which the holy is related much
too one-sidedly to man and his soul.' That Otto did not condone
the materialization of the Holy, which Jesus later condemned, is
certainly no flaw in his theology. The point is, however, that
he dissolved the 'wholly other' into the consciousness of the
perceiving subject in such a way that the objective nature of the
Holy - the set-apartness extra nos - was almost completely done
away with. Though the objectivity of Israel's cult often
degenerated into a very static materialism, it did nevertheless
maintain the separate distinctiveness of the Holy. The Holy is
set apart - even from the human consciousness.
Even further removed is Otto from the ethical dimension of
the Holy. Indeed, he consciously tried to distance himself from
this. Yet, as was shown, this is eventually of great importance for
biblical faith, especially in prophetic theology. Otto's
phenomenological description of holiness established it as an
independent, de-personalized category, quite apart from any specific
religious faith, let alone any specific God. If he finally affirmed
the superiority of Christianity, it was because, in his judgment,
it best conformed to the specification of the Holy enabled by empirical
696 von Rad, OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY - Vol.1, p.206.
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analysis. But for Christian faith, the Holy is not an empty,
independent category; it knows only the Holy One of Israel revealed
in the Holy One of Nazareth. While there is always the 'wholly
other' dimension of holiness in biblical faith, its separateness
is filled-in, as it were, with a specific content: the 'otherness'
of God is precisely his redemptive love. Abraham Heschel, a Jewish
theologian, has accurately hit upon Otto's weakness:
The God of the prophets is not the wholly other,
a strange, weird, uncanny Being, shrouded in un¬
fathomable darkness, but the God of the covenant,
whose will they know and are called upon to convey.
The God they proclaim is not the Remote One, but
the One who is invoked, near, and concerned.
The Silent One may be the antithesis of man,
but the prophecy is God meeting man. 697
b. While Otto has emphasized the religious nature of
holiness, other theologians have stressed its moral character.
Paul Tillich attributes the association of the Holy with the morally
clean to the influence of Calvin and his followers.
An almost neurotic anxiety about the unclean develops
in later Calvinism. The word 'Puritan' is most
indicative of this trend. The holy is the clean;
cleanliness becomes holiness. This means the end of
the numinous character of the holy. The tremendum
becomes fear of the law and of judgment; the
fascinosum becomes pride of self-control and
repression. 698
A glance at Heinrich Heppe's REFORMED DOGMATICS would confirm
that some following in Calvin's train have indeed moved in the direction
697 Abraham J. Heschel, THE PROPHETS (New York and Evanston:
Harper & Row, 1962), p.227.
698 Tillich, ST I, p.217.
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indicated by Tillich. However, we cannot accurately characterize
this as a particularly Reformed approach to the Holy. As will be
shown shortly in this chapter, Emil Brunner, P. T. Forsyth, and
Karl Barth do not identify the Holy with the morally clean.
Furthermore, a survey of standard dogmatic works shows the
description of holiness in moral categories to be a tendency that
cuts across denominational and theological lines.It is present,
as Tillich noted, in later Calvinism (with its concern for cleanliness),
but also in the vastly different theological framework of the
Ritschlian school of Liberal Theology (with its stress on the ethical).
In any event, the Holy has often been linked to notions of moral
cleanliness; the prophetic-ethical conception of holiness stressed
to the exclusion of the cultic-religious. Thus Clarke, for example,
writes: '. . . the doctrine of holiness is at the deepest a doctrine
701
of absolute and perfect moral excellence.' And Hall discusses
holiness under the 'moral attributes' of God, defining it as his 'self
702
affirming purity . . . freedom and separation from moral perfection.'
699 'MASTRICHT, (11,19,1): God's holiness is the "moral goodness by which
God is at most imitable." - LEIDEN SYNOPSIS VI, 40: "It is holiness
by which being most pure in Himself God approves all cleanness and
abhors the contrary." - STAPFER sees in holiness absolute
perfection or God's good pleasure init(I, 139): "God embraces all
that can be conceived of perfection and indeed perfections alone
with nothing diverse or contrary, all imperfection being excluded,
and in this sense He is called holy . . ."' (Heinrich Heppe,
REFORMED DOGMATICS, revised and ed. Ernst Bizer, trans.
G. T. Thompson (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1950), p.92.).
700 See, e.g., Albert C. Knudson, THE DOCTRINE OF GOD (New York: The
Abingdon Press, 1930), pp.335-36 (Methodist); Edward Arthur
Litton, INTRODUCTION TO DOGMATIC THEOLOGY, ed. Philip E. Hughes
(London: James Clarke & Co. Ltd., i960), p.71 (Anglican); Ernest
Swing Williams, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY - Vol.1 (Springfield: Gospel
Publishing House, 1953), p.187 (Pentecostal).
701 William Newton Clarke, THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD (Edinburgh:
T. & T. Clark, 1909). See also ibid., pp.94-107 for an
expansion of this idea.
702 Francis J. Hall, THEOLOGICAL OUTLINES, revised Frank Hudson
Hallock (London: SPCK, 1934), p.90.
235
Certainly this understanding of holiness is consonant with
part of the biblical witness. Moral cleanliness is connected
with the Holy in both the priestly and prophetic literature.
Yet, as we have attempted to demonstrate, it is not so to the
exclusion of the religious dimension; the 'wholly other' aspect
is never dissolved - not even in prophetic theology. Isaiah
was overwhelmed with his own uncleanness, in the presence of
awesome majesty describable only in the symbolic language of
royalty ('upon a throne, high and lifted up . . . his train filled
the temple'), angelic beings ('above him stood the seraphim'),
703
and cataclysmic violence ('the foundations of the thresholds shook').
The 'woe is meJ' of personal imperfection was experienced in the
presence of the 'wholly other' One who was almost completely
indescribable.
It is indeed unquestionable that the idea
of the holy in reference to the concept
of God strongly emphasizes also moral
perfection. But as holiness is re¬
interpreted in the direction of morality,
sin is likewise interpreted moralistically
and loses its religious orientation. It
is therefore, as has been stated, very
important that holiness retain its original
and purely religious meaning. Only when the
separation between the divine and the human
implied in holiness is given due consideration,
and the divine is allowed to appear as un¬
conditional majesty in relation to the human,
703 Isaiah 6:1-4.
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can holiness be of fundamental significance
for the Christian conception of God. 704
c. By stressing either a purely religious or a purely
ethical conception of holiness, such theologies find themselves
in the untenable position of abstractly defining the being of
God apart from his full, concrete revelation in Jesus Christ.
Otto's mysterium tremendum was discovered by means of the empirical
observation of the nature of religious experience in the presence
of the 'wholly other.' The Holy, for him, is a general, a priori
category, distinct from any of its specific manifestations in
human history. Jesus Christ has significance for Otto because he
instantiates and fills out a previously determined - hence,
independent - category of holiness. But if Jesus Christ is the
Word of God incarnate, the fullest and final self-revelation of
God to humanity, then must we not judge all descriptions of the
704 Gustaf Aulen, THE FAITH OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH,
trans'. Eric H. Wahlstrom (London: SCM Press Ltd.,
I960), p.103. See also Gustaf Aulen, THE DRAMA
AND THE SYMBOLS - A BOOK ON THE IMAGES OF GOD
AND THE PROBLEMS THEY RAISE, trans. Sydney Linton
(London: SPCK, 1970), pp.107-109: Bertrand
Brasnett, GOD THE WORSHIPFUL (London: Longmans,
Green & Co., 1935), p.104; and Jaroslav Pelikan,
HUMAN CULTURE AND THE HOLY - ESSAYS ON THE TRUE,
THE GOOD, AND THE BEAUTIFUL (London: SCM Press
Ltd., 1959). In Pelikan's interesting study, six
thinkers are discussed: Kierkegaard, Paul, Dostoevsky,
Luther, Nietzsche, and Bach. Pelikan believes that
'in his own way each has pointed up one or another
aspect of the relation between Christianity and
the problem of value: either the impossibility of
equating the Holy with one or another value, or
the necessity of subjecting all values to the Holy.
All of them were drawn to an equation of the Holy
with human value, but all came to realize, with
existential dread, that God cannot be domesticated
in a value' (pp.viii-ix).
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nature of God's being according to the knowledge of Christ, rather
than gauge Christ by the measuring rod of an a priori standard
somehow disclosed through human experience? Is not Otto's
mysterium tremendum far removed from the God revealed in Jesus
Christ?
Similarly, a one-sided emphasis on the ethical dimension of
holiness is equally unacceptable, for it also abstractly defines
God apart from his concrete revelation in Christ. When the being
of God is defined by such terms as 'clean,' 'stainless purity,'
'moral goodness,' and others taken from the realm of human values,
has not theology recast God into the human image, however many
adjectives are employed to show that he is infinitely better? And
however much such a God may help reinforce ethical values, is he not
himself threatened by an ethical legalism - the laws of which are
legislated and adjudicated by human experience? In that God has
revealed himself in Jesus Christ, the event of revelation is an
event of grace. Does this not mean, then, that God always stands
over-against humankind, the 'wholly other' who because he is separate
can give to it something it does not possess of itself, i.e.,
a true knowledge of the Holy?
Therefore, we must look for an understanding of holiness that
is grounded in Jesus Christ. Inasmuch as both the 'religious' and
the ethical dimensions of holiness find their unity in him, we
cannot be satisfied with approaches which abstract one or the
other apart from him.
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Are there any guides with whom we may travel as we seek to
reach a more Christocentric understanding of holiness? Fortunately,
there are. We shall consider the ways taken by Emil Brunner,
P. T. Forsyth, and Karl Barth, and hopefully they will together
point out the road on which to continue our journey.
1. Emil Brunner recognized that 'in the Biblical revelation . . .
we are concerned not with "the Holy" (as an abstract conception),
705
but with the Holy One (as personal).' Because the Holy One has
revealed himself in Jesus Christ as a God of love, Brunner sought
to grasp the dynamics of love and holiness, and to understand each
in relation to the other.
Brunner begins his discussion of holiness with a grateful
706
acknowledgement of Otto's work on the subject, emphasizing that
originally the word 'holy' had no ethical connotations.
Holiness is the Nature of God, that which
distinguishes Him from everything else,
the Transcendence of God in His very Nature,
as the "Wholly Other' .... it is that
which sets the Being of God apart from all
other forms of being. 707
705 Emil Brunner, THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD:
DOGMATICS - Vol.1, trans. Olive Wyon





Yet, inasmuch as the 'wholly other' is not an 'it' but an 'I',
Brunner does not wish to let this definition of holiness stand
as it is, for it is 'too static and too logical to give the full
708
meaning of the Biblical word '"holy."' As personal, God is Will,
and thus 'the Being of God which His Name makes known to us can
709
never be grasped by neutral categories of existence.'
The Holiness of God is therefore not only an
absolute difference of nature, but it is an
active self-determination, the willed energy
with which God asserts and maintains the fact
that He is Wholly Other against all else. 710
By introducing the notion of will, Brunner is thus able to
account for the moral dimensions of the Holy, since it is God's
will 'to be known by His creatures, and to possess them in a
711
qualified sense as His own possession.' Behind all moral
71 2
law is simply this: 'You belong wholly and entirely to God.'
7X3









wherever the will of God is known as the will of
the Holy, as the will of the Lord and Creator
who is bent upon asserting His right over us,
there is no possibility of a conflict between
the religious and moral elements. What God wills -
the sovereignty of God - is the foundation of all
true morality; conversely, all morality which is
directed toward the good of our neighbour has
its deepest motive in obedience to the Will
of God. 714
Thus Brunner1s thought accurately reflects both the religious
('wholly other') dimension and the ethical dimension present in
the biblical concept of holiness. He has united these aspects
under the idea of 'will.' Unfortunately, however, this unity
begins to fall apart when he relates God's holiness to his love.
Brunner's intention is to keep both holiness and love grounded
in the Christian conception of God, i.e., to understand both from
715
the being of God revealed in Jesus Christ. However, it is
doubtful whether he really succeeds, for he never gets beyond
' 716
what he terms 'the paradoxical dualism' of holiness and love.
What we would expect to find unified in the person of Christ,
remains, for Brunner, distinctly separated. There is, he tells us,
a sharp and essential contrast; for Holiness
creates distance, but love creates communion.
Holiness erects barriers, love breaks through
them. Holiness is the will which asserts its
rights, and claims glory, recognition, sovereignty.
714 Ibid., p.167.
71 5 Ibid., p.183.
716 Ibid.
241
The Holy God speaks thus: 'I will to have all
for Myself; claim everything for Myself.' But
love is the very opposite of all this. Love
says: 'all for thee, nothing for me.' Love
is surrender, sacrifice, renunciation of one's
own claims, service. Above all, however, the
contrast becomes clear when we look at Holiness
in its negative form: as the wrath of God,
which annihilates resistance, and finally
crushes those who resist Him. This contrast
must not be glossed over or weakened, for if
we do either we make it impossible to under¬
stand either Holiness or Love. 717
Now, the difficulty with this position is that Brunner
ends up, in effect, with two contrasting 'wills' in God: one
will is exclusive (holiness);, the other, inclusive (love).
It is true that he tries to resolve the difficulty by asserting
that holiness is the presuppositon of love, since ofily a God who
7
is absolutely sovereign possesses the freedom to love unfathomably.
And further, he explains that as the Holy One, God wills that his
holy will shall be realized in human creation. 'Thus God wills
that the creature should become full of His own nature - and that
719
is the same as His will to impart Himself, His love . . .' But
if Brunner means by this that the holiness of God is the maintenance
and guarantee of the victory of his love, then why does he go to
such lengths to contrast them? If the holy will of God is his love,
there is no reason to set them in antithetical opposition. But
clearly, whatever Brunner means, this cannot be what he has in mind,
because holiness for him is first marked by exclusion, distance.




That Brunner does not adopt the full union of love and holiness
may be due to the fact that he can speak of a '"God outside of
720
Christ," the God whom we encounter in the natural sphere.'
Here holiness corresponds to the wrath of God under which the sinner
stands, 'so long as he has not entered into the sphere of grace
721
of Jesus Christ through revelation and faith.' Thus Brunner
conceives of a wrathful holiness, which is quite distinct from the
reconciliation of God in Christ.
Can we really accept these distinctions? Are there really
two different 'wills' in God, one for exclusion, the other for
inclusion? Is there really a wrathful holiness alongside a loving
holiness? Is there really a God outside of Christ as well as a
God in Christ? If these distinctions are accepted, one is led,
it seems, to an unacceptable division within God himself. Does
not Brunner's position finally threaten the trinitarian understanding
of God's being? For if God is eternally Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit, can we ever know of a God outside of Jesus Christ without
positing a break in the trinal unity of the divine being?
Therefore, we conclude that while Brunner correctly finds
the religious and ethical dimensions of holiness in God, he does
720 Ibid., p.173. See also Karl Barth and Emil Brunner,
NATURAL THEOLOGY, trans. Peter Fraenkel (London:
Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary Press, 1946), pp.15-60.
where this notion emerges very clearly in his
disagreement with Barth.
721 Brunner, THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD: DOGMATICS -
Vol.1, p.173.
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not complete the process of unification by linking them together
in a convincing way. Instead, by keeping them distinct, he
leaves us with a tension - perhaps even a conflict? - within God
himself.
2. A discussion of the various theological attempts at
722
defining holiness should not neglect reference to P. T. Forsyth.
'There is no one point at which Forsyth stood so alone as in his
conscious, explicit relating of all doctrine to a fundamental
723
understanding of God as holy.1 Unfortunately, however, though
722 Unfortunately, this reference is often neglected.
Strangely, P. T. Forsyth is generally overlooked
by present day theological discussions. Yet his
was a prophetic voice that still has a compelling
contemporaneity for the modern reader. • 'The truth
is that, like Kierkegaard, Forsyth was a great man
born before his time. In an era of prosperity
before two World Wars had blown sky-high the
secular dogma of inevitable progress, Forsyth did
what Karl Barth, Reinhold Niebuhr and others did
for us in an era of collapse and despair, but with
this difference: whereas they were, partly at
least, commenting on accomplished facts, Forsyth
was "seeing the invisible." Now, at long last,
his kairos has come' (A. M. Hunter, P. T. FORSYTH
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974), pp.11-12).
'He anticipated much that was later developed by
Karl Barth - the social and political realism of
human sinfulness, the primacy of objective grace
over subjective illumination, the intrinsic
authority of the person of Christ, the power and
finality of the Cross' (Alan Galloway, 'P. T. Forsyth,'
THE EXPOSITORY TIMES 84 (Oct. 1972-Sept. 1973): 58).
723 John H. Rodgers, THE THEOLOGY OF P. T. FORSYTH -
THE CROSS OF CHRIST AND THE REVELATION OF GOD
(London: Independent Press, 1965), p.30. See also
W. F. Bradley, P. T. FORSYTH - THE MAN AND HIS WORK
(London: Independent Press, 1952), pp.113-38;
Robert McAfee Brown, P. T, FORSYTH: PROPHET FOR
TODAY (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1952),
pp.75-78; Gwiiym 0. Griffith, THE THEOLOGY OF
P. T. FORSYTH (London and Redhill: Lutterworth Press,
1948), pp.66-73.
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the category of the Holy was the touchstone of his theology,
'he never attempted any constructive explication of this basic
724
concept.1 We are left, therefore, with the task of inferring
from his works why he believed that the holiness of God is the
real foundation of religion . . . the ruling interest of the
725
Christian religion.' This task is complicated by the fact
that Forsyth often wrote more like a preacher than a systematic
theologian: his prose is cast in prophetic fire, marked by
images and metaphors, more poetic than pedantic. The careful
student of Forsyth will be cautious about making too much of any
single phrase from Forsyth's pen, however apt and well-turned
it may be. An understanding of Forsyth's theology comes after
total immersion in it, when the poetic poundings of individual
waves are finally gathered up in the deep vastness of the
subject matter itself.
As an approach to Forsyth's understanding of holiness',
let us consider a quotation from one of his sermons - a quotation
that comes as close as any to summarizing his theology.
The divine Father is the holy. And the Holy Father's
first care is holiness. The first charge on a Redeemer
is satisfaction to that holiness. The Holy Father is
one who does and must atone. Atonement wears a new
glory when read in Christ's own light. We see it
flowing in grief from that very holiness of the
Father to which it returns in praise. 726
724 Ibid., p.66.
725 P. T. Forsyth, THE CRUCIALITY OF THE CROSS (London:
Independent Press, 1909), p.23.
726 P. T. Forsyth, GOD THE HOLY FATHER (London:
Independent Press, 1957), p.4.
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There are two things to notice in this passage: first,
holiness is related to the fatherhood of God; second, the
reconciling work of Jesus Christ is the outworking of this
holiness in relation to humanity.
Forsyth was concerned to counter certain aspects of nine¬
teenth century liberalism, namely, the rather vague and sentimental
emphasis on the fatherhood of God (with divine love conceived of
as a sort of kindly pity) and 'the brotherhood of man.' The
Consuming Fire had been domesticated, cooled to the temperature
727
of a 'love slack and over-sweet.' The answer, Forsyth felt,
was not to abandon the idea of divine fatherhood, but rather to
raise it to its true and full meaning: 'We make too little of the
Father when we do not rise beyond love to grace - which is holy
728
love, suffering hate and redeeming it.' Thus, according to
Forsyth, what is necessary is to see God anew as Holy Father.
In the face of God's holiness, humanity is shown to be
unholy - sinful.
We put too little into fatherhood then if we treat it
simply as boundless, patient, waiting, willing love ....
It is not the father's sensitive love only that we
have wounded, but His holy law. Man is not a mere
runaway, but a rebel; not a pitiful coward, but





This rebellious mutiny on the part of the creature requires
judgment according to the 'law of holiness.' 'The enforcement of
God's holiness by judgment is as essential to a universal and eternal
730
Fatherhood as is the outflow of His love.' This judgment took
effect in Christ. It was not simply suffering that fell upon the
Saviour, it was holy judgment. 'God in Christ judged sin as a
731
Holy Father seeking penalty only for holiness' sake.'
Does this mean, then, that Forsyth, like Brunner, understands
holiness as something distinct from love? From the above, it
might appear that such is the case. Even more is this so when we
hear him say that 'you can go behind love to holiness, but behind
73?
holiness you cannot go.' While recognizing a certain ambiguity
and imprecision in his phraseology, I believe nonetheless that in
the broader outlines of his thought as a whole he more closely links
together the holiness and love of God than does Brunner. To see
this, we must try to comprehend Forsyth's theology of atonement,
a central theme in his thought.
The atonement, for Forsyth, is the act of God's holiness in
relation to the sinner. Humankind's sin, that is, its unholiness,
means it owes a debt - holiness. Only holiness itself can atone for
the sin against holiness. Suffering alone is not holiness; it
lacks final redemptive power. Only obedience, human holiness
answering God's holiness, could pay the sinner's debt.
730 Ibid. , p.10.
731 Ibid.
732 Ibid. , p.5.
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There was owed that debt to holiness, that atonement
to holiness which is so misconstrued when we make it
due to justice or demanded by justice alone. Justice
wants penalty, holiness wants holiness in the midst
of penalty. It wants a soul's own perfect holiness
in the midst of penalty due to other souls; it
wants loving obedience amid the penalty of love¬
less defiance. 733
Since only an act of holiness - obedience - was able
satisfactorily to answer God's holiness, only God could accomplish
it. 'God alone could fulfil for us the holy law He never broke,
734
and pay the cost He never incurred.' 'If we could satisfy the
moral order we disturbed, our insufferable self-satisfaction would
derange it straightaway. We should be (as Luther said) "the
735
proudest jackasses under heaven."' Because humans are helpless,
perverted at the centre of their wills by sin, God alone is able
to establish his holiness in the midst of his creation.
We should pause to note, at this point, that Forsyth has
maintained adequately the aspect of 'otherness' that is part of the
biblical idea of holiness. Holiness, even in the act of its
establishment, is totally alien to the world: it comes from the
'wholly other,' not from within the creature himself. Thus the act
and maintenance of holiness is grace, a gift from One distinct and
separate in being from the being of sinful humanity. And herein
is its connection with love. 'God's love is the outgoing of His





words, holiness 'asserts itself in redeeming grace.' Holiness is
not something other than love; it is its ground and outworking.
'The holiness of God is the sum. of all His action and relation to
737
the world. '
Though the act of holiness is completely God's act, and there¬
fore grace, it is, all the. same, humanity's act, too. For in Jesus
Christ, and his death, we have to do not so much with substitutionary
738
expiation as with 'solidary reparation.' That is to say, as man,
Jesus was more than a single individual; he was 'a Victor who had a
739
capital solidarity with the race.' In what did his victory consist?
Just this: he lived a life of perfect obedience, and thus gave holy
answer to the holiness of God. This is why the New Testament connects
reconciliation with the blocd of Christ, for the shedding of blood
has reference to the outpouring of life.
It means something which touches the seat of life -
as we might now say, puncture of the heart. It means
the total surrender of a personality from its centre
by the one means wherein personality both receives
effect and produces effect - by means of a personal
act of conquest which requires (but also releases)
the whole resources of the personality. What God
seeks is not religious tribute or present, costly
or partial; His self-complete holiness requires, to
meet and satisfy it, a total holy self, in a real act
or deed of gift once for all, the absorption and
oblation of the whole self in a crucial and objective
achievement. 740
736 P. T. Forsyth, POSITIVE PREACHING AND THE MODERN MIND, p.145.
737 P. T. Forsyth, THE WORK OF CHRIST (London: Independent Press, 1910), p.125.
738 Ibid., p.223.
739 Ibid., p.222.
740 Forsyth, THE CRUCIALITY OF THE CROSS, p.87. For the New
Testament linkage of reconciliation with the 'blood of
Christ,' see I Peter 1:18-19 and Hebrews 9:22.
249
Thus the atonement was 'vindicative and not vindictive,'
the re-establishment of holiness in the midst of the world. Christ's
obedience was both God's act for humanity and humanity's confession
742
before God.
If we set this alongside the double aspect of holiness which
we have seen emerge from the biblical witness, it seems as if Forsyth
has come closer than Brunner to our goal: he has defined holiness
and its outworking in such a way that both its 'wholly other' and
its ethical characteristics are maintained. Because God alone is
holy, he alone is able to execute the holy act; atonement is
accomplished extra nos. Yet, inasmuch as that holy act was atonement,
the overcoming of the barriers created by sin, we see that it is not
something other than love, but is, in fact, the power of love, its
guarantee, the securing of its victory over the lovelessness of the
sinner. 'Holiness is that in the love of God which fixes it and
741 Forsyth, THE CRUCIALITY OF THE CROSS, p.98.
742 Forsyth's doctrine of reconciliation is remarkably
similar to that later developed by Karl Barth,
who also emphasized the twofold movement in
Christ: God toward humanity, and humanity
toward God. See esp. CD IV/'l and IV/2.
There are also resemblances in Forsyth's thought
to the earlier emphases of McLeod Campbell and
Horace Bushnell. See John McLeod Campbell,
THE NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT AND ITS RELATION TO
REMISSION OF SINS AND ETERNAL LIFE (London:
Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1855), and Horace Bushnell,
THE VICARIOUS SACRIFICE - GROUNDED IN PRINCIPLES OF
UNIVERSAL OBLIGATION (London: Richard D. Dickson,
1880).
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assures it for ever. If holiness fail not, then love cannot' -
and holiness cannot fail because it is the innermost nature of God
himself, that which sets him apart from all others. Reconciliation,
then, is not love's triumph over holiness, the victory of God in
Christ over the 'God outside Christ,' but is the event of holiness
itself, the victory of holy love. Salvation means that God gains
his victory over against me (he is eternally the 'wholly other'),
which is nothing other than the revelation of the fact that he
is wholly for me.
3. This same identification of holiness with love is re-stated
in the theology of Karl Earth, with the lingering ambiguities still
occasionally present in Forsyth's thought completely swept away.
Though we shall consider Earth's theology in more detail later in
this chapter, it is appropriate to consider his specific handling of
the subject of God's holiness at this point, for it is the follow-
through, as it were, of the christological approach to holiness.
The linkage between holiness and love, which Brunner sought to come
to terms with, but without success, and which Forsyth united,
though not without ambiguity, Barth grasped and clarified. Here is
the essence of what he has to say on the subject:
If God's love is what is revealed to us in Jesus
Christ, if Jesus Christ Himself is the revealed
love of God, there is an end of the divorce
between God's grace and holiness, and there
remains to us only the recognition and
adoration of Him who is both gracious and holy:
gracious as He is holy and holy as he is gracious. 744
743 Forsyth, GOD THE HOLY FATHER, p.26.
744 Barth, CD II/l, p.367
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What Barth is saying is this: holiness _is grace. When we
745
speak of holiness 'we are merely continuing to speak of God's grace.'
Thus the holy God of Scripture is not 'the holy' of Rudolf Otto,
but the Holy One of Israel. 'The Israelites will hold his name
holy because they will see what His hands have done for them
23
(Is. 29 ).' This means that 'holiness could obviously stand for
grace, since it characterizes God as Him who is and acts for
Israel.,746
But of course the full revelation of the fact that God is
both gracious and holy comes to us in Jesus Christ. In him we
see the unity of grace and judgment.
That God is gracious does not mean that He
surrenders Himself to the one to whom He is
gracious. He neither compromises with his
resistance, nor ignores it, still less calls
it good. But as the gracious God He affirms
Himself over against the one to whom He is
gracious by opposing and breaking down his
resistance, and in some way causing His own
good will to exert its effect upon him.
Therefore the one to whom He is gracious comes
to experience God's opposition to him. 747
Because humanity is sinful, God's grace reveals itself in judgment;
it is active opposition over against the creature. But since it is
judgment in Christ, it is also grace. Thus God's assertion of his
will, the maintenance of his 'wholly other-ness' is exactly the over¬
coming of the barrier between the sinner and himself by grace. 'The
holiness of God consists in the unity of His judgment with His grace.
748






In that his grace judges, he remains forever distinct, set-apart and
set-over-against humanity; yet because his holy will is accomplished
in Christ, his judgment is gracious. Thus do holiness and love merge
together in Jesus Christ.
4. What,then, is the Holy? Biblically, it has two aspects:
complete 1 otherness,' as is seen in the original 'religious' use of
the word, and mercy, as shown in the 'ethical' application of the word.
These two strands are not mutually exclusive; quite the contrary.
As the concept of holiness developed, they merged to the extent that
the holy-profane antithesis came to consist fully in the overcoming
of the antithesis. This overcoming found its fulfilment in Jesus
Christ. In him, love and holiness coalesce. In the unity of his
act of grace and judgment, God's 'otherness' asserts itself without
compromise - an 'otherness' which is nothing other than love.
We have, therefore, in the Holy a concept which describes the
distinct being of God as a being-in-relationship-with-the-world.
That God is holy means that he is 'wholly other' because he is
wholly for us; separate precisely in his overcoming of the divine-
human separation.
The Holy is 'the great stranger in the human world, that is, a
datum of experience which can never really be co-ordinated into the
749 |world in which man is at home.' Over against the self-centbred
drive for personal autonomy and lordship, which marks human sin,
stands the absolute contrast of the Holy: the self-sacrificing
love of God. ^ Nels Feme" is correct when he points out that
749 von Rad, OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY - Vol.1, p.205.
750 See Chapter VI for a fuller discussion of the
relationship between holiness and sin.
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holiness receives its meaning precisely in relation to that which
is not holy, and thus needs to be separated from it. Holiness,
therefore, always involves a negative relation, but its definition
must ever be in terms of God's love, of ultimate truth as such . .
751
Holiness is love's negative work in relation to sin. Inasmuch,
however, as the content of that 'negative work' is love, holiness
is negative only to the extent that it is also positive. When set
in relation to humanity's sinful resistance, holiness is a negative
work; yet, because it is the overcoming of that resistance, it
is fully positive. It is negative because it is positive and
positive because it is negative.
In OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD, John Baillie questioned whether Otto
and others were correct in their acceptance of God as 'wholly other
The reason why it is difficult to regard the
relation of man to God as merely a relationship between
two beings who stand over against each other (and are
in that sense wholly other) is that God appears in
some sort to be present on both sides of the
relationship. When I respond to God's call, the
call is God's and the response is mine; and yet the
response is God's too; for not only does He call me
in His grace, but also by His grace brings the
response to birth within my soul. 752
751 Nels F. S. Ferre, THE CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF GOD
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1951), p.116. Ferre (ibid.,
p. 115) approvingly quotes H. R. Mackintosh: '"to assert
unflinchingly that love and holiness are one in God,
despite their seeming antagonism, is as much the
business of a true theology as to assert that
deity and manhood are one in Christ"'(H. R. Mackintosh,
TYPES OF MODERN THEOLOGY - "SCHLEIERMACHER TO BARTH
(London: Nisbet, 1939), p.159).
752 John Baillie, OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
(London: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp.233-34.
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Baillie's criticism may bear some relevance to Otto's mysterium
tremendum, but it fails to account for the fact that the God
revealed in Jesus Christ is 'wholly other' precisely in his grace
which both calls and effectually quickens the human response.
What is necessary is not to abandon the 'wholly other' aspect
of God's holiness, but to understand it aright. As holy, God




(1) Our first advance against the trend toward the loss of
ontological distinction between the Church and the world in
twentieth century theology, must be directed against the immanentalism
of Bonhoeffer and Tillich. To arm ourselves for the engagement,
let us take up 'the idea of the Holy.'
*
a. What does the holiness of God mean for the incarnational
immanentalism of Dietrich Bonhoeffer? It was Bonhoeffer's concern
to understand and explicate the full implications of the incarnation
of the Son of God. Since he believed that this event signified
that God has entered fully into our space and time, he sought to
define the place of Christ in the world. As we have seen, it is
this quest that caused the far-reaching development of his thought
as he followed out the logic of the communicatio idiomatum of
Lutheran theology.
Now we ask: What does it mean that the Incarnate One is the
Holy One? Is it possible to assert, with Bonhoeffer, that, because
of the incarnation, the Holy and the profane have become one
reality?
If the above exegetical and theological arguments about the
nature of the Holy are correct, then Bonhoeffer's position proves
untenable, for in the event of Jesus Christ the holiness of God is
fulfilled in the midst of creation. In this event of holiness
God reveals himself as a being wholly distinct from us because he is
a being wholly for us. The structure of grace in Jesus Christ is
such that it forever maintains this dialectic. That God bridged
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the chasm which sin created between himself and the world, Bonhoeffer
clearly perceived; but what his later theology tended to overlook
is that God's bridging the gap does not close all distances so
that the two become one in undifferentiated unity. In fact, it is
this action itself which establishes what T. F. Torrance terms a
753
'proper dualism' between God and the world, for what was established
in Christ is a divine-human fellowship shaped according to the structure
of grace. Because God reconciles humanity to himself, and not vice
versa, a definite relationship is created. God is the benefactor;
the sinner the grateful beneficiary. Can we ever speak, then, of God
and the world becoming one reality - without completely distorting
754
this structure of grace?
753 Torrance, SPACE, TIME AND INCARNATION, p.72.
754 Cf. J. G. Davies, EVERY DAY GOD - ENCOUNTERING THE HOLY
IN WORLD AND WORSHIP (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1973).
In a way similar to Bonhoeffer, Davies emphasizes the
incarnation and seeks to interpret holiness in its light.
Thus he sees Christ as a 'model' of the Holy. '1, In
Christ the holy is embodied in man in all his human
perfection. 2. As each man realizes his potentialities
and approaches nearer to his own human perfection, he
is approaching the condition of Christ. 3. Hence,
since the Incarnation, man, in order to find the holy,
needs to do nothing else than become a fully mature
human being' (pp.94-95). Or, as he states it in another
place, 'the New Testament writers make it clear that the
holy is not separate from the human, that there is no
gulf between the divine and man, and that the holy
indeed confronts us with nothing alien to ourselves
but with our own humanity' (p.74). Davies clearly
reveals the outcome of the tendencies which have been
traced in Bonhoeffer"s later thought, and the criticisms
made of Bonhoeffer can be quite appropriately directed
against him.
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In his book SPACE, TIME AND INCARNATION, T. F. Torrance
presents a view of the incarnation which adequately preserves the
dialectic of the Holy. The incarnation, he believes, is the event
in which 'the Son of God has become man without ceasing to be the
God He ever was, and that after the Incarnation He is at work within
755
space and time in a way that He never was before.' In order to
explain this, Torrance refers to the creation of the universe
ex nihilo, a doctrine which 'implies the absolute priority of God
over space and time, for space and time were produced along with
the creaturely world as orderly functions of contingent events
756
within it.' This means that 'God stands in a transcendent and
creative, not a spatial or temporal relation to the creaturely
757
world.' He is free from any necessity in the relation with
758
creation. In the incarnation God assumes the rationality of
created truth. The Son of God enters the realms of space and time
759
and 'makes them His own although He is distinct from them..'
To show how we may understand God as transcendentally free
in relation to the creation, without turning his freedom into an
arbitrary inscrutability, Torrance introduces the concept of an
'infinite differential':






Considered in itself, then, there is only the
world, this world that has come into being,
but considered from the side of God's creation
it is only one of all possible worlds. Thus
we must think of God's relation to the world
in terms of an infinite differential, but we
must think of the world's relation to God in
terms of a created necessity in which its
contingence is not negated. 760
In the incarnation God interacts with the world, making created
time and space the 'chosen path' of his rationality, establishing
time and space as the sphere of his relations with us; yet,
761
because of his infinite freedom, he is not limited by creation.
Therefore, we must reject the 'radical dualism' which conceives
of a 'deistic disjunction' between God and the world, for God has
freely created this world and assumed for himself its structures
of rationality. On the other hand, however, 'there can be no
resolving of divine transcendence into this worldly transcendence
or any merging of the divine reality and this worldly reality on
762
the same horizontal level.' The 'proper dualism,' according to
Torrance, is best conceptualized by the image of a vertical axis
(divine reality) intersecting the horizontal plane of this-worldly
reality. Jesus Christ is the 'place' where the vertical and
horizontal dimensions intersect, for God has established him as the
place where he 'meets with man in the actualities of his human






763 Ibid. , p.75.
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the transcendent God is present and immanent
within this world in such a way that we encounter
His transcendence in this-worldly form in Jesus
Christ, and yet in such a way that we are aware
of a majesty of transcendence in Him that reaches
out infinitely beyond the whole created order. 764
Torrance has used very different language than we have employed
in our discussion of holiness, but even so, has he not presented
a view of the incarnation which more accurately reflects the biblical
view of holiness than did Dietrich Bonhoeffer? For all his
concern to understand fully God's involvement in the world,
Bonhoeffer allowed the transcendence of God to 'flatten-out' into
a wholly this-worldly reality. In so doing, he violated the
'wholly other' nature of the Holy. By use of geometrical imagery,
Torrance has shown that we can maintain both the transcendental
freedom of God and his this-worldly involvement - both of which
find their unity in Jesus Christ. To take up again the terminology
of this chapter, in Jesus Christ there exists the unity of the
'wholly other' and the 'wholly for' aspects of holiness, for the
two are revealed as one and the same in the being of God.
b. If the concept of the Holy forces us to part company
with the incarnationai immanentalism of the later Bonhoeffer, it
also separates us from the abstract transcendentalism of Paul Tillich.
For the 'otherness' of the Holy One means that he is absolutely
764 Ibid., p.79. See also T. F. Torrance, 'The Relation of the
Incarnation to Space in Nicene Theology,' in THE ECUMENICAL
WORLD OF ORTHODOX CIVILIZATION - Vol.Ill, ed. Andrew Blane
(The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1973), pp.43-70.
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free from all rationalistic conceptions, however exaltedly he may¬
be set upon the heights (or into the depths) of being. And yet,
inasmuch as the transcendent 'otherness' of the Holy One ijs his
freedom for this world, the knowledge of God is a given .reality
to human experience. In the revelation of himself, God fully
binds himself to the world by a loving self-surrender which is
exactly that which sets him apart from it. Inherent within the
notion of the holiness of God, therefore, is the fact that humanity
is completely other than God (thus incapable of rationally taking
hold of him), and yet dependent on that very 'otherness' for the
knowledge of him. That God does reveal himself, and that humankind
does receive knowledge of his being, does not mean the dissolution of
ontological distinction between them; rather, it reveals it in its
fulness.
Karl Heim clearly articulated the choice before us when he
wrote:
The bare emergence of the Idea of God confronts us
with an ultimate Either-Or. Either our Forms of
Intuition and Forms of Thought have final validity
for the understanding of Reality, and then we must
either interpret the Idea of God in the way Idolatry
does, by giving absolute value to some only relative
reality, or, as Pantheism does, by deifying the
infinite Whole of things; or, on the other hand,
God is the ens realissimum, and then our intramundane
Forms of Intuition have the effect of veiling the
ultimate deeps of the 'I', the 'Thou', and the World,
because God, the Giver of all existence, cannot be
apprehended in these Forms ....
If God is a Reality and not to be explained
away in the manner of Idolatry and Pantheism, then
it is impossible for us, by any observation or any
thinking of our own, to reach what He is and what He
wills. We are thrown back on God's own revelation. 765
765 Karl Heim, GOD TRANSCENDENT - FOUNDATION FOR A CHRISTIAN
METAPHYSIC, trans. Edgar Primrose Dickie, revised
Edwyn Bevan (London: Nisbet, 1935), p.231.
261
In Paul Tillich's system we have a theology developed on the
basis of Heim's first choice. By relying on 'our Forms of Intuition
and Forms of Thought,' Tillich defined God in a way which fully
intended to protect his transcendental 'otherness,' but a way doomed
to failure from the beginning. For as long as God remains imprisoned
in the rationalistic structures of human thought, he is indistinguish¬
able from the human mind, having been made a captive of its finitude.
Such a 'God' is definitely not the Holy One revealed in Christ.
Because He is Holy he remains forever distinct from created reality,
including human thought processes. Yet, because his distinctiveness
is, in fact, the impartation of himself to this world, he is really
knowable, comprehensible. Because he is 'wholly other' than us,
we are totally dependent on what he reveals to us of himself;
because his 'otherness' consists in the fact that he is 'wholly for'
us, we are able to know and apprehend his being. Such is the
revelatory dialectic of holiness.
(2) The criticisms levelled against Bonhoeffer and Tillich in
this chapter have been based upon a biblical and theological analysis
of holiness. Accordingly, we have been led to advance an onset
against the immanentalism which developed as a consequence of the
work of both of these theologians. In the ensuing foray, have we
been alone? Have we represented a position defended by the solitary
(and inadequate) forces of our own intellect? Or have there been
allies, silently in reserve, as it were, until called upon to lend
support?
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To conclude this chapter, we shall call upon the considerable
theological forces of Karl Barth. We turn to Karl Barth at this
juncture, not because we have been labouring to set him up as the
answer to all theological problems of the twentieth century, but
rather for two reasons: first, any study which attempts to under¬
stand this century's theological movements, as we have tried to do,
simply cannot ignore Karl Barth; and second, it is our judgment
that he represents a viable theological alternative to those
approaches discussed at length in the preceding chapters of this
thesis - a theology, moreover, which more adequately expresses the
biblical sense of God's holiness.
Barth's significance for twentieth century theology has
been universally acknowledged by friend and foe alike. For the
student of theology, there is no way around the work of Barth -
only through it, 'for the contribution of Karl Barth to theology is,
like that of Albert Einstein to natural science, so deep-going
and fundamental that it marks one of the great eras of advance
76 6
in the whole history of the subject.' 'The theology of the
767
twentieth century began with Karl Barth.'
766 Thomas F. Torrance, KARL BARTH - AN INTRODUCTION
TO HIS EARLY THEOLOGY, 1910-1931
(London: SCM Press Ltd., 1962), p.9.
767 Zahrnt, THE QUESTION OF GOD, p.15.
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a. Though Barth did not often write directly about holiness,
his whole theological development may well be described as a theology
of the Holy. As indicated earlier in this chapter, the Holy has
two aspects: it designates the complete separation between God
and the world, and locates the divine distinctiveness in God's
self-giving love. The 'wholly other' is the 'wholly for'; early
in his career, Barth set about to understand the former, and as his
thought developed, he worked out more fully the implications of
the latter. Both were present in the beginning, and both at the
end; yet, in emphasis he clearly moved from the 'otherness'
of God's grace to the 'otherness' of God's grace.
From his first book to the last fragment of the CHURCH
DOGMATICS, there is present on every page the unifying theme
which Barth holds closest to his heart: 'the powerful and yet not
768
overpowering supremacy of God.' Nowhere is this seen more
clearly than in his early works, especially his first book;
769
THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS. With prophetic force, this commentary
plants the reader 'face to face with Almighty God in his infinite
770
Majesty and Holiness and incredible, inscrutable Grace.'
768 Hans Kung, JUSTIFICATION - THE DOCTRINE OF KARL BARTH AND A
CATHOLIC REFLECTION, trans. Thomas Collins, et. al.
(London: Burns and Oates, 1964), p.29.
769 Karl Barth, THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS, trans. Edwin C. Hoskyns
(London: Oxford University Press, 1933; paperback reprint,
1976). This translation is of the sixth edition, which is
virtually unchanged from the second edition.
770 Torrance, KARL BARTH, p.50.
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From beginning to end, the book's concern is this: Let God be God,
and let the creature learn to stay in his rightful place. Thus
he writes:
if I have a system, it is limited to a recognition
of what Kierkegaard called the 'infinite qualitative
distinction' between time and eternity, and to my
regarding this as possessing negative as well as
positive significance: 'God is in heaven, and thou
art on earth.' 771
With the conviction of a complete diastasis between God and the
world, Barth hammers away against the nineteenth century's subject-
772
ivism, particularly as it was exemplified in Schleiermacher .
Torrance has described well the situation confronting the young
pastor of Safenwil, Switzerland, as he sought to come to terms with
the Apostle Paul and the contemporary meaning of his words:
Throughout all the tradition of the nineteenth
century as it spilled over into the twentieth
there was a morbid disease: modern philosophy
and theology suffered from a cancerous subject¬
ivism. Like a sheep overwhelmed in the snowdrift
trying to keep itself alive by feeding upon his
771 Barth, ROMANS, p.10.
772 See, e.g., Schleiermacher, THE CHRISTIAN FAITH, p.17:
'If, however, word and idea, are always originally one,
and the term "God" therefore presupposes an idea, then
we shall simply say that this idea, which is nothing more
than the expression of the feeling of absolute dependence,
is the most direct reflection upon it and the most general
idea with which we are here concerned, and is quite
independent of that original knowledge (properly so-called),
and conditioned only by our feeling of absolute dependence.
So that in the first instance God signifies for us simply
that which is the co-determinant in this feeling and to
which we trace our being in such a state; and any further
content of the idea must be evolved out of this
fundamental import assigned to it.'
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own ideas. What he needed above all was to
break through to concrete relations with the
living God. 773
The Christianity of Barth's day had read the Gospel backwards,
for instead of taking the way from God to the world (as did Calvin
and Kierkegaard) it reversed the Gospel of election, with its
prius of divine grace, and had sought to journey along a private
774
road from the depths of human experience to God. But because
'one can not speak of God simply by speaking of man in a loud
775
voice,' Barth endeavoured to reverse this whole approach, in
order to let the Word take with us the way it had originally taken
in the incarnation. As Zahrnt graphically puts it,
Barth literally stood the theology of the
nineteenth century on its head, turning it
upside down. His way did not lead from
below to above, but from above to below.
God is simultaneously the subject and
predicate of his theology. Thus Barth
carried out a vast rearrangement of the
entire theological furnishings, provided one
773 Torrance, KARL BARTH, p.31. .
774 Ibid.
775 Karl Barth, THE WORD OF GOD AND THE WORD OF MAN,
trans. Douglas Horton (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1928), p.196.
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may call rearrangement a process which turrrs
the whole house upside down. 776
This 'rearrangement' began with Barth's constant stress
on the fact that God is totaliter aliter. The Gospel he heard
proclaimed by the Apostle's pen in Romans was of a 'God utterly
distinct from men. Salvation comes to them from Him, because
777
they are, as men, incapable of knowing Him.' That we are able
to see what eye hath not seen and hear what ear hath not heard is
because of Jesus Christ. He is_ the Gospel of God. 'In His
name two worlds meet and go apart, two planes intersect, the one
"778
known and the other unknown.' Therefore one can speak of the
776 Zahrnt, THE QUESTION OF GOD, p.38. For this reason,
Zahrnt believes that Barth is still fundamentally a
child of the nineteenth century in that he is still
dominated by its questions (ibid., p.39). So also
Gustaf Wingren, THEOLOGY IN CONFLICT, trans. Eric Wahlstrom
(Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1958), p.34: 'It is strange that
we must make this statement, but it is necessary: in Barth's
theology man is the obvious center. The question about
man's knowledge is the axis around which the whole subject
matter moves.' But these criticisms hardly commend them¬
selves as accurate interpretations of Barth. For is it
not the case that if one is attacking a particular position -
anthropocentricity, let us say - one begins by dealing with
the same questions that led one's opponents to adopt it in
the first place? Otherwise, one would never really be
speaking to the issues that concern them, let alone offering
different answers in order to move them to a different
position.
777 Barth, ROMANS, p.28. See also THE WORD OF GOD AND THE
WORD OF MAN, p.74: God 'cannot be grasped, brought
under new management, and put to use; he cannot serve.
He must rule. He must himself grasp, seize, manage, use.
He can satisfy no other needs than his own. He is not
in another world over against this one; he submerges all
of this in the other. He is not a thing among other things,
but the wholly other, the infinite, aggregate of all
merely relative others.'
778 Barth, ROMANS, p.29.
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unspeakable and conceive the inconceivable - but only because God
has revealed himself in Jesus Christ. And inasmuch as he has
provided the knowledge of himself, he maintains his absolute
priority.
In order to shatter the axiom of the basic continuity between
the Creator and the creature, and yet to affirm humanity as fully
as God affirmed it in Jesus Christ, Barth's theology took dialectical
779
form. This theological method was but the attempt to echo the
Yes and the No which was spoken in Christ. Since the Yes of God
was grace, it was therefore also judgment (No) against the sinner.
That meant for Barth that one had constantly both to affirm and to
negate, though perhaps the No needed to be sounded with greater
volume in an age that needed to hear again of the diastasis
between the divine and human. 'God is Yes in its fulness; it
is only in order that we may understand him as God that we must
730
pass through his No.' Thus the agenda was set for a time that
had failed to 'let God be God' and had instead dissolved his deity
in anthropocentric experience. Accordingly, Barth set before his
readers, with the fire of an Old Testament prophet, the 'wholly
other,' the Holy.
Yet the 'wholly other' to whom Barth pointed was definitely
not the 'wholly other' of Rudolf Otto. He had an objectivity apart
779 Torrance, KARL BARTH, p.85.
780 Barth, THE WORD OF GOD AND THE WORD OF MAN,
pp.120-21. ~~
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from human experience. 'In Biblical experience nothing is less
781
important than experience as such.' The 'wholly other' is as
objective as Jesus Christ. In him the Gott-Mensch antithesis is
both revealed and overcome; the transcendental intersects the
horizontal; the divine encounters the human; God's judgment
agains-t is revealed in his grace for. 'It is knowing how merciful
he is that keeps us aware how holy he is, how terrible he is in his
782
holiness.' The 'wholly other' proclaimed in the Gospel has
fully entered our reality; but inasmuch as he meets us in the
grace (and therefore judgment) of Jesus Christ, he remains distinctly
other, even in his closeness.
That there was a certain turning-point in Earth's theology
783
has been generally recognized. What change there was, though,
should be seen not so much as a break but as an expanding develop¬
ment with corresponding changes in terminology and emphasis. The
primacy of God, his absolute sovereignty, was a constant theme for
784
Barth throughout his theological career, but, in Zahrnt's words,
781 Ibid. , p.69.
782 Ibid., p.171.
783 See, e.g., Colm 0'Grady, THE CHURCH IN THE THEOLOGY OF
KARL BARTH (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1968) p.34;
Torrance, KARL BARTH, pp.136, 182; Zahrnt,
THE QUESTION OF GOD, p.88.
784 Wingren believes the divine-human antithesis in Barth is
'the most interesting part of his dogmatics. From this
point of view the difference between earlier and later
parts of Barth's theological production appear insignificant'
(Wingren, THEOLOGY IN CONFLICT, p.23).
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'the zeal of a prophet . . . / became_/ the zeal of an evangelist.'
If the early 'crisis theology' of Barth employed the dialectical
method in order to set apart heaven and earth, this evolved into
a 'theology of the Word' in which the emphasis shifted from
diastasis to analogy. That is to say, Barth began with the
negative clearing away of anthropocentric presuppositions in order
to 'let God be God,' and as he thought out more fully the implications
of the fact that this 'wholly other' is the One revealed in Christ,
he turned to the task of understanding the positive significance
of this revelation. Theology became for him the careful description
of its one object: Jesus Christ. The grace of God in Jesus Christ
became his starting-point and constant concern. Believing that
Jesus Christ is the 'alpha and omega' of God's ways with humanity,
he sought to understand the being of God and the meaning of human life
from the concrete name of Jesus Christ. 'If ever solus Christus
applied to any theology, it applies to Barth's CHURCH DOGMATICS:
780
here we are as it were surrounded by Jesus Christ on every side.'
Thus, all things are worked out b^ analogy from the grace of God
in Christ.
It should be noted, however, that the centrality of grace
was present at the beginning of his work, and the supremely free
God still retained the place of priority at the end. Even in the
'crisis theology,' Barth's 'deepest intention was to point to the
785 Zahrnt, THE QUESTION OF GOD, p.88.
786 Ibid., p.94.
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crisis for the sake of pointing to the grace of God, to speak
787
the No for the sake of making the divine Yes heard.1 And yet,
for all the identification God makes with humanity, the event of
Jesus Christ is the event of grace, and therefore God maintains his
freedom over against humanity even in his effective union with
it. As the theology of Barth developed into its full fruition in
his magnum opus, the CHURCH DOGMATICS, it maintained throughout
its stress on the complete freedom of grace revealed in Christ.
All things - creation, justification, sanctification, redemption -
flow from the free gift of God in Christ Jesus. Therefore Barth
vigorously opposed any diminution of the doctrine of election.
God, and God alone, saves. As Torrance writes,
the critical test Barth proposes to apply to
theology is: How far does it give central
expression to predestination in its idea of God?
How far is the material content of theology
built around the absolute prius of God's grace?
How far does it really repose on the ultimate
objectivity of God himself? Unless predestination
is set at the very summit of all our thinking,
then that thinking has no ultimate meaning
beyond itself in God, but can only run to
ground upon itself. If we do not realize that
the best thought of God we can produce may not
point to God but to the devil, if we imagine that
we can grasp God through some extremely acute and
pious correlation of the concepts of Being and
Thought, or Fate or Idea, if we attempt to work
out our knowledge into a self-contained system,
if we think we have grasped the Spirit by our
word, and the Word by our spirit, if we make
out of predestination a harmless little comment
on the appropriation of salvation, then our
787 G. C. Berkouwer, THE TRIUMPH OF GRACE IN THE THEOLOGY
OF KARL BARTH, trans. Harry R. Boer (Grand Rapids:
William B. Eerdmans, 1956), p.33.
271
thinking may well be suspect of being but
human speculation about God, that is, an
act of self-justification on our part set¬
ting aside the free, undeserved grace of
God. 788
For this reason Barth vigorously opposed any notion that
789
conceivably opened the way for human self-salvation. Thus
it is against this background we should understand his rejection
of the genus majestaticum of the Lutheran doctrine of the communicatio
790
idiomatum - a theological tenet of crucial importance for the
791
development of Bonhoeffer's thought, as was shown.
788 Torrance, KARL BARTH, p.170. So also does von Balthasar
see predestination as that which 'seems to hold the key
to his whole theology1 (von Balthasar, THE THEOLOGY OF
KARL BARTH, trans. John Drury (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1971), p.155). For the full development of
Barth's doctrine of election, see CD II/2.
789 As, e.g., the analog!a entis of Roman Catholicism.
See Barth CD II/2, pp.530ff. By affirming a natural .
analogy between the being of God and the being of
humanity Roman Catholicism has, in Barth's view, under¬
mined the reality of grace. In speaking of God, we
certainly employ analogy, but it is the analogia fidei,
that which faith receives through the Word of God. For a
Roman Catholic response to this view, see Henri Bouillard,
THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD, trans. Samuel D. Femiano (London:
Burns and Oates, 1969).
790 'But where does the way through this door lead? It obviously
leads smoothly and directly to anthropology: and not to a
dull naturalistic and moralistic anthropology, but to a
"high-pitched" anthropology; to a doctrine of a humanity
which is not only capable of deification but already deified,
or at any rate on the point of apotheosis or deification.
If the supreme achievement of Christology, its final word,
is the apotheosised flesh of Jesus Christ, omnipotent,
omnipresent and omniscient, deserving of our worship, is it
not merely the hard shell which conceals the sweet kernel of
the divinity of humanity as a whole and as such, a shell
which we can confidently discard and throw away once it has
performed this service? (CD IV/2, pp.81-82.)
791 See Chapter I.
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Just as Barth feared may happen when this doctrine is accepted,
Bonhoeffer ended with a theology which seriously blurred the
distinction between God and humanity. Given the one reality of
God and the world which Bonhoeffer believed to be the consequence
of the incarnation, he was forced to understand this world's present
godlessness as the very experience of God himself in the suffering
of the crucifixion of his Son. Thus he hoisted up humanity to the
place of Christ upon the cross, and in so doing threatened to under¬
mine the vicarious nature of Christ's work of grace extra nos■
We were thus compelled to question whether in Bonhoeffer's theology
the creature does not perhaps achieve his own reconciliation with
the Creator.
Does it not seem, therefore, that Barth's approach more
effectively reflects the biblical meaning of holiness? At no
point does he let slip away the distinction between God and the world.
Even in the incarnation, where the divine and human were fully
united, Barth sees the act of a sovereign God who is free in his
judging grace and gracious judgment. Because of his 'unparalleled
792
christological concentration,' Barth maintained the dialectic
of the Holy: the 'wholly other' is distinct from all other
reality in that he is 'wholly for.'
b. Barth's strict focus on the concrete revelation of God in
Jesus Chri.st also prevented him from being led into an abstract
transcendentalism like that of Paul Tillich's. Like Barth,
792 Zahrnt, THE QUESTION OF GOD, p.94.
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Tillich was concerned to protect the deity of God, to preserve
his freedom in the face of all human conceptions which reduced
him to one being alongside others. To escape this sort of
reductionism, Tillich defined God as 'being-itself.' As was
793
shown, this transcendental abstraction resulted in an immanentalism
of perhaps even greater proportions than Bonhoeffer1s. Thus,
by searching for the most all-inclusive concept (to protect the
transcendence of God over all other beings_) , Tillich ironically
lost the divine transcendence altogether by means of an abstraction.
By contrast, the 'wholly other' of Barth is not the highest
entity conceivable by means of human reason. He is the Holy God
who, being absolutely separate and therefore free even from human
thought, has revealed himself in Jesus Christ. He is not a being
'behind Christ; not the all-inclusive 'being-itself.' His
being (in all its 'otherness') is given to human apprehension in
Christ.
Therefore, the doctrine of revelation is no minor concern
for Barth, but to his mind central to the theological task of
understanding the being of God. Revelation, according to Barth,
is the self-interpretation of God. It is not something alongside
of God, as for example, an autobiographical volume given as a gift
from its author to a reader (and thus independent of the author);
rather, it is the being of God in its self-manifestation. 'In God's
793 See Chapter II.
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revelation God's Word is identical with God Himself.' In
revelation 'reposes and lives' the fulness of the original self-
795
existent being of God.
Revelation then becomes the 'root' of the doctrine of the
796
Trinity, for the Trinity is the interpretation of the event
797
of revelation and therewith the being of God. The complete
revelation is 'God in unimpaired unity, who according to the
biblical understanding of revelation is the revealing God and
798
the event of revelation and its effect on man.' Thus God,
in complete identity with his Word of revelation, is manifest in
the unity of being which is also the 'unimpaired differentiation
- 799
within Himself /_ of _/ this threefold mode of being. ' God is
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 'God is subject, predicate, and
object of the revelation-event.
794 Barth, CD 1/1, p.304.
795 Ibid., p.305.
796 Ibid., pp.304ff.
797 I am much indebted in the pages that follow to Eberhard
Jungel's excellent, study of.Barth's doctrine of the
Trinity. See Eberhard Jungel, THE DOCTRINE OF THE
TRINITY - GOD'S BEING IS IN BECOMING, trans. Horton Harris
(Edinburgh and London: Scottish Academic Press, 1976).
798 Bar 111, CD 1/1, p. 299.
799 Ibid.
800 Jungel, THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY, p.16.
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God's being is identical to his revelation. His revelation
manifests a threefold mode of being. Therefore, God's being may
801
not be thought of as something abstract. God's being is self-
related being, structured according to the living dynamic of the
relationship of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. God is, therefore,
already in his eternal being no other than he who he is in his
802
revelation. 'He is thus in his being already ours in advance.'
In that he has revealed himself in Jesus Christ as he is, we must
therefore confess that his being is a being-for-us, his being is
grace.
Again, Barth has maintained the biblical dialectic of the
Holy. The uniqueness of God's being, grounded as it is in the
revelation of Christ, is his gracious decision on behalf of us,
his love. Moreover, now we have added to the discussion the
dimension of revelation. The event of revelation is not something
other than God himself; it i_s the living being of God. This means
that if the 'otherness' of God is exactly the 'otherness' of his
grace, then this 'otherness' is also the event of revelation. The
holiness of God means, therefore, that God is ontologically
separate because of his gracious self-impartation which is his
revelation. Thus the knowledge of the Holy can only be received




This, of course, bears direct relevance to Tillich's theology.
By abstractly conceptualizing transcendence, Tillich cut himself
off from the truly transcendent, for the 'otherness' of God is
that which is given in Christ. The dialectic of the Holy forbids
any side-glances around Jesus Christ which aim to find the 'God
of the heavens' in abstract purity. The Holy God is one with his
revelation in Jesus Christ. There is no other God behind Christ,
or outside Christ; only God in Christ. The being of God is
'wholly other' and therefore the knowledge of him is given; and
since the 'wholly other! is '-wholly for' us, the knowledge of him
is given. To know Jesus Christ is to know God in the transcendent
'otherness' of his being.
So this, then, is the Holy: God in Jesus Christ. 'Let us
offer to God acceptable worship, with reverence and awe; for our




THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE HOLY
'This is the place of my song-dream,
the place the music played to me,' whispered
the Rat, as if in a trance. 'Here, in this
holy place, here if anywhere, surely we shall
find Himi'
Then suddenly the Mole felt a great Awe
fall upon him, an awe that turned his muscles
to water, bowed his head, and rooted his feet
to the ground. It was no panic terror -
indeed he felt wonderfully at peace and happy -
but it was an awe that smote and held him and,
without seeing, he knew it could only mean
that some august Presence was very, very near ....
Perhaps he would never have dared to raise
his eyes, but that . . . the call and the
summons seemed still dominant and imperious.
He might not refuse, were Death himself
waiting to strike him instantly, once he had
looked with mortal eye on things rightly kept
hidden. Trembling he obeyed, and raised his
humble head; and then ... he looked in the
very eyes of the Friend and Helper ....
'Rat!' he found breath to whisper,
shaking. 'Are you afraid?'
'Afraid?' murmuured the Rat, his eyes
shining with unutterable love. 'Afraid!
Of Him? 0, never, never! And yet - and yet -
0, Mole, I am afraid!'
Then the two animals, crouching to the earth
bowed their heads and did worship. 804
Rat and Mole - a fellowship of the Holy. Huddled close
together in the posture of worship, the animals had looked upon the
face of the Wholly Other and seen the eyes of a Friend and Helper.
And is this not the experience of the Church? Overpowered by
the august Presence who has come very, very near, the Church has be¬
held the countenance of its Friend and Helper, Jesus Christ. As such,
it is the fellowship of the Holy.
804 Kenneth Grahame, THE WIND IN THE WILLOWS (London:
Methuen Children's Books Ltd., Magnet reprint edition,
1978), pp.134-36.
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A. Call For The Password
In its creeds, the Church confesses its own holiness (credo
805
sanctam ecclesiam). Is this an honest assessment of the nature
of its being? Or is it an arrogant assumption of an alien attribute?
How is it possible for the Church - an institution often so pain¬
fully this-worldly in the worst sense of the term - to believe in
its own holiness? Is not the Holy, by_ definition, the 'wholly
other,' the great stranger in the world? In this final chapter,
I shall argue that the adjective 'holy' is justifiably applied
to the Church, and draw out the implications of this for our
understanding of the relationship between the Church and the world.
(1) What is the biblical evidence to support the notion
of a holy Church? First, it must be admitted that nowhere does the
New Testament refer to a 'holy Church.' Hans Kung, for this reason,
has emphasized that the idea of a holy institution is completely
foreign to biblical thought: 'the New Testament knows noticing of
80 6
institutional sanctity, of a sacred "it."' He points out that what
is at issue in the holiness of the Church is a completely personal
sanctity.
805 See, e.g., the Nicene Creed ('one holy, catholic, and apostolic
Church'), and the Apostles' Creed ('one holy catholic Church').
806 Hans Kung, THE CHURCH, trans. Ray and Rosaleen Ockenden (London:
Burns and Oates, 1967), p.325. See also Emil Brunner,
THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH, FAITH, AND THE
CONSUMMATION - DOGMATICS: Vol.Ill, trans. David Cairns '
and T. H. L. Parker (London: Lutterworth Press, 1962),
p.125.
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It is believers who have been set apart from the
sinful world by God's saving act in Christ and
have entered a new Christian existence who make
up the original 'communio sanctorum'; they
constitute the Church of the saints and hence
the holy Church. 307
Kung has correctly recognized that the materialization of the
Holy, as occasionally present in the Old Testament, is no longer present
in the New Testament. Sanctity is personal; that is to say, it has
to do with persons in their relationship with God and each other.
Nevertheless, it would not be correct to understand 'personal'
808
in the sense of 'individualistic.' The Church is more than an
aggregate of individuals who profess faith in Jesus Christ. The
iKK\rj<?ia is the community of persons called out of the world by
809
the Word of God in Jesus Christ. In him, a new people of God has
81.0
been constituted within the old. With reference to Exodus 19:5-6,
807 Kiing, THE CHURCH, p.325.
808 Brunner seems to imply this when he writes: 'The Church as a
sancta ecclesia is known by nothing else than this, that here
men are present who allow this incredible Word of God's love
in Christ to be said to them, believe it, and obey it . . .'
(Brunner, THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH, FAITH, AND
THE CONSUMMATION, p.126).
809 '_ekkl_esiaJderived via ek-kaleo, which was used for the summons
to the army to assembly, from kaleo, to call .... denotes
in the usage of antiquity the popular assembly of the competent
full citizens of the polis, city' (L. Coenen, 'The Church,'
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY -
Vol.1, ed. Colin Brown (Exeter: The Paternoster Press, 1975),
p.291). See also K. L. Schmidt, r£KKArf<T{_CLJ , THEOLOGICAL
DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT - Vol.Ill, ed. Gerhard Kittel,
trans. Geoffrey Bromiley (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans,
1965), pp.501-36.
810 '. . . you shall be my own possession among all peoples;
for all the earth is mine, and you shall be to me a kingdom
of priests and a holy nation.'
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the Church is addressed in I Peter as 'a chosen race, a royal priest¬
hood, a holy nation, God's own people' (2:9). Even as the miracle
811
of divine deliverance from Egypt meant that Israel was to 'be holy,'
so also the community of Christ is admonished to 'be holy yourselves
in all your conduct' (I Pet. 1:15); that is, the Church, as the New
Israel, is called to live according to the nature of its new being
as God's chosen people.
With the powerful historical sweep of Pauline theology this
idea of the Church as the new people of God reaches its clearest
conceptualization. 'On the holy stump of the 0T people of God the
new branches from the Gentile world have been engrafted (Rom. 11:17),
812
and they are sanctified by the stump.' This stump is obviously
Christ, 'the root of Jesse' ordained to rule the Gentiles (Rom. 15:12).
And according to Ephesians, Christ has 'broken down the dividing
wall of hostility,' and out of two groups - Gentiles and Israelites -
■has created 'one new man' (Eph. 2:14-15). There is now one household
of God, 'built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets,
Christ Jesus himself being the cornerstone, in whom the whole structure
is joined together and grows into a holy temple in the Lord' (Eph. 2:20-21).
811 'For I am the Lord who brought you up out of the Land of
Egypt, to be your God; you shall therefore be holy,
for I am holy' (Lev. 11:45).
812 Procksch, , p . 106 .
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Notice: 'holy temple.' The imagery is cultic. This, of
course, is not at all surprising, for as we saw in the last chapter,
there are two biblical strands of tradition regarding holiness: the
cultic-religious and the prophetic-ethical. In Christ, these
have merged; but for his community both retain significance as
together they illuminate what it means to be the holy people of God.
a. The language of the cult provides much of the imagery
used in the New Testament to describe the character of the Church.
It is the CLyLO(I Cor. 3:17; Eph. 2:21) - the holy temple.
Accordingly, 'to all God' s beloved in Rome, who are called to be
. r —
saints' ( ay L OL^ ), Paul urges that they present their 'bodies as
living sacrifices, holy and acceptable to God' (Rom. 1:7; 12:1).
The Apostle describes his own life as a 'libation upon the sacrificial
offering' of the faith of the Philippian saints (Phil. 2:17).
Cultic terminology is employed more vigorously in the Letter
to The Hebrews than anywhere else in the New Testament. Here Christ
is presented as the great high priest 'after the order of Melchizedek'
(5:6; 17:17), that mysterious figure who, even in the Old Testament,
seemed to transcend the Aaronic priesthood. As the high priest who
brought to perfection the new covenant, of which the old was but an
imperfect shadow (ch.8), Christ 'entered once for all into the Holy
Place, taking not the blood of goats and calves but his own blood,
thus securing an eternal redemption' (9:12) - a redemption, moreover,
that is complete, having been efficaciously established 'once for all
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. .
at the end of the age1 (9:26). Thus Procksch describes the CCy L O L
813
as 'members of a cultic circle grounded in the sacrifice of Christ.'
b. Similarly, the prophetic-ethical conception of the
Holy also emerges in the New Testament description of the Church.
This stream of tradition emphasizes the moral distinctiveness of
holiness, and so the Church is described in ways which stress its
cleanness.
Christ loved the Church and gave himself up for
her, that he might sanctify her, having cleansed
her by the washing of water with the word, that
he might present the church to himself in
splendour, without spot or wrinkle or any such
thing, that she might be holy and without
blemish (Eph. 5:25-27).
r ^ >'
Here &y i a is linked with o ^ ; the final purpose of
Christ's self-giving on behalf of the Church is that it may have
a holy purity.
As the prophetic-ethical description of the Holy finds its
clearest manifestation in the coupling of love and holiness (e.g.,
Hosea), so also Paul carries this linkage into the age of the Church.
In his benediction at the end of the third chapter in I Thessalonians,
he writes:
may the Lord make you increase and abound in love
to one another and to all men, as we do to you,
so that he may establish your hearts unblamable
in holiness before our God and Father, at the
coming of our Lord with all his saints. 814
813 Ibid., p.107.
814 I Thess. 3:12-13 (italics mine).
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And Paul makes a personal boast that by the grace of God he has
815
'behaved in the world . . . with holiness . . Clearly, Paul
discerns a connection between holiness and the Christian walk.
So also does the author of I Peter, who called the Christians
to 'be holy yourselves in all your conduct' (1:15). In what does
this 'conduct' consist? The believers are 'purified' in order
'to love one another earnestly from the heart' (1:22).
Furthermore, even when the New Testament terminology is
largely cultic, the thought is never far from the ethical. 'Present
your bodies as living sacrifices, holy ... to God' (Rom. 12:1).
In Christianity the material offering, distinct
from the giver, is replaced by the personal
offering of the body, of the earthly life,
inseparable from the existence of the one who
offers. It is at this point that the holy
impinges on the ethical, with which it may
so easily be equated. 816
c. My concern, to this point, has not been to develop a
complete biblical theology of the holiness of the Church. ' Rather,
I have hoped simply to show, first, that it is_ biblically justifiable
to speak of the 'holy Church,' for holiness is a quality attributed
by the New Testament writers not only to individuals, but also to
the community as a whole. Secondly, I have tried to demonstrate
that both the cultic-religious and prophetic-ethical conceptions of
the Holy, which are clearly present in the Old Testament, re-emerge
in the descriptive language of the New Testament concerning the Church.
815 I Cor. 1:12 (italics mine).
cf \
816 Procksch, < C. y ( O ^ , p. 108.
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The examples cited are certainly not exhaustive, but may, I hope,
be adequate to make the point.
Therefore, if we have been on the right track - one that has
at times had to wind tortuously through the biblical material -
then we should expect the final word about the Church's holiness
to be an affirmation of its holiness in Christ. As demonstrated
in the last chapter, it is in him that both the cultic and
prophetic approaches to the Holy find their ultimate unity. If
there are such things as 'saints' in this world, it is only
817
because they are 'saints in Christ Jesus.' Though perhaps
guilty of over-simplification, Schmidt is nevertheless not far
from the mark when he writes:
In face of all sociological attempts to under¬
stand the question of the Church, it must be
considered that in Paul, in his disciples and
then in the Fourth Evangelist ecclesiology is
simply Christology and vice versa■ 818
The reason for this is the fact that the Church is the fellowship
of those who have been 'blessed ... in Christ with every
spiritual blessing,' not the least of which is that they have been
chosen 'in him before the foundation of the world' to the end
819
that they may 'be holy and blameless before him.' If the Church
is able to be the bride of Christ, it is only because the Groom
S 20
himself has sanctified her and made her worthy. Thus the holiness
817 Phil. 1:1 (italics mine).




of the Church is but the consequence of the fact that in. Christ
God has reconciled it to himself, and, being grounded and rooted
in him, it is now qualified 'to share in the inheritance of the
saints in light.'
He has delivered us from the dominion of
darkness and transferred us to the kingdom
of his beloved Son, in whom we have redemption,
the forgiveness of sins. 821
Nowhere is the Church's being more clearly underscored as
a being-in-Christ than in the 6OiyLLtX <■ (J To O imagery of the New
822
Testament. To the Corinthians Paul says simply, 'now you are the
body of Christ and individually members of it' (I Cor. 12:27).
They do not have to become the body of Christ; they are the body
of Christ by virtue of their standing in him who is its head (Eph.
4:15). This means that, as the ruling 'head' of the Church, Christ
is the source of the Church's being. The Church is holy, not because
of its own intrinsic nature, but because it participates in his holiness.
(2) How has systematic theology accounted for this biblical
material? Just as with the holiness of God, theologians have tended
to follow out one of the strands of tradition regarding the Holy;
that is, the holiness of the Church has been described in either
821 Col. 1:12-14.
822 See Rom. 12:3-8; I Cor. 12; Eph. 4:1-16. See Ernest Best,
ONE BODY IN CHRIST - A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CHURCH
TO CHRIST IN THE EPISTLES OF THE APOSTLE PAUL (London: SPCK,
1955); Paul S. Minear, IMAGES OF THE CHURCH IN THE NEW TESTAMENT
(London: Lutterworth Press, I960), pp. 173-220; John A. T. Robinson,
THE BODY - A STUDY IN PAULINE THEOLOGY (London: SCM Press Ltd.,
1952); Eduard Schweizer, , THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE
NEW TESTAMENT - Vol.VII, ed. Gerhard Friedrich, trans. Geoffrey
Bromiley (Grand Rapids-: William B. Eerdmans, 1971), pp.1068-74.
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a cultic-religious, prophetic-ethical, or Christocentric way.
a. In his book THE CHURCH, G. C. Berkouwer attempts to
understand the holiness of the Church in light of Rudolf Otto's
824
THE IDEA OF THE HOLY. In so doing, he clearly places himself
in the train of those who have understood the Holy in the cultic-
religious categories. It is characteristic of this approach that
the moral and ethical connotations of holiness are consciously set
aside in favour of a religious emphasis on its 'wholly other'
aspect. Thus Berkouwer refers to Otto's description of the Holy
as tremendum and fascinans, and asks whetheb it would not be
helpful 'to bring the holiness of the Church into connection with
825
the fascinans.' While recognizing the empirical difficulty of
considering the historical Church in terms of the 'fascinating,'
Berkouwer nevertheless wants to uncover the genuine fascinans
'which rests in the acceptance of the gift, the nearness of the
Lord in humility, in nostalgia, and striving for the sanctification
326
that is seen and experienced by others.'
823 The following brief survey is in no way meant to be an exhaustive
historical analysis on the different theological formulations
of the holiness of the Church. Rather, it aims simply to
demonstrate that these three strands of tradition regarding
the Holy have indeed surfaced in various ways as the Church has
sought to describe the nature of its own holiness.
824 G. C. Berkouwer, THE CHURCH, trans. James E. Davison (Grand
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1976), pp.325-33. For a discussion
of Rudolf Otto's THE IDEA OF THE HOLY, see Chapter V of the
present thesis.
825 Berkouwer, THE CHURCH, pp.325-26.
826 Ibid., p.328.
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What, exactly, is the fascinans?
In analyzing what is actually fascinating,
one has pointed out that the fascinans has
usually been connected to what is new, to some¬
thing surprising that was outside our horizon
of expectation, and, especially, to 'what had
never been before.' 827
Berkouwer acknowledges that the Church has all too often not been
associated with newness, but rather its opposite, as the guardian of
tradition. But the Church cannot be related exclusively to the
past for the simple reason that 'in the New Testament, salvation is
828
connected with unmistakable clarity to radical newness.' This
newness is both an eschatological hope and a present reality for
829
the Church. 'The old has passed away, behold, the new has come,'
as Paul expressed it.
In the light of this Pauline 'lyric'
about the new life (Eph.4:24), the new creation
(II Cor.5:17; Gal.6:15), and the new man (Col.
3:10; Eph.2:15), one can say that, although
'the past' and 'tradition' are not lost in
oblivion for Paul, whatever is 'venerable' still
has to legitimize itself for this new time.
Only so can it be incorporated in the continuity
of life in Christ on the way to the future. For
this life is no longer characterized by what is
'old' and 'antiquated,' but by a radical newness. 830
Holiness, then,for Berkouwer, is 'the setting apart of the Church
831
in Christ and for newness of life.'
827 Ibid.
828 Ibid., p.330.
829 II Cor. 5:17;
830 Berkouwer, THE CHURCH, p.330.
831 Ibid., p.331.
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Berkouwer is certainly on solid ground when he attempts to
demonstrate the element of newness in the Gospel. In Christ,. the
new has come. But it is not clear why Berkouwer has understood
holiness so completely in the light of this. The only apparent
reason is his unquestioned acceptance of Otto's definition of the
Holy. The difficulty with this, as shown in the last chapter,
is that such a position allows 'holiness' to be defined by an
external, perhaps empirically observable, concept. Ironically,
this 'idea of the Holy,' which above all aims to make clear its
'wholly other' aspect, allows the Holy itself to be taken bondage
by an alien concept - a concept, moreover, discovered and formulated
in the world over against which the Holy is supposed to be 'wholly
other.' If the Holy i_s distinct from the world and its rationality
(empirical or otherwise) then it must define itself in its own terms.
That the Holy has revealed itself in the Word of God, we have already
shown. And what this Word has revealed in Christ is a holiness marked
by a distinctive otherness which is the alien otherness of God's
redemptive love. Certainly this love in Christ is new, and its
Gospel has much newness about it, but Berkouwer, by limiting his
understanding of holiness to this, has run the risk of evacuating
holiness of its content. God's 'newness' in Christ is something
specific in content; so also is the 'newness' of the Church.
b. With more frequency than the cultic-religious, the
prophetic-ethical approach to holiness has also been used with
regard to the Church. Here the Church's holiness is conceived of
as moral or ethical purity, as freedom from the stain of sin.
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Now of course the immediate problem one is faced with when
this approach is adopted is the empirical fact that the Church is
all too obviously not free from sin. Though b^r faith one may believe
it has been clothed in the righteousness of Christ, by_ sight one
clearly sees the bride of Christ still dressed in the soiled garments
of unrighteousness. Thus holiness must be seen to be a matter of
'more or less' - a quantity possessed in certain degrees.
Calvin, for example, believes the Church is holy in the sense
that it is daily advancing: 'it makes progress from day to day
832
but has not yet reached its goal of holiness.' Because Christians
'zealously aspire to holiness and perfect purity, the cleanness
that they have not yet fully attained is granted them by God's
833
kindness.' In Calvin's view, holiness is granted to the Church
by God's grace in Christ in, an objective, eschatological sense,
but is only a present reality in part. 'It is . . . true that the
church's spots and wrinkles have been wiped away, but this- is a
daily process until Christ by his coming completely removes what-
834
ever remains.' In its concrete actuality, then, the Church is
less holy than it will one day be, and in the future will be more
holy than it is today. That it is daily advancing means that some¬
thing is being added to it, rather like a liquid being poured into
a cup. It is being filled with stainless purity.
832 John Calvin, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION - Vol.11,
ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles




Though in a vastly different theological framework, E. H. Askwith
takes a similar approach in his dealing with holiness. When it comes
to the holiness of the Church, he contends, we must not seek to
understand it according to the meaning of (iS~T
and say that the 'holiness' of the church connotes
its separateness from the world, however true such
an idea might be. The Church is holy because it
partakes of the divine character, or because
such is its ideal. 835
Holiness thus has to do with participation in the 'divine character,'
if not in fact, at least in ideal. The Church is sanctified by
its aspirations, as it were, which will be progressively realized
in the present. This theology, cast in the liberal optimism of
the nineteenth century, is cut from a very different cloth than
Calvin's; but both have an eschatological emphasis that views the
Church as advancing into greater and greater holiness.
Heinrich Heppe does not stress the progressive addition of
holiness as much, but he also seems to come at the problem quantitatively.
Faced with the belief that holiness is a moral, ethical quality,
on the one hand, and the actuality of the Church's sinfulness on the
other, Heppe puts both in the scales and declares that the holiness
side is the heavier.
The Church is holy and infallible, i.e., she
is established in the life and knowledge of faith,
in the same way as her members, the elect and
called believers, who cannot fall into deadly sins
or deviate from the sanctifying basis of truth.
Consequently, while the Church is indeed not with¬
out lack of knowledge and of life, still,
preserved by grace she cannot completely lose
835 E. H. Askwith, THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF HOLINESS
(London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1900), pp.239-40
(italics mine).
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the righteousness of Christ bestowed on her,
deny the basic doctrines of the Gospel and
sin against God with really deliberate dis¬
obedience and persistently; so that at any
time she therefore remains in essential
possession of grace and of sanctifying
knowledge. 836
And finally, John Macquarrie gives a more contemporary
expression of this approach. Holiness, he tells us, 'is very
much a case of."more or less," and to many it will seem that the
837
Church has often been less rather than more holy.' What does
'holiness' mean? It means 'being an agent of the incarnation,
838
letting Christ be formed in the Church and in the world.' The
results will be ethical in nature. Unfortunately, the Church
will not always live according to its proper moral standards, but
in the end one can hope that the specific failures will be over¬
balanced by the life of the Church as a whole. He writes:
in many particular instances, the Church
utterly falls short of holiness, and may even,
through its support of wrong causes or a
reactionary politico-social status quo,
or sometimes through the idolization of its
own structure, work against sanctification.
Yet one would hope - and legitimately, since
this is simply part of the eschatological
hope - that these lapses would be episodes
which would be eventually overcome in the
total life of the Church. 839
836 Heppe, REFORMED DOGMATICS, pp.662-63.
837 John Macquarrie, PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY





Calvin, Askwith, Heppe, Macquarrie - theologians with systems
that vary considerably; however, they have in common the fact that
all believe holiness to have to do with the ethical life of the
Church. Since conduct clearly is not always free from sin, they
attempt to solve the problem quantitatively, that is, by measuring
holiness against unholiness, and pronouncing the former to be (at
least eschatologically) the dominant characteristic of the Church.
As we saw in the last chapter, when holiness is defined
ethically, to the exclusion of the religious 'otherness' which is
also a part of the biblical notion of the Holy, it risks trivial-
ization into a this-worldly legalism where the freely transcendent
is bound by the chains of moralism. Consequently, the religious
dynamic is lost as the vertical of the 'wholly other' is flattened
out into the horizontal of a proper code of well-regulated
behaviour. Not only does this ignore a considerable body of biblical
material regarding holiness, but it sets the FIRE under a bushel;
it de-claws the Lion of Judah into a tame, domesticated pet as
comfortable and familiar as old slippers. Commandments, principles,
ideals: these may all remain, but they are de-fused, safe, non-
threatening, as long as the lightning shock of the Holy has been
deflected by the rod of moralism.
When holiness is quantitatively measured against unholiness,
we must ask: With what sort of scales is the judgment made? Who
has supplied the measuring device? In the furnace of which - and
whose - values has the weighbeam been cast? How many ethical deeds
are needed to cancel out an unholy deed? Certainly the sort of
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legalism implied in these questions is far from the minds of the
theologians just examined, and, in most instances, rendered powerless
by the rest of their theological thought; but the questions serve
to point out the slippery slope one ventures upon when holiness is
defined in primarily ethical terms. When it is a question of
'more or less' holiness, something independent of holiness itself-
a value, an ideal, a principle? - will be required to judge human
conduct and pronounce verdict upon it. Consequently, the Holy is
stripped of its regal robes of transcendence, and forcibly wrapped
in the beggarly rags of human wisdom and morality. When this
happens holiness is lost, for whatever else one may have in hand,
the Holy remains ungraspable in the radical freedom of its
'wholly otherness.'
c. In what does the holiness of the Church consist? To this
point, I have shown what it cannot mean. Holiness may neither be
reduced to a bare religious notion, indicating a formal separation
void of specific content, nor to a purely ethical concept where it
acts as merely a cipher for a moralism judged and directed by human
reason. Biblically, 'the Holy' is both a religious and ethical term:
in Jesus Christ both the cultic and prophetic approaches to holiness
find their fulfilment and final unity; in him, the two have become
one. As the Holy One of God, Jesus Christ is the 'wholly other,'
absolutely free and distinct from this world, the personal embodiment
of transcendent grace. And yet, inasmuch as the 'wholly other' is
revealed in grace, he is shown to be 'wholly for'; what sets the
Holy One off from the world is precisely his being for the world.
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Thus the unity of the religious and ethical sides of holiness is
this: the utter separation of the divine from the human is shown
precisely in the divine love for the human. The FIRE of the Holy
• 4-v, r- r i 840is the consuming fire of love.
Two important implications follow from this for the Church.
First, because 'holiness' is, in its original sense, the act of
God's grace in Christ, it can never be abstracted from the event of
grace. That is to say, the holiness of the Church is always God's
gift to the Church. And second, inasmuch as the holiness of the
Church is participation in God's gift of holiness, the distinctiveness
of its being is revealed as the very distinctiveness of God himself.
1. The Church is holy because God is holy. If it is
true that God's holiness is the event of his grace in Jesus Christ,
in which the 'wholly other' is revealed as the 'wholly for,'
then this means that the Church's holiness is grounded in the holiness
of God. What sets God off in ontological distinction from-the rest
of creation is his transcendent 'otherness' - an 'otherness' which
is, in fact, his love for the world. He is separate because he
does not will to remain separated; he is ontologically distinct
because he wills to share his distinctive being with others, to
enter into fellowship with them. His gracious love is the true
antithesis between the divine and the human. Therefore, the holiness
of God is the guarantee of his grace. The Church exists, not in
spite of his holy 'otherness,' but because of it. His holiness is
840 For a fuller discussion of this idea, see Chapter V.
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the uniqueness of his grace by which he has constituted for himself
a people for fellowship. That there is a koinonia of persons who
are chosen by the Father, reconciled in Jesus Christ, and empowered
for praise and service in the Holy Spirit, is because God is holy,
and remaining true to the distinctiveness of his being as love, he
has established a sanctuary of grateful human response in the midst
of the world.
The Church is holy, then, not of its own accord, but because
God is holy. And in the active working out of that holiness, the
Church has been granted a share in his holiness. Thus the Ephesian
letter, in its opening paean to the God of grace, states:
Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord
Jesus Christ, who has blessed us in Christ with
every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places,
even as he chose us in him before the foundation
of the world, that we should be holy and blame¬
less before him. 841
The purpose of our election in Christ: that we should be holy
before him. In other words, God has established, in the act of
holiness, the reality of holiness in the midst of his creation.
The holy Word has created a holy echo. The Church is this holy
response. It is the fellowship of the Holy.
841 Eph. 1:3-4. See also Col. 1:21-22: 'And you,
who once were estranged and hostile in mind,
doing evil deeds, he has now reconciled in his
body of flesh by his death, in order to present
you holy and blameless and irreproachable before
him . . . .' (italics mine).
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The Church is holy because God made it holy. Even as Israel
842
was called out of the nations to be the holy people of God,
so also the Church, the New Israel, has been called out of the
world to be God's people in Jesus Christ. 'It is God who dis¬
tinguishes the Church, sets it apart, marks it out for his own and
843
makes it holy.' The holiness of the Church is the word of God
amongst humanity; it is a result of his election in Christ and
the impartation of his Holy Spirit. It
is not accessible to us or controllable by us;
it is not something seen, but something that is
revealed to those who in faith open their hearts
to the sanctifying Spirit of God. To the believers
alone is revealed the fact that this people which
looks so familiar to other peoples and communities
in the world, and yet is fundamentally so dissimilar,
is illumined by the holiness of God .... God
sets the community apart as something holy by
awakening faith in the individual, by justifying
him. 844
We must stress the divine initiative in the establishment of
holiness, because of the nature of holiness itself. Since, the
'wholly other' is nothing else than the 'wholly for,' grace
issues from holiness. There is no holiness without grace, for the
842 'When Israel is called to be the people of God and
spoken of as the holy people, the underlying
idea is that of separation. Israel is the
people which is set apart from all others, not
for its own merits but because the Lord has
been pleased to choose it, to separate it and
to consecrate it as holy' (Stephen Neill,
CHRISTIAN HOLINESS (London: Lutterworth Press,
1960) , p.13).
843 Kung, THE CHURCH, p.325.
844 Ibid., p.326.
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divine 'otherness' to which the word 'holiness' points is the
'otherness' of redeeming love. Grace is the distinguishing aspect
of the being of God. 'God is love.' Therefore, because 'holiness'
at once denotes what is God's distinctive being (as opposed to all
other beings) and reveals that distinction to be his loving grace,
we must affirm that only God can grant holiness to others and
that he does grant it. Since grace is the mark of the divine,
\
only God may give it; because this mark is grace, it i_s given.
Thus the Church is holy because God is holy.
Now it is for this reason that all attempts to define the
Church's holiness in terms of certain ethical qualities which it pos¬
sesses in a 'more or less' way must be rejected. Where holiness is
established, the reign of grace effectively draws all into its
domain. If the Church is holy, it is by God's grace extra nos;
its holiness is granted in an objective way, outside of itself.
And because holiness and grace can never be sundered, the Church
may never point to one part of its life and witness and say,
'This is holy and righteous' (as if it needed no grace), and to
another part, 'This is sinfully unholy' (and thus in need of grace).
For if the Church is holy, then it is so only in grace, and grace
is the overcoming of sin by divine love. There cannot be parts
of the Church that are holy and thus freed from the structure of
grace, and other parts that are still sinful and dependent on grace.
For - and this is the critical link in the argument - the Church
has its being in Jesus Christ, it is his body even as he is its
head. There is no part of the Church isolated from him; anything
separated from his being is not the Church. Therefore, because
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Jesus Christ is the name and personal embodiment of God's loving
grace, it follows that the whole Church is established in grace.
Being the body of Christ, it exists totally in grace, and thus
totally in the sphere of God's holiness.
Furthermore, because grace is what constitutes the Church,
the Church is in itself the opposite of holy love; it is sinful.
Grace is the overcoming of sin by God's redeeming love in Christ.
Where grace is total, sin is total. Without the barrier there
would be no need for the overcoming. If the whole Church is con¬
stituted in Christ, if the whole Church is thus established in the
sphere of grace, then the whole Church is also guilty of sin.
Such are the implications of confessing the sancta ecclesia.
The whole Church is holy, and the whole Church is sinful: 'simul
justa et peccatrix.'
There are not two Churches, one holy when
seen from above and one sinful when seen
from below. There is only one Church, holy
and sinful at the same time, casta meretrix,
as it has often been called since patristic
times, echoing the Old Testament imagery. 845
This does not mean, though, that holiness and sinfulness are
simply two co-equal sides of the Church. 'The holiness of the
Church is light, revealing its nature, the sinfulness of the Church
846
is shadow, darkening its true nature.' The true being of the
Church is its holy life in Christ; with him it exists in a
845 Ibid., p.328. So also Hall: the Church's membership
'consists of those who have been separated by
election of grace, rather than of those who




relationship structured by grace, and thus always as a fellowship
of sinners grateful for the love and mercy of God. But because
the holy love of God is the eternal and victorious side of this
structure of grace, the sin of the Church is its passing shadow.
As the Church, a pilgrim people, journeys on through its historical
existence, its constant movement is away from the sin of its past
and toward the eternally victorious love of God.
2. The Church is holy as God is holy. As we have just
seen, the Church is holy because God is holy; that is, as a
consequence of his holiness, which is also grace, he overcomes
the barriers erected by the sin of humanity. He establishes holiness
in the midst of his creation; he shares the uniqueness of his being
with a fellowship of persons united together by his act of holiness
in Christ Jesus. Now because it is God1s holiness which is granted,
it must then be acknowledged that the Church is holy as God is
holy. The exact nature of its holiness is not known and measured
by some sort of external ethical standard; rather, holiness is
defined by God alone. The shape and content of the Church's holiness
is seen only in the light of God's holiness. Thus to comprehend
its own true nature, it must look to the event of divine holiness,
to Jesus Christ, in whom it shares in the being of God. In him it
participates in the holiness embodied in his person.
At this juncture, we should recall the definition of holiness
arrived at in the last chapter. The Holy is revealed in the Holy One,
Jesus Christ. In him is the uniting of the religious and ethical
conceptions of holiness woven throughout the biblical account.
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The resulting description of holiness: what sets God apart as
'wholly other,' in ontological distinction from humanity, is the
fact that he is 'wholly for' humanity. The true, distinctive
nature of God's being was revealed in Christ,, and thus showed
itself to be gracious love. So we were led to assert the strange
fact that the antithesis is the overcoming of the antithesis;
the genuine, eternal distinction between the divine and the human,
the holy and the profane, is the love which overturns and defeats
the false and passing division between God and his human partner.
The implications of this for the holiness of the Church are
far-reaching. It is the end of all attempts to understand the
holiness of the Church in purely religious ways. The Church's
separateness is not merely a formal abstraction; it has a specific
content. If God's holiness is revealed in his self-giving love
for the world, and if it is this which distinguishes his being
from all others, then does it not follow that the Church, as holy,
is also ontologically distinct from the world precisely in its
self-giving for the world? As already shown, the Church is holy
to the extent that it is in Christ and therefore shares his being.
His being is the being of love, the active event of God's self-
sacrifice for the sake of sinful humanity. As 'saints in Christ
847
Jesus,' therefore, the Church participates in the being of him
who, though he was in the form of God, did not
count equality with God a thing to be grasped,
but emptied himself, taking the form of a
servant, being born in the likeness of men.
847 Phil. 1:1
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And being found in human form he humbled himself and
became obedient unto death, even death on a cross. 848
The holiness of the Church, as concrete fellowship in the
holiness of God, means that the Church is ontologically distinct
from the world and that its distinction is its embodiment of the
self-giving love of Christ for the world.
As it lives by faith in Jesus Christ, and in the power of
his Holy Spirit, it is holy. This means, first of all, that it
really is set apart from the world. To deny this is to deny the
basic root meaning of holiness. The Holy is the great stranger in
this world, utterly distinct, separate. As the Church is granted
a share in this holiness, it cannot fail to become different -
perhaps not always visibly, but different in essence, ontologically,
because it has a new being in Christ. Therefore, its true nature,
whether immediately evident or not, is an alien characteristic
which does not grow out of the inherent goodness of its members but
is given to it. We could say, then, that the Church is, ontologically,
as ecstatic community of the Holy. Its essential being is outside
849
of itself in Christ; its 'life is hid with Christ in God.1
The Church has already been set apart from
the world by God as something holy; this is an
effect of his grace. It must remain set apart;
this is his call to metanoia and renewal. It




The Church cannot maintain its course
of itself; like Israel, it is supported
by God's mercy and faithfulness. Its
being set apart cannot be revoked; the
whole New Testament message depends on
this belief. 850
Yet this separateness cannot mean the Church is set apart
in aloofness; its separation is not the neutral self-saving
distance created by a Pilate who washes his hands of the godforsaken
agony of the world's black Friday. Its separateness is the
distinction of being found in the Holy One who did not wash his
own hands but washed the sin-stained world with the blood of his
broken body, the One for whom it was not too mean a thing even
to wash away the dust and sweat of his disciples' feet on the eve
of his death. If the Church is 'wholly other,' it is so as its
Lord, as it is 'wholly for.' The Church is not the world; to
the extent that it is 'wholly for' it is 'wholly other.' Its
being is not that of the world but that of the One who stands
over against the world in the judgment of his grace: separate
in love for the world; distinguished by self-giving in a world
whose engines are fuelled with the crude oil of self-love; different
in new life from the aged and broken-down world encompassed by
death; set off by servitude in a world drowning in the quicksands
of its own self-exaltation; filled with the refreshing wind of
the indwelling Spirit of the Holy in a world choking in the
blinding smog of its materialism. The Church _is different,
ontologically distinct.
850 Rung, THE CHURCH, pp.341-42.
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But the church is most surely preserved
from becoming the world when she embodies
the servant-form of the incarnate Lord,
as she becomes the suffering servant and
bears in her body the dying of Christ for
men, as she is willing to make the world's
suffering her own. And the church most
surely becomes the sinful world when she
is afraid to spend her life and seeks to
save it, becomes self-defensive and trusts
only to her own strength, falls into
spiritual pride and holds aloof from the
world . . . 851 r.
Even as the being of Christ stands over against the wcrld
(separate) in the gracious judgment of his self-emptying love,
so the Church, as it 'lives and moves and has its being in him,'
is separate - separate in the concrete love it lives out on
behalf of the world.
851 Claude Welch , THE REALITY OF THE CHURCH
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p.207.
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B. The Advance In Force
(1) In the last chapter it was shown that the loss of
ontological distinction between the Church and the world, as
exemplified by the theologies of Bonhoeffer, Tillich, Pannenberg,
and Moltmann, was the result of either an immanentalism or a
universalism. The former eventuated from Bonhoeffer's incarnationalism
and Tillich's transcendentalism; the latter was a consequence of
Pannenberg's and Moltmann's eschatology. In seeking first to under¬
stand the holiness of God, we found in 'the idea of the Holy' helpful
guidance for defining the proper relationship between God and the
world. Following this lead, the inadmissibility of any sort of
immanentalism which undermines the ontological distinction between
God and the world became evident. Now, in discussing the holiness
of the Church, we raise the question about God-in-relationship-to-
the-world-in-sin. What does the Church's holiness mean for the
thought of Pannenberg and Moltmann, especially their universalism
which tends to undercut the ontological distinction between the
Church and the world? With regard to Pannenberg, we must re-assert
that the Church's holiness is established in the grace of God in
Christ Jesus; and against the background of Moltmann's thought,
we must re-emphasize that the Church's holiness is established in
the grace of God in Christ Jesus.
a. With the torchlight of the doctrine of holiness cast
upon it, the theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg is vulnerable to
criticism because of its emphasis on ontological wholeness. As
852
noted earlier, Pannenberg's system emerges out of a passion for
852 See Chapter III.
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wholeness. It is his concern to grasp the truth in its entirety
and sweeping universality. Individual events are meaningful, he
contends, only within their contexts; each context requires a
greater context, until the final meaning of all reality is revealed
at the end of history. As the determining power and unity of all
things, God himself is the universal truth which will be revealed
at the end. He has, however, proleptically manifested himself in
the eschatological event of the resurrection of Jesus Christ.
According to Pannenberg, this means that since the end has in fact
broken into the midst of history, we are now able to grasp, though
of course only partially, the meaning of universal history. Among
other things, the resurrection also validates the teaching of
Jesus regarding the future reign of God, and since the being of God
is one with his reign, Pannenberg describes God as the 'power of the
future.' Because God is the creative source of all historical events,
all things must necessarily flow out of the future; the end, therefore,
is really the beginning. Thus Pannenberg's system creates for the mind's
eye a circle of wholeness: God, the unity and power of all things, is
future, and all historical reality both flows from him and toward him.
This totalitarianism of the future caused us to ask about the
place of evil and brokenness in Pannenberg's holistic view of
reality. If all things evolve out of a future of absolute good,
then is evil simply a temporary illusion which will be cleared up at
the end of time when the universal truth is finally revealed in its
fulness? And if so, what then of the joint testimony of Scripture
and human experience to the very real presence of evil in this world?
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And what of the brokenness of Jesus himself - where does the cross
of the Crucified One fit into this system of symmetrical wholeness?
These questions invite a comparison between Pannenberg's theology
and the doctrine of holiness. Holiness, it has been maintained,
is the absolute otherness of God's grace. Now inasmuch as we must
speak of holiness in terms of grace, sin is presupposed. Until this
point, sin has remained in the background: a silent presence in the
discussion, asserting itself only indirectly. But now we must give
more direct attention to this dark partner of holiness, this black
shadow cast upon the wall of reality by the light of grace.
853
Holiness manifests not only God, but sin, that is,
in the event of God's holy act in Jesus Christ, whereby his
ontological distinction from the world was shown to be his love for
the world, we have given to us both the knowledge of the unique¬
ness of the being of God and therein the knowledge of the being of
the world. If the event of grace reveals the distinctive nature
of God to be love, then its opposite, sin, is also shown. With
the shining of the light, the darkness is revealed as darkness.
The Holy is 'wholly other,' not abstractly but concretely, in being
'wholly for.' Now we ask: 'W'holly other' than what? The answer:
'wholly other' than what is not 'wholly for'; and what is not
'wholly for' is the world in sin. Because the uniqueness of the being
of God manifest in Christ is his self-giving love by which he
853 So also P. T. Forsyth, THE CRUCIALITY OF THE CROSS,
p.24: 'To bring sin home, and grace home, then, the
Holy must be brought home.'
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overcomes the distance between himself-and humanity, its opposite
can be nothing other than the unloving creation of the distance in
the first place. This the Scriptures term 'sin.' Sin is the
negative to God's positive; the world's No against God's Yes.
It is the long shadow touching the form of humanity as it stands
in the light of God.
The holiness of God is his being pro nobis, the event of his
grace in Jesus Christ. In him, he surrendered, 'emptied himself,'
for the sake of the beloved. He took the form of a servant to
minister to the broken wounds of humanity. By his own suffering
and death he built a bridge across the great divide, opening a
thoroughfare between the divine and the human. The holiness of God
is grace: it is self-giving, other-oriented, aimed at fellowship.
Now since it is this which separates God and humankind, then we
must define sin as its opposite: self-absorption, ego-oriented,
struggling for autonomy. If holiness is the glad acceptance of
servitude, sin is the great quest for lordship. If holiness is the
using of self for the sake of the other, sin is the using of the
other for the sake of the self. If holiness is Life giving itself
over to death to secure life for the other, sin is death struggling
for life only to secure death. Thus Paul writes: 'For the wages
of sin is death but the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ
r r j r854Jesus our Lord .'
854 Rom. 6:23.
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Holiness, then, defines both the being of God (love) and the
being of humanity (sin), and as this distinction in being has been
established in the act of holiness, the event of God's judging grace
in Jesus Christ, all monism must be ruled out. We cannot conceive
of reality as one ontological whole. Though perhaps aesthetically
satisfying in its geometrical completeness, such a system is clearly
an unwelcome intruder in the house of theology. For as theology
attempts to think out the faith of the Church from the event of
God's grace in Christ, it comes face to face with an unavoidable
dualism: on the one side, God and his loving grace, and on the
other side, humanity with its loveless sin. To be sure, this
dualism is not absolute, for it is finally overcome in the being of
Christ himself; yet, because the being of Christ is the event of
grace, a relational structure between the divine and human is
eternally established. God is the gracious giver; humanity, the
sinful recipient. Thus what we have is not the smooth evolution of
reality out of a divine totalitarian power of the future, the
unravelling of an unbroken ontological whole; rather, in Christ a
permanent structure of grace has been ontologized, so that the
picture of the whole includes not only the light but the dark.
What we have in Christ is the gracious overcoming-of-a-conflict.
Because this is _iri Christ, a unity is secured over an abstract
dualism; but as this is grace, a proper dualism is maintained
against a sweeping monism. In the unity of Christ we have, as it were,
a wholeness which includes brokenness, grace which is also judgment.
The unity of God's act of holiness in Christ is not a oneness,
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but the complementary interplay of the dualism of divine love
and human sin in conflict - the final result of which is not
eternal discord but the harmony of the triumphant song of grace.
The difficulty with Pannenberg's universalism - indeed,
all universalism - is that it turns the vital, moving, engaging
relationship between God and humanity into something automatic
and predictable. T. F. Torrance has identified the problem
with universalism in this way:
Universalism is always and inevitably
inconsistent for two reasons. (a) It commits
the logical fallacy of transmitting movement into
necessity. At the very best universalism could
only be concerned with hope, with a possibility,
and could only be expressed apocalyptically. But
to turn it into a dogmatic statement, which is
what the doctrine of universalism does, is to
destroy the possibility in the necessity ....
(b) It commits the dogmatic fallacy of
systematizing the illogical. Sin has a
fundamentally surd-like character ....
The Christian faith which has looked into the
limitless depth of the Eli, Eli lama sabachthani,
and considered the great weight of sin to dis¬
cover that only by the act of God can man get
across the gulf, will accept the way of humility
where the cross makes foolish the wisdom of this
world. It will learn the discipline of suspending
judgment in order to avoid foisting a false and
abortive unity or a closed system of thought
upon the actual facts of existence ....
Whether all men will as a matter of fact be saved
or not, in the nature of the case, cannot be known. 855
Though Pannenberg does not argue directly for universalism,
such a doctrine is called for by his theology. For him, all
things flow out of, and toward, a future of absolute good;
855 T. F. Torrance, 'Universalism or Election?',
SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY 2(1949): 314.
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a totalitarianism of the future exerts a creative and eschatological
conformism by which all reality is stamped with deterministic
necessity. But we ask: Is not grace the surprising act of
divine freedom? The holiness of God teaches us to view things in
a more dynamic way, for it maintains the essential distinction
between God and the world in which a living, vital relationship can
exist, and yet as this relationship is one of grace, we are kept
in the wonder and awe of the surprising gift of divine love. The
grace of God is the judgment against sin in Jesus Christ; that this
is the judgment of the 'wholly other' causes us to take with
absolute seriousness the situation of humanity as it has turned its
back on God. Forasmuch as this is accomplished in Christ, however,
we are freed from debilitating guilt to turn to the perfect love
which casts out fear. For the person who has looked into the black
depths of his own perverted motives, been wearied by attempts to
be the lord he is not, and experienced the consequent brokenness
of his own being, for this person there is nothing 'automatic'
about God's act of loving mercy in Christ Jesus. It is Good News -
unpredictable, ego-shattering, and awe-inspiring. It creates the
human response of faith.
This leads to a second point in our dialogue with Pannenberg:
not only does holiness reveal sin, it establishes the human response
pf faith. This follows from the definition of the Holy, for as it is
'wholly other' through being 'wholly for,' the ontological separation
of God from the human by his embrace of the human, something
really does happen to humanity. The act of holiness is the concrete,
311
effectual overcoming of the barriers created by sin. A relationship
is established; the creature finds himself drawn back to the
Creator from whom he is fleeing. God accomplishes the event, and
thus his absolute distinction is maintained according to the structure
of grace; but this ontological distinction is the actual overcoming
of the distance which does take place. The runaway returns.
Fellowship is established.
What happens is this: the holiness of God is established in
the midst of humanity. God shares the uniqueness of his being with
others. He gives it, and so maintains his distinction, the prius
of his grace; but he does give it, and humanity is enabled to
participate in the love of God. By his act of reconciliation in
Christ Jesus, God has judged human sin. He has stormed the
barriers of separation. Thus his judgment is grace, the victory
of God's will to fellowship over the sinner's will to autonomy.
This is the act of holiness, the working out of the 'wholly for'
which is the content of God's ontological 'otherness.' In Christ,
a bridge has been erected by which humankind may cross over the
gulf of division and enter into the fellowship of God's love and
life.
And thus the biblical testimony is a summons: the sinner
must respond with trust in this God of aggressive grace. Because
holy love has effectively breached the barricades, because a wide
path has been paved, the rebel must return. After God's choice
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of us in Jesus Christ,
still to draw back in proud independence
and selfish denial of God's love is an
act of bottomless horror .... To
choose our own way and yet in that choice
still to be chosen by God would be hell. 856
Therefore, the apostolic call is for faith.
Since all have sinned and fall short of
the glory of God, they are justified by
his grace as a gift, through the redemption
which is in Christ Jesus, whom God put
forward as an expiation by his blood,
to be received by faith. 857
858
Thus Paul can say that 'we are justified by faith,' and he
•encourages the Colossians with the fact that they have been
reconciled to God by the death of Christ provided they 'continue
859
in the faith.' There is nothing at all 'automatic' about the
salvation of humanity in Christ: we are faced with a call to
decide for the God who has decided for us. The summons is
freighted with the full cargo of God's eternal love. To turn
our back on it is the horror of death; to embrace it is life.
'For man believes with his heart and so is justified, and he
confesses with his lips and so is saved.
By faith, then, persons enter into the sphere of God's act
of holiness, they are united together as the body of the Holy One.
861
Their lives are 'hid with Christ in God.' We can put it this way:
856 Ibid., p.317.






by faith, human beings complete the act of holiness. Inasmuch as
God's holiness is the gracious bridging of the gulf to the end
that divine-human fellowship may be established, faith is the
follow-through of this action. It is the turning of the creature
to his Creator. Because this is the aim of the grace of holiness,
we say that this turning - faith - completes holiness. The sinner
is taken up into the act of God's holiness in Christ Jesus, and his
participation fulfils holiness.
Does this mean that God's holiness is dependent upon human
action? Are we asserting the absurdity that God's 'otherness' is
humanity's creation? Decidedly not. For the act of faith - the com¬
pletion of holiness - is also God's act. It is part of the one
complete act of holy love which distinguishes him from all other
beings. It was explained to the Ephesians this way:
For by grace you have been saved through faith;
and this is not your own doing, it is the gift
of God - not because of works, lest any man
should boast. 862
Faith itself is a work of God. Through the quickening of his
Holy Spirit, human beings are empowered for the response which
completes holiness. They believe-and are saved; that is, they are
united to Christ by faith and share in his being. They enter into
his holiness; they are 'saints in Christ Jesus.' In this, holiness
finds completion. Because it is all God's action, his 'wholly
862 Eph. 2:8-9.
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otherness' is not threatened; rather, it is maintained and
manifested. Yet, as a result of this wholly divine action, the
Christian is incorporated into the Holy, he is granted existential
participation in the holiness of God. Therefore the Church -
the called-out ones - are holy, not of themselves, but because
they have been swept up by the Spirit of Holiness into participation
in the being of God and thus constituted a fellowship of the Holy.
This means that, even as God is ontologically distinct from
the world, so also is his Church. The Church has a different
being from that of the world. In spite of itself it is granted
this new life in Christ. The congregatio fidelium is the
congregatio sanctorum. Just as it is impossible to minimize the
'wholly other' aspect of God's holiness, so also do we err if the
Church's distinctive being is minimized. The Church is ontologically
distinct from the world, for it participates in the holiness of
God. To deny this distinction is to deny the meaning of the Holy.
b. With a view to Pannenberg's theology we have emphasized
that the Church's holiness is the consequence of God's grace in
Jesus Christ. This has enabled us to take seriously the brokenness
of sin and the Gospel's call for faith. Now, with Moltmann's theology
in mind, it should be stressed that the Church's holiness is the
consequence of God's grace in Jesus Christ.
Jurgen Moltmann shares with Pannenberg a concern to understand
863
fully the eschatological implications of the Gospel. But whereas
863 See Chapter IV.
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Pannenberg's is a theology motivated by a passion for wholeness,
Moltmann's seeks *to be more open-ended and to account for the
brokenness of the present age. In the end, however, both arrive
at a universalism which robs the Church of any ontological distinction
between itself and the world. For this reason, the arguments
presented against the universalism of Pannenberg are directly
relevant to Moltmann, also; but now we shift the emphasis slightly.
Pannenberg's universalism is the result of his holistic
view of reality, by which all things were part of a circular move¬
ment from God to God. In the face of this, it was necessary to
insist on the reality of grace - God's free gift in response to
the brokenness of human sin. With Moltmann, however, the problem
is somewhat different. He recognizes the reality of sin and the
brokenness of the present age. And, with the controlling concept
of promise, he juxtaposes this age and the next as contradictory
realities. If this age is under the sign of the cross, the age
to come is promised by the resurrection. As God took all sin into
himself in the cross, so in the resurrection all reality is given
the promise of life. Though Moltmann intends to have an
eschatology which is more open-ended than Pannenberg's, it in fact
becomes nearly as universal and 'automatic,' for Moltmann believes
that one can extrapolate from the 'inner tendency' of the Christ event
to arrive at a picture (though of course incomplete) of the future.
Forasmuch as God, in the cross, absorbed into himself all the death-
dealing sin of the present, this means for Moltmann that the resur¬
rection of Christ promises life to all in the coming eschaton.
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Since he-contends, further, that essence is determined by the
eschaton (that is, the being of a thing is ordained by its future),
this can only mean the dissolution of any ontological differentiation
of present phenomena, for the 'inner tendency' of the Christ event
points to an end of universal restoration.
In dialogue with Moltmann, therefore, it is necessary to
accentuate the fact that the Church has its being _in Christ. With
his eschatological focus and stress on the promissory nature of
revelation, Moltmann risks locating the essence of the Church in the
future, rather than in the One under whose headship it exists as body.
With his notion of the eschatological determination of essence,
Moltmann has no option but to derive the nature of the being of the
Church - indeed, all reality - from the future. The 'horizon of
meaning' for the Church and the world is the same: the coming
eschaton. Thus the Church cannot be essentially different from the
rest of reality. Any distinctiveness it may bear is only .that of
its particular function in relation to the eschaton. The Church,
for Moltmann, 'is characterized as an instrumental function of the
864
apostolic process of God's history.' That is to say, it is not
set apart from the world because of what it ijs, but only because
of what it does. Its task is the missionary function of bearing
witness to the future of all creation. It is at the vanguard of
the eschatological movement of creation, and thus is in a unique
position to serve the future by working for 'the qualitative
864 Moltmann, HOPE AND PLANNING, p.145.
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alteration of life's atmosphere' by infecting others with the
spirit of hope and love, with 'Christian ideas, values and
806
principles.' The vague tone of this description of the Church's
missionary work is a clue to the difficulty with Moltmann's
ecclesiology: the Church, for him, has its meaning in a future
only vaguely knowable through extrapolation from the 'inner tendency'
of the Christ event.
The doctrine of holiness, however, disallows any attempt to
understand the being and action of the Church apart from Jesus Christ.
Ecclesia sancta means: a Church which is the fellowship of the Holy;
that is, a Church constituted in the act of holiness in Jesus Christ,
and a Church which has its being in this Holy One. It is holy
only because it shares, by grace, in his holiness. Because it owes
its existence to the One who is the holiness of God - the concrete
embodiment of the 'wholly other' which is the 'wholly for' -
it can look nowhere else but to him as it seeks to understand the
nature of its life and witness. Its essence and work are not defined
867
by the future, or a principle; its life is 'hid with Christ in God.'
Moreover, this means that both its being and its action are
the consequence of its engrafting into Christ. As we have already
seen, holiness is the distinctiveness of love. Even as God is




'wholly other' - ontologically distinct - precisely in that he
is 'wholly for,' so also is the Church. Because it is grounded
in Christ, there can be no split between the Church's essence and
activity. Its being is its act. The communio sanctorum participates
in the holiness of God in Christ Jesus, and thus the distinctiveness
of its being is its action of love. It i_s as it does the work of
self-giving love, and it does this as it i_s in Christ; neither
one nor the other may be minimized without doing violence to the
Church's holiness.
By locating the being of the Church in the eschaton,
Moltmann not only sweeps aside all ontological distinctions, but
also contradicts the character of the Holy. Distinction, separation,
set-apartness - these are all fundamental to holiness; yet this
'wholly other' quality may be understood in a way which does not
condemn the Church to irrelevance in the contemporary world. What
distinguishes it, ontologically, is its participation in tjie servant-
hood of Christ. As it shares his being it shares his act. Thus
in him it _i£ distinct, but in such a way that it cannot live with¬
out the world but only for the world.
And what of the future, which is of such importance for Moltmann?
Whatever life may be like in the eschaton, we can only say that it
will be life in Christ. We may not look around Christ to another age,
the character of which we seek to outline according to the 'tendencies'
in the Christ event of this age. The future for which the Church
hopes is the future of Jesus Christ; it does not look forward to
the arrival of an: abstract eschaton, but to the coming of its Lord.
319.
His future is the Church's future. 'When Christ who is our life
868
appears, then you also will appear with him in glory,' the
Coldssians were told.
The Church, accordingly, will possess a genuine openness in
its hope for the future. This was Moltmann's intention, but by .
reasoning from what he believed was implied in the event of Christ's
death and resurrection, he arrived at a rather closed view of the
eschaton. Because he understood Good Friday as a symbol of this
age, and Easter, in strict contradiction, as a sign of the age to
come, he boldly argued for the universal restoration of all reality.
But if the Church is waiting for the future of Christ, it will be
cautious about guaranteeing an automatic redemption of all reality.
What it can say about the eschaton is that it will be the future of
Jesus Christ. This means it will be an act of God's freedom, and
thus we are not able to seize upon a 'law' which makes certain a
definite issue of history. And it will be an event of grace which
is not divorced from judgment. In its Lord, the Church has beheld
the paradoxical unity of judgment and grace, the overcoming of a
conflict between God and humanity. It is in Christ that it knows
this, and this is its release from insecurity: in him it possesses
the salvation granted to it in virtue of his standing in its place
to receive the condemnation it deserved. But for this reason,
it will look only to him, and not to something beyond him. It can
868 Col. 3:4.
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only take with great seriousness the fact that while Scripture
809
certainly has passages that point to universal restoration, • it
also has many other passages which declare in no uncertain terms
that at the last judgment there will be a final division between
870
the children of light and the children of darkness. 'There is
not a shred of Biblical witness that can be adduced to support the
impossibility of ultimate damnation. All the weight of Biblical
871
teaching is on the other side.' ~ The Church must take this
witness seriously because of its Lord's descent into the hell of
godforsakenness: the words 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken
me?' on the lips of the Crucified One forbid any complacency
about the wrath of God against sin. By faith it trusts that the
judgment he experienced unto death was its own, and thus also grace,
but accordingly it can look neither to the right nor to the left;
it cannot speculate about the eternal outcome of those who
resolutely refuse to be joined to Christ by faith. At most, it may
hope that the abundance of God's grace may perhaps reach even those
who are not obstinate in their refusal of grace, but it is able to
make no dogmatic statements. Exactly how God's grace and judgment
will be worked out at the end of history for those who foolishly
flee from the loving pursuit of the 'Hound of Heaven,' the Church
869 E.g., Eph. 1:10; Col. 1:20; Phil. 2:10-11.
870 E.g., Matt. 25:41; Mk. 9:42-49; Jn. 3:36; II Thess. 1:6-10;
Heb. 2:3; 10:26-31; Rev. 20:11-15.
871 Torrance, 'Universalism or Election?', p.313.
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does not know. For its part, however, it will look only to Christ,
in whom, it trusts, is found the final unity of judgment and grace.
Thus the Church's hope is open, awaiting Jesus Christ in the freedom
of his grace; and the Church's hope is confident, awaiting Jesus
Christ in the freedom of his grace. As it hopes in him, it hopes
for nothing less than its own future, for its being is united with
the being of the coming Lord.
Therefore, against both Pannenberg and Moltmann, it must be
firmly asserted that the Church is ontologically distinct from the
world, for it shares in the distinctive being of the Holy One.
This distinction may not be crushed under the wheels of a universal-
ism which pulls in its train an ontological conformism admitting
only functional differences between the Church and the world.
Rather, the Church must be seized anew by the implications of its
creed, credo sanetarn ecclesiam. The Church is separate from the
world - separate in the loss of its self for the world.
(2) In the last chapter, it was pointed out that the theology
of Karl Barth proves to be an effective ally in the fight to maintain
the proper distinction between God and humanity - a distinction
implicit in the notion of holiness. To conclude this chapter, I
shall again call upon the reserve forces of this theology. Here,
too, it will become evident that Barth, by consistently defending
the structure of grace implicit in holiness, has preserved the
ontological distinction between the Church and the world.
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a. The early stages of Barth's theological labours were
like the razing of an old, dilapidated building which was unable to
shelter a generation battered by the storms of World War I. The
structure of nineteenth century liberalism, with foundations
precariously anchored in the insecure sands of anthropocentrism,
needed to be laid waste in order to 'let God be God.' So Barth
set to work with a theological wrecking ball forged in the fire of
the Holy. By underscoring the diastasis between a holy God and
sinful humanity, Barth aimed to bring the roof down on a house whose
timbers had long ago been rotted out by theological subjectivism,
the enfeebling cor curvum in se of an era stewing in the juices
872
of its own religious experiences and moralistic fervour.
Eventually, this necessary work of destruction was followed,
in Barth's thought, by the work of construction. After the ground
had been cleared by the dialectical juxtaposing of God and humanity
in antithesis, Barth began the process of rebuilding by taking up
a different tool; by means of analogy, Barth sought to understand
fully the implications for all reality of the fact that the holy-
profane antithesis consists precisely in the grace of its overcoming.
As Barth restructured theology's house, he attempted to follow as
consistently as possible the architectural blueprints for a
building with 'Christ Jesus himself being the cornerstone, in whom
873
the whole structure is joined together.' Accordingly, his
872 For a fuller discussion of the early theology of
Karl Barth, see Chapter V.
873 Eph. 2:20-21.
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emphasis shifted: the negative notes of his early strains were
modulated into the fortissimo of a fully positive theology.
Jesus Christ became his constant theme, and like a great symphony,
Barth's massive CHURCH DOGMATICS has this theme as both its constant
motif and the keystone of its structural unity. His theology is
simply the passionate endeavour to comprehend all that is revealed
about God and his creation in the name of Jesus Christ.
This 'christological concentration' leads
to that mode of thought in Barth which he himself
has termed intensive universalism. It is both
intensive and universal because it sees the
entire history of the world and of salvation
as comprehended in a single point, and develops
it from this point. That God and man are united
in Jesus Christ is the central fact, the basis
and explanation of everything that is decreed
in eternity and takes place within time. 874
Thus christology, for Barth, is not one part (alongside
others) of theology, but all theology, in so far as it is Christian,
is christology; that is, all theological formulations must
necessarily be grounded in the concrete revelation of God in Jesus
Christ. John Thompson has rightly observed that in Barth's theology
there is no Christology as such; on the other
hand, it is all Christology. By this we mean
the following. It is an interesting but a
significant fact that there is no such thing
as a section of Christology as such in the
whole of Karl Barth's writings. Yet it is
christological through and through. This is
due to the fact that Barth's theology as a
whole and in every part is determined by its
relation to Jesus Christ, his being and action,
874 Zahrnt, THE QUESTION OF GOD, p.95. The use of the word 'universalism'
in this quote should be understood as indicating the comprehensive
scope of God's work in Christ, but not in the sense that I have
used it earlier in this thesis, i.e., as meaning an 'automatic'
issue of human history.
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so that one cannot detach any aspect from its
christological basis. 875
Though christology is omnipresent in the entire CHURCH DOGMATICS,
nowhere is its decisive importance for Barth more apparent than
in his doctrine of reconciliation. Here he deals with, in his
words, the 'centre of all Christian knowledge,' and therefore he
recognizes that, 'to fail here is to fail everywhere. To be on the
right track here makes it impossible to be completely mistaken in
876
the whole.' To stay on the right track, Barth devoted himself
S77
wholly to the explication of the name of Jesus Christ. ' The result
is a theology of both'massive breadth and breathtaking simplicity -
'simple' in the sense that it is the constant reiteration of one
theme, Jesus Christ, but in scope as universal as the eternal
reality of God and his dealings with humanity.
It is impossible to summarize justly Barth's doctrine of
reconciliation without doing violence to its architectonic beauty;
but just as his earlier theology provided an alternative to the
875 John Thompson, CHRIST IN PERSPECTIVE - CHRISTOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES IN THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH (Edinburgh:
The Saint Andrew Press, 1978), p.l.
876 Barth, CD IV/1, p.ix.
877 Shortly before his death, Barth took part in a Swiss radio
broadcast, in which he ended with these words: '"The last
word which I have to say as a theologian and also as a
politician is not a term like 'grace,' but a name, 'Jesus
Christ.' He is grace, and he i_s the last, beyond the
world and the church and even theology . . . What I
have been concerned to do in my long life has been
increasingly to emphasize this name and say: There is no
salvation in any other name than this. For grace, too, is
there. There, too, is the impulse to work, to struggle, and
also the impulse towards fellowship, towards human solidarity.
Everything that I have rested in my life, in weakness and in
foolishness, is there. But it i_s there"' (as quoted in
Eberhard Busch, KARL BARTH, trans. John Bowden (London:
SCM Press Ltd., 1976), p.496).
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immanentalism of Bonhoeffer and Tillich, so this final stage of his
thought presents a clear option to the universalism (and its attendent
problems) we found with Pannenberg and Moltmann - an alternative,
moreover, which more adequately accords with the biblical and
theological implications of holiness. Therefore, in spite of the
difficulties, an attempt must be made to explain concisely what
Barth understands to have taken place between God and humanity in
the event of Jesus Christ.
b. Barth himself condenses into two paragraphs the contents
of several thousand pages of theological exposition:
The content of the doctrine of reconciliation
is the knowledge of Jesus Christ who is (1) very God,
that is, the God who humbles Himself, and therefore
the reconciling God, (2) very man, that is, man exalted
and therefore reconciled by God, and (3) in the unity
of the two the guarantor and witness of our atonement.
This knowledge of Jesus Christ includes the know¬
ledge of the sin of man: (1) his pride, (2) his
sloth and (3) his falsehood - the knowledge of the
event in which reconciliation is made: (1) his
justification, (2) his sanctification and (3) his
calling - and the knowledge of the work of the Holy
Spirit in (1) the gathering, (2) the upbuilding and
(3) the sending of the community, and of the being of
the Christians in Jesus Christ (1) in faith, (2) in love
and (3) in hope. 878
From the above quotation, it is clear that Barth begins with
the fact that in Jesus Christ 'we have to do wholly with God and
879
wholly with man, and with both in their complete and utter unity.'




atonement. 'His being as God and man and God-man consists in the
880
complete act of reconciliation of man with God.' Notice his
wording: 'His being . . . consists in the completed act.' Barth
refuses to follow the way of traditional christology in distinguishing
between the person (being) and work (act) of Christ. That Jesus
is both God and man is known only in his work; and the meaning
of the divine action in him cannot be understood without reference
881
to what took place in his being as God and man.
In order to elucidate this being and act of God manifest in
Jesus Christ, Barth follows the munus triplex arrangement of
Reformation christology - but with a significant difference. He
does not distinguish between Christ's offices as prophet, priest,
and king by assigning them to specific stages of his existence.
For Barth, Christ was not first a prophet as he proclaimed the
kingdom of God, then a priest as he offered himself as an atonement
for the sins of the world, and finally a king as he ascended to rule
at the right hand of God the Father. Rather, in the complete unitary
action of his incarnation, death, and resurrection Jesus Christ is
the priest who effectively establishes reconciliation between God
and fallen humanity, the king who reigns as exalted man, and in the
unity of these two, the prophet who has proclaimed, and continues to
proclaim, this Word of God revealed in his being and act. Thus also




two distinct periods, one following the other, but sees in the one
divine work of grace in Jesus Christ both, and at the same time,
the humiliation of God and the exaltation of man.
1. That Jesus Christ is very God is shown in the fact
that he made his way into the far country; the Lord became a
servant.
Inasmuch as the being of God is one with his act of revelation
in Jesus Christ, we know the meaning of deity, not from any
abstract notions of a supreme, absolute, non-worldly being.
It can be learned only from what took place
in Christ .... the mirror in which it
can be known (and is known) that He is God,
and of the divine nature, is His becoming
flesh and His existence in the flesh. 882
This means that the obedience of the Son to the Father - shown
in his self-humiliation, his journey into the far country inhabited
by sinful humanity - enclosed within itself •'the mystery that He
883
is very God.' God does not, according to Barth, lay aside his
divinity to become a man (he rejects kenotic theology), for
God is always God even in His humiliation.
The divine being does not suffer any change,
any diminution, any transformation into some¬
thing else, any admixture with something else,
let alone any cessation. 884
Who God is, is something that we can only learn in the school of
Christ; what it means to be divine can be known only where God





'we have to be ready to be taught by Him that we have been too
small and perverted in our thinking about Him within the framework
885
of a false idea of God.1 What he reveals to us is that for him
'it is just as natural to be lowly as it is to be high, to be near
as it is to be far, to be little as it is to be great, to be abroad
as it is to be at home.'^®®
As the Son of God came into this world, he came as Judge.
'He is the One whose concern is for order and peace, who must
8Q7
uphold the right and prevent the wrong.' In so doing, he reveals
to the world its sin, for sin 'has its being and origin in the
888
fact that man wants to be his own judge.' The world wants to'
justify itself, to assert pridefully its autonomous independence
from God. For this reason, the incarnation of the Son of God means
889
judgment, rejection, and condemnation against all flesh. But
God, in the freedom of his grace, passed full judgment on humanity
890
in a way that provided, at the same time, the world's pardon.
Christ reveals the Deus pro nobis, in that as Judge he himself
885 Ibid., p.186.
886 Ibid., p.192. Cf. C. G. Jung, MEMORIES, DREAMS, REFLECTIONS,
ed. Aniela Jaffe, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (London:
Collins; Fount Paperbacks Reprint, 1977), p.388: 'There is
a fine story about a student who came to a rabbi and said,
"In olden days there were men who saw the face of God.
Why don't they any more?" The rabbi replied, "Because
nowadays no one can stoop so low."'





took our place: he removed us from the judgment seat (this means
891
our abasement but also our liberation from a burden we cannot bear) ;
and he accepted responsibility for our sin by taking upon himself
the judgment we deserve for our arrogant usurpation of the unlawful
4- * ^ +■ 892place we tried to occupy.
The decisive thing is not that He has
suffered what we ought to have suffered so
that we do not have to suffer it, the destruction
to which we have fallen victim by guilt, and
therefore punishment which we deserve. This is
true, of course. But it is true only as it
derives from the decisive thing that in the
suffering and death of Jesus Christ it has come
to pass that in His own person He has made an end
of us as sinners and therefore sin itself by going
to death as the One who took our place as sinners.
In His person He has delivered up us sinners and
sin itself to destruction. 893
The resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead is the Father's
verdict on the Son's act of obedience: it is the announcement that
the Son's self-humiliation unto death is accepted as 'the justification
of God Himself . . . who has willed and planned and ordered this
event,' the justification of Jesus Christ 'who willed to suffer this
event,' and 'the justification of all sinful men, whose death was
894
decided in this event.' In the concrete event of Christ's
891 Ibid., pp.231-35.
892 Ibid., pp.235-83.
893 Ibid., p.253. Barth recognizes that there are images other
than forensic used in the Scripture to speak of the reconciliation
accomplished in Christ. See pp.273-83, where he acknowledges
that he could as easily have employed the terminology of the
cultic. Thus, the crucial thing for Barth is not the particular
image, but the fact that in Christ God has effectively encountered




resurrection is shown that the 'No' of God's judgment is not
independent, but enclosed in his 'Yes' of grace. 'Death is swallowed
896
up in victory.' This victory is made provisionally manifest in
the Easter event, but because the living Christ is not only the One
who has come, and is_ present, but also is_ to come, we look forward to
the final fulfilment of this revelation. And in this interval between
the first and final parousia, the community of Christ is given
897
existence in this world.
Because Jesus Christ is the full Word of God, revealing not
only the being of God but also the being of humanity, his act of
atonement reveals both the grace of God and the sin of the world.
We have no autonomous knowledge of sin apart from Christ, for access
to the knowledge of our sin is lacking precisely because we are
898
sinners. Theology errs, according to Barth, when it seeks a
knowledge of sin in the knowledge of God in his majesty as Creator
and Ruler of the world, in the demand with which he confronts
humanity in history, as distinct from his presence, action, and
revelation in Jesus Christ. 'A division of God into a god in Christ
899
and a god outside Christ is quite impossible.'
895 Barth contends that the resurrection happened in fact, and it
was this event which gave birth to Easter faith and not vice
versa. See ibid., p.333.
896 Ibid., p.349.
897 Ibid., p.353.
898 Ibid. , p.361.
899 Ibid., p.363. For this reason, Barth reverses the traditional
order of 'Law and Gospel,' and speaks rather of 'Gospel and Law.
See Karl Barth, GOD, GRACE AND GOSPEL, trans. James S. McNab
(Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1959; Scottish Journal of Theology
Occasional Papers No.8), pp.1-27.
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The order of knowing, therefore, is not from the sickness to
the cure, but from the cure to the sickness. If the remedy was
the self-abasement of the Son of God as he accepted judgment
against himself, then 'the sin of man is the pride of man.
Humanity's struggle to be its own lord, to justify itself, is
revealed in the medicine of the Lord becoming a servant. 'The
fact that Jesus Christ died totally for the reconciliation of
every man as such, for the man who exists in this way, means
decisively that this corruption is both radical and total'; sin
901
entails the consequent perversion of the whole person.
Nevertheless, however total a person's depravity may be
902
'the wrong of man cannot in any way alter the right of God.'
Man may fall. Indeed he necessarily falls,
and into the abyss, when he sets himself in
the wrong against God. But in this fall into
the abyss he cannot fall out of the sphere of
God and therefore out of the right which God
has over him .... even in the lowest depths
of hell, whatever that may mean for him, he is
still the man whom God has elected and created,
and as such he is in the hand of God. He has
not escaped the right of God over him, and to
him, but is still subjected to it, utterly and
completely. He is still in the sphere of God's
jurisdiction. 903
And God has caused his right to prevail - in Jesus Christ.
The journey of the Son of God into the far country was the
maintenance of God's righteousness over against the sin of humanity,





and his righteousness is the rule of his grace. God first
justified himself by securing his will over humanity and judging
it for its rejection and despising of his grace; but since God
justified himself in Christ, the sinner, too, is justified. God's
judgment is grace and his grace judgment. The result: 'Pardon -
by God and therefore unconditionally pronounced and unconditionally
905
valid - that is man's justification.' This does not mean that
the justified person is no longer a sinner. Even though he is
already righteous before God, he is still sinful; but
the new thing which comes from God has as such
precedence over the old man. The right which is
ascribed to him by God has as such precedence
over his own wrong. His life has precedence
over death .... The completion of justification
has precedence over its commencement. 906
What remains for us to do by way of response? Simply this:
to accept by faith God's work pro nobis. Faith is not another
work by which we can justify ourselves; quite the contrary. It
is the humble acknowledgment of God's work. Faith 'knows and grasps
and realizes the justification of man as the decision and act
and word of God . '
2. In the first part of his doctrine of reconciliation,
Barth focuses on the movement from God to humanity. As the Son of






by his self-humiliation the justification of prideful humanity.
In the second part of his doctrine of reconciliation, Barth
concentrates on a second movement which also took place in the
being and act of Jesus Christ. The atonement accomplished in Jesus
Christ is the one event of the going out of the Son of God and the
coming in of the Son of Man.^^ The humbling of the Son of God
is also - at the same time - the exaltation of the Son of Man.
Jesus Christ is vere Deus and vere homo. What does this
vere homo mean? It means, Barth tells us, that his humanity is
'both completely like and yet also completely unlike that of all
i 909other men
He is man. He is man totally and unreservedly
as we are. He is our Brother in which each of
us can and may recognize himself as His brother,
but also recognize the form and aspect of every
other man . . . 910
On the other hand, he is also completely unlike us in that he is
not simply a man, but the true man. He is decisively different
from us in the fact that 'in His human existence . . . there took
place an exaltation of the humanity which as His and ours is the
,911same.'
Now inasmuch as the Son of God assumed into unity with himself
not merely 'a man' (that is, a specific individual) but 'the
91 2
humanum, 1the being and essence of man,' this means that 'in




912 Ibid. , p.48.
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Him, in this man, we have to do with the exaltation of the essence
913
common to all men.' This does not involve the divinisation of
human essence, however. It means that human essence 'is set in
914
perfect fellowship with the divine essence.' As 'true man,'
Jesus was exalted.
Exaltation to what? To that harmony with the
divine will, that service of the divine act,
that correspondence to the divine grace, that
state of thankfulness, which is the only
possibility in view of the fact that this man
is determined by this divine will and act and
grace alone, and by them brought in His existence
into not merely indirect but direct and
indestructible confrontation with the divine
essence. 915
That is to say, Jesus was exalted to true human freedom, and
'
916
therefore he was without sin.
It is important to realize that for Barth 'it is the act of
the humiliation of the Son of God as such which is the exaltation
917
of the Son of Man, and in Him of human essence.' The exaltation
of man takes place precisely in the humiliation of God. The
resurrection and ascension are not the exaltation of Christ, but
are the events of his self-declaration.
913 Ibid., p.69. For Barth's defence and explanation of the
unio hypostatica including his discussion of the






As His self-revelation, His resurrection and
ascension were simply a lifting of the veil ....
The authentic communication and proclamation
of the perfect act of redemption once for all
accomplished in His previous existence and
history, of the Word of salvation once for all
spoken in Him. 918
Sanctification, no less than justification, is an objective,
universal event. There is no one who is exempt from this turning
to God which was accomplished in Jesus Christ. 'There is no one
919
who is not raised and exalted with him to true humanity.'
'There is no sinful man who is not affected and determined with
and by His existence.
Yet this sanctification is not only an objective, external
event extra nos; it is also a subjective, internal event intra nos.
The power_for this inner change of direction comes from without,
but its effect is experienced in the centre of a person's being.
What happens is this: men and women become Christians. How is it
possible that this inner re-direction of being takes place?
If we are to think and speak in New Testament
terms the answer can only be that, deriving from
Jesus Christ, i.e., His resurrection, there is a
sovereignly operative power of revelation, and
therefore of the transition from Him to us, of
His communion with us; a power by whose working
there is revealed and made known to us our own
election as it has taken place in Him, His
humiliation as the Son of God as it has occurred
for us, but also His exaltation as the Son of
Man as it has also occurred for us, there¬








being, so that our existence receives a new
determination. It is by the operation of this
power that we become and are Christians. 921
This power is the 'outgoing and receiving and presence and action
922
of the Holy Spirit.' It is the power of Jesus Christ - his
Spirit; for the Holy Spirit 'is no other than the presence and
923
action of Jesus Christ Himself.'
If this exaltation of the Son of Man, and with him, all
humanity, is the remedy, what is the disease? In the light of
the new man introduced in Jesus Christ, Barth's answer now is that
924
'the sin of man is the sloth of man.' Sin is not only the
evil action of pride, but also the evil inaction of sloth.
925 926 927
Marked by stupidity, inhumanity, dissipation, and human
928
care, it is the refusal to be truly human. Wallowing in the
mud of its own indolence, humanity exists in the misery of its
929
status corruptionis.
Again, the cure was an effective medicine for this 'sickness
unto death.' The liberation of persons from this misery has been




















will, the decision of liberum arbitrium, offered complete
930
obedience to the will of God the Father.
It has not always been taken with sufficient
seriousness that He took our place and acted
for us, not merely as the Son of God who
established God's right and our own by
allowing Himself, the Judge, to be judged
for us, but also as the Son of Man who was
sanctified, who sanctified Himself ....
This means, however, that in and with His
sanctification ours has been achieved as well.
What remains for us is simply to recognize
and respect it with gratitude in that
provisional praise, the offering of which is
the reason for the existence of His people,
His community and all its individual members. 931
3. Justification and sanctification are two sides of the one
event of atonement in Jesus Christ. But this intrinsically perfect
action has a distinct character: 'as it takes place in its
perfection, and with no need of supplement, it also expresses,
93?
discloses, mediates and reveals itself.' . " This, then, is the
third dimension of Barth's doctrine of reconciliation. Its presence
at the end of the CHURCH DOGMATICS is perhaps the logical consequence
of a theology consistently unified in its emphasis on the Word of
God. Nonetheless, it has about it something surprising and yet
satisfying; its originality is striking, but once presented it
seems as indispensable as a leg on a three-legged stool.
930 Ibid., pp.405-98.
931 Ibid., p.516.
932 Barth, CD IV/3, p.8.
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What Barth is saying is this: reconciliation is not only real,
but true; it not only is, but shows that it is; it not only is
a fact, but it proves its factuality in the enlightening work of the
Holy Spirit. Reconciliation is the justification and sanctification
of humanity, and it is the 'disclosure, declaration and impartation'
933
of this event. The reason this is so is because the One in
whom reconciliation has taken place now lives. Jesus Christ
speaks for himself, is his own authentic witness. 'He grounds and
summons and creates knowledge of Himself and His life, making
934
it actual and therefore possible.'
935
As the one Word of God, Jesus is engaged in a
great historical drama, a conflict which is genuine though the
936
outcome will assuredly be his victory. In the war with
933 Ibid., p.11.
934 Ibid., p.46.
935 Barth clearly desires to preserve the uniqueness of
Jesus Christ as the 'one and only' Word of God.
He allows no diminution of, or competition with,
his transcendent authority. However, it is interesting,
in light of his life-long battle against 'natural theology,'
that Barth discusses at length the relationship between
the one Word of God and all other words. These 'other
words' have an independent existence and proper place,
he affirms, but they are only given this place in Jesus
Christ. They are grounded in the one Word. Therefore,
he rules out both monism and dualism, and seeks to recognise





evil, it is not a matter of 'the triumph of grace' or any other
938
principle : the aggressor is the living person, Jesus Christ,
who as Light overcomes the darkness, as Revealer defeats ignorance
and falsehood, as Life destroys death.
This conquering Word of grace is spoken to the world, first
and foremost, in the resurrection. This event is
the primal and basic form of His glory,
of the outgoing and shining of His light,
of His expression, of His Word as His self-
expression, and therefore of His outgoing
and penetration and entry into the world
around ourselves, of His prophetic work. 939
This Easter proclamation was issued 'with all the power of
God and therefore once for all, totally, universally, radically
940
and with definitive newness.' Thus it was an eschatological
937 Barth refers to evil as 'nothingness,' and has been criticized
for it (see e.g., Berkouwer, THE TRIUMPH OF GRACE IN THE
THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH); however, by that term, he does not
mean that it is unreal, but that next to God's 'positivity'
it exists as 'negativity': 'when I speak of nothingness,
I cannot mean that evil is nothing, that it does not exist,
or that it has no reality. I mean that it exists only in
the negativity proper to it in its relationship to God and
decisively in God's relationship of repudiation to it. It
does not exist as God does, not as His creatures, amongst
which it is not to be numbered. It has no basis for being.
It has no right to the existence which to our sorrow we can¬
not deny to it. Its existence, significance and reality are
not distinguished by any value nor positive strength. The
nature underlying its existence and activity is perversion.
Its right to be and to express itself is simply that of
wrong. In this sense it is nothingness' (Barth CD IV/3,
p.178).
938 Ibid., p.173. For Barth's response to Berkouwer's book,
THE TRIUMPH OF GRACE IN THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH,
see pp.173-80.
939 Barth, CD IV/3, p.281.
940 Ibid., p.323.
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event, the parousia of Christ. According to Barth, there are three
forms of the parousia: the Easter event, the impartation of the
i
Holy Spirit, and the return of Jesus Christ as the goal of history.
'In all these forms it is one event. Nothing different takes place
941
in any of them.' This threefold appearance is the new coming of
the One who had come before, and by his coming he declares his
Word of reconciliation.
Now inasmuch as the resurrection has already taken place,
this means that his self-declaration, 'to us and all men, has taken
942
place once for all and irrevocably.' This Word was not spoken
in a heavenly or supra-heavenly realm, or simply as part of a
divine conversation, 'but before the gates of Jerusalem in the
• 943
days of Tiberius Caesar, in our time and place. Because this
'prophecy' of Jesus Christ is a 'divine noetic which has all the
944
force of a divine ontic' (that is, as God's Word it is an
effective Word), the world's condition is no longer the same.
It has been given a new determination by the kingdom of God, for
what came upon the world and man in the
resurrection of the man Jesus, in His appearance
in the glory of God, was this presence of its




943 Ibid. , p.298.
944 Ibid., p.297.
945 Ibid. , p.316.
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If this is so, we may well ask, then why the time in-between?
If the future has appeared in Jesus Christ's resurrection, then
why did it not come in immediate fulfilment? If Christ has come
again, then why do we live in a time still marked by conflict with
evil and hope for his future return? The answer, Barth tells us,
is that it is the Lord's good will 'to act and show Himself as
946
Victor in the fight against darkness,' to give himself time and
space for combat, and to procure for the creation the time and
space not only to witness, but actively to participate with him in
his work and 'share in the harvest which follows from the sowing of
947
reconciliation.' As the 'True Witness' to his act of reconciliation,
Jesus Christ calls us to join in this Word of witness. Thus the
Word which effectively confirms to us the reality of our justification
and sanctification in him, is also an irresistible summons to be
engaged with him in his continuing witness.
We could summarize this third part of Barth's doctrine of
reconciliation this way: Jesus Christ not only accomplishes our
justification and sanctification, he tells us so; this witness took
place at his resurrection and continues to take place because of
his resurrection, that is, because he is the living Lord; this
witness is effective, and when it encounters us, it claims us
for the sphere and service of his truth.
946 Ibid., p.330.
947 Ibid. , p.331.
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The sin revealed by this aspect of the work of grace in
Christ is falsehood. 'If pride and sloth are the works, falsehood
948
is the word of the man of sin.' Human falsehood is the great
enemy which resists the promise of God declared in the prophetic
work of Christ. It consists in a movement of evasion from the truth.
It excels in its own dishonesty when it uses the truth to silence
the truth, when it affirms Jesus Christ by championing him as its
Hero, Example and Symbol, yet all the time
patronizing, interpreting, domesticating,
and gently but very definitely and significantly
correcting Him. 949
Why should the truth be feared and thus evaded? Because the
truth is not an idea, but a person, Jesus Christ, and therefore
when a person encounters the truth he encounters the scandalous form
of 'the man of Gethsemane and Golgotha, and therefore the truth
950
of His death and passion.' Like a tornado, this truth sweeps
away all assurances, props, and supports of self-justification, and
a person is left stripped of all reservations and excuses regarding
his relationship with God, and he is deprived of any place where
he might hold himself aloof from God and secure a place of his
951
own. Thus he seeks refuge in falsehood; but it is his
condemnation. He becomes a lie, deformed in being, and he is
952
forced to live with a distorted image of reality.
948 Ibid., p.373.
949 Ibid., p.437.




Once again, however, the grace of God is sufficient. Not
only has God sanctified and justified humanity in Christ Jesus,
he has also called all persons to turn from this falsehood to
the truth, and to enter its service as a co-witness with Jesus
Christ, to enter the ministerium Verbi divini. Though 'there are
countless men whose justification, sanctification and vocation
in the history of Jesus Christ have not yet taken place in their
953
own history,' there is no one who can be neutral in relation
to Jesus Christ. For all are reconciled in him:
no man is rejected, but all are elected in
Him to their justification, their sanctification
and also their vocation. This is their prior
history which precedes and underlies the event
of vocation in their own history, which is
purely and totally divine, but which in
intention is already divine-human. 954
c. In the exposition of Barth's theology to this point,
the objective, external nature of God's reconciliation in Christ
has been stressed. We shall eventually return to Barth's theology
in order to consider his understanding of the subjective, internal
character of the event of divine grace, but now we pause briefly
to consider his thought in relation to the doctrine of holiness in
general, and Pannenberg and Moltmann's theologies in particular.
1. Holiness, we have shown, presupposes its opposite.
As the distinction which is the overcoming of the distance, its




is holiness itself, as God's act of grace in Jesus Christ, which
reveals the reality of sin. For this reason, it was necessary ho
criticize Pannenberg's holistic system which failed to account
adequately for the brokenness of sin.
In this regard, therefore, does not Barth's theology offer
us a more acceptable alternative? With his 'christological
concentration,' Barth encountered the objective reality of grace
in Jesus Christ. In thinking through the meaning of this event,
and discovering in it the humiliation of the Son of God, the
exaltation of the Son of Man, and the prophetic mediation of the
Word of this God-man, Barth had to reckon with what it was that
was overcome by the grace of God. From Christ, therefore, he
learned the nature of sin. If the humiliation of God, the exaltation
of man, and the true witness of the God-man were the antidotes
given in the one event of reconciliation, then that meant for Barth
that the misery of humanity consists in its sin-sick pride, sloth,
and falsehood. Thus Barth's theology, structured as it is
around the objective reality of grace, has, by inner necessity,
a fully developed doctrine of sin.
2. The act of holiness - the separateness which distinguishes
itself in the bridging of separation - is the event of God's grace
in Jesus Christ. And where this overcoming is actualized, persons
become a part of this holy act. In other words, when divine-human
fellowship is created, persons are set in the sphere of God's
holiness. They are made members of the body of Christ. Given a
share in his being, they are made holy. This means, therefore,
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that because their 'life is hid with Christ,' their present,
past, and future are with the One 'who is and who was and who is to
956
come.' The future which they await is not an idealized
eschaton, nor even one abstracted from certain 'tendencies' in the
Christ event. Their future is the future of the Coming One.
Even as he is their present source of life, so his future parousia
will be their future life. And thus it was necessary to part
company with Moltmann when he tends to project from the 'inner
tendency' of the Christ event a future abstracted from the concrete
person of Jesus Christ himself.
With reference to this concern, it again appears as if Barth
has more adequately maintained this view of the future as the
future of Christ himself. Moltmann was correct when he interpreted
Barth's view of the eschaton as the noetic unveiling of what has
957
already been accomplished in Christ, but he erred in criticizing
and rejecting this position. For if something 'new' is to take
place - that is, something that has not taken place (even partially)
in Christ - then are we not forced to look beyond Christ toward a
future which, for all its projected ideals, is clouded by vague
uncertainty? If we do this, have we not let slip the fact that
our being is in Christ, and that our future is simply his future?
By contending for the eschatological determination of essence,
has not Moltmann come dangerously close to substituting the future
for Christ as the source of the Church's being?
955 Col. 3:3.
956 Rev. 1:8.
957 Moltmann, TO, p.46.
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There is no doubt that Moltmann was anxious to preserve the
dynamic of a history moving toward an open future in hope and
expectation, and felt that Barth's 'epiphany of the eternal present'
caused the moving wheels of time and events to come to a screeching
halt. But we should be clear about what is involved in Barth's
noetic unveiling of what already is in Christ. It means nothing less
than this: the final victory of Jesus Christ over evil; the
recognition of his lordship by all humanity; the time when every
knee shall bow in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and
958
every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord' ; the full
actualization of his reign of grace wherein shall be the peace and
justice so sadly lacking in the affairs of the present. Will this
be a new future? The answer to that is both 'yes' and 'no.'
Certainly it will be new in the sense that it will be the fulfilled
actualization of Christ's lordship, but it will be nothing other
than the unveiling of what is in fact a present reality - though
hidden from our eyes. Our hope is not in the future, but in
Christ, in whom is the future, as well as the past and present.
d. While it may be granted that Barth has 1) more faith¬
fully dealt with the reality of sin than Pannenberg, 2) provided
a more Christocentric vision of the future than Moltmann, and
thus has 3) offered us theological alternatives to the problems
which led Pannenberg and Moltmann to a universalism that resulted
958 Phil. 2:10-11.
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in the loss of ontological distinction between the Church and the
world, is it not possible that Barth himself is nevertheless
guilty of his own brand of universalism, so that in the end the
effect is the same? For if Jesus Christ has accomplished the
reconciliation of the world to God by his gracious justification,
reconciliation, and calling of all humanity, have not all meaning¬
ful distinctions between the Church and the world been swept
away?
The major criticisms levelled against the theology of Karl Barth
have tended to cluster around four inter-related points. He has
been charged with universalism, with being a-historical, with
failing to take evil seriously, and with denying a place for
concrete, personal sanctification in the individual.
1. The critics who argue that Earth's theology leads to the
notion of apokatastasis are not unaware that Barth has explicitly
959
refused to endorse the doctrine of universal redemption. , Rather,
their contention is that Barth's theology as a whole leads to this
end, in spite of what he says directly about it. Thus Berkouwer:
959 Barth1s position is that we cannot doctrinally assert
an apokatastasis. 'No such postulate can be made
even though we appeal to the cross and resurrection
of Jesus Christ. Even though theological consistency
might seem to lead our thoughts and utterances clearly
in this direction, we must not arrogate to ourselves
that which can be given and received only as a free
'gift.' Nevertheless, Barth does not see any reason
why we should not be open to the possibility of
universal reconciliation, 'to hope and pray cautiously
and yet distinctly that, in spite of everything
which may seem quite conclusively to proclaim the
opposite, His compassion should not fail . . .'
(Barth, CD IV/3, p.478).
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'There is no alternative to concluding that Barth's refusal to
accept the apokatastasis cannot be harmonized with the fundamental
structure of his doctrine of election.'Indeed, given Barth's
emphasis on the objective work of grace in Jesus Christ, it is not
difficult to compile a long list of quotations from any volume
of the CHURCH DOGMATICS to support this charge.
2. What some see as the reason for Barth's universalism
is the more profound problem that his theology is unhistorical.
Helmut Thielicke puts it this way:
In any case it is not clear, if one follows
the thrust of his teaching, how Barth can
escape the doctrine of apocatastasis. On
the other hand, it is understandable why
Barth does all he can to avoid this conclusion -
though the avoidance takes more the form of a
simple desire to steer clear of it than of
reasoned argument for doing so. The reason
is that to expose the universalist thesis
would be to confess openly the non-historical
cycle. It would be an admission that the
history of salvation does not consist of
events and turning points and divine resolves,
but involves only some noetically significant
demonstrations of primal facts, and hence an
intratrinitarian circle. 961
960 Berkouwer, THE TRIUMPH OF GRACE IN THE THEOLOGY OF
KARL BARTH, p.116. See also Brunner, THE CHRISTIAN
DOCTRINE OF GOD: DOGMATICS - Vol.1, pp.348-52;
Lewis, 'The Experience of Grace - The Problem of
Sanctification in Contemporary Systematic Theology,'
p.150; Colm 0'Grady, THE CHURCH IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY:
DIALOGUE WITH KARL BARTH (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1969),
p,30; Prenter, 'Dietrich Bonhoeffer And Karl Barth's
Positivism of Revelation,' WORLD COME OF AGE, ed.
Ronald Gregor Smith, pp.93-130; Helmut Thielicke,
THEOLOGICAL ETHICS - Vol.1, ed. William H. Lazareth,
(London: Adam & Charles Black, 1968), p.116;
von Balthasar, THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH, p.163;
Zahrnt, THE QUESTION OF GOD, p.109.
961 Thielicke, THEOLOGICAL ETHICS - Vol.1, p.116.
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By establishing the event of salvation on a 'primal perfect,1
Barth has deprived the event of genuine historicity.
Nothing remains but a play of waves over the
timeless deep. Gone is the tension-packed
commerce between God and the world (which none¬
theless still has 'its ruler of this world'1).
All that remains is a mere monologue of God with
himself. The result is that everything is subject -
and here finally is the 'slogan' - to a dominant
Christomonism. 962
As Zahrnt sees it, 'the basic fault of the whole of Barth's
theology is that it is unhistorical. ' ^
3. This alleged de-historicizing of the relationship
between God and the world has resulted according to some, in the
failure to take evil seriously. If all has already been decided
in a 'primal perfect' intratrinitarian event, then the conflict
with evil can only be a mock battle. Thus Wingren interprets
Barth like this:
The essential point is that evil is not a
power opposed to God which God in a new act
defeats on the last day. There are no new
acts or events to be expected. Everything
has already taken place. What we lack is insight.
There is no evil power standing side by side with
the kingdom of God, even though it may appear
so to our blinded eyes. Revelation tells us
that this is an illusion. 964
4. Finally, the eternal, a-historical salvation which some
perceive in Barth's theology has been criticized as allowing no
place for human transformation. His salvation is seen as so
'high-flying' that it never really touches down on the soil of
962 Ibid,, p.115. For a very similar view, see Zahrnt,
THE QUESTION OF GOD, pp.112-13.
963 Ibid., p.107.
964 Wingren, THEOLOGY IN CONFLICT, pp.37-38. See also
Berkouwer, THE TRIUMPH OF GRACE IN THE THEOLOGY OF
KARL BARTH, p.232.
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human experience. Alan Lewis contends that
Earth's is not a transformation to be
experienced . . . .For the new, real person
of the Christian is Christ himself, the eternally
elect substitute. It is not a historical reality,
which delivers some men and women from brokenness
and sin, but not others, as they choose in the
particularity of their personal histories to
surrender to grace or to resist it. Rather,
it is a universal, eternal identity, which
pertains to all humanity by virtue of our
being created and elected in Christ, and
superseding all anthropological differentia
and personal decisions. 965
e. There are two important facts about Barth's theology
which must be stressed in the face of these criticisms. First,
whatever Barth may eventually say about the triune being of God
and his free, sovereign electing grace, he takes as his starting
point, not a philosophical principle, nor a heavenly speculation,
nor an abstract theology of the divine, but an event. It is
difficult to see how the argument that Barth's theology is un-
historical can be sustained, for if ever there was a theology which
endeavoured to think through the implications of an event in
historical space and time, it is Barth's. Theology, for Barth, is
rational reflection on the Word - a Word which has given itself to
our apprehension by becoming flesh and dwelling among us.
We know about God only if we are witnesses -
however distantly and modestly - of His act.
And we speak about God only as we can do so -
however deficiently - as those who proclaim His
act. 'God with us' as it occurs at the heart of
965 Lewis, 'The Experience of Grace - The Problem of
Sanctification in Contemporary Systematic Theology,'
p.303. See also James M. Gustafson, CHRIST AND THE
MORAL LIFE (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p.96.
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the Christian message is the attestation and
report of the life and act of God as the One
who is. 966
Barth's entire theological method is predicated on the premise
that, to say anything at all about God, one must lay down all pre¬
conceptions, all heavenly speculations, all theories of divinity,
and simply listen to the Word which has been spoken in the event
of 'God with us' - the historical event of Jesus Christ. If Barth
later affirms, for example, the objective, eternal election of all
humanity in Jesus Christ, then it is because he believes this to
be a necessary part of the knowledge given to us in the event of our
space and time of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
967
'To say "Jesus" is necessarily to say "history."' In a letter
(dated 30 December 1954) to Berkouwer about his book, THE TRIUMPH
OF GRACE IN THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH, Barth wrote:
I'm a bit startled at the title, THE TRIUMPH. . .
Of course I use the word and still do. But it
makes the whole thing seem so finished, which
it isn't for me. THE FREEDOM . . . would
have been better! And!then instead of GRACE
I would much have preferred . . . JESUS CHRIST.
My intention, at any rate, has been that all my
systematic theology should be as exact a develop¬
ment as possible of the significance of this
'name' (in the biblical sense of the term)
and to that extent should be the telling of a
story which develops through individual events -
the story of a struggle, but a victorious one. 968
966 Barth, CD IV/1, pp.6-7.
967 Barth, CD IV/3, p.179.
968 Busch, KARL BARTH, p.381.
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As he tells this 'story' of Jesus Christ, Barth's aim is to
avoid monism, in which God's grace is seen to have so
thoroughly overwhelmed all opposition that evil is thought to be
completely nullified and the conflict brushed aside as if of no real
account, and dualism, in which God and evil co-exist in an opposing
equilibrium, as though darkness really had the power to withstand
the light. What he proposes as an alternative is a 'dynamic
teleology.' The power of light, though superior to darkness,
has so far not yet attained its goal, but is wrestling toward it,
being opposed by the power of darkness, which, even though it is
yielding the field in clear inferiority, is still present and
active in its own restrictive way.
A history is here taking place; a drama
is being enacted; a war waged to a success¬
ful conclusion. If from the first there can
be no doubt as to the issue of the action,
there can also be no doubt that there is an
action, and that it is taking place, and
can thus be described only in the form of
narration. 969
The second point which must be raised against Barth's critics
is that the reconciliation in Jesus Christ is both an objective and
a subjective event. This fact is often lost sight of, perhaps
because of the extraordinary clarity of Barth's witness to the
extra nos character of grace. But Barth has not envisioned salvation
in Christ as a self-enclosed fact soaring high above us. 'It is a
970
living redemptive happening which takes place.'
969 Barth, CD IV/3, p.168.
970 Barth, CD IV/2, p.621.
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The object and theme of theology and the
content of the Christian message is neither a
subjective nor an objective element in isolation.
That is to say, it is neither an isolated man
nor an isolated God, but God and man in their
divinely established and effected encounter,
the dealings of God and the Christian and of
the Christian with God. 971
While Barth's theology may certainly be termed 'Christocentric,'
it is clearly not 'Christomonistic.' That Barth's theology is
vigorously trinitarian is because of its rootedness in the
event of revelation in Jesus Christ; that is to say, by being
strictly Christocentric, by focusing solely on Jesus Christ and
thinking through the revelatory implications of this name, Barth
became fully trinitarian. The unshakable axiom for his theological
method is that God's revelation is identical with God's being.
Thus for him the Trinity is the interpretation of both the event
of revelation and the being of God. Revelation is 'God in unimpaired
unity, who according to the biblical understanding of revelation is
972
the revealing God and the event of revelation and its effect on man.'
Therefore, as the subject, predicate, and object of the revelatory
event in Jesus Christ, God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
This means that response to Gods Word in Christ is no mere
appendage to the body of his theology, but an essential element of
its trinitarian structure. Revelation is not only the objective
971 Barth, CI3 IV/3, p.498. Thus Rung: "... Barth has not
ignored the anthropological aspect of grace ....
Barth realizes that something actually occurs in man through
grace; that it is man who is graced; that man is altered
in his very being' (Rung, JUSTIFICATION - THE DOCTRINE OF
RARL BARTH AND A CATHOLIC REFLECTION, p.194).
972 Barth, CD 1/1, p.299.
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Word of God addressed to the world, but also the subjective response
973
to it, 'its effect on man.1 Interpreters of Barth who criticize
him because of his supposed lack of place for concrete human
change have missed a very fundamental aspect of Barth's entire
theological program. They have recognized his Christocentric
emphasis, to be sure, but have overlooked that fact that this is
the ground of a fully trinitarian framework. His 'christological
concentration' leads to a full doctrine of God in the trinal unity
of his being as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and therefore to both
his objective work extra nos and his subjective work intra nos -
the latter enclosed within the former. God's Word in Christ is an
effective Word, and thus it creates a response to itself in the ones
to whom it is addressed. This is the work of God the Holy Spirit -
not another work of God apart from his work in Christ, but an
intrinsic element of the one work of grace in Jesus Christ.
In Jesus Christ and in the power of his Spirit, therefore,
there takes place not only the objective justification, sanctification,
and vocation of humanity, but also the subjective response, namely,
the gathering, upbuilding, and sending-out of the Church, and the
creation of faith, love, and hope in the individual.
1. The Holy Spirit is 'the power in which Jesus Christ attests
himself, attests himself effectively, creating in man response and
974
obedience.' Barth thus describes the Holy Spirit as Christ's
973 'The objective and subjective realizations are but aspects
of the one grace of reconciliation. While they must be
distinguished, they must not be separated' (0'Grady,
THE CHURCH IN THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH, pp.241-42).
974 Barth, CD IV/1, p.648.
355
'awakening power.' He is the power of Jesus Christ through which
persons come to know of the reconciliation of the world which has
taken place through the journey of the Son of God into the far country.
By this knowledge, a fellowship is created; individuals are
knit together to become the body of Jesus Christ. This community
is 'the earthly-historical form of existence of Jesus Christ
976
Himself.' In the power of the Spirit, Jesus gathers unto
himself a community in which he lives and gives concrete form to
his existence in our space and time.
What distinguishes this community, the Church, is first of
all a certain knowledge. This fellowship comes into being when
the Holy Spirit opens the eyes of individuals to see what has
happened for them in Jesus Christ. Here men and women know that
they have been justified because the Judge has been judged in
their place. Faith, for Barth, is a cognitive act; he describes
977
it as acknowledgement, recognition, and confession. It'is
'the simple taking cognisance of the preceding being and work
of Jesus Christ.<
We would be mistaken, however, to infer from this that Barth
has reduced the word 'faith' to the level of mere intellectual
979
assent. This is how his position is sometimes interpreted.
975 Ibid.
976 Ibid., p.661.
977 German verbal forms: anerkennen, erkennen, and bekennen.
978 Barth, CD IV/1, p.758.
979 See e.g., Wingren, THEOLOGY IN CONFLICT.
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'//hat Barth means by faith is an acknowledgement that is obedient
and compliant; a recognition which is an existential 'action and
decision of the whole man,1involving both mortificatio and
981
vivificatio; and confession before others of the grace in Jesus Christ-
Faith's knowledge is the proper human response to the Word of
God revealed in Jesus Christ- The present time and space of
humanity are given to it in order that it may offer this response.
Its purpose is obviously this - that God will not
allow His last Word to be fully spoken or the
consummation determined and accomplished and
proclaimed by Him to take place in its final
form until He has first heard a human response
to it, a human Yes; until His grace has found
its correspondence in the voice of human thanks
from the depths of the world reconciled with
Himself; until here and now, before the
dawning of His eternal Sabbath, He has received
praise from the heart of His human creation. 982
And this grateful response really does distinguish the
Church from the rest of the world. Because it is, by the power
of the Holy Spirit, granted faith and therewith constituted the
body of Christ, the Church is made holy. This holiness is nothing
other than 'the reflection of the holiness of Jesus Christ as its
heavenly Head, falling upon it as He enters into and remains in
983
fellowship with it by His Holy Spirit.' The Church is holy
because Jesus Christ constantly wills to bind himself to it.





'He is always the Subject, the Lord, the Giver of the holiness
984
of its action.'
As regards the Church's relationship with the world, it is
holy, and
holy means set apart, marked off, and therefore
differentiated, singled out, taken (and set) on
one side as a being which has its own origin and
nature and meaning and direction - and all this
with a final definitiveness, decisively,
inviolably and unalterably, because it is
God who does it. The term indicates the
contradistinction of the Christian community
to the surrounding world, and in particular
to the other gatherings and societies which
exist in the world. 985
The Church is holy, set apart from the world, by virtue
of the fact that it has been gathered together by Jesus Christ in
the power of his Spirit to offer the praise of faith, acknowledging,
recognizing, and confessing before others the grace of God.
2. The Holy Spirit is the power in which Jesus Christ
upbuilds his community, sanctifying his particular people ,in the
980
world. Christians are not only those who by faith know of
their objective sanctification in the homecoming of the Son of Man;
they also participate subjectively in this aanctification.
man, Jesus Christ, actualizes their true humanity in them,
987
differentiates them from the world. The saints are not
human beings, but 'disturbed sinners' whose sleep has been
984 Ibid., p. 694.
985 Ibid., p. 685.
986 Barth, CD IV/2, p.522








They have been given not only a new possibility, but a new actuality.
They have been set free to respond in obedience to Jesus Christ's
989
call to discipleship. In the power of the Spirit, slothful
sinners are awakened to a new life, set in motion, re-directed.
This is the process of conversion.
Conversion means the turning on an axis ....
The difference between the life of the one who
is engaged in conversion and that of others is
not that the former moves itself, but that it
has an axis on which to turn. 990
As individuals are thus sanctified, given an axis at the
centre of their beings and set in movement around it, the community
of saints is thus built up. The living Lord Jesus Christ not only
gathers the Church unto himself, but upbuilds it, sanctifying
991
men and women and their human work. This building up means
integration. The community is knit together into a mutually
992
dependent fellowship marked by love. It is so integrated
because it is united under the headship of Jesus Christ.
Barth does not hesitate to say that 'Jesus Christ is the
community,' but adds that this does not mean that the community is
Jesus Christ.
There can be no thought of the being of
Jesus Christ enclosed in that of His community,
or exhausted by it, as though it were a kind of
predicate of this being. The truth is the very
opposite. The being of the community is exhausted
and enclosed in His. It is a being which is taken up






governed by it. The being of the community is a
predicate of His being. 993
994
Thus Barth speaks of Christ and the community as the totus Christus.
Christ is not an isolated individual, but the Head of his whole
body and all its members; 'He constitutes an indissoluble whole
995
with those who are His.u In this way he determines their
being and action.
The hallmark of the Christians' new being and action is love.
In this, Barth is simply restating the Lord's words, 'By this all
men will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one
996
another.' As they participate in the distinctiveness, of Christ's
being, Christians are those who are given the freedom and power to
love. By this love for one another, the Church is integrated and
997
thus built up. When men and women are converted, that is, given
a new direction in Jesus Christ, they are freed to love.
998
If faith is pure reception, love is self-giving. To love





997 Barth underscores the Johannine 'love for one another' with
particular clarity and force. As he sees it, Christians
are not called to love the world in general, but fellow
Christians (see ibid., pp.802ff). He bases this on the
fact that the Christian loves in the power of God's love,
and God's love is an electing love which discriminates and
chooses. Thus the community is a 'closed circle' of fellow
disciples who are united in their common love. One cannot
helpbut wonder, however, if Barth would not have been on more
solid ground if he had emphasized the other Johannine witness
about love, namely, that 'God so loved the world.' This
would have been more consistent with his theology as a whole -
especially his doctrine of the electing love of God in Jesus
Christ for all humanity (cf. CD II/2).
998 Barth, CD IV/2, p.730.
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interposes himself for the other, making himself his guarantor and
999
desiring nothing else but to be this.' This is the meaning of
biblical love - agape - and the essence of God's love for us in
Jesus Christ.
In the power of the Holy Spirit Christians become free for
this action of love; the life of the True Man is actualized
within them.
As there can be no above without a below,
no before without an after, so there can be
no divine revelation without a human ministry
of witness, no history of salvation between God
and man without its reflection and repetition in
a history between man and man. The one without
the other would necessarily prove to be a mere
mythology and illusion in the form of a
'positivism of revelation.' But its reflection
and repetition can take place only as the men
who are loved by God and love Him in return
enjoy and make use of the freedom to love one
another. 1000
3. The Holy Spirit is the power in which Jesus Christ
calls men and women to his side to participate with him in the
task of witnessing to the grace of God. Jesus Christ is not only
the justifier and sanctifier of humanity; he is also the One who
attests himself as such. As the living God-man, he proclaims the
reconciliation of God and the world effected in the being and act
his person. And in this prophetic witness to his high priesthood
and royal kingship, Jesus Christ effectively summons individuals




The call of Jesus Christ has been addressed to all humanity,
but this objective event finds its subjective answer in the fact
that in certain men and women an inner awakening takes place so
that his prophetic Word is heard and acted upon. 'Why does Jesus
Christ issue his call? 'The purpose of a man's vocation is that
he should become a Christian, a homo christianus.By taking
the word in its most obvious sense, Barth understands a Christian
1003
as one who belongs in a special way to Jesus Christ.~
The one who is called by Him, and thus called
by Him a child of God and made a brother or
sister, is set in fellowship with Him in a way
which seriously distinguishes though it does
not separate him from other men. For this is
something which happens to him but not to all.
All are elected and ordained for fellowship
with Jesus Christ. All move towards it. It
is waiting for all. But it is one thing to
be elected for it and another to be set in it.
The latter is the distinctive thing which takes
place in the calling of man and makes him a
Christian. As certainly as this calling aims
at his becoming and being a child of God, its
goal is very simply but powerfully his fellow¬
ship with its source, i.e., with the One who
calls him .... He calls them to Himself,
to attachment to Himself as we have previously
said, to fellowship with Himself. 1004
And if we ask further why it is that Christ calls men and
women to his side, making them distinct from all others in the
world - if we ask what it means concretely and in practice to be a
Christian - then the answer Barth gives is that 'it is common





to all the biblical accounts of calling that to be called means
being given a task. What is this task?
It consists in the fact that with their whole
being, action, inaction and conduct, and then by
word and speech, they have to make a definite
declaration to other men. The essence of their
vocation is that God makes them His witnesses. 1006
Thus it is this task of witnessing which 'makes them what they are
in distinction from all others' • they are given a share in
Christ's prophetic work, the ministerium Verbi divini.
The community of Christ, therefore, is the communio vocatorum.
In being set at the side of Christ, Christians are at the same
time set in a human fellowship which exists in distinctive
particularity in the world.
Its real distinction from and superiority
to the world, is that it is elected and
called to be a people alongside and with
Jesus Christ and with a share in His self-
declaration, that it is given to it to be
appointed His witnesses, to be set in the
service of the eternal Word of God spoken
in Him, to be ordained to follow the Son
of God incarnate in Him .... This is
what makes it unique among all people. 1008
Yet this distinctiveness does not mean the Church is made
autonomous in relation to the world, for 'the community of Jesus
Christ is for the world- ' 'This simply follows from the fact








Inasmuch as Jesus Christ exists for the world, the Church, as it
is called out of the world to be at his side, is genuinely called
into it.^^ It is given to the Church really to know the world as
1012
it is, to exist, not in conformity with the world, but in
solidarity with it,1^"^ and to live under obligation to the world
The Church's ministry on behalf of the world will take many different
forms, but as it lives actively for the world it fulfils its
task as witness to Jesus Christ.
This prophetic work of the totus Christus - Christ and the
Church - is an ongoing process that is not yet complete, and thus
the Christian life is marked by hope.1^1^ Like faith and love,
hope is the fruit of the Spirit's work in an individual's life.
Even as the Christian believes in the One who came, and loves the
1017
One who is present, so also he hopes for the One who is coming.
His hope itself is a witness, and thus a necessary aspect of his
vocation.That a person is given the freedom to hope is
because Jesus Christ, in the power of the Holy Spirit, has awakened










this fellowship - with Christ and his community - the Christian
takes part in the ongoing task of witnessing to the One 'who is
and who was and who is to come, the Almighty. 1
According to Barth, then, the one work of God's grace in
Jesus Christ has two sides to it: the objective and the subjective.
The revelation of God includes the Word from God the Father, the
event of its manifestation in the Son, and the human response to
it in the power of the Holy Spirit. The objective Word of
justification, sanctification, and vocation is answered subjectively
by the gathering, upbuilding, and sending out of the community,
and by the faith, love, and hope of the individual. This response
sets the community of Christ apart from the world - a distinctive¬
ness which, in virtue of the Church's participation in the being
of Christ, is shown in its ministry of witness on behalf of the
world.
f. With a final, brief glance over our shoulders at the
theologies of Pannenberg and Moltmann, it is once again clear
that Barth avoids some of the problematic tendencies found in their
works. While Pannenberg's proclivity is to minimize the role of
human response in favour of a holistic view which gravitates
toward a totalitarianism of the future over all reality, Barth
finds a necessary place for the human response, grounding it in his
doctrine of revelation and its trinitarian implications. Barth
1019 Rev. 1:8.
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fully accounts for the world's sin, and the overcoming - both
objective and subjective - of this brokenness. For Barth, all
human beings are not swept up into one cycle of reality moving from
the future toward the future, smooth and unbroken in universal
uniformity; rather, in the power of the Holy Spirit certain
persons are, by faith, set apart as those who have entered into the
actualized sphere of God's grace in Jesus Christ. As Hans Kung
described Barth's position,
faith really involves the creation of a
new man, a new creation, and a being born
again. The just man, despite the simul
peccator, is ontologically different from
the sinner. This clear teaching of Barth
must not be overlooked. 1020
On the other hand, whereas Moltmann's theology tends to define
the Church's essence according to an eschaton abstracted from the
concrete person of Jesus Christ, Barth refuses to locate the being
of the Church anywhere other than in Jesus Christ. Therefore, the
Church's relationship with the world is not, for Barth as it is
with Moltmann, determined eschatologically, but christoiogically.
The Church is given a new being - alien to it but nonetheless
its genuine possession - which ontologically distinguishes it from
the rest of the world. In the power of the Holy Spirit, it is in
Christ in a way the world is not; this is its distinctiveness.
The result is that Barth's ecclesiology is not marked by the
functionalism evident with Pannenberg and Moltmann. It has already
1020 Kling, JUSTIFICATION - THE DOCTRINE OF KARL BARTH AND
A CATHOLIC REFLECTION, p.82.
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been shown that their universalism had the effect of limiting the
Church's distinctiveness to specific acts, as for example, witnessing
to the coming kingdom. For them, the Church fulfils a certain
functional role in the world, but since it has, in common with
everything else, an eschatologically determined being, it is not
ontologically distinct. For Barth, however, the Church has a new
being in Christ. In him it is made holy, and that means it is set
apart with a radical, uncompromising distinctiveness. And yet,
this being of the Church is not merely a static 'otherness,'
but a being-in-the-act of love and ministry for the world. In the
power of the Holy Spirit, Jesus Christ gathers a Church unto him¬
self as his body, builds it up through the integration of love,
and, because it shares in his being, sends it into the world to
be a witness with him in his ongoing prophetic task. By the
giving of its life for the world, the Church bears witness to the
fact that it is not of the world, but of him who sacrificed
himself in the act of holy love.
So this then is the fellowship of the Holy: the Church
in Jesus Christ. As the body of 'the Holy One,' the Church
exists in his holy being and act; therein is its distinction
from the world and its life for the world.
*****
At the outset of this theological venture, I indicated that
behind it all was the question, Does it really make any essential
difference whether one is a part of Christ's Church or not?
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Clearly, the answer is, Yes! It matters because there exists
between the Church and the world an ontological distinction grounded
in the very distinction between God and the world. As the fellow¬
ship of those who, by faith, have been united together in Jesus
Christ and empowered with his Spirit, the Church participates in
the holiness of God. It is the grateful community of those who
have gladly received the divine fellowship offered them in the great
act of holiness. Not to trust the One who is distinguished by his
unlimited, self-giving love, not to turn away from proud independence,
is an unthinkable alternative. It is a choice as dangerous as it
is absurd, for it means turning away from him who is 'the resurrection
and the life.1
And yet, for all its distinctive uniqueness, the Church may
not rest proudly in a safe position, withdrawn from the world, with
fences strong and secure marking it out as the party of the pious
in a world gone to hell. For what distinguishes it in thi,s world
is its holiness, Its constant effort to break through the fences in
order to be in and for the world. The Church's life in Christ is not
one set on the serene heights above the world's storm and stress.
To the extent that it shares in the being of Christ, it is forever
descending into the valleys of care and human misery. It has no
choice in this matter, for its life is hid with him who 'emptied
himself, taking the form of a servant.' This is its holiness.
This is its distinction.
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED
368
ANDERSON, Ray Sherman. HISTORICAL TRANSCENDENCE AND THE REALITY OF GOD.
ASKWITH, E. H.
Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1975.
THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF HOLINESS.
London: Macmillan, 1900.
AULEN, Gustaf. THE DRAMA AND THE SYMBOLS - A BOOK ON THE IMAGES
OF GOD AND THE PROBLEMS THEY RAISE. Translated
by Sydney Linton. London: SPCK, 1970.
THE FAITH OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. Translated
by Eric H. Wahlstrom. London: SCM Press
Ltd., 1960.
BAILLIE, John. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD. London: Oxford
University Press, 1939.
. THE SENSE OF THE PRESENCE OF GOD. London:
Oxford University Press, 1962.
BARTH, Karl. CHURCH DOGMATICS. Edited by T.'F. Torrance
and G. Bromiley. Translated by G. Bromiley,
et. al. 4 vols. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
1936-69.
. THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS. Translated by
Edwin C. Hoskyns. London: Oxford University
Press, 1933.
. GOD, GRACE AND GOSPEL. Translated by
James S. McNab, Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd,
1959. Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional
Papers No.8.
. 'An Introductory Report By Karl Barth.' In
THE SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH -
A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS, pp.11-15. By
Alexander J. McKelway. Richmond: John Knox
Press, 1964.
. THE WORD OF GOD AND THE WORD OF MAN. Translated
by Douglas Horton. London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1928.
. and BRUNNER, Emil. NATURAL THEOLOGY. Translated by
Peter Fraenkel. London: Geoffrey Bles:
The Centenary Press, 1946.
BERKOUWER, G. C. THE CHURCH. Translated by James E. Davison.
Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1976.
. THE TRIUMPH OF GRACE IN THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH.
Translated by Harry Boer, Grand Rapids:
William B. Eerdmans, 1956.
369
BEST, Ernest. ONE BODY IN CHRIST - A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP
OF THE CHURCH TO CHRIST IN THE EPISTLES OF THE
APOSTLE PAUL- London: SPCK, 1955.
BETHGE, E berhard. BONHOEFFER EXILE AND MARTYR. Edited by
John W. DeGruchy. London: Collins, 1975.
'The Challenge of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Life and
Theology.' In WORLD COME OF AGE, pp.22-88.
Edited by Ronald Gregor Smith. London:
Collins, 1967.
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER - THEOLOGIAN, CHRISTIAN,
CONTEMPORARY. Translated by Eric Mosbacher,
et. al. London: Collins, 1970.
BETZ, Hans Dieter. 'The Concept of Apocalyptic In The Theology
Of The Pannenberg Group.' In JOURNAL FOR
THEOLOGY AND THE CHURCH, pp.192-207. Edited
by Robert W. Funk. New York: Herder & Herder,
1969.
BONHOEFFER, Dietrich. ACT AND BEING. Translated by Bernard Noble.
London: Collins, 1970.
. CHRISTOLOGY. Translated by Edwin Robertson.
London: Collins, 1978.
THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS - A DOGMATIC INQUIRY
INTO THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE CHURCH. Translated
by R. Gregor Smith. New York: Harper, & Row,
1963.
THE COST OF DISCIPLESHIP. Translated by
R. H. Fuller. London: SCM Press Ltd., 1959.
CREATION AND FALL - A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION
OF GENESIS 1-3. Translated by John C. Fletcher.
London: SCM Press Ltd., 1959.
ETHICS. Edited by Eberhard Bethge. Translated
by Neville Horton Smith. London: SCM Press
Ltd., 1955.
I LOVED THIS PEOPLE. Translated by Keith R. Crim.
Richmond: John Knox Press, 1965.
LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON. Edited by
Eberhard Bethge. Translated by Reginald
Fuller, et. al. London: SCM Press Ltd., 1971.
LIFE TOGETHER. Translated by John W. Doberstein.
London: SCM Press Ltd., 1954.
370
NO RUSTY SWORDS - LETTERS, LECTURES AND NOTES
1928-1936. Edited by Edwin H. Robertson.
Translated by John Bowden & Eberhard Bethge.
London: Collins, 1965.
TRUE PATRIOTISM - LETTERS, LECTURES AND NOTES
1939-1945. Edited by Edwin H. Robertson.
Translated by Edwin H. Robertson & John Bowden.
London: Collins, 1973.
THE WAY TO FREEDOM - LETTERS, LECTURES AND
NOTES 1935-1939. Edited by Edwin H.Robertson.






BONHOEFFER TRUE PATRIOT. Oxford:
A. R. Mowbray, 1968.
THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD. Translated by Samuel D.
Femiano. London: Burns & Oates Ltd., 1969.
'Theology And Our Common World.
September 1972, pp.22-27.
WORLDVIEW,
T. FORSYTH - THE MAN AND HIS WORK. London:
Independent Press, 1952.
BRASNETT, Bertrand R. GOD THE WORSHIPFUL. London: Longmans,
Green & Co., 1935.
BROWN, Robert McAfee. P. T. FORSYTH: PROPHET FOR TODAY.
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1952.
BRUNNER, Emil. THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD - DOGMATICS:
Vol.I. Translated by Olive Wyon. Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1950.
. THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH, FAITH,
AND THE CONSUMMATION - DOGMATICS: Vol.III.
Translated by David Cairns and T. H. L. Parker.
London: Lutterworth Press, 1962.
. ETERNAL HOPE. Translated by Harold Knight,
London: Lutterworth Press, 1954.
. THE MEDIATOR - A STUDY OF THE CENTRAL DOCTRINE
OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH. Translated by Olive
Wyon. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1957.
BULTMANN, Rudolf, THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT - Vols.I-II.
Translated by Kendrick Grobel. London:





KARL BARTH. Translated by John Bowden.
London: SCM Press Ltd., 1976.
THE VICARIOUS SACRIFICE - GROUNDED IN PRINCIPLES
OF UNIVERSAL OBLIGATION. London:
Richard D. Dickinson, 1880.
'The Meaning of History.' In THEOLOGY AS HISTORY,
pp.135-54. Edited by James M. Robinson and
John B. Cobb, Jr. New Frontiers In Theology -
Discussions Among Continental And American
Theologians, vol.3. New York: Harper & Row,
1967.
PASCAL - GENIUS IN THE LIGHT OF SCRIPTURE.
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1945.
INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION - Vol.11.
Edited by John T. McNeill. Translated by
Ford Lewis Battles. Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1960.
CAMPBELL, John McCleod. THE NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT AND ITS RELATION
TO REMISSION OF SINS AND ETERNAL LIFE. London:
Macmillan, 1855.
CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, Miguel de. THE ADVENTURES OF DON QUIXOTE.
Translated by J. M. Cohen. Middlesex:
Penguin Books Ltd., 1950.
CLARKE, William Newton. THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD. Edinburgh:
T. & T. Clark, 1909.
CAILLIET, Emile.
CALVIN, John.
COBB, John B., Jr.
COENEN, L.
'Wolfhart Pannenberg's "Jesus: God And Man"'.
THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION 49 (1969): 192-201.
1 Church. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
CONZELMANN, Hans.
OF NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY - Vol.1. Edited
by Colin Brown. Exeter: The Paternoster
Press, 1975.
AN OUTLINE OF THE THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.
Translated by John Bowden. London: SCM Press
Ltd., 1969.
COUSINS, Ewart H., ed. HOPE AND THE FUTURE OF MAN. London: The
CULLMAN, Oscar.
Garnstone Press, 1973.
THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. Translated
by Shirley C. Guthrie and Charles A. M. Hall.
London: SCM Press Ltd., 1959.
DANTE, Alighieri. THE DIVINE COMEDY - PURGATORY. Translated by





EVERY DAY GOD - ENCOUNTERING THE HOLY IN WORLD
AND WORSHIP. London: SCM Press Ltd., 1973.
HISTORY OF PROTESTANT THEOLOGY. Vol.11.
Translated by George Robson, Sophia Taylor.
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1871.
DOSTOEVSKY, Fyodor. THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV. Translated by




DIETRICH BONHOEFFER - THEOLOGIAN OF REALITY.
Translated by Robert McAfee Brown. London:
SCM Press Ltd., 19 71.
WORD AND FAITH. Translated by James W. Leitch.
London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963.
EICHRODT, Walther. THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. 2 vols. Translated
by J. A. Baker. London: SCM Press Ltd., 1961.
FACKRE, Gabriel.
rERRE, Nels F. S.
THE RAINBOW SIGN - CHRISTIAN FUTURITY.
New Reformation Series. London: Epworth
Press, 1969.
THE CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF GOD. London:
SCM Press Ltd., 1951.
'Tillich's View of the Church.' In
THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH, pp.248-265.
Edited by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W.
Bretall. New York: Macmillan, 1952.





GOD THE HOLY FATHER. London: Independent Press
Ltd., 1957.
POSITIVE PREACHING AND THE MODERN MIND. London:
Independent Press. 1907.
THE WORK OF CHRIST. London: Independent Press,
191'0.
'A New German Theological Movement.' SCOTTISH
JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY 19 (1966): 160-75.
'P. T. Forsyth.' THE EXPOSITORY TIMES 84
(Oct. 1972-Sept. 1973): 57-58.






THE LAST DAYS OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER. New York:
Harper & Row, 1976.
THE THEOLOGY OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER. London:
SCM Press Ltd., 1960.
THE WIND IN THE WILLOWS. London: Methuen
Children's Books Ltd., Magnet Reprint
Edition. 1978.
GRANT, Frederick C. AN INTRODUCTION TO NEW TESTAMENT THOUGHT.
New York and Nashville: Abingdon - Cokesbury
Press, 1950.
GRIFFITH, Gwilym 0. THE THEOLOGY OF P. T. FORSYTH. London and
Redhill: Lutterworth Press, 1948.
GUSTAFSON, James M. CHRIST AND THE MORAL LIFE. New York:
Harper & Row, 1968.
HALL, Francis J.
HAMILTON, William,
THEOLOGICAL OUTLINES. Revised by Frank Hudson
Hallock. London: SPCK, 1934.
'The Character of Pannenberg's Theology.'
In THEOLOGY AS HISTORY, pp.176-96. Edited
by James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr.
New Frontiers In Theology - Discussions
Among Continental And American Theologians,
vol.3. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.
. LIFE IN ONE'S STRIDE - A SHORT STUDY IN DIETRICH
BONHOEFFER. Grand Rapids: William B'. Eerdmans,
1968.
. REVOLT AGAINST HEAVEN - AN ENQUIRY INTO ANTI-
SUPERNATURALISM. Grand Rapids: William B.
Eerdmans, 1965.
. THE SYSTEM AND THE GOSPEL - A CRITIQUE OF
PAUL TILLICH. London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963.
HARDER, Helmut G. and STEVENSON, W. Taylor. 'The Continuity of
History and Faith in the Theology of Wolfhart
Pannenberg: Toward An Erotics of History.'
THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION 51 (1971): 34-56.
HARVEY, John W.
HEIM, Karl.
'Translator's Preface To The Second Edition.'
In THE IDEA OF THE HOLY, pp.ix-xix. By
Rudolf Otto. London: Oxford University Press,
1950; reprint ed., 1977.
GOD TRANSCENDENT - FOUNDATION FOR A CHRISTIAN
METAPHYSIC. Translated by Edgar Primrose Dickie.









REFORMED DOGMATICS. Edited by Ernst Bizer.
Translated by G. T. Thompson. Forward by
Karl Barth. London: George Allen & Unwin
Ltd., 1950.
THE PROPHETS. New York and Evanston:
Harper & Row, 1962.
THE CHURCH INSIDE OUT. Edited by
L. A. Hoedemaker & Pieter Tijmes. Translated
by Isaac G. Rottenberg. London: SCM Press
Ltd., 1966.
TILLICH: A THEOLOGICAL PORTRAIT. Philadelphia
and New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1968.
P. T. FORSYTH. Philadelphia: The Westminster
Press, 1974.
GOD AFTER GOD - THE GOD OF THE PAST AND THE GOD
OF THE FUTURE, SEEN IN THE WORK OF KARL BARTH.
Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, 1969.
MEMORIES, DREAMS, REFLECTIONS. Edited by
Aniela Jaffe. Translated by Richard and
Clara Winston. London: Collins; Fount
Paperbacks Reprint, 1977.
JUNGEL, Eberhard. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY - GOD'S BEING IS
IN BECOMING. Translated by Horton Harris.
Edinburgh and London: Scottish Academic
Press 1976.
KEGLEY, Charles W. and BRETALL, Robert W., ed. THE THEOLOGY OF
PAUL TILLICH. New York: Macmillan, 1952.
KING, Coretta Scott. MY LIFE WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1969.





'The Word of the Cross.'
(1970): 220-42.
INTERPRETATION 24
IN PURSUIT OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER. London:
Burns & Oates, 1967.
THE CHURCH. Translated by Ray and Rosaleen
Ockenden. London: Burns and Oates, 1967.
JUSTIFICATION - THE DOCTRINE OF KARL BARTH
AND A CATHOLIC REFLECTION. Translated by




LADD, George Eldon. A THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. Guildford
and London: Lutterworth Press, 1975.
LEWIS, Alan E. 'The Experience of Grace - The Problem of
Sanctification in Contemporary Systematic
Theology.' Th.D. dissertation, Princeton
Theological Seminary, 1977.
LITTON, Edward Arthur. INTRODUCTION TO DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.
Edited by Philip E. Hughes. London:
James Clarke and Co. Ltd., 1960.
MACKINTOSH, Hugh Ross, TYPES OF MODERN THEOLOGY - SCHLEIERMACHER
TO BARTH. London: Nisbet, 1937.
MacLEOD, Alistair, PAUL TILLICH - AN ESSAY ON THE ROLE OF ONTOLOGY
IN HIS PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY. London:
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1973.
MACQUARRIE, John. THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. London:
SCM Press Ltd., 1966.
MARTY, Martin E., ed. THE PLACE OF BONHOEFFER - PROBLEMS AND
POSSIBILITIES IN HIS THOUGHT. London:
McKELWAY, Alexander
SCM Press Ltd., 1962.
. THE SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH
McLEAN, George F.
A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS, An Introductory Report
By Karl Barth. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1964
'Paul Tillich's Existential Philosophy of
Protestantism.' In PAUL TILLICH IN CATHOLIC
THOUGHT, pp.42-84. Edited by Thomas A O'Meara
and Celestin D. Weisser. London: Darton,
Longman and Todd Ltd., 1965.
MEEKS, M. Douglas. ORIGINS OF THE THEOLOGY OF HOPE. Foreword
by Jiirgen Moltmann. Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1974.
MINEAR, Paul S. IMAGES OF THE CHURCH IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.
London: Lutterworth Press, 1960.
MOLTMANN, Jurgen. THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT -
A CONTRIBUTION TO MESSIANIC ECCLESIOLOGY.
Translated by Margaret Kohl. London:
SCM Press Ltd., 1977.
THE CRUCIFIED GOD - THE CROSS OF CHRIST AS THE
FOUNDATION AND CRITICISM OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
Translated by R. A. Wilson & John Bowden.
London: SCM Press Ltd., 1974.
376
THE EXPERIMENT HOPE. Edited and translated by
M. Douglas Meeks. London: SCM Press Ltd., 1975.
HOPE AND PLANNING. Translated by Margaret Clarkson.
London: SCM Press Ltd., 1971.
RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE. Translated
by M. Douglas Meeks. New York:
Charles Scribner1s Sons, 1969.
THEOLOGY AND JOY. Introduction by David E. Jenkins.
Translated by Reinhard Ulrich. London:
SCM Press Ltd., 1973.
THEOLOGY OF HOPE - ON THE GROUND AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF A CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY.
Translated by James W. Leitch. London:
SCM Press Ltd., 1967.
. and WEISSBACH, Jurgen. TWO STUDIES IN THE THEOLOGY OF
BONHOEFFER. Translated by Reginald H. Fuller &
Use Fuller. New York: Charles Scribner1s
Sons, 1967.
MUILENBURG, J. 'Holiness.' In THE INTERPRETER'S DICTIONARY
OF THE BIBLE - Vol.11, pp.616-25. Edited by
George Arthur Buttrick. New York and
Nashville: The Abingdon Press, 1962.
MULLER, Hanfried, 'Concerning the Reception and Interpretation of
Dietrich Bonhoeffer.' In WORLD COME OF AGE,
pp.182-214. Edited by Ronald Gregor Smith.
London: Collins, 1967.
VON PER KIRCHE ZUR WELT. EIN BETRAG ZU PER
BEZIEHUNG PES WORTES GOTTES AUF DIE SOCIETAS
IN DIETRICH BONHOEFFERS THEOLOGISCHER ENTWICKLUNG.
Leipzig: Koehler & Amalang, 1966. Cited by
Andre' Dumas, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER - THEOLOGIAN
OF REALITY, p.248.
MURDOCK, William R. 'History And Revelation In Jewish Apocalypticism.'
INTERPRETATION 21 (1967): 167-87.
NEILL, Stephen. CHRISTIAN HOLINESS. London: Lutterworth
Press, 1960.
NEUHAUS, Richard John. 'Wolfhart Pannenberg: Profile of A Theologian.'
In THEOLOGY AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD, by Wolfhart
Pannenberg, pp.9-50. Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1969.
NIEBUHR, Reinhold, 'Biblical Thought And Ontological Speculation
In Tillich's Theology.' In THE THEOLOGY OF
. PAUL TILLICH, pp.216-227. Edited by
Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall.
New York: Macmillan, 1952.
377
OBAYASHI, Hiroshi. 'Future And Responsibility: A Critique of
Pannenberg's Eschatology.' STUDIES IN
RELIGION/SCIENCES RELIGIEUSES 1 (1971): 191-202.
0'GRADY, Colm. THE CHURCH IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY: DIALOGUE
WITH KARL BARTH. London: Geoffrey Chapman,
1969.
THE CHURCH IN THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH.
London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1968.
O'MEARA, Thomas A. and WEISSER, Celestin D., ed. PAUL TILLICH
IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT. London: Darton,
Longman and Todd Ltd., 1965.
OTT, Heinrich. REALITY AND FAITH - THE THEOLOGICAL LEGACY OF
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER. Translated by Alex A.
Morrison. London: Lutterworth Press, 1971.
OTTO, Rudolf. THE IDEA OF THE HOLY - AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NON-RATIONAL FACTOR IN THE IDEA OF THE DIVINE
AND ITS RELATION TO THE RATIONAL. Translated
by John W. Harvey. London: Oxford University
Press, 1923; reprinted 1977.
PANNENBERG, Wolfhart. 'A Theological Conversation With Wolfhart
Pannenberg.1 DIALOG 11 (1972): 286-95.
THE APOSTLES' CREED IN THE LIGHT OF TODAY'S
QUESTIONS. Translated by Margaret Kohl.
London: SCM Press Ltd., 1972.
BASIC QUESTIONS IN THEOLOGY. 3 vols. Translated
by George H. Kehm and R. A. Wilson. London:
SCM Press Ltd., 1970-1973.
'Did Jesus Really Rise From The Dead?' DIALOG 4
(1965): 128-35.
FAITH AND REALITY. Translated by John Maxwell.
London: Search Press, 1977.
HUMAN NATURE, ELECTION, AND HISTORY. Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1977.
JESUS - GOD AND MAN. Translated by Lewis L.
Wilkins and Duane Priebe. London: SCM Press
Ltd., 1968.
ed. REVELATION AS HISTORY. Translated by David Granskou.
London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1968.
378
. et. al. SPIRIT, FAITH, AND CHURCH. Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1970.
. THEOLOGY AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD. Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1969.
. THEOLOGY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. Translated
by Francis McDonagh. London: Darton, Longman &
Todd, 1976.
. 'WHAT IS MAN? Translated by Duane Priebe.
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970.
PAUCK, Wilhelm and Marion. PAUL TILLICH - HIS LIFE AND THOUGHT.
London: Collins, 1977.
PELIKAN, Jaroslav. HUMAN CULTURE AND THE HOLY - ESSAYS ON THE
TRUE, THE GOOD AND THE BEAUTIFUL. London:






THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN THE TEACHING OF JESUS.
London: SCM Press Ltd., 1963.
'Putting the Clock Back.' CHRISTIAN CENTURY 85
(December 11, 1968): 1575-76.
THE FORM OF CHRIST IN THE WORLD - A STUDY OF
BONHOEFFER'S CHRISTOLOGY. London: Collins, 1967.
'Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Karl Barth's
Positivism of Revelation.' In WORLD COME
OF AGE, pp.93-130. Edited by Ronald -Gregor
Smith. London: Collins, 1967.
r S-* In THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE
NEW TESTAMENT - Vol.1, pp.88-115. Edited by
Gerhard Kittel. Translated by Geoffrey W.
Bromiley. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans,
1964.
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEOLOGY OF THE NEW
TESTAMENT. London: SCM Press Ltd., 1958.
ROBINSON, James M. and COBB, John b., Jr., ed. THEOLOGY AS HISTORY.
New Frontiers In Theology - Discussions Among
Continental And Anerican Theologians, vol.3.
New York: Harper & Row, 1967.
ROBINSON, John A. T. THE BODY - A STUDY IN PAULINE THEOLOGY.
London: SCM Press Ltd., 1952.
HONEST TO GOD. LondonL SCM Press Ltd., 1963.
379
RODGERS, John H. THE THEOLOGY OF P. T. FORSYTH - THE CROSS OF
CHRIST AND THE REVELATION OF GOD. London:
Independent Press, 1965.
SCHLEIERMACHER, Friedrich. THE CHRISTIAN FAITH. Edited by
H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart. Translated
by D. M. Baillie, et. al. Edinburgh:
T. & T. Clark, 1928.
SCHMIDT, K. L. * £KK Xf] <T O-S In THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE
NEW TESTAMENT - Vol.Ill, pp.501-36. Edited
by Gerhard Kittel. Translated by Geoffrey W.
Bromiley.r Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans,
1965.
SCHMIDT, Hans. 'The Cross of Reality? Some Questions Concerning
the Interpretation of Bonhoeffer.' In WORLD
COME OF AGE, pp.215-255. Edited by Ronald
Gregor Smith. London: Collins, 1967.
SCHWEIZER, Eduard, r CU)JLLCl\ In THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE NEW
TESTAMENT - Vol.VII, pp.1068-74. Edited by
Gerhard Friedrich. Translated by Geoffrey W.
Bromiley. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans,
1971.
SMITH, Ronald Gregor. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD. Edited by K. Gregor Smith
and A. D. Galloway. London: Collins, 1970.
. THE NEW MAN - CHRISTIANITY AND MAN'S COMING OF AGE.
London: SCM Press Ltd., 1956.
. SECULAR CHRISTIANITY. London: Collins, 1966.
. ed. WORLD COME OF AGE - A SYMPOSIUM ON DIETRICH
BONHOEFFER. London: Collins, 1967.
STAUFFER, Ethelbert. NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY. Translated by
John Marsh. London: SCM Press Ltd., 1955.
TAPPERT, Theodore G., ed. and trans. THE BOOK OF CONCORD - THE
CONFESSIONS OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH.
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959.
TAVARD, George H.
THATCHER, Adrian.
PAUL TILLICH AND THE CHRISTIAN MESSAGE.
London: Burns & Oates, 1962.
THE ONTOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH. London:
Oxford University Press, 1978.
THIELICKE, Helmut. THE EVANGELICAL FAITH - VOLUME TWO: THE DOCTRINE
OF GOD AND OF CHRIST. Grand Rapids:
Willaim B. Eerdmans, 1977.
THEOLOGICAL ETHICS - Vol.1■ Edited by
Willaim H. Lazareth. London: Adam & Charles
Black, 1968.
380
THOMAS, J. Heywood. PAUL TILLICH - AN APPRAISAL. London:
SCM Press Ltd., 1963.
THOMPSON, John. CHRIST IN PERSPECTIVE - CHRISTOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES IN THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH.
Edinburgh: The Saint Andrew Press, 1978.
TILLICH, Hannah. FROM TIME TO TIME. London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., 1974.
TILLICH, Paul. 'Autobiographical Reflections.' In THE THEOLOGY
OF PAUL TILLICH, pp.3-21. Edited by Charles W.
Kegley and Robert W. Bretall. New York:
Macraillan, 1952.
. BIBLICAL RELIGION AND THE SEARCH FOR ULTIMATE
REALITY. London: James Nisbet, 1955.
. THE COURAGE TO BE. London: Collins, 1952;
Fount Paperbacks, 1977.
. THE DYNAMICS OF FAITH. London: George Allen
& Unwin Ltd., 1957.
. A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT FROM ITS JUDAIC
AND HELLENISTIC ORIGINS TO EXISTENTIALISM.
Edited by Carl E. Braaten. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1967.
. LOVE, POWER AND JUSTICE - ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSES
AND ETHICAL APPLICATIONS. London: Oxford
University Press, 1954.
. MYSTIK UND SCHULDBEWUSSTSEIN IN SCHELLINGS
PHILOSOPHISCHER ENTWICKLUNG. Gtltersloh:
Bertelsmann, 1912.
. ON THE BOUNDARY - AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.
Introduction by J. Heywood Thomas. London:
Collins, 1967.
. THE PROTESTANT ERA. Translated by James Luther
Adams. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1948.
. THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS. London:
~
SCM Press Ltd., 1949.
. THE SOCIALIST DECISION. Translated by Franklin
Sherman. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 3 Vols. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1951-1963.
381
. THEOLOGY OF CULTURE. Edited by Robert C. Kimball.
London: Oxford University Press, 1959.
TORRANCE, Thomas F. GOD AND RATIONALITY. London: Oxford University
Press, 1971.
. KARL BARTH - AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS EARLY
THEOLOGY, 1910-1931. London: SCM Press Ltd.,
1962.
. 'The Relation of the Incarnation to Space
In Nicene Theology.' In THE ECUMENICAL WORLD
OF ORTHODOX CIVILIZATION - Vol.III. Edited
by Andrew Blane. The Hague and Paris: Mouton,
1973.
. SPACE, TIME AND INCARNATION. London: Oxford
University Press, 1969.
. 'Universalism Or Election?' SCOTTISH JOURNAL
OF THEOLOGY 2 (1949): 310-318.
TUPPER, E. Frank THE THEOLOGY OF WOLFHART PANNENBERG. Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1973.
VAN BUREN, Paul M. THE SECULAR MEANING OF THE GOSPEL - BASED ON AN
ANALYSIS OF ITS LANGUAGE. London: SCM Press
Ltd., 1963.
von BALTHASAR, Hans Ur. THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH. Translated
by John Drury. New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1971.
von RAD, Gerhard. OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY.
by D. M. G. Stalker.
Oliver and Boyd, 1962
2 vols. Translated
Edinburgh and London:
WEIGEL, Gustave. 'The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich.'
In PAUL TILLICH IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT, pp.3-24.
Edited by Thomas A. O'Meara and Celestin D.
Weisser. London: Darton, Longman and Todd
Ltd., 1965.
WELCH. Claude. THE REALITY OF THE CHURCH. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.
WILLIAMS, Daniel Day. 'Response to Wolfhart Pannenberg.' In
HOPE AND THE FUTURE OF MAN, pp.83-88.
Edited by Ewart H. Cousins. London:
The Garnstone Press, 1973.
382
WILLIAMS, Ernest Swing. SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 3 vols. Springfield:




THEOLOGY IN CONFLICT. Translated by Eric H.
■Wahlstrom. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1958.
BONHOEFFER'S THEOLOGY - CLASSICAL AND
REVOLUTIONARY. Nashville & New York:
Abingdon Press, 1970.
THE QUESTION OF GOD - PROTESTANT THEOLOGY IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. Translated by
R. A. Wilson. London: Collins, 1969.
